Government Enforcement & Corporate Investigations

The House passed the Financial CHOICE Act on Thursday as part of the new administration’s bid to overhaul Dodd-Frank. It is not expected to get through the Senate in its current form, but it does provide an interesting read. While current disclosure requirements have become too lengthy and cumbersome in many respects, the proposed change to Say-on-Pay voting frequency requires a materiality determination that may prove difficult for companies to implement. Currently, public companies are required to provide their shareholders with an advisory vote on executive compensation no less than once every three years. Most companies hold the vote annually. The Financial CHOICE Act would modify this requirement so that the vote is held “[e]ach year in which there has been a material change to the compensation of executives of an issuer from the previous year.” So, each year the issuer would have to determine if there has been a material change to executive compensation when deciding what proposals are put before shareholders at the annual meeting. I expect many issuers would continue to hold an annual vote to seek feedback from their shareholders even if there was no material change in compensation. However, given the high profile nature of a negative say-on-pay result, would issuers shy away from the advisory vote in a year of poor company performance (absent an obviously material change to executive compensation)? Will an issuer’s determination not to include the advisory vote bring on another wave of proxy disclosure litigation? Could an issuer determine not to hold a say-on-pay vote for multiple years in a row? Fewer say-on-pay advisory votes may not be problematic for issuers with strong corporate governance and shareholder engagement. However, for other issuers, say-on-pay advisory votes provided shareholders with a powerful (albeit imprecise) means of communicating their displeasure to the Board of Directors.

As noted in the earlier post, the House passed the Financial CHOICE Act yesterday. While the headline-grabbing aspects of the Financial CHOICE Act relate to a repeal of the Volcker Rule and reducing the authority of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, there are some other interesting tidbits relating to public company disclosure, including two that would provide significant relief for smaller issuers. However, the Financial CHOICE Act is unlikely to be adopted by the Senate, which is expected to draft its own measure to modify the Dodd-Frank Act. Hopefully these provisions will be considered for the Senate's bill. Voluntary XBRL. Smaller issuers with total annual gross revenues of less than $250 million as well as emerging growth companies would be exempt from the requirement to use XBRL for their financial statements or other periodic reporting. They could, however, elect to use XBRL voluntarily. Expanded Exemption from Internal Control Attestation. Section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley requires an issuer to file an attestation report from its independent registered public accounting firm on the issuer’s internal control over financial reporting. The current requirement only applies to accelerated filers or large accelerated filers. The Financial CHOICE Act amends and expands the exemption to include any issuer that has total market capitalization of less than $500 million and any issuer that qualifies for the new low-revenue issuer exemption. The low-revenue issuer exemption is a temporary exemption which applies to an issuer that: ceased to be an emerging growth company on the last day of the fiscal year of the issuer following the fifth anniversary of the date of the first sale of common equity securities of the issuer pursuant to an effective registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933; had average annual gross revenues of less than $50 million as of its most recently completed fiscal year; and is not a large accelerated filer. These amendments are a dramatic expansion of the exemption and would provide significant relief to smaller issuers. They also stand in stark contrast to the position taken by the SEC back in 2011, when the SEC examined the impact of 404(b) on smaller issuers with a market capitalization between $75 and $250 million. Back in 2011, the SEC recommended against expanding the existing exemption.

Companies frequently wrestle with perks in their proxy executive compensation disclosure. Whether an item constitutes a perk often requires judgment based on the facts and circumstances,¹ and disclosure may elicit intense, public scrutiny over what amounts to a relatively small percentage of an executive’s total compensation package.² From time to time, the SEC issues a cautionary tale that perks need to be accounted for and reported with care. The SEC recently announced that Miles Nadal, the former CEO of marketing company MDC Partners, has agreed to pay $5.5 million to settle charges that his perks were not properly disclosed to shareholders. While MDC Partners disclosed certain perks received by Mr. Nadal, including an annual allowance of $500,000, it failed to disclose payments for personal use of private airplanes, charitable donations in Mr. Nadal’s name, yacht and sports car expenses, cosmetic surgery, and a wide range of other perks totaling an additional $11.285 million from 2009 through 2014. The SEC order notes that MDC Partners, which agreed to a $1.5 million settlement of the matter earlier this year, understated Mr. Nadal’s perks by an average of almost 300% each year. While MDC Partners’ example is an egregious one, companies should verify that they have implemented internal controls that are capturing the full range of perks and potential perks, particularly where there is temptation to omit or mischaracterize these items, and that they have implemented disclosure controls that ensure the accurate reporting of these items. 1  In its adopting release for the “Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure,” Release Nos. 33-8732A, 34-54302A, File No. S7-03-06 (Aug. 29, 2006), the SEC established a two-step analysis for whether an item constitutes a perk: An item is not a perquisite if it is “integrally and directly related” to the performance of the executive’s duties, even if there is an element of personal benefit, so no disclosure would be required. If an item is not integrally and directly related to the performance of the executive’s duties, and it confers a direct or indirect benefit that has a personal aspect, then the item is a perquisite, unless it is generally available on a non-discriminatory basis to all employees. It does not matter whether the item may be provided for some business reason or for the convenience of the company. 2  Under Item 402(c)(2)(ix) of Regulation S-K, perquisites or other personal benefits paid to the named executive officers in the proxy statement must be disclosed in the summary compensation table, unless their total value is less than $10,000. Each perquisite or personal benefit must be identified by type, and each one that exceeds the greater of $25,000 or 10% of the total amount of perquisites and personal benefits must be quantified and disclosed in a footnote. Perquisites and other personal benefits are to be valued based on their aggregate incremental cost to the company.  

While passage in the House seems likely, the Financial Choice Act may undergo significant changes before it may pass in the Senate. Here is a summary of certain governance and executive compensation provisions that are included in the discussion draft: Prohibit Universal Proxy Ballots. Currently, companies are not required to use a universal proxy ballot in the event of a proxy contest, so shareholders receive one ballot listing candidates nominated by the board of directors and separate ballot(s) listing candidates nominated by the shareholder proponents. The Financial CHOICE Act would prohibit the SEC from requiring that companies use a universal proxy ballot. Modernize Shareholder Proposal Thresholds. The Financial CHOICE Act would increase share ownership thresholds for submitting shareholder proposals, from ownership of 1% of outstanding shares or $2,000 for one year, to 1% of outstanding shares for three years; increase resubmission thresholds; and prohibit proposals by a proxy other than the shareholders. Amend Frequency of Say-on-Pay Votes. Currently, under the Dodd-Frank Act, non-binding shareholder votes approving executive compensation must occur at least once every three years. The Financial CHOICE Act would amend the frequency to “each year in which there has been a material change to the compensation..." Require proxy advisory firms to register with the SEC and to provide companies with an opportunity to review and provide meaningful comment on draft recommendations. The registration application would include a certification that the firm has the financial and managerial resources to consistently provide proxy advice based on accurate information. The firm would be required to disclose the procedures and methodologies used in developing proxy voting recommendations, its organizational structure, whether or not it has a code of ethics, any potential or actual conflict of interest, and its policies and procedures to manage conflicts of interest. The registration would be updated as there are material changes, and at least on an annual basis. Repeal CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure. The Financial CHOICE Act would repeal the section of the Dodd-Frank Act which requires companies to disclose the ratio of pay between CEOs and the median employees. Acting SEC Chairman Michael S. Piwowar’s has requested an expedited review of unanticipated challenges to implementing the CEO pay ratio disclosure rule. Repeal Incentive-Based Compensation Disclosure by Covered Financial Institutions. The Financial CHOICE Act would repeal the Dodd-Frank provision which requires enhanced disclosure and reporting of incentive-based compensation by covered financial institutions. This Dodd-Frank Act provision targets excessive compensation and compensation that could lead to material financial loss. More broadly, President Trump has issued an executive order mandating that the Department of the Treasury review financial regulations, including the Dodd-Frank Act. Repeal Disclosure of Hedging Policies. The Financial CHOICE Act would repeal the Dodd-Frank requirement that companies disclose whether employees or directors may engage in hedging transactions in the company’s equity securities. Limit Clawbacks. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, companies that haven’t developed and implemented compensation clawback polices cannot be listed on national securities exchanges and associations. The Financial CHOICE Act would limit the scope of the clawback rule to current and former executives who had “control or authority over the financial reporting that resulted in the accounting restatement.” Pay vs. Performance Disclosure. The future of the pay versus performance provision is uncertain because it isn’t addressed by the Financial CHOICE Act or Hensarling’s memo. Section 953(a) of Dodd-Frank requires companies to disclose the relationship between executive compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the company.

Companies that permit the grant of early exercise incentive stock options (“ISOs”) do so primarily to limit the impact of the alternative minimum tax (“AMT”). However, due to fairly counterintuitive tax regulations, structuring options in this fashion can expose optionees to negative tax consequences in the event of a disqualifying disposition. Read more about the tax effects of early exercise ISOs and how the tax results compare to alternate structures in our recent eUpdate here: www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2017/04/unexpected-risks-of-early-exercise-isos

On April 10, 2017, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement brought enforcement actions against 27 individuals and entities behind various alleged stock promotion schemes. These actions arose when public companies, through promoters or communications firms, hired newsletter writers to generate publicity for their securities without publicly disclosing that the writers were being paid. While it is not illegal to hire newsletter writers, Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) requires that newsletter writers fully disclose both the amount and the nature of the compensation received, including the dollar amount of a cash payment, the number of shares issued, or any other compensation. Additionally, newsletter writers and persons who adopt, approve or authorize the content of a publication may be liable for untrue statements of material facts or omissions for misleading investors. The Internet provides a ready means for fraudulent promotion of securities though social media, newsletters, chat rooms, emails, online blogs, press releases, and other media. The SEC’s Division of Enforcement is focusing attention on companies using stock promotion schemes that lead investors to believe that they were reading independent, unbiased analyses in newsletters, social media, stock forums, or other media when writers are secretly compensated for promoting a company’s securities. The SEC can bring charges against companies and promoters for these types of violations under various provisions of the Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), including: Securities Act Section 17(a)/ Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: For, directly or indirectly, using interstate commerce to offer or sale any securities by: - employing any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; or - obtaining money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or - engaging in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. Section 17(b) of the Securities Act: For, directly or indirectly, using interstate commerce to publish, give publicity to, or circulate any notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper, article, letter, investment service, or communication which, though not purporting to offer a security for sale, describes such security for a consideration received or to be received, directly or indirectly, from an issuer, underwriter, or dealer, without fully disclosing the receipt, whether past or prospective, of such consideration and the amount thereof. Exchange Act Section 20(b):  For aiding and abetting violations of Section 17(a) and Section 17(b) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. In addition, violations of securities laws may result in criminal prosecution. Allegations of securities law violations or association with firms that are charged with securities law violations may cause liability and embarrassment to a company and its officers, directors and employees. These violations may result in penalties, fines, imprisonment, or sanctions, including barring persons from serving as an officer or director of a public company or participating in certain securities offerings. Companies may be ultimately responsible for the investor relations work performed by investor relations, communication, social media, marketing, and other firms. Companies can take steps to avoid securities law violations by: Completing due diligence and selecting only reputable investor relations, communication, social media, marketing, and other firms to engage in investor relations activities. Limiting the use of paid newsletter writers and making sure that any compensation paid is properly disclosed. Adopting public communications policies that require authorization of company communications prior to dissemination. Carefully reviewing all materials for accuracy to ensure that the disclosure does not contain untrue statements of a material fact or omissions. Making sure that all content is consistent with the company’s public disclosures filed with regulatory agencies. Including forward looking statement and other disclaimers in all materials that are promotional in nature. Involving legal counsel, auditors and other professionals in the review of investor relations materials.

Beginning April 2017, companies with 250 or more employees in England, Wales and Scotland on April 5th should be aware of a requirement to begin publishing annually on their own website and on a government website the following four figures: Gender pay gap (mean and median averages) Gender bonus gap (mean and median averages) Proportion of men and women receiving bonuses Proportion of men and women in each quartile of the organization’s pay structure Please note that the term “employee” is very broadly defined for this reporting purpose.  For guidance on managing the calculation and reporting requirements, the Government Equalities Office and Acas prepared guidance available here: http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=5768

On March 31, 2017, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued final rules regarding inflation adjustments and other technical amendments under Title I and III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. Under the inflation adjustments, the SEC adjusted the gross revenue threshold for an issuer to lose its status as an Emerging Growth Company (EGC) from $1.0 billion to $1.07 billion, a $70 million dollar increase. Further, the SEC adjusted the Regulation Crowdfunding thresholds, increasing among other thresholds the maximum amount an issuer can raise under Regulation Crowdfunding from $1 million to $1.07 million. In relation to the various exemptions and scaled disclosure permitted to EGCs under the JOBS Act, the SEC also adopted technical amendments to certain rules and to certain forms, adding check boxes to the cover pages for companies to indicate if they are an EGC and whether they have elected not to use the extended transition period for complying with any new or revised financial accounting standards provided pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). Forms and rules amended include Forms C, S-1, S-3, S-4, S-8, S-11, F-1, F-3 and F-4 under the Securities Act of 1933; Rule 12b-2, Rule 14a-21 and Forms 10, 8-K, 10-Q, 10-K, 20-F and 40-F under the Exchange Act; Rule 2-02 and Rule 3-02 of Regulation S-X; Rule 100 and Rule 201 of Regulation Crowdfunding; and Items 301, 303, 308, 402 and 1101 of Regulation S-K to reflect these reporting accommodations. The new rules and changes in the forms will take effect upon publication in the Federal Register, which is currently scheduled to take place on April 12, 2017. Issuers should take note of these changes in the form cover pages in preparing their next periodic reports to the SEC.

The staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) continues to encourage companies to provide useful disclosure to investors with regard to the new revenue recognition standard that will apply for reporting periods beginning after December 15, 2017. The new standard not only changes the method for measuring revenue and the timing of revenue recognition, but also requires expanded disclosures to enable users of financial statements to understand the nature, amount, timing, and uncertainty of revenue and cash flows arising from contracts with customers. This will mean considerably more disclosures in the first quarter of 2018, or sooner for companies that choose to adopt early. Of more immediate concern, companies should be reviewing their Form 10-Q disclosures this quarter and for the balance of the year to make sure that they have addressed the SEC staff’s transitional disclosure requirements set forth in Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 74 regarding the expected impact of the new revenue recognition rules. If a company does not know, or cannot reasonably estimate, the expected financial statement impact of the new rules, that fact should be disclosed. In that case, however, as noted in a recent speech by the SEC’s Chief Accountant, Wesley Bricker, the SEC staff expects a qualitative description of the effect of the new accounting standard, and a comparison to the company’s current accounting, to aid investors in understanding the anticipated impact. Mr. Bricker said that companies “should also disclose the status of its implementation process and significant implementation matters yet to be addressed.” Based on a preliminary look at disclosures in SEC filings to date, Mr. Bricker reported that a number of companies have enhanced their transition disclosures, while for others “there is still more work to do.” Mr. Bricker also advised caution for companies that conclude in their transitional disclosures that the impact of the new revenue recognition standard is not expected to be material. Because the new standard includes comprehensive new disclosures about contracts with customers and related judgments made by companies, he warned that “the basis of any statement that the impact of the new standard is immaterial should reflect consideration of the full scope of the new standard, which covers recognition, measurement, presentation and disclosure for revenue transactions.”

We get asked from time-to-time whether it is advisable for issuers to pay fees to unregistered “finders” for introducing potential investors in the United States to the issuer in connection with securities offerings. The short answer is “no.” Most finders are engaged by issuers under finder’s, advisory, or other arrangements, which typically require payment of “success fees” upon completion of a financing transaction. While these arrangements are sometimes structured to try to hide or disguise the true intent of the arrangement, payment of transaction-based compensation is treated by U.S. securities regulators as a nearly-conclusive indication that a person is engaged in the securities business and should be registered as a broker-dealer. The relevant U.S. federal broker-dealer laws that should be of concern to an issuer using an unregistered finder include: Section 15(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), which makes it unlawful for a person to “effect a transaction in securities” or “attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security” unless they are registered as a broker or dealer under the rules and regulations of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA). FINRA is the regulatory organization designated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to license and regulate broker-dealers. Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act, which provides that every contract made in violation of any provision of the broker-dealer registration requirements “shall be void” as to rights of persons who made or engaged in the performance of such contract. It results in the underlying purchase of securities becoming a voidable transaction that gives the investor a right of rescission, effectively granting a put right to the investor or purchaser. Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, under which the SEC may impose aiding-and-abetting liability on any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance in a violation of the Exchange Act. The theory behind broker-dealer registration is to provide a gatekeeper to protect investors in the marketplace. FINRA members are required to “observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade” in the conduct of its business, including determining if an investment is "suitable" for its customer. Finders assisting in transactions rarely make such determinations and view themselves simply as middlemen in making introductions to potential investors. Because unregistered broker-dealers may not adhere to these high commercial standards, the SEC broadly construes the broker-dealer laws and narrowly construes the few permitted exceptions. Under SEC guidance derived from no-action letters, the SEC requires all intermediaries effecting transactions in securities to be licensed, subject to a few limited exceptions. Effecting a securities transaction may include, among other factors, receiving transaction-based compensation, recommending a company or the purchase of its securities, negotiating terms of a securities offering or purchase, attending meetings or presentations where the merits of the investment are discussed, performing or accommodating due diligence efforts, providing valuations or estimates of value, and other activities that facilitate a securities transaction. The consequences of engaging an unlicensed finder can be troublesome: Finder Risks:  Any unlicensed person engaging in activities designed to effect a transaction in securities may violate broker-dealer laws. The SEC or state securities regulators may seek to enjoin the unlawful activities or seek monetary penalties or criminal sanctions. Issuer Risks:  Retaining and permitting an unlicensed intermediary to effect a securities transaction may be a violation of federal and many state laws, and may subject the issuer to possible civil and criminal penalties. Any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance in a violation of the Exchange Act may be subject to aiding-and-abetting liability. Rescission Risks:  A violation of broker-dealer laws creates a right of rescission under federal and/or state securities law. The SEC or state securities regulators may require the issuer to offer investors rescission rights, and the issuer may be required to return the investment. State Securities Violations:  Many states have begun reviewing state notice filings on Form D (which report transactions exempt from registration under Regulation D) and actively monitoring finder’s fees paid in connection with securities transactions. Some states have required issuers to provide additional information related to unlicensed broker-dealers and, in some cases, to certify that finder’s fees or commissions have only been paid in compliance with broker-dealer laws. Accounting Liability Risk:  Auditors may raise accounting issues resulting from paying finder’s fees to unregistered broker-dealers and may require an issuer to account for potential liability arising from rescission rights. Bad Actor Consequences:  An issuer or finder that is convicted of any felony or misdemeanor, is subject to any order, judgment, or decree of any court, or is subject to any order of certain regulators may be ineligible to participate in certain types of securities offerings, including Rule 506 of Regulation D offerings and Regulation A offerings. Using an unlicensed finder can result in broker-dealer law violations. Many times the issue arises in the context of state notice filings and direct inquiries from state securities regulators where finder’s fees or commissions are paid in connection with an offering. Other times, they arise from a failed investment where the investor may assert claims related to broker-dealer law violations to establish a right of rescission. Issuers should use caution in determining whether to engage a finder to assist in financing transactions.

On March 22, 2017, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted an amendment to Rule 15c6-1(a) to shorten by one business day the standard settlement cycle for most broker-dealer securities transactions.  Currently, the standard settlement cycle for these transactions is three business days, known as T+3.  The amended rule shortens the settlement cycle to two business days, T+2. The amended rule will take effect on September 5, 2017. The SEC stated that the amended rule is “designed to enhance efficiency, reduce risk, and ensure a coordinated and expeditious transition by market participants to a shortened standard settlement cycle.” To assist in the preparation for the implementation of the new, shortened settlement cycle, the SEC has established an e-mail address – T2settlement@sec.gov – for the submission of inquiries to SEC staff.  Issuers will want to consider and be prepared for the impact of the shortened settlement cycle in relation to closing and settlement of public securities offerings.

On March 9, 2017, the Senate Banking Committee passed a series of four bills focused on deregulation, including one that would make it easier for privately held companies to issue stock awards through equity compensation plans. Each of the bills was a bipartisan effort. One bill eases certain restrictions on reporting on exchange traded funds (ETFs). The bill would address securities laws and regulations that discourage broker-dealers from publishing research on ETFs by directing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to provide a safe harbor for research reports that cover ETFs. The second bill proposes to ease reporting thresholds for privately held corporations when issuing stock awards. Currently, under Item 701 under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, if the sales price or amount of securities sold in any 12-month period under a private company’s equity compensation plans exceeds $5 million, then the company must provide certain information to the holders of the equity compensation securities, which many companies consider onerous and inappropriate for a privately held corporation. The bill would increase that threshold to $10 million and have it adjusted for inflation. A third bill would raise to 250 from 100 the number of investors venture capital funds can acquire before triggering SEC registration requirements under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended. The final bill would credit stock exchanges for any fees they have overpaid the SEC. The bills have been reported to the Senate, placed on the Senate legislative calendar and are awaiting further action by the Senate. Companion bills in the House are moving through the House Finance Committee.

On March 1, 2017, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) published the taxonomy for the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) for financial statements prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IFRS). Accordingly, foreign private issuers that prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS may immediately begin submitting their financial statements in SEC filings in the XBRL format. While Rule 405 of Regulation S-T would require foreign private issuers that prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS to submit financial data in XBRL upon publication of the taxonomy, the SEC has stated that such foreign private issuers are only required to submit financial data in XBRL with their first annual report on Form 20-F or 40-F for a fiscal period ending on or after December 15, 2017. Therefore, foreign private issuers who prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS are not required to submit XBRL data for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016. The full text of the SEC’s release can be found at the following link: https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2017/33-10320.pdf See our previous postings on the topic here: SEC delays XBRL compliance for foreign private issuers that prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS SEC Mandates Use of XBRL for Financial Statements

We reported in September 2016 on proposed Securities and Exchange Commission rules requiring the use of hyperlinks to exhibits in most registration statements and periodic and current reports. On March 1, 2017, the SEC adopted final rules, largely in line with the proposed rules, amending Item 601 of Regulation S-K and Rules 102 and 105 of Regulation S-T. Read more in our eUpdate here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2017/03/sec-adopts-use-of-exhibit-hyperlinks-in-filings

In a recent case, Wadler v. Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. case number 3:15-cv-02356 (2016), the federal court in the Northern District of California ruled that the plaintiff and former general counsel of Bio-Rad Laboratories could use attorney-client privileged information to support his claim of whistleblower retaliation. The court determined that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s whistleblower protections preempt the state ethical rules against disclosure of attorney-client privileged information. In reaching its determination, the court noted that this ruling reflects “a reasonable balancing of conflicting policies to the extent that it protects attorney whistleblowers from retaliation even as it requires them to report violations.” The jury awarded the plaintiff $8 million, including $5 million in punitive damages, finding that the plaintiff’s report of suspected payments in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was a substantial motivating factor in Bio-Rad’s decision to terminate him in 2013 after serving as Bio-Rad’s general counsel for nearly 25 years. The SEC filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff’s claim, arguing that the federal whistleblower scheme would be “seriously undermined” if attorney-client privilege prevents attorney-whistleblowers from using their reports of potential violations as evidence in anti-retaliation litigation. The Wadler decision may signal a shift in judicial attitude toward the protections afforded in-house attorneys who act as whistleblowers. Previously, courts have not permitted attorney whistleblowers to use attorney-client privileged materials in litigation against their former employers. For example, in 2013, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a former general counsel violated New York Rules of Professional Conduct when he used attorney-client privileged materials as evidence in a whistleblower retaliation suit (United States ex rel. Fair Laboratory Practices Associates v. Quest Diagnostics Inc.). The SEC has indicated a willingness to consider the extent of retaliation that a whistleblower suffers when determining the amount of the whistleblower award. In 2015, the SEC announced a maximum whistleblower award payment of 30% of the amounts collected in connection with In the Matter of Paradigm Capital Management, Inc. and Candace King Weir, File No. 3-15930 (June 16, 2014) because the whistleblower was retaliated against as a result of reporting to the SEC. If other courts follow the precedent established in Wadler, employees in general, and in-house attorneys in particular, may find it easier to support claims of whistleblower retaliation.

On February 14, 2017, President Trump approved a joint resolution of Congress that disapproves the SEC’s rule requiring specific disclosures by resource extraction issuers, effectively repealing the rule. The rules required resource extraction issuers to disclose payments made to the U.S. federal government or foreign governments, including foreign subnational governments, for the commercial development of oil, natural gas or minerals. Compliance under the rules for resource extraction issuers would have begun for fiscal years ending on or after September 30, 2018. The quick death of these rules are somewhat ironic given the time and energy taken to adopt them in the first place. Consider the timeline: 2010 - Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act enacted, which mandated the implementation of the resource extraction rules 2012 - First set of rules adopted 2013 - Rules vacated by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 2015 - After Oxfam America Inc. brought suit in an effort to expedite the long-delayed rules, a federal judge held that the SEC had “unlawfully withheld” agency action by failing to promulgate final rules on this topic 2015 - SEC re-proposes rules 2016 - SEC adopts final rules 2017 - Rules disapproved under the Congressional Review Act While the mandate to implement these rules still exists under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the Congressional Review Act bars the enactment of a new rule that is substantially in the same form as the repealed rule. These rules, like the conflict minerals rules, attempted to further social policy through public company disclosure requirements. The aim here was to promote and support “global efforts to improve transparency in the extractive industries . . . to help combat global corruption and empower citizens of resource-rich countries to hold their governments accountable for the wealth generated by those resources.” While the goal is a worthy one, it was unclear whether the disclosure required by these rules would effectively and efficiently advance that goal. Congress and the White House were concerned with the regulatory burden and competitive disadvantage that these rules imposed. The White House’s Statement of Administration Policy noted that the “rule would impose unreasonable compliance costs on American energy companies” and could put American resource extraction issuers at a “competitive disadvantage in cases where their foreign competitors are not subject to similar rules.” Reducing the regulatory burden on public companies is both useful and necessary. However, there is one unfortunate aspect of this repeal. The rules provided for alternative reporting, so that issuers could comply with SEC disclosure obligations with a report complying with the requirements of an alternative reporting regime, such as Canada’s Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act and the EU Accounting Directive and the EU Transparency Directive. For companies with operations in multiple jurisdictions, the recognition of an alternative reporting regime was a welcome attempt to address concerns of duplicative reporting requirements and implement mandated rules in a more efficient and cost-effective way for many issuers. This allowance was similar in concept to the Canadian Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System (the MJDS), a widely used alternative reporting regime for certain types of Canadian issuers. Successful implementation and use under an alternative reporting regime under the repealed rules by a wide variety of resource extraction issuers might have nudged the SEC to consider broader use of alternative reporting systems. On the whole, the repeal of resource extraction issuers is a positive development. Now if we could just eliminate the conflict minerals disclosure rules and the CEO pay ratio rules...

On January 6, 2017, the SEC Staff granted no-action relief that would allow companies to exclude shareholder proposals preventing management or the board from accessing preliminary voting results on uncontested matters prior to the annual meeting, including a running tally of votes for and against, and using that information to solicit votes. See, The Boeing Company, Ferro Corporation, Honeywell International Inc., L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc., NiSource Inc., and Praxair, Inc. Under the shareholder proposals, this enhanced confidential voting requirement would apply to management or board-sponsored resolutions seeking approval of executive pay or for other purposes, including votes mandated under applicable stock exchange rules; proposals required by law, or the company’s bylaws, such as say-on-pay votes; and Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals included in the proxy. The proposals would not apply to director elections, or contested proxy solicitations, except at the board’s discretion, and they would not prevent companies from monitoring voting for purposes of achieving a quorum.  In its no-action letters, the companies cited a history of relief granted for shareholder proposals that seek to restrict management’s access to preliminary voting results, to manage the conduct of annual shareholder meetings, and to restrict a company’s solicitation of its shareholders. The Staff concluded that the companies may rely on the “ordinary business” basis for exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), and noted that each proposal “relates to the monitoring of preliminary voting results with respect to matters that may relate to [the company’s] ordinary business.”  The Staff does not conclude that the monitoring of preliminary voting results and the solicitation of votes per se are part of ordinary business operations, which leaves open the question of whether the proposals would survive if they were limited to matters that the Staff deems unrelated to the company’s ordinary business.  This series of no-action letters represents the latest volley in the debate over the disparity between boards and management versus shareholder proponents, in terms of their ability to access voting information and to communicate with shareholders on proposals. As described in the 1998 amendments to Rule 14a-8, the underlying policy of the “ordinary business” basis for exclusion is “to confine the resolution of ordinary business problems to management and board of directors, since it is impracticable for shareholders to decide how to solve such problems at an annual shareholders meeting.” There are two frequently cited considerations for evaluating whether an activity is within the ken of “ordinary business”: (1) whether the tasks are “so fundamental to management’s ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis that they could not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct shareholder oversight,” and (2) whether the proposals seek to “micro-manage” the company by “probing too deeply into matters of a complex nature upon which shareholders, as a group, would not be in a position to make an informed judgment.”

For public companies whose fiscal year is the calendar year, the 10-K season is quickly approaching. One technical change to Form 10-K this year is the addition of new Item 16 (Form 10-K Summary). As you may recall, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act, more commonly known as the FAST Act, which became law in December 2015, was primarily a transportation bill, but also contained a number of changes to the federal securities laws. One of the FAST Act’s securities law provisions instructed the SEC to issue regulations, within 180 days of the FAST Act’s enactment, that would permit issuers to submit a summary page on Form 10-K, but only if each item on that summary page included a cross-reference (by electronic link or otherwise) to the material contained in the Form 10-K to which that item related. Accordingly, in June 2016, the SEC adopted an interim final rule that expressly allowed issuers to include, at their option, a summary page in their Form 10-Ks. As noted in the SEC’s adopting release, prior to the enactment of the FAST Act, nothing prohibited issuers from voluntarily including a summary page in their Form 10-Ks. And, because both the FAST Act and the interim final rule required that any summary page included in a Form 10-K meet certain specified requirements, an issuer actually had more flexibility regarding the content of any summary page it chose to include in its Form 10-K prior to the SEC’s adoption of the interim final rule. In any event, historically, most issuers have not included a summary page in their Form 10-Ks, and we do not expect this to change in the near term. However, as a technical matter, when issuers file their Form 10-Ks this year, they should remember to include new Item 16 (Form 10-K Summary) at the end of Part IV. Most of the issuers that have thus far included new Item 16 in their Form 10-K filings, but that have not included a summary page, have inserted “none” for this item.

2016 was a busy year for securities law developments, with the SEC adopting and proposing new rules and issuing significant interpretations that will affect SEC reporting companies in the coming years. We have highlighted a few of these recent developments in this post as companies prepare for the upcoming reporting cycle. With the new incoming U.S. administration it is important to note that some of the rules that were adopted by the SEC in the past few years may be repealed or amended, and some of the rules that are currently being finalized by the SEC may not be adopted or may be further modified or delayed. New Rules and Interpretations Proxy Cards – “Clear and Impartial” On March 22, 2016, the SEC released a proxy card interpretation, which serves as a reminder that proxy cards must “clearly and impartially” identify each item to be voted on by shareholders. The full text of the SEC’s interpretation can be found here: https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/exchange-act-rule-14a-4a3-301.htm Paper Copies of Annual Reports On November 3, 2016, the SEC released an interpretation which stated that companies may post an electronic version of its annual report to shareholders on its corporate web site by the dates specified in Rule 14a-3(c), Rule 14c-3(b) and Form 10-K, respectively, in lieu of mailing paper copies or submitting it on EDGAR. The report must remain accessible for at least one year after posting. See our previous post on this topic here: http://governancecomplianceinsider.com/sec-staff-makes-life-a-little-easier-for-reporting-companies-by-permitting-annual-reports-to-shareholders-to-be-posted-on-company-websites/ NASDAQ Golden Leash On July 1, 2016, the SEC approved a change to the NASDAQ Listing Rules that will require NASDAQ listed companies to publicly disclose “golden leash” arrangements. “Golden leash” arrangements are generally defined as agreements or arrangements made by activist shareholders to pay a director or director nominee in connection with his or her service on, or candidacy for, a company’s board of directors, usually in connection with a proxy fight. The final rules for “Golden Leash Arrangements” are described further in our complete summary here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/07/disclosure-of-golden-leash-arrangements Form 10-K Summary Disclosure On June 1, 2016, in accordance with the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (the “FAST Act”), the SEC issued an interim final rule amending Form 10-K by adding a new Item 16 to permit companies to provide certain summary disclosure in the annual report, provided that each item in the summary includes a cross-reference by hyperlink to the related more detailed disclosure in the report to which the item relates. The new summary section is not required and the SEC has provided issuers with flexibility on how best to prepare the summary. The full text of the SEC’s interim final rule can be found at the following link: https://www.sec.gov/rules/interim/2016/34-77969.pdf The FAST Act is further described in our summary here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2015/12/fast-act-company-disclosure-capital-markets-access Non-GAAP financial measures On May 17, 2016, the SEC issued new interpretations regarding the use of non-GAAP financial information by public companies. The new interpretations provide specific guidance for certain types of non-GAAP financial information including providing examples on how to describe GAAP measures with equal or greater prominence and how to avoid making non-GAAP measures misleading. See our summary here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/05/tighten-use-of-non-gaap-financial-measures Pay Ratio Disclosure Most public companies will be required to make the pay ratio disclosure following their first full fiscal year beginning on or after January 1, 2017. For a typical, calendar-year reporting company, the first pay ratio disclosure would be made in its proxy statement for its 2018 annual meeting. The SEC released an interpretation on October 19, 2016 to provide additional guidance on the upcoming disclosure requirements. For a summary of the interpretations see our discussion here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/10/new-cdis-help-issuers For a discussion of the final rules see our summary here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2015/08/sec-issues-final-rule-for-pay-ratio-disclosure Disclosure of Government Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers On June 27, 2016, the SEC adopted rules requiring disclosure of government payments by resource extraction issuers.  The rules will require resource extraction issuers to disclose payments made to the U.S. federal government or foreign governments, including foreign subnational governments, for the commercial development of oil, natural gas or minerals. Resource extraction issuers are required to comply with the new rules starting with their fiscal year ending no earlier than September 30, 2018.  A resource extraction issuer with a December 31 fiscal year end will be required to file its first resource extraction payment report no later than 150 days after December 31, 2018, which is May 30, 2019. The full text of the final rules are found here: https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78167.pdf Proposed Rules Mining Disclosure Rules The SEC proposed new rules relating to disclosure by companies engaged in material mining operations in SEC reports. The proposed rules were subject to a comment period that was extended to September 26, 2016. The SEC is in process of reviewing the comments and we anticipate that new proposed rules or final rules will be released in 2017. The proposed rules are summarized here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/07/new-mining-disclosure-rules Clawback Policies On July 1, 2015, the SEC proposed rules regarding clawback policies and disclosure, requiring the recovery of incentive-based compensation of officers in cases of material non-compliance with accounting reporting requirements. The SEC received comments on the proposed rules and the SEC is in the process of drafting new rules. We anticipate that new rules will be adopted in 2017. The proposed rules are summarized here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2015/07/sec-issues-proposed-rules-for-clawback-policies Proxy Cards – Universal Ballots On October 26, 2016, the SEC proposed the mandated use of universal ballots in contested director elections at annual meetings. A universal ballot or proxy card is a single proxy card that includes the names of both management and dissident nominees. The universal ballot would allow shareholders to vote for any combination of director nominees using one proxy card. The proposed rules are summarized here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/10/sec-proposes-universal-ballots

Last Friday, ISS released new and updated FAQS on U.S. Equity Compensation Plans, as summarized below. These FAQs provide new and updated guidance on ISS’s evaluation of equity compensation plan proposals, including treatment of performance-based awards in burn rate calculations, bundling of plan amendment proposals, updates to ISS’s Equity Plan Scorecard (EPSC) policies, and the EPSC as it applies to newly public companies. Since 2015, ISS has evaluated proposals for equity compensation plans and certain amendments to these plans using the EPSC. The ESPC analysis is based on three pillars: Plan cost ("shareholder value transfer" or SVT), relative to the company's market and industry peers, Plan features, and The company's historical grant practices, including its 3-year average burn rate relative to market and industry peers. ISS scores proposals according to factors under each of these three pillars, using its proprietary model. Proposals may receive a maximum of 100 total points, with a threshold of 53 points required to receive a favorable recommendation (absent egregious factors). Summary of New and Updated FAQs 19. If a company grants performance-based awards, how will the shares be accounted for the purposes of calculating burn rate? Both time- and performance-based awards will be counted in the year in which they are granted for the burn rate calculation, but performance-based awards will be counted in the year in which they are earned if the company provides a table of awards granted and earned each year for the past three years, either in the 10-K or proxy statement. There’s a sample table in the FAQ. The aggregate of performance-based awards from all plans to all participants must be disclosed, and not just awards for NEOs. For performance awards that are subject to additional time vesting, the shares generally will be counted at the end of the time-vesting period if the number is disclosed. ISS advises companies to continue to make the additional disclosure, so that ISS may capture performance awards going forward and to provide a clear view of the year-to-year status of the performance award program. 28. How does ISS evaluate an equity plan proposal seeking approval of one or more plan amendments? If the proposed amendments do not request additional shares (or other modifications deemed to potentially increase cost), ISS will make a recommendation based on an analysis of whether the amendments are deemed to be “overall beneficial or contrary to shareholders’ interests.” If the proposed amendment is bundled with a material new share request (or are deemed to potentially increase cost), or this is the first time shareholders may vote on the plan, then ISS generally will support the amendments if there is a passing EPSC score, unless the amendments represent a “substantial diminishment to shareholders’ interests.” ISS will generally support proposals seeking approval of performance measures for Section 162(m) tax deductibility purposes, unless they are bundled with other plan amendments. For ISS’s treatment of bundled amendments, see FAQ #30. 30. How are proposals that include 162(m) reapproval along with plan amendments evaluated? ISS encourages companies to unbundle plan amendments from proposals seeking 162(m) reapproval, since the latter are generally supported by ISS (see FAQ #28). ISS will analyze bundled amendments to determine whether they are, on balance, positive or negative with respect to shareholders' interests. ISS may consider both an EPSC score and/or the balance of positive and negative impacts from the bundled amendments. 32. How does ISS view a plan amendment to increase the tax withholding rate applicable upon award settlement? This type of amendment is generally viewed as an administrative change neutral to shareholders' interests. However, if the plan contains a liberal share recycling feature (such as recycling of shares tendered as payment for an option exercise, shares withheld to cover taxes, shares added back that have been repurchased using stock option exercise proceeds, and stock-settled awards where only the actual shares delivered are counted against the plan reserve), then a company can mitigate ISS’s concern by providing that only the number of shares withheld at the minimum statutory rate may be recycled, even if the tax withholding is at a higher rate. See also, Nasdaq Doesn’t Require Shareholder Approval of Equity Compensation Plan Amendments to Increase Tax Withholding. 36. What changes were made to the EPSC policy for 2017? Effective for meetings as of Feb. 1, 2017, the following adjustments will apply to EPSC evaluations: Payment of dividends on unvested awards (new factor): Full points will be earned if the equity plan expressly prohibits, for all award types, the payment of dividends before the vesting of the underlying award. Accrual of dividends that are only payable upon vesting is allowed. No points will be earned if this prohibition is absent or incomplete (i.e. not applicable to all award types). Minimum vesting terms (updated factor – see also, FAQ #47): Full points are awarded only if the equity plan specifies a minimum vesting period of one year for all equity awards. Also, no points will be earned if the plan allows for the administrator to reduce or eliminate the one-year vesting requirement. Companies are permitted to carve out 5% of equity awards granted under the plan, which do not have to be subject to the minimum vesting requirement. Burn rate data: For companies with between 33 and 36 months of trading history at the applicable quarterly data download date, the EPSC model index will be based on whether the company has disclosed three years of burn rate data. Special Cases models apply for companies with 32 or fewer months of trading history. Factor scoring adjustment (see also, FAQ #42 and 43): Scoring for certain EPSC factors has been adjusted, though ISS does not provide specifics under its proprietary model. 41. How will equity plan proposals at newly public companies be evaluated? Newly public companies, including recent IPOs, spinoffs, and bankruptcy-emergent companies, may be evaluated under an EPSC model that includes fewer factors. In addition to these FAQS, ISS also released new and updated FAQs on U.S. Executive Compensation Policies and updated Pay-for-Performance Mechanics (which details ISS’s new Relative Pay and Financial Performance Assessment).

The SEC recently issued a no-action letter to Morgan Stanley that will streamline the process for its wealth management clients to participate in IPOs. The SEC said it would not object to Morgan Stanley’s proposed use of conditional offers to buy shares (“COBs”) prior to the effectiveness of IPO registration statements under specific conditions. The no-action request and the SEC’s letter confirm that COBs, if properly implemented, may be used in registered offerings, and when read together, outline detailed procedures to follow in order to use COBs. Read more in our eUpdate here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/12/sec-endorses-use-of-conditional-offers

As the 2017 proxy season begins to unfold, proxy access continues to be a focus of shareholder proposals. Last year, companies that had already adopted mainstream proxy access bylaws, or that were planning to put mainstream proxy access bylaws up for a shareholder vote, were largely successful in being able to exclude shareholder proposals to adopt proxy access bylaws on the grounds that such proposals had already been “substantially implemented.” This year, companies have received a wave of new shareholder proposals seeking to amend their existing proxy access bylaws. Until recently, the SEC staff had generally denied requests to exclude such proposals. In two recent no-action letters, however, the staff has provided relief where the company adopted several of the requested amendments. In addition, for the first time in the United States, a shareholder attempted to use a proxy access bylaw to nominate a director candidate and to have that candidate included in the company’s proxy statement. Read more about these recent developments in our full summary here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/12/recent-developments-in-proxy-access

On November 18, 2016, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance issued a set of compliance and disclosure interpretations (“C&DIs”) pertaining to abbreviated debt tender offers, which were the subject of an SEC no-action letter in early 2015. The new C&DIs offer important clarifications regarding abbreviated debt tender offers and the previous no-action letter guidance. Read more in our full summary here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/11/guidance-provided-by-sec

Over the last few months, the SEC has obtained a string of cease and desist orders against SEC reporting companies, both domestic and foreign, to enforce an often overlooked rule adopted under Dodd-Frank.  Rule 21F-17 provides that “[n]o person may take any action to impede an individual from communicating directly with the [SEC] staff about a possible securities law violation, including enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement … with respect to such communications”. Many practitioners thought little about this rule until this summer.  In recent cease and desist orders involving Health Net, BlueLinx and Anheuser-Busch InBev, the SEC has made clear that it believes that a confidentiality clause violates Rule 21F-17 if, read on its face, it would prevent an individual from voluntarily communicating with the SEC regarding potential securities law violations (something that is not “required by law”) or if the clause would require the individual to obtain anyone’s consent or provide notice to anyone in order to engage in such communications.  In other words, the SEC now views “standard” confidentiality clauses included in employment, separation, confidentiality and other agreements and policies entered into with employees and other individuals as violating U.S. federal securities laws unless they include a specific carve out allowing whistleblowing. In recent months, the SEC has imposed fines ranging from $250,000 to more than $6 million on companies using such clauses in their agreements, and required such companies to take remedial actions, including informing current and former employees of their right to communicate with the SEC regarding potential securities law violations.  In several cases, the SEC did not allege that any of the affected persons was a whistleblower or had been impeded from being a whistleblower, just that the language used in the agreements was impermissible.  The SEC has also taken the position in recent actions that any purported waiver of an individual’s right to obtain a whistleblower award from the SEC is impermissible. While the cease and desist orders have, to date, been limited to SEC reporting companies, Rule 21F-17 does not appear limited to public companies.  Accordingly, private companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction should also consider their compliance with Rule 21F-17. Because the offending language is language that many consider “standard” for employment, separation, confidentiality and other agreements, as well as corporate governance policies such as codes of conduct and ethics, many companies will need to modify their corporate governance policies and their existing and template agreements to comply with the new interpretations.  We have developed language for confidentiality clauses and corporate governance policies that is intended to comply with the SEC’s new interpretations, and have worked with a number of companies to implement compliance regimes.  For further information or for assistance in complying with Rule 21F-17, please contact the author or your other Dorsey contacts.

ISS has published an executive summary of 2017 updates to its benchmark proxy voting policies for the Americas, EMEA, and Asia-Pacific regions.  The updated policies will generally be applied to shareholder meetings on or after February 1, 2017. U.S. policy changes are summarized below, and companies should keep them in mind as they consider policies on director compensation, dividend and vesting policies for stock awards, and shareholder rights to amend bylaws.  For companies contemplating IPOs, governance structures that have a material adverse impact on shareholder rights, including multi-class shareholder structures, generally will lead to recommendations against director candidates.  It’s worth noting that in certain situations where ISS finds a practice problematic, it will result in ongoing (versus one-time) recommendations against directors (see the last two policies described below). In December 2016, ISS will release a complete set of updated policies, and it will release updated Frequently Asked Questions ("FAQ") documents on certain U.S. policies, including the Equity Plan Scorecard. Non-Employee Director Pay:  While ISS does not evaluate stand-alone non-employee director (“NED”) plans according to its Equity Plan Scorecard he EPSC model, these plans do receive a standard cost evaluation for Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT).  Under the updated policies, NED pay proposals will be evaluated across “a broader range of factors and more nuanced consideration of director pay.”  ISS will assess advisory proposals seeking shareholder approval of NED pay, and certain NED equity plan proposals that are determined to be relatively costly, considering the following, additional qualitative factors: The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile; The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation; Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements; Equity award vesting schedules; The mix of cash and equity-based compensation; Meaningful limits on director compensation; The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation. This policy update is consistent with recent judicial scrutiny of director compensation.  In Calma v. Templeton, the Delaware Chancery Court denied Citrix’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against the Citrix board of directors, and furthermore, held that director compensation decisions would be judged by the heightened entire fairness standard (versus the deferential business judgment rule), where the director compensation program did not include “meaningful limits.” Dividends and Minimum Vesting for Stock Awards:  ISS added a factor on dividend payments on unvested awards.  ISS will award full points if the equity plan expressly prohibits dividend payments for all award types before the vesting of the underlying award.  Accrual of dividends payable upon vesting is acceptable.  No points will be earned if this prohibition is absent or incomplete (i.e. not applicable to all award types).  Notably, a company's general practice of not paying dividends until vesting, if it is not memorialized in the plan document, is insufficient to earn full points. The minimum vesting factor was also updated so that an equity plan must specify a minimum vesting period of one year for all award types under the plan in order to receive full points for this factor.  No points will be earned if the plan allows for individual award agreements that reduce or eliminate the one-year vesting requirement. Restrictions on Shareholder Amendments to Bylaws:  ISS will make ongoing recommendations against governance committee members if the company's charter imposes undue restrictions on shareholders' ability to amend the bylaws.  These restrictions include but are not limited to a prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals or ownership/holding requirements for such shareholder proposals that exceed those in the SEC’s Rule 14a-8. IPOs with Multi-Class Shareholder Structures:  If prior to or in connection with a company's public offering, the company or its board adopted bylaw or charter provisions materially adverse to shareholder rights, or implemented a multi-class capital structure in which the classes have unequal voting rights, ISS will generally recommend withhold or against votes on directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case).  Unless the adverse provision and/or problematic capital structure is reversed or removed, ISS will recommend a vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.  

On Thursday, December 8, Dorsey will present our annual review of developments and disclosure requirements for the upcoming proxy season. Click here for more information and to register for the event, which will be presented via webinar.

The SEC announced on November 14 that it had made an award of more than $20 million to another whistleblower.  This was the third highest award since the agency began paying them out in 2012, and it brings the total of such awards under the SEC’s program to more than $130 million.  Although the current whistleblower program has been criticized by conservative groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (in part because it does not require whistleblowers to give notice to their employer at the same time they give it to authorities), the program has relatively broad bi-partisan support and has given rise to a cottage industry of law firms specializing in representing whistleblowers.  Among supporters of whistleblowing generally are Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), a key Trump ally during the presidential campaign, and Congressman Jeb Hensarling (R-Texas), chair of the House Financial Services Committee and chief proponent of legislation that would roll back most of the Dodd-Frank Act’s regulatory provisions.  Hensarling’s proposed legislation, the Financial Choice Act, however, does not touch the existing legislative structure for SEC whistleblower awards.  The Trump transition website calls for dismantling Dodd-Frank, but there are no specific references to whistleblower regulations in the writing on the wall.  So, speculation is widespread that the SEC’s whistleblower program, in some form, will survive the decimation of Dodd-Frank and the demise of its regulatory provisions. It is too soon to say what changes, if any, may be made to the program (for example, adding the simultaneous notice requirement or disqualifying anyone involved in criminal activity from receiving an award, as proposed by the Chamber).  It is also too soon to predict whether the surviving program would be used as forcefully going forward as it has been during the tenure of outgoing SEC Chair Mary Jo White (since the SEC enforcement staff must receive approval from the Commission, which will have a Republican majority, before proceeding with an enforcement action involving a whistleblower reward). Under the current framework, whistleblower awards may range from 10 percent to 30 percent of the money collected when the monetary sanctions exceed $1 million.  Whistleblower award payments are made from an investor protection fund established by Congress that is funded through sanctions paid by securities violators, so no money is taken or withheld from investors to pay the awards.