The TMCA
Advertising
Made in the USA? It Better be!
A recent Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) settlement reinforces the need for companies to substantiate MADE IN THE USA product claims in advertisements. Gennex Media LLC and its owner, Akil Kurji, recently found themselves the subject of an FTC investigation regarding claims made on their Brandnex website, social media sites, and in a YouTube video that their customizable promotional products (including items such as wristbands, lanyards, temporary tattoos, and buttons) were “Made in USA,” “USA MADE,” and “Manufactured Right Here in America!” As it turns out, many of these products were not made in the United States and were actually wholly imported from China. As a result of these violations, which date back 2012, Gennex and Kurji were collectively ordered to pay the Commission a monetary judgment of $146,249. The proposed order prohibits Gennex and Kurji from making unqualified U.S.-origin claims for any product, unless (1) the final assembly or processing of the product occurs in the United States, all significant processing that goes into the product occurs in the United States, and all or virtually all ingredients or components of the product are made and sourced in the United States; or (2) a clear and conspicuous qualification appears immediately adjacent to the representation that accurately conveys the extent to which the product contains foreign parts, ingredients or components, and/or processing; or (3) for a claim that a product is assembled in the United States, the product is last substantially transformed in the United States, the product’s principal assembly takes place in the United States, and United States assembly operations are substantial. The order defines “Made in the United States” as any representation, express or implied, that a product or service, or a specified component thereof, is of U.S.-origin, including, but not limited to, a representation that such product or service is “made,” “manufactured,” “built,” “produced,” or “crafted” in the United States or in America, or any other U.S.- origin claim. This case is an important reminder for companies to ensure compliance with FTC guidelines regarding U.S. origin claims. Here are some best practices to keep in mind when making US origin claims, based on the FTC’s Made in the USA Policy: U.S. content must be disclosed on automobiles and textile, wool, and fur products. Disclosure is not required on most other products sold in the United States. The FTC’s Made in the USA policy applies to all products advertised or sold in the United States, except for those specifically subject to country-of-origin labeling by other laws. The FTC’s Made in the USA policy applies to all origin claims that appear on products and labeling, advertising, and other promotional materials, and also to all other forms of marketing, including digital or electronic mechanisms, such as internet or e-mail. Made in the USA claims can be express or implied, but the policy applies to both. Preapproval of Made in the USA claims is not required. Any manufacturer or market may make the claim, so long as it is truthful and substantiated. The standard for a product to be called Made in the USA without qualification is that the product must be “all or virtually all” made in the United States. The elusive phrase “all or virtually all” means that all significant parts and processing that go into the product must be of U.S. origin and should contain no (or negligible) foreign content. To substantiate a Made in the USA claim, a manufacturer or marketer needs competent and reliable evidence to back up the claim that its product is “all or virtually all” made in the United States. To determine whether a product is “all or virtually all” made in the United States, the product’s final assembly or processing must take place in the United States. Other factors, such as how much of the product’s total manufacturing costs can be assigned to U.S. parts and processing, and how far removed any foreign content is from the finished product, are also considered. A qualified Made in USA claim describes the extent, amount, or type of a product’s domestic content or processing but also indicates that the product is not entirely of domestic origin. Qualified Made in the USA claims are appropriate for products that include U.S. content or processing but do not meet the criteria for making an unqualified Made in USA claim. Because these claims can be misleading in terms of the amount of domestic content that exists, manufacturers and marketers should avoid qualified claims, unless the product has a significant amount of U.S. content or U.S. processing. Terms such as “produced,” “created” or “manufactured” in the United States should be avoided when referencing that a particular manufacturing or other process was performed in the United States, as these terms suggest a broader application than just a specific process and may be misleading. The FTC’s Enforcement Policy Statement can be found here: Enforcement Policy Statement on U.S. Origin Claims | Federal Trade Commission (ftc.gov).
March 30, 2021
Trademarks
Advantages of Voluntary Copyright Registration in China Explained
China, like the United States, is a party to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. As such, in general any literary or artistic work created in the US will also be protected in China. Unlike trademark rights, which are based on use or registration (depending on the country of adoption and use), copyright rights are automatically generated once the creation of the relevant work has been completed and do not require any compulsory registration. Nonetheless, some Berne Convention countries, including China and the US, offer a system of voluntary copyright registration in order to provide a way for the copyright owners to record the particulars of the copyright in the works they created/own and other related transactions. Copyright registration in the US is also a prerequisite for filing a lawsuit for infringement, and depending on when registration occurs relative to the date when infringement began, copyright registration in the US, can provide enhanced statutory remedies once liability is established. This article provides an introduction to the voluntary copyright registration system in China and some key advantages in holding a copyright registration in China enforcement actions. Voluntary copyright registration in China Voluntary copyright registration in China is administered by the Copyright Protection Center of China (CPCC). The CPCC, after receiving an application for copyright registration, will only review the application documents to ensure that all the formality requirements for copyright registration are met before approving a registration. No substantive examination will be conducted by the CPCC in relation to the application by looking into the validity of the underlying copyright rights. The whole process will generally take a few months to complete. Obtaining a copyright registration in China is a relatively cost-efficient process since the CPCC does not require notarization and legalization of the application documents, except the certificate of good standing of the applicant pursuant to the recently-updated requirements of the CPCC. Once registered, a copyright registration certificate will be issued by the CPCC. The certificate will contain the important particulars relating to the work registered, such as the title of the work, the name of the author, the name of the copyright owner, the mode of creation, the date of completion and the place of creation, etc. A sample of the subject work as recognized by the CPCC will be attached to the certificate. Key advantages in holding a copyright registration in China If a US copyright owner wishes to initiate a copyright enforcement action in China, such as online takedowns, administrative raid, trademark opposition and invalidation, border interception at the Chinese Customs, and civil and criminal proceedings, it first has to prove that it owns the copyright in the subject work in question. A copyright registration certificate issued by the CPCC may serve as prima facie proof of the holder’s ownership of the copyright in the subject work. By contrast, if no copyright registration is obtained in China, a US copyright owner will be required to submit documents to prove its ownership of the copyright in the subject work, which is a notoriously difficult task and expensive exercise for foreign copyright owners. In China, a witness statement such as a declaration/affirmation of creation and ownership of a work alone will not be given much weight by the Chinese courts and government enforcement authorities, and will not be welcomed by the major trading platforms for takedown purposes either. In addition, even assuming a US copyright owner is able to produce the relevant documents required to prove its ownership in the subject work, those documents must first meet the formality requirement of notarization and legalization and must be translated into Chinese before they can be admitted as evidence in an enforcement action in China. This onerous formality requirement and its cost implication might simply deter a US copyright owner from taking enforcement action. A copyright registration in the US for the same work is normally not very helpful in serving as prima facie evidence of proof of the registrant’s ownership, primarily because it does not include an officially- recognized sample of the subject work attached to the registration certificate. Trademark opposition and invalidation actions in China – Conflict with prior copyright in an artistic work is a valid opposition/invalidation ground under Article 32 of the Chinese Trademark Law. The Chinese trademark authorities have been more willing to recognize the effect of a copyright registration in China in ascertaining and determining the issue of the opponent’s/petitioner’s ownership of copyright in the work in question, especially where the copyright registration certificate submitted by the opponent/petitioner predates the filing date of the disputed trademark filing, or there is some other favorable circumstance or evidence in the case, notwithstanding that the copyright registration is obtained without going through any substantive examination. Administrative Raid Action – The copyright administration authority requests that a copyright owner prove its copyright ownership as a pre-condition for accepting a complaint of copyright infringement filed by the rights owner. A copyright registration certificate as issued by the CPCC in Chinese will be good evidence to overcome this first hurdle in an administrative raid action on the complainant. Unless the infringer can provide conflicting evidence to successfully rebut the validity of the copyright registration in China, the copyright administration authority will officially accept the complaint for further investigation and review. Online takedowns – Online takedowns have become frequent enforcement actions taken by US copyright owners to protect their IP rights in China. To file a copyright takedown complaint with the major online trading platforms in China such as Taobao, Tmall and JD, a complainant is required to submit proof of its ownership of the copyright to the platform. In this situation, a copyright registration certificate in China will obviously be the most preferred prima facie evidence that those trading platforms would like to receive for verification, as a copyright registration certificate is an official certificate issued by a government body (i.e., the CPCC), which contains all the necessary particulars for the platforms’ verification. A copyright takedown request can only be filed with those online trading platforms after the platforms have completed their verification process and recognize the complainant’s copyright ownership. Enforcement via Chinese Customs – Customs/border interception of goods suspected to have infringed other’s trademark rights, copyrights or patent rights is also an important way to protect the owners’ rights and interest and enforce against infringers. In order to avail oneself of the Customs protection, an IP rights owner will normally need to record its IP rights with the Chinese Customs in advance. With regard to the recordal of copyright rights with the Chinese Customs, Section 7(2) of the Implementing Measures of the Regulations on Customs Protection of IP rights in China specifically provides that a copy of the copyright registration certificate, together with a sample of the work officially recognized by the CPCC in China, are acceptable proof of the applicant’s copyright ownership for purpose of recordal. Otherwise, a foreign copyright owner will need to go through the difficult and expensive exercise as mentioned above to prove its copyright ownership to the Chinese Customs.
March 23, 2021
Trademarks
E-Commerce and Trademark Infringement: OSU Wins a Battle at the Sixth Circuit
The Ohio State Buckeyes may have lost the college football national championship to Alabama earlier this year but OSU can take some consolation from its recent victory in a trademark case before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In The Ohio State University v. Redbubble, Inc., Case No. 19-3388 (6th Cir. Feb. 25, 2021), the Sixth Circuit reversed a lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Redbubble, an Australian online retailer that OSU had sued for trademark infringement and related claims. In doing so, the Sixth Circuit grappled with an increasingly relevant issue in the digital age: whether e-commerce companies are liable for trademark infringement arising from products they sell in the online marketplace. Redbubble operates an online marketplace for print-on-demand products based on user-submitted artwork. Independent artists upload images to Redbubble’s interface and consumers can place an order for a customized item. Once a consumer makes a purchase, Redbubble contacts the artist and arranges the manufacturing and shipping of the product with independent third parties. The shipped products, however, are delivered in Redbubble packaging with Redbubble tags. Back in 2017, OSU discovered products on Redbubble’s marketplace that displayed OSU’s trademarked images without approval. Redbubble declined to remove the offending articles unless OSU complied with onerous demands for identification of the infringing articles, following which OSU sued it for trademark infringement, counterfeiting, and unfair competition (under both the Lanham Act and Ohio’s right-of-publicity law) in the Southern District of Ohio. The parties subsequently cross-moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment for Redbubble, holding that “Redbubble did not ‘use’ OSU’s trademarked images in operating its business model under the Lanham Act because it only acted as a ‘transactional intermediary’ between buyers, sellers, manufacturers, and shippers. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first addressed OSU’s argument that Redbubble was vicariously liable under the Lanham Act. The appellate court held that, while OSU might have a good argument for vicarious liability, it was barred from pursuing that claim because it had failed to raise the issue in the district court (litigators, don’t let this happen to you - make sure to raise every possible argument in the trial court or you risk being barred from pursuing even meritorious claims on appeal). The Sixth Circuit then moved on to the more interesting question: did Redbubble “use” OSU’s trademarks under the Lanham Act by marketing and selling infringing products? The Court first noted that online marketplaces, like eBay and Amazon, that merely facilitate sales for independent vendors generally escape Lanham Act liability. On the other hand, parties who design and print trademark-infringing goods typically violate the Lanham Act, as do direct sellers of offending products (whether brick-and-mortar stores or company websites). So, which is Redbubble? The Court distilled the question as follows: “What level of involvement and control must a defendant exercise over the creation, manufacture, or sale of offending goods to be considered akin to a ‘seller’ or ‘manufacturer’ to whom Lanham Act liability applies?” The Court stated that, based upon Sixth Circuit precedent, a key distinction between a direct seller who “uses” a trademark and a mere facilitator of sales is “the degree to which the party represents itself, rather than a third-party vendor, as the seller, or somehow identifies the goods as its own.” In this case, the evidence suggested that “products ordered on Redbubble’s website do not yet exist, come into being only when ordered through Redbubble, and are delivered in Redbubble packaging with Redbubble tags.” Thus, Redbubble is more than just a “passive facilitator” – it “brings trademark-infringing products into being by working with third-party seller to create new Redbubble products, not to sell the artists’ products.” In the mind of the Sixth Circuit, that “use” of OSU’s trademark was sufficient to preclude summary judgment in Redbubble’s favor. After discussing OSU’s Ohio right-of-publicity claim (again reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Redbubble on this claim too), the Court considered whether OSU was entitled to summary judgment on its claims. On that issue, the Sixth Circuit concluded that there was insufficient record evidence and so remanded for additional fact-finding. According to the Court, the factual gaps include the precise nature of Redbubble’s contractual relationships with third-party manufacturers and shippers, the degree to which Redbubble is involved in selecting and imprinting trademark-infringing designs on its products, Redbubble’s involvement in product returns, and facts relating to potential defenses Redbubble might have. While the final outcome of this case is uncertain, OSU can certainly be pleased with the Sixth Circuit’s decision. More generally, this case contributes to an understanding of when and how online retailers may be liable for trademark infringement – at least in the Sixth Circuit. The general lesson? Unless an online retailer is clearly a passive facilitator of third-party sales like Amazon or eBay, it needs to be careful how involved it is in the product manufacturing and sales process or it runs the risk of being sued for trademark infringement. Also, lawyers: make sure you preserve issues for appeal!
March 18, 2021
Advertising
FTC Finalizes Deals with Six CBD Companies
The FTC recently reached deals with six CBD companies after it issued formal complaints against them in December 2020 over concerns about deceptive practices. The initial complaints (found here: In re Bionatrol Health, LLC, In re Epichouse, LLC, In re CBD Meds, Inc., In re Easybutter, LLC, In re Reef Industries, Inc., and In re Steves Distributing, LLC) brought various counts against the companies, including allegedly making a wide range of claims about their ability to treat serious health conditions, including cancer, heart disease, hypertension, Alzheimer’s disease, and other diseases. Some complaints also include deceptive pricing allegations. The FTC approved final consent orders resolving all the complaints. Those orders (found here: In re Bionatrol Health, LLC, In re Epichouse, LLC, In re CBD Meds, Inc., In re Easybutter, LLC, In re Reef Industries, Inc., In re Steves Distributing, LLC) obligate the companies to take and avoid various actions, including refraining from making misleading statements about the health benefits of CBD (including that such products prevent Alzheimer’s disease, autoimmune diseases, arthritis, cancer, diabetes, heart disease, seizures, skin cancer or other diseases), refraining from deceptive pricing tactics, notifying customers of the FTC’s lawsuit, and paying fines ranging from $20,000 to $85,000. These orders come on the heels of two years of relatively aggressive enforcement efforts against CBD companies by both the FDA (which we wrote about here) and the FTC. The FDA has already written two more warning letters to CBD companies in 2021, which you can find here. As shown on that same page, the FDA sent 21 letters to CBD companies in 2020 and, in 2019, sent another 22 letters. Sometimes these letters were jointly signed by the FTC, and the FTC has sent other letters to CBD companies over the past years (such as those discussed here). While the FDA continues to consider further regulations governing more widespread use of CBD products, these orders and letters will continue to act as de facto guidance for CBD companies. Dorsey will continue to monitor the FTC's and FDA’s actions in this area.
March 17, 2021
Trademarks
Look What You Made Her Do: Taylor Swift Brings Her Own Lawsuit Against Evermore Park
In December 2020, Taylor Swift released her ninth studio album, Evermore. The album came as somewhat of a surprise, following the release of her eighth album, Folklore, by only 5 months. Evermore sold over 1 million copies in its first week, helped propel Swift to being the most streamed artist on Apple Music in 2020, and was met with critical success. It was also met with a lawsuit. On February 2, 2021, Evermore Park, LLC sued Taylor Swift in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. In its Complaint, Evermore Park alleged that Evermore infringes several EVERMORE trademarks that Evermore Park has owned since 2015. Evermore Park also sued TAS Rights Management, LLC (“TAS”), the entity that owns and manages Taylor Swift’s intellectual property rights, and Taylor Nation, LLC, the entity that operates Swift’s websites among other things. Evermore Park is an “ancient township” built “upon a body of mysterious energy” that opened in 2018. According to its website, doorways to other lands, worlds and dimensional planes once open at Evermore Park were sealed for centuries until keys to unlocking the magic of these gateways were rediscovered and the portals were unsealed. Now guests can experience the magic emanating from the portals at the Park’s Axe Throwing Field, Elven Archery Range, or Crooked Lantern Tavern. Like many theme parks, Evermore Park sells merchandise at the Park and through its online store, such as bags, t-shirts, and ornaments. Evermore Park also has live musical performances at the park and plays songs upon request, including Taylor Swift’s songs. Evermore Park owns several trademarks for EVERMORE for use on these goods and services, namely several types of apparel and “live visual and audio performances by an actor.” Evermore Park is alleging that Taylor Swift is already marketing Evermore merchandise that infringes its trademarks and is likely to begin offering “live visual and audio performances,” presumably in the form of concerts or a tour, using the EVERMORE trademark. In addition, Evermore Park claims that because it has created two original music scores Evermore Park Vol. 1 and Evermore Park Vol. 2, Swift’s Evermore album itself is likely to cause confusion in the marketplace. Evermore Park claims that Swift’s alleged infringement is causing it irreparable harm, and has filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, seeking to stop Swift’s sale of Evermore merchandise or offering “live entertainment services” under the Evermore brand during the pendency of the case. Swift’s team has not responded to Evermore Park’s Complaint or Motion for Preliminary Injunction. But in a letter exchanged before Evermore Park filed the Complaint, Swift’s attorneys made clear that “there is no basis” for Evermore Park’s claims of trademark infringement. And, if anything, rather than causing harm, the Evermore album has created marketing opportunities for Evermore Park. Curiously, the Park confirmed this in its Complaint, noting that it experienced a 330% increase in traffic to its website in the days following the release of Evermore. Swift’s counsel ended the letter warning that “the asserted claims are frivolous and irresponsible and, if pursued further, will be defended vigorously.” As they say, the most vigorous defense is a good offense. Taylor Swift, through TAS, filed her own Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee on February 22, 2021. TAS alleges that Evermore Park has infringed several of Swift’s copyright protected works, including some of her most well-known songs: Bad Blood, You Belong With Me, and Love Story. According to TAS, Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) protects and enforces Swift’s rights in the songs and has been attempting to get Evermore Park to license the music since at least August 2019. Despite repeated follow ups, Evermore Park “blatantly ignored” BMI—until TAS threatened to file this lawsuit. The Complaint alleges that once this lawsuit became imminent, Evermore Park contacted BMI to request a retroactive license for live performances of Swift’s songs from 2018 to present. However, Evermore Park is not out the woods yet. TAS alleges that by seeking the retroactive license, Evermore was trying to cover its tracks and has all but admitted infringement in the process.
March 5, 2021
Trademarks
Extricating the UK from the European Union IP Systems – Contrasting Approaches Across the Channel
The European Union (“EU”) has shaped and developed Intellectual property (“IP”) policy extensively over the years. IP law in EU member states is today largely a matter of EU law. Key areas of IP are dominated by EU rights and institutions. Separating the United Kingdom (“UK”) out of those systems can be a complicated matter. As in many other areas, the UK and the EU handled the separation in very different ways. In principle, the implications of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU in relation to IP are pretty obvious and unequivocal. The UK ceases to be part of the EU trademark and design systems (managed by the EUIPO) which means that from now on trademark and design registrations have to be secured locally. More generally, EU law and the decisions of the EU courts no longer apply in the UK and in the future the UK can develop and revise its laws independently. Those are the simple facts. Where there is much more room for nuance is in relation to IP separation issues and transitional arrangements. For Britain, “Project Brexit” was all about smoothing out the transition, ensuring continuity, where possible, and minimising disruption. By contrast, the EU was never going to go out of its way to ensure an easy transition. Politically, the main message the EU wanted to send out was that there is a heavy price for leaving the bloc, so that other member states are not tempted to follow in Britain’s footsteps. In terms of IP, the EU’s main policy seems to have been to let things lie where they fall. Continuity of Law In broad terms, to ensure continuity of law, the UK adopted all EU legislation existing on 31 December 2020 into its domestic law. The same applies to IP laws. The EU has legislated in most areas of IP and EU law, harmonising and modernising the law across the EU and introducing many new policies. Apart from the fact that the UK has withdrawn from the EU trademark and design systems, this EU legislation generally continues to apply in the UK with very few modifications and the UK courts will continue to follow the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (up to and including 31 December 2020) subject to future changes in domestic UK law. There are some important exceptions. The new and controversial Copyright in the Digital Single Market directive which has not yet been implemented into UK law will not be adopted. The UK has also announced that it will not participate in the EU unitary patent scheme. The implementation of the EU unitary patent and the corresponding agreement on the Unified Patent Court have been delayed since 2016 following the Brexit referendum decision. Most EU member states are yet to ratify the agreement which is a pre-condition for the EU unitary patent to come into effect. Following Brexit, it is unclear whether these initiatives will ever be implemented by the EU. EU Trademarks and EU Designs The UK’s exit from the EU meant that it could no longer participate in the EU trademarks and design systems. However, from the UK point of view, it was a priority to ensure continuity and to minimise disruption. Further, the owners of registered EU trademarks and registered designs had vested property rights in the UK based on these EU registrations. It was out of the question to allow those IP owners to lose their property rights in the UK as a result of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. So it was clear that the UK will have to continue to protect those EU trademarks and designs after Brexit. Still, the UK had different options how to manage the transition. At the end of the day it chose a solution that ensures maximum continuity and requires no intervention on the part of right holders. The UK adopted legislation to automatically extend protection in the UK to all EU trademarks and designs registered as at 31 December 2020, without any fee or notification requirements. By creating cloned UK registrations for each EU trademark and design registration, the UK effectively created new domestic independent UK registrations to replace the legacy EU rights, with the new rights having the same priority and renewal dates as their legacy rights. In the same way, for each international trademark registered under the Madrid Protocol and protected in the EU on 31 December 2020, the UK automatically created a new domestic independent registration in the UK, without requiring right holders to apply for such protection. The same arrangement applies to registered designs registered at WIPO under the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs. Applications for EU trademarks and EU registered designs which were still pending before the EUIPO on 31 December 2020 are treated differently. They were not replicated as UK applications, but applicants can file new applications in the UK, which can have the benefit of the priority date of the legacy EU application if filed within 9 months. Owners of international registrations designating the EU, unless the registration was already protected in the EU on 31 December 2020, will have to re-designate their international registrations to include the UK if they wish their international registration to be protected in the UK. Transitional Arrangements The extraction of the UK from the EU trademark and design systems opens up a number of practical legal questions. For example, in the context of for EU proceedings, whether the use of a mark in the in the UK before 31 December 2020 should be taken into account when considering issues such as acquired distinctiveness, non-use, reputation and likelihood of confusion, or similar questions in the context of UK proceedings with regard to the use or repute of a mark gained in the EU before Brexit. Many such questions will remain relevant for years to come in contentious proceedings both in the UK and in the EU. In this context, the UK and the EU adopted quite distinct approaches. The UK introduced comprehensive new legislation to deal with those kind of separation and transitional issues. The legislation lays down a new rule book which provide a nuanced approach to those issues and will enable right holders and practitioners to plan ahead and for the courts and the UKIPO to resolve disputes. By contrast, no legislation at all has been introduced by the EU to deal with similar questions that will inevitably arise in EU proceedings. The EUIPO issued guidance to right holders and representatives regarding the implications of Brexit. The guidance, which has no legal effect, explains how the EUIPO would deal with issues relating to the UK. Essentially, the EUIPO interprets the existing law and concludes, in almost every respect, that UK prior rights or the use or reputation of a right in the UK (including reputation or use before 1 January 2021) will be ignored by the EUIPO. The one exception is that use of an EU mark before 1 January 2021 can still be relied on as part of a defence to a non-use challenge. The guidance is useful as far as it goes, but it is not legislation. Parties to disputes may seek to test the law and courts in member states will have to decide themselves how to interpret the law in view of Brexit. It is likely that some uncertainty will surround those issues within the EU for some time to come.
February 26, 2021
Trademarks
Shifting Gears: A Quick Tour of Genericide
Have you ever been to an indoor cycling class? If so, you most likely have heard the term “spin class,” or referred to the act itself as “spinning.” Mad Dogg Athletics, Inc. would take offense, however, calling such uses infringement unless the studio is an authorized licensee of its marks. Mad Dogg Athletics has owned numerous trademark registrations for SPIN and SPINNING for a number of goods and services, including exercise equipment and fitness instruction, since the early 1990s. It’s been a heck of a ride for Mad Dogg, though Peloton Interactive Inc. recently upped resistance by filing petitions in the U.S. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel Mad Dogg’s exclusive rights in both marks for exercise equipment and fitness instruction. According to Peloton, Mad Dogg Athletics has lost exclusive rights in the SPIN and SPINNING marks for indoor cycling equipment and fitness instruction due to genericide. Genericide is nothing new: ESCALATOR, LINOLEUM, and DRY ICE are just a few examples of terms that were once the subject of trademark protection that are now known as common nouns for those same items. Genericide is not up to a brand owner – it occurs when the relevant public understands the primary significance of the mark as referring to the name for the goods or services. See 15 U.S.C. §1064(3). In essence, companies can fall victim to their own success in the marketplace when the brand name they create and promote becomes what their goods/services actually are called or how they are referred to generally instead of functioning as a source indicator. Brand owners can contribute to genericide by using their trademarks as verbs or nouns, which effectively turns the mark into an everyday term instead of a source indicator. The relevant public is the primary decider, however, of which marks have become generic, and consumer survey evidence often plays a critical role in the inquiry into whether a term has become generic. Successful brand owners understand the need to break away from genericide by actively policing the marketplace, enforcing against descriptive uses of their marks by competitors, informing the press, and educating their customers and licensees on how to properly refer to the brand as a source indicator. For example, the owners and attorneys who represent Velcro® fasteners made the hilarious viral video "Don't Say Velcro" to educate the public that Velcro® is a registered trademark for hook and loop fasteners. Mad Dogg Athletics has tried similar tactics, allegedly sending numerous demand letters to competitors and even writing to the Deputy Commissioner of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in 2012, requesting that Examining Attorneys refuse marks that include SPIN and SPINNING for goods/services related to health and fitness, particularly indoor cycling and group fitness instruction; stop treating the terms “spin” and “spinning” as merely descriptive for goods/services related to indoor cycling; and stop permitting third parties to include “spin” or “spinning” relating to indoor cycles or indoor cycling instructions. Whether such efforts have succeeded is a question that Mad Dogg Athletics will have to address in the TTAB proceeding. Peloton obviously has the resources to go the distance in this trademark dispute and to commission consumer survey evidence to support its position. Ultimately, though, whether Mad Dogg’s marks have become generic will shift down to what the relevant public understands the terms “spin” and “spinning” to mean.
February 24, 2021
Trademarks
To Kalon: Trademark or Geographical Description
The Northern District of California concluded last week that Constellation Brands has the exclusive right to use the TO KALON and TO KALON VINEYARD marks on wine, and that The Vineyard House, LLC (TVH) “cannot use the term in any way, shape or form.” At issue was Constellation’s claim that TVH was improperly selling wine using Constellation’s validly registered “To Kalon” mark. TVH claimed that because it grew its grapes on land owned by the original “To Kalon” wine maker, it used the phrase “To Kalon” on its label and in its marketing, not as a trademark, but instead as a vineyard designation. To determine whether TVH could appropriately use the To Kalon mark as a geographic source identifier, the court had to unwind the tangled vines covering the history of the To Kalon marks. The History of the Mark The term “To Kalon,” a Greek phrase meaning “Highest Good” or “Highest Beauty,” has a complex history with and relationship to wine that extends back over 130 years to a vigneron named Hamilton Walker Crabb. Between 1868 and 1879, Mr. Crabb purchased approximately 360 acres of land in the Napa Valley, and he harvested and sold grapes from this land. In 1889, Mr. Crabb bought another 168.5 acre, non-continuous parcel – the Baldridge Parcel – which was largely hilly and wooded. Relying on Mr. Crabb’s probate records, which the court found was the best evidence, the court concluded that Mr. Crabb never used the Baldridge Parcel to grow wine grapes, but instead its value was comprised of water rights, piping, and timber. Though he initially cultivated grapes and sold wine under the name “Hermosa Vineyards,” in 1886 Mr. Crabb renamed his winery as the To-Kalon Winery Company, and thereafter won numerous domestic and European wine awards, spoke at conferences, wrote prolifically and shared his expertise and knowledge about viticulture. In short, he promoted the To Kalon name. Mr. Crabb continued growing grapes on the non-Baldridge Parcel land and selling wine under the To Kalon name until 1899 when he passed away, and the winery operations continued under the To Kalon name until 1939 when a fire closed the operations. After a multi-decade hiatus, Robert Mondavi Wines (RMW), Constellation’s predecessor trademark owner, picked up the To Kalon torch. RMW was awarded trademark registrations in TO KALON on May 24, 1988, and both the TO KALON and TO KALON VINEYARDS marks had achieved incontestability. Mr. Mondavi himself then worked to make the To Kalon marks famous by repeatedly retelling the (nonfictional) story of the original significance of Mr. Crabb’s land, and the (fictional) story of how after buying grapes from the To Kalon land for years, he ultimately purchased 325 acres of the To Kalon land in 1958. The Court Finds TVH Infringed Based on this background, the court concluded that sophisticated wine consumers, merchants, and professionals immersed in the Northern California wine industry have a current understanding of To Kalon, but that this understanding did not exist prior to 1988. The court therefore held TVH committed trademark infringement because Constellation owned a valid, protectable mark, TVH used the mark on wine without Constellation’s consent, and after applying the Sleekcraft factors, that such use was likely to cause confusion among ordinary consumers of such wine. The court also ruled against TVH on each affirmative defense, but its analysis of the fair use and cancellation affirmative defenses are what is noteworthy. TVH claimed fair use in referencing To Kalon on its wine bottles because Mr. Crabb owned the Baldridge Parcel for at least ten years before he died, and, according to TVH, Mr. Crabb produced wine from grapes grown on the Baldridge Parcel. Though typically the fair use doctrine requires a party show the use by the alleged infringing party is “otherwise than as a mark,” in some circumstances, a junior user can use another’s registered trademark so long as it is in a non-trademark, geographical sense. Producers of goods that are located in a specific place have a limited right to tell purchasers their location. TVH claimed, therefore, that because it grew grapes used to make and sell wine sourced from one of Mr. Crabb’s parcels—the Baldridge Parcel—it should be permitted to use To Kalon as a geographic source identifier. The court rejected this argument because the evidence suggested that Mr. Crabb had never actually used the hilly and wooded Baldridge Parcel to grow grapes for the To Kalon wine, and TVH’s own expert conceded that the wine industry did not consider the reference to “To Kalon” to include hillside vineyards, such as the Baldridge Parcel. Based on this, the court concluded that not only was TVH’s reference to Kalon not fair use, but also that “such a representation on its wine would itself mislead the wine consuming public.” The court next turned to TVH’s claim that Constellation’s To Kalon marks should be cancelled because in his response to an Office Action from the USPTO, RMW had misrepresented (according to TVH) that “TO KALON” had “no present meaning or significance” in wine though “[p]rior to the turn of the 20th Century, there was a winery in the Napa Valley which used the name ‘Tokalon’.” This statement is largely true, but also incomplete, including because it arguably understated the prior notoriety of the To Kalon mark, stated that the name had no present meaning or significance and incorrectly stated that its use was only “prior to the turn of the 20th Century” when its use continued to until the 1939 fire. But the court took a ‘close enough’ approach noting that “while RMW could have been more complete in its response,” the missing or incorrect information is “not the type of material information which is determinative of whether the ‘primary significance’ of a term is geographic,” especially in light of the substantial evidence showing that Mr. Crabb himself used To Kalon as both a brand and a reference to his vineyard. The Real Winner(s) Constellation vindicated its exclusive right to use the To Kalon mark in court, but the lawsuit, and, perhaps more importantly, the coverage of the lawsuit should provide some consolation to TVH. Drawing a distinct line between Constellation’s To Kalon and TVH’s Baldridge Parcel grapes may just lead to an increase in sales. I, for one, look forward to purchasing and opening a bottle from each to determine which is the true winner. I suspect I won’t be alone.
February 18, 2021
Advertising
Down the Hatch: Jägermeister Douses Impaired Survey Evidence in Trademark Victory
Jägermeister: it’s no longer for “pukey frat guys.” Or, at least according to Jägermeister’s recent adversary, that was the sordid reputation Jägermeister wanted to shed in a PR blitz launched in 2016. Instead of being associated with “Jägerbombs” and spring break ragers, Jäger sought a more sophisticated, hip, and “KÜHL” vibe. Billboards, commercials, and digital media were suddenly soaked with ads featuring phrases like “DRINK IT ICE KÜHL,” “ICE KÜHL,” and “RUN TO A KÜHL PLACE.” All was going well until Jäger got popped for alleged trademark infringement and dilution by Alfwear, a Utah-based rugged clothing manufacturer who claimed Jäger was piggy-backing on its wholesome reputation. Alfwear owns a federal registration for “KÜHL” and uses it in connection with a variety of products and on its website. The case proceeded through discovery, and the court ultimately awarded Jägermeister summary judgment due to a number of evidentiary shortcomings with Alfwear’s case. We focus here on the problems with Aflwear’s consumer survey evidence. Survey evidence needs to replicate marketplace conditions to be probative of a consumer’s state of mind. Alfwear’s proffered survey deviated from this principle. The expert’s report was filed under seal, so we don’t have access to the questionnaire and the stimuli. But we can glean what the problems were from the court’s opinion. To show confusion, Alfwear’s expert first showed respondents a screenshot of an Alfwear KÜHL ad on Facebook. The expert then showed respondents one of two Jäger KÜHL ads on Instagram “as each appeared individually side-by-side with the KÜHL Facebook ad.” Based on the data gathered, Alfwear’s expert concluded that Jäger’s ads created “net confusion” rates of over 30%. It appears the court correctly observed that this study design “does not prove actual confusion in the marketplace.” Just because two ads appear on social media platforms does not mean that consumers will view them in close succession or juxtaposed for any extended period of time. Having respondents focus on two ads that both contain the prominent use of “KÜHL” could bias them to draw connections and conclusions that they would not necessarily draw in a real-world context. When designing consumer surveys in Lanham Act cases, experts and their counsel need to avoid creating their own special concoctions. A survey will only be useful if it approximates marketplace conditions. This principle does not call for exactness down to the last detail of recreating the marketplace, but it does require careful attention and consideration. If products are not sold side-by-side in the marketplace, they should not be presented that way in a consumer survey. While a survey design with loose connections to the marketplace may gin up a more “favorable” result, that high will most certainly recede. In this regard, one should think of designing an improper survey as akin to having one too many Jägerbombs: they both may be pleasing in the moment, but may lead to foggy, hazy, and, ultimately, painful results.
February 9, 2021
Trademarks
Highlights Part III of the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020: Letters of Protest and Shortened Office Action Response Times
As we wrote in Parts I and II in this series, the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (“TMA”) was signed into law on December 27, 2020, containing several significant amendments to the Lanham Act. This post will cover two of the legislative changes: (1) the formalization of procedures for Letters of Protest; and (2) the discretionary shortened timeframe to file a response to Office Actions. The formalization of procedures for Letters of Protest is not anticipated to require new regulations for implementation, and the newly-formalized procedures and fee for submissions went into effect on January 2, 2021. The new changes for shortened response times to Office Actions will take effect on December 27, 2021, though the implementing regulations and procedures, as well as the fees for these procedures, have not yet been set. Procedures for Letters of Protest Letters of Protest can be a useful tool for interested third parties to bring to the attention of an examining attorney the existence of prior pending applications or registrations alleged to be confusing similar, or other issues, such as the descriptive significance of the applied-for mark, that a third party believes create a bar to registration. A third party must follow the procedures set forth below. (For additional details, we suggest reviewing the procedures on the USPTO’s website.) These newly-formalized procedures may not be very different from what has been informal practice up until now, but it is helpful to have confirmation of what the USPTO requires: Letters of Protest must include a valid legal ground for a USPTO examining attorney to refuse registration. Evidence must be submitted by the party filing the Letter of Protest. Timing for filing a Letter of Protest and Evidentiary Requirements: If filed before the trademark application is published, the evidence must be relevant to the stated reason(s) for why registration should be refused. If filed after the trademark application has published, the evidence must establish a prima facie case for refusing registration. Letters of Protest must be filed electronically at the USPTO and a fee of $50 is required. The TMA adds the following changes to the procedures: A third party may submit for consideration for inclusion in the record of an application evidence relevant to a ground for refusal of registration. The submission shall identify the ground for refusal and include a concise description of each piece of evidence submitted in support of each identified ground for refusal. Not later than 2 months after the date on which the submission is filed, the Director shall determine whether the evidence shall be included in the record of the application. If the Director determines that the third party evidence should be included in the record of the application, only the evidence and the ground for refusal to which the evidence relates may be included. Any determination by the Director whether or not to include evidence in the record of an application shall be final and non-reviewable, and a determination to include or to not include evidence in the record shall not prejudice any party’s right to raise any issue and rely on any evidence in any other proceeding. The key takeaway here is that the USPTO now will have a set deadline to review evidence submitted in Letters of Protest and make a determination about whether the evidence will be included in the record of the application. Provision for Discretionary Shortened Response Deadline to Respond to Office Actions Under current USPTO procedures, an application will be reviewed by an examining attorney, who will either approve an application for publication for opposition, or issue an Office Action raising particular issues that must be addressed before the application can move forward. If an Office Action issues, an applicant has 6 months to respond. The TMA changes the current process by authorizing the issuance of Office Actions that require a response as early as 60 days after issuance, or within 6 months from issuance. The discretionary shortened response deadline is intended to be a tool for eliminating applications that will ultimately be abandoned and thus unclutter the register. If an applicant fails to reply, amend, or appeal within the relevant time period, including any extension available, the application shall be deemed abandoned, unless it can be shown to the satisfaction of the Director that the delay was unintentional, in which case the application may be revived and time may be extended. The Director may prescribe a fee to accompany any request to revive. The Director shall provide by regulation for extensions of time to respond to the examiner for any time period that is less than 6 months. The Director shall allow the applicant to obtain extensions of time to reply or amend for a period of time not exceeding 6 months from the date of notification of the issuance of the Office Action. However, the Director may set by regulation the time for individual periods of extension, and prescribe a fee, by regulation, for any extension request. Any request for extension shall be filed on or before the date on which a reply or amendment is due. It remains to be seen how it will be determined which issues might fall into the shortened “60-day deadline” or less than 6 months categories. While the USPTO suggests that the goal behind the implementation of the shortened deadline to respond to an Office Action is to cut dead wood from the register, it could have the effect of making the application process more expensive for applicants who may need additional time beyond a 60-day Response deadline to address what may seem to an examining attorney to be relatively minor issues. We will, of course, provide updates on the implementation of the TMA as updates become available over the course of 2021.
February 8, 2021
Advertising
Graham Cracker Caper or Class Action Case? Consumer Survey Evidence May Tell Us
Graham Crackers—the ubiquitous, rectangular-shaped snack crackers with air holes and perforations—occupy a unique niche in American snack food lore. In the 1830s, the Rev. Sylvester Graham, a Presbyterian minister from Connecticut, became a ferocious advocate of healthy living. Among other things, he invented his “Graham Bread” made from coarsely ground unsifted wheat flour. Apparently, a staple diet of Graham Bread—coupled with vegetarianism and abstention from spirits and tobacco—would do wonders to suppress human carnal desires. Several decades later, NABISCO introduced its “Graham Crackers” to widespread acclaim. The morsel really took off in 1925 when NABISCO added a touch of honey and launched its “Honey Made” line. Today, multiple companies make their own versions of “graham cracker” and consumers are still clamoring for them. According to one estimate, in 2020 alone, more than $450 million dollars’ worth of graham crackers were sold by a handful of the top vendors in the United States. That’s a hell of a cracker. With such a long, storied history, graham crackers couldn’t possibly be the subject of a class action suit for false advertising in 2021, could they? Meet Chandra Campbell, who recently purchased a box of “Honey Graham Crackers” at Whole Foods. Despite the ingredient listed on the packaging, Ms. Campbell was allegedly shocked—shocked!—that her graham crackers were not made from healthy whole wheat “graham” flour. She also thought her crackers were sweetened with actual honey as opposed to some other sweetening agent. Channeling her inner Rev. Graham, she brought hellfire and brimstone. She sued Whole Foods in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for false advertising on her behalf and on behalf of all other similarly-situated aggrieved consumers. Whole Foods’ response? Pshaw! Whole Foods moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that no reasonable consumer could be deceived by its use of “Honey Graham Crackers.” Judge Gregory Woods denied the motion. He believed that Ms. Campbell had plausibly stated a claim that she and others were deceived. Importantly, he noted that whether a product package misleads consumers is generally not divined by judges. Instead, “[e]vidence such as a consumer survey, not merely judicial introspection, is needed to determine what consumers understand the phrase to mean in the context of this particular product and its packaging.” The important takeaway is that even when a food product has been around for many, many decades, that does not necessarily insulate it from false advertising claims—even if those claims seem implausible based upon the product’s success and longevity in the marketplace. Judge Woods’ decision underscores the importance of consumer surveys to separate the wheat from the chaff in these types of cases. Is Ms. Campbell’s claim legit or will it be a mere graham cracker caper? Consumer survey evidence may ultimately be the path to salvation for Ms. Campbell and the rest of her class action flock.
February 4, 2021
Trademarks
Highlights Part II of the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020: Ex Parte Expungement, Ex Parte Reexamination, and Non-Use Cancellation of Federal Trademark Registrations
As we wrote in Part 1 of this series, the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (“TMA”) was signed into law on December 27, 2020, and contained several significant amendments to the Lanham Act. This post will cover three of the legislative changes, all pertaining to the elimination of “deadwood” marks that clutter the register and create needless impediments to registration of new marks: (1) ex parte expungement; (2) ex parte reexamination; and (3) non-use cancellation. These new vehicles for challenging unused marks will not take effect until December 27, 2021, and implementing regulations and procedures, as well as the fees for these procedures, have not yet been established. Ex Parte Expungement – For Marks That Have Never Been Used What for – As a well-known New Yorker cartoon asked – “How about never – is never good for you?” If the answer is a mark has never been used, then ex parte expungement is the procedure for you to consider. Section 16A is added to the Lanham Act to allow any person—including the Director of the USPTO on the Director’s own initiative—to file a petition to expunge a trademark registration on the ground that the mark has never been used in commerce on or in connection with some or all of the goods or services covered by the registration. Who can petition – The TMA provides that “any person” can file an expungement petition. So unless the implementing regulations specify a standing requirement or one is adapted from analogous opposition and cancellation proceedings through case law, it appears that anyone (plus the Director) can take advantage of this procedure. How to petition – A petition for expungement must identify the specific goods or services alleged never to have been used in commerce in association with the mark. Further, the petitioner must include a verified statement that sets forth the details of its reasonable investigation into whether the goods or services have been offered and additional facts that support the allegations. The TMA indicates that the Director is to promulgate regulations regarding what constitutes a reasonable investigation and the type of evidence that could support a prima facie case that a mark has never been used in commerce. How to respond – The TMA indicates that a registrant’s evidence of use in defense of an ex parte expungement proceeding is the type of evidence that is consistent with when a mark is deemed to be in use in commerce under Section 45 of the Lanham Act. The Director is also charged with establishing the procedures for ex parte expungement proceedings, including setting response times. What about U.S. Marks Registered Based on a Foreign Registration? – For a mark registered solely on foreign registration basis (Section 44(e)) or as an extension of protection via the Madrid Protocol (Section 66), a registrant can offer evidence of special circumstances that provide a basis for excusable nonuse. No duplicate proceedings – The TMA prohibits co-pending ex parte expungement proceedings against the same goods or services in a registration. Further, once ex parte expungement proceedings have been brought against a registration and the registration is upheld for the goods or services at issue, there is an estoppel provision in the Act providing that no later petitions with respect to those same goods or services can be filed, regardless of the identity of the petitioner. When you can petition – Until December 27, 2023, ex parte expungement petitions can be filed against any registration at any time after the third anniversary of the registration. Beginning December 28, 2023, petitions can only be filed between the third and tenth anniversary of a registration. Appeal Procedure – The TMA allows for appeal of decisions in ex parte expungement proceedings to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board or to the Federal Circuit. Ex Parte Reexamination – For Marks Not in Use When Use Was Alleged What for – The TMA adds a new Section 16B to the Lanham Act to allow any party to petition for reexamination of a registration on the ground that the mark was not in use in commerce in connection with some or all of the goods covered by the registration on or before the “relevant date.” As used in the statute, “relevant date” means: (1) for use-based applications that did not have any change in basis after filing, the date the application was initially filed; or (2) for intent-to-use applications, the date on which an amendment to allege use was filed. What about U.S. Marks Registered Based on a Foreign Registration? – The ex parte reexamination procedure under Section 16B cannot be initiated against foreign-based registrations issued under Sections 44(e) or 66 of the Lanham Act. Who can petition – As with expungement petitions under Section 16A, there is no standing requirement – a reexamination petition can be filed by any person. How to petition and respond – Ex parte reexamination proceedings will share the following similarities with ex parte expungement proceedings: the Director can request ex parte reexamination on the Director’s own initiative; the petitioner must identify the challenged goods or services and include a verified statement that details the reasonable investigation into use the petitioner has conducted; the Director will establish the procedures for ex parte reexamination proceedings; the Director will identify the type of evidence that could support a prima facie case that a mark has never been used in commerce; a registrant’s evidence of use is the type of evidence that is consistent with when a mark is deemed to be in use in commerce under Section 45 of the Lanham Act; co-pending proceedings involving the same goods or services are not allowed; if a registration is upheld for certain goods or services, no further ex parte reexamination proceedings may be initiated against the registration for those goods or services; and decisions can be appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board or the Federal Circuit. When you can petition – Petitions for ex parte reexamination may be commenced at any time before the fifth anniversary of a registration, except for registrations on the Supplemental Register, which are vulnerable to petition for reexamination at any time. New Non-Use Cancellation Proceeding What for – Section 14 of the Lanham Act is amended to allow a petition for cancellation on the ground that the registered mark has never been used in commerce on or in connection with some or all of the goods covered by the registration. Who can petition – A party who believes it may be damaged by a trademark registration; thus, there is a standing requirement, as with other types of cancellation proceedings. When you can petition – This new non-use cancellation petition can only be filed after the third anniversary of the registration. How does this ground of cancellation for non-use differ from abandonment claims? This new ground for cancellation based on non-use appears to differ from a claim for abandonment because it applies to marks that have never been used, as opposed to marks that were in use for some time but then discontinued. It also does not involve any requirement for a petitioner to establish a lack of intent to resume use by the registrant, a factor that comes into play when a mark has been used for a period of time and then discontinued. * * * Look for Part 3 of our series on the TMA soon, which will discuss new Letter of Protest procedures and the discretion given to examining attorneys to set discretionary response deadlines.
January 28, 2021
Trademarks
Derby Pie Eats Humble Pie
Rupp v. Courier-Journal, Inc. involves a dispute between the makers of DERBY-PIE®—a trademarked chocolate-nut pie—and a local newspaper that published two articles about other businesses creating other chocolate-nut desserts. Departing somewhat from its own ruling decades earlier in a separate case involving “Derby pie,” the Sixth Circuit doled out a loss to Rupp, affirming the district court’s holding that the defendant’s challenged use of the term “Derby pie” was a non-trademark use for which the newspaper was not liable. This is a case packed to the brim with sweet treats, racing horses, and a reminder that each race—er, litigation—is a fresh opportunity to win or lose. Plaintiff Alan Rupp, owner of the bakery and Kentucky institution Kern’s Kitchen, sued the Courier-Journal for its use of the phrase “Derby Pie.” The Kern family developed its secret recipe for this chocolate-walnut-vanilla pie in the 1950s and registered a trademark for DERBY-PIE® in 1969. Since at least the 1980s, Kern’s Kitchen has repeatedly sued restaurants and publishers who have used the term “Derby pie” to refer generically to a chocolate-nut pie. See, e.g., Kern’s Kitchen, Inc. v. Bon Appetit, Case Nos. 87-5852, 87-6152 (6th Cir. July 7, 1988). In past decades, this strategy seemed to work, even though defendants had claimed that the term “Derby pie” was a generic descriptor for a chocolate nut pie. For example, in the 1980s Kern’s sued the magazine Bon Appetit for its inclusion of an article for “Derby pie” in a cookbook. Although the district court granted summary judgment to Bon Appetit on the ground that “Derby pie” is a generic term, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that there was a genuine factual dispute. Id. But earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit determined that the newspaper’s use of the term “Derby pie” in two articles was merely descriptive. The first piece, titled “Bourbon makes this Derby pie a state original,” shared a recipe for a walnut-chocolate-bourbon pie from a different local restaurant, the Captain’s Quarters. The second piece was a review of an up-and-coming new bakery, and included a reference to a Derby-pie-flavored macaron. The Courier-Journal argued that it was simply using the popular phrase to describe chocolate-nut flavored baked goods, not as an indicator of the source of goods (Kern’s). Importantly, trademark law only applies if the mark is used in a way that designates the origin of goods. But Rupp tried to skip straight to the likelihood-of-confusion test, and the Sixth Circuit sent him back to the starting line. Rupp reminds trademark owners that before even contemplating whether a trademark use is actionable, including applying the eight-factor likelihood-of-confusion test, a court must find that the trademark was used in a legally-protected way. If a trademark is used in a non-trademark way—for example, in a descriptive way—trademark infringement laws simply don’t apply. The Sixth Circuit’s decision was based on all three factors of the test used to determine whether the use of a trademark constitutes a “non-trademark” use: The goods were “sufficiently different”: the newspaper Derby pie used bourbon and no vanilla, and there was no indication Kern’s had ever made any macarons. Both newspaper articles clearly identified the source: other local establishments. Without citing the earlier Sixth Circuit opinion in Kern’s v. Bon Appetit, the Sixth Circuit stated that “Derby Pie” was a common descriptive phrase to denote chocolate-nut flavored pie. The Court’s decision that a descriptive, non-trademark use is not actionable is a straightforward application of trademark law. But the Court’s implicit suggestion that “Derby pie” is a generic term—at odds with the 1988 Sixth Circuit opinion stating there is an issue of fact as to whether it is generic—is notable. Perhaps the mark lost its uniqueness in the intervening three decades, and now approaches generic status. Or perhaps, as the Sixth Circuit suggested, the evidence presented by Rupp defeated his own case. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit explained that the DERBY-PIE® sold by Kern’s could not be confused with the “Derby pie” referenced in the newspaper, because the latter lacked a key ingredient that make DERBY-PIE® famous (vanilla), and included an ingredient never found in DERBY-PIE® (bourbon). So, would a consumer confuse “Derby pie” with DERBY-PIE®? Perhaps, but Rupp confirms that we must first ask the “necessary preliminary question” of whether the mark was used in a non-trademark way. For brand owners, Rupp thus serves as a reminder to consider the broader context of how their marks are used by others when contemplating litigation.
January 27, 2021
Trademarks
#BLACKLIVESMATTER: A Trademark or A Social Justice Movement
One of the many reasons the year 2020 will be memorable is for the social justice movements and demonstrations that have inspired a flood of new trademark applications with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. A recent search of the USPTO database revealed that there are 77 pending or dead applications for trademarks that include the phrase “Black Lives Matter.” Since the murder of George Floyd in late May 2020, over 50 new applications were filed for marks such as “BLACK LIVES MATTER MOVEMENT,” “BLACK LIVES MATTER HAND SANITIZER,” and “BLACK LIVES MATTER MOSCATO.” This wave of “Black Lives Matter”-related trademark applications in 2020 is remarkable, given the USPTO’s previously articulated position regarding the registrability of trademarks using the phrase. Specifically, in 2018, the USPTO rejected the six applications containing the phrase “Black Lives Matter” that were filed by the originators of the movement. Founded by Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi, three black women, #BlackLivesMatter was ignited in response to the acquittal of George Zimmerman who fatally shot Trayvon Martin. Since 2013, #BlackLivesMatter (or sometimes referred to as “BLM”) has utilized its platform to address racism across the nation, and seeks to affirm black humanity, to acknowledge of the contributions made in society by black men and women, and recognize the resilience of the black community in the face of oppression. Relying upon this history, the USPTO rejected the BLM founders’ the applications for three reasons. First, the USPTO determined that the “Black Lives Matter” a slogan or term that does not function as a trademark or indicate the source of applicant’s goods and/or services and to identify and distinguish them from others. Second, the phrase identifies an informational, social, political, religious, or similar kind of message that merely conveys support of, admiration for, or affiliation with the ideals conveyed by the message. Third, the phrase is not one the public would not perceive as source-identifying matter that identifies applicant alone as the source of the goods/services, but rather as an expression of support for anti-violence advocates and civil rights groups because potential consumers would simply access the publications and enlist or engage in applicant’s services because they want to support the cause that the slogan represents, not because they believe the slogan indicates the source of such goods and services. The USPTO gave no weight to the fact that the founders of the BLM movement lodged the application. The USPTO’s position is not surprising given that the purpose of a trademark registration is to identify a source. Trademarks help consumers identify the goods and services they wish to purchase, and those they want to avoid. The function of trademark is to designate the source of a particular good or service and to protect the good will of merchant supplying that good or service. Whether a term or phrase functions as a trademark or service mark depends on how it would be perceived by the public. The USPTO has determined that the more frequently a phase is used, the less likely that the public will use it to identify a source. In fact, the USPTO’s standard practice is to reject applications seeking to register marks that are merely informational, based on the nature and the context of the mark’s use in the marketplace, consumers would perceive it as merely conveying general information about the goods or services or an informational message, and not as a means to identify and distinguish the applicant’s goods/services from those of others. See Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure section 1202.04. Specifically, the USPTO instructs the examiners reviewing trademark applications to reject those seeking to register “widely used messages” or otherwise, slogans, terms, and phrases used by various parties to convey ordinary or familiar concepts or sentiments, as well as social, political, religious, or similar informational messages that are in common use or are otherwise generally understood. See 1202.04(b). The USPTO has recently rejected the first of Black Lives Matter applications that were filed in 2020. Like the applications filed by the BLM founders in 2018, the USPTO determined that the recently applied-for mark, “2020 BLACK LIVES MATTER,” fails to function as a trademark to indicate the source of the applicant’s goods and fails to identify and distinguish itself from other “Black Lives Matter” marks or the movement itself. However, a rejected application does not diminish the value and significance of the Black Lives Matter slogan or movement. Kevin Britton, a summer associate, co-wrote this with Tiana Towns.
January 22, 2021
Trademarks
What’s in a Name? Influencer Trademark Name Disputes Provide Lessons for the New Year on Clarity in Agreements
Many industries were negatively impacted by the pandemic in 2020, but one industry that continues to grow is the influencer marketing industry. The influencer marketing model typically involves agreements between companies and influencers, where the influencer creates content promoting companies’ products for posts on social media and blog sites. Influencers have often built their brands, social media accounts, and blog sites under their own names, and companies want access to the loyal consumer fan base drawn to those names. However, as disputes shared on Instagram this year illustrate, it is not always clear as to which party owns the brand, social media accounts, or products bearing the influencer’s name. Moving into the New Year, both companies and influencers can learn lessons on clarity in IP and social media agreements when engaging in influencer marketing. Two weeks ago, popular wedding dress designer Hayley Paige Gutman (known as “Hayley Paige”) posted on Instagram about a legal dispute arising from an employment agreement between her and bridal house JLM Couture, Inc., her former employer. JLM recently filed suit against Hayley Paige in the Southern District of New York, asserting breach of contract, conversion, and trademark dilution, among other claims. The complaint alleges that an employment agreement between JLM Couture and Hayley Paige provides that Hayley Paige granted JLM “the exclusive world-wide right and license to use her name ‘Hayley’, ‘Paige’, ‘Hayley Paige Gutman’, ‘Hayley Gutman’, ‘Hayley Paige’ or any derivative thereof (collectively the ‘Designer’s Name’) in connection with the design, manufacture, marketing and/or sale of bridal clothing, bridal accessories and related bridal and wedding items, including and [sic] all good will associated therewith for the term of the Agreement, and for a period of two years thereafter”. The complaint also alleges that Hayley Paige irrevocably sold, assigned, and transferred all right, title, and interest to JLM to register her name as a trademark. JLM alleges that Hayley Paige covenanted that she would have no right to use her name during the term of the employment agreement or any time after without JLM’s consent. Based on these provisions, JLM alleges that it owns social media accounts bearing Hayley Paige’s name. The main social media account at issue – @misshayleypaige – features a mix of bridal and wedding-related content and personal images, and has more than 1 million followers. JLM alleges that the account was created as part of its marketing strategy, and thus the number of followers of the account is a direct result of JLM Couture’s advertising expenditures. JLM argues that Hayley Paige’s assistance in the collaborative maintenance of the account falls within the scope of her employment under the employment agreement. The federal court for the Southern District of New York granted JLM’s request for a temporary restraining order against Hayley Paige, prohibiting the designer from making any changes and postings to social media accounts bearing her name, including the @misshayleypaige Instagram, Pinterest, and TikTok accounts. The court also ordered Hayley Paige to deliver to JLM the login credentials for these social media accounts. In two videos with over 2 million views combined posted on a separate account, Hayley Paige stated she has resigned from JLM Couture after a year and a half long legal battle to negotiate a new contract with JLM. Hayley Paige stated that she always considered the @misshayleypaige Instagram account to be her own since the account was opened, and that the employment agreement makes no mention of social media accounts or management thereof. Hayley Paige stated that the @misshayleypaige Instagram account has always been used for her own personal photos, thoughtful quotes, and real relationships. In the meantime, Hayley Paige noted that she is no longer posting or engaging on the social media accounts bearing her name until the dispute is resolved in court. While the dispute between Hayley Paige and JLM Couture focuses on the scope of an employment agreement and the use of an employee’s name, companies and influencers can also learn from a business dispute involving the use of a vegan chef’s name. This past year, the winner of the television competition Cupcake Wars and vegan chef Chloe Coscarelli (known as “Chef Chloe”) recently posted on Instagram that she won a legal dispute with her business partner, ESquared Hospitality LLC (“ESquared”) in May. Chef Chloe rose to fame after she won the television competition Cupcake Wars, and has since authored cookbooks, made other television appearances, impacted the vegan culinary scene, and originated the concept for a fast casual vegan restaurant chain bearing her name – “by Chloe.” Chef Chloe wholly owns California limited liability company Chef Chloe LLC. Under her limited liability company, Chef Chloe filed a demand for arbitration against business partner ESquared, seeking a judgment declaring that Chef Chloe still owns 50% of the interests in “by Chloe” restaurants. Chef Chloe also sought a permanent injunction barring her business partner from selling any packaged food or beverages using the name “Chloe” or any variation thereof, including the trademark “by Chloe,” for projects other than fast casual vegan restaurants. The arbitration addressed terms of an operating agreement between Chef Chloe LLC and ESquared. One of the issues addressed in the arbitration was whether, under the operating agreement, the vegan restaurants had the unlimited right to expand their usage of the “by Chloe” trademark without obtaining consent from Chef Chloe because Chef Chloe LLC was terminated as a member. The arbitrator found that the operating agreement did not strip Chef Chloe of approval rights for future expansion of trademark usage as one of its penalties for termination as a member. The arbitrator stated that Chef Chloe must “abide by the deal that she made with the Company to continue to use her first name as the name of the fast casual vegan restaurant, but likewise [her business partner] must abide by the terms of the deal that it struck with Chef Chloe not to expand the use [of] the trademark beyond fast casual restaurants without getting her pre-approval.” The arbitrator also awarded full, undiluted 50 % interest in the restaurant chain. Thus, Chef Chloe retains approval rights for the usage of her name, even though she does not actually own the mark. Companies and influencers can also learn from a disagreement stemming from the control of an influencer’s blog-turned-apparel brand bearing the influencer’s name. This past June, influencer Julia Berolzheimer posted on Instagram that she would no longer use the name of the blog-turned-content creation business she originated following a disagreement with her business partner. Julia Berolzheimer is a successful influencer known all over the world with 1.4 million followers on Instagram. Julia began her brand, “Gal Meets Glam,” as a personal style blog. The blog was transformed into a content creation business, which then expanded into an apparel brand bearing the name of the blog – the Gal Meets Glam Collection. Despite the success of the brand, Julia Berolzheimer announced on her blog that the Gal Meets Glam Collection would be ending. Julia Berolzheimer stated that the decision to end the Gal Meets Glam Collection stemmed “from the lengthy disagreement between how we wanted to build Gal Meets Glam and how our business partner felt it should be run.” Julia informed her followers that her content would now fall under her own name, rather than the Gal Meets Glam name. These three disputes about individual names being used as trademarks involve different kinds of agreements in varying circumstances, but there are general lessons companies and influencers can apply when engaging in influencer marketing in the New Year. Agreements arising from influencer partnerships should clearly delineate social media accounts and blog sites, rather than extending intellectual property provisions in general broad terms to encompass these accounts. Ownership of the social media account (both during the term and after the expiration of the agreement), management of the social media account, the name of the account, and approval of content should be spelled out in the agreement and employment policies, where relevant. In this way, both the company and the influencer are clear as to the roles and expectations surrounding names functioning as trademarks for the New Year and beyond.
January 7, 2021
Trademarks
Highlights Part I of the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020: Irreparable Harm and TTAB Inferior Officers
After a fair amount of end-of-year legislative drama, the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (“TMA”) was signed into law on December 27, 2020 as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2021, which also included needed funding for COVID-19 relief and support. The text of the Act from the House Report can be seen here. The TMA amends the Lanham Act in several different unrelated ways, all of which are important for trademark practitioners, whether litigating in federal court, prosecuting trademark applications in the USPTO or engaging in proceedings before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Some parts of the TMA, such as the provisions for ex parte reexamination, become effective a year from signing, on December 27, 2021. Other provisions, such as the statutory amendment concerning the presumption of irreparable harm and the clarification of status of TTAB judges do not specify an effective date and may be left to the courts to decide. Our first post on The TMCA will cover the presumption of irreparable harm for obtaining injunctive relief under the Lanham Act and amendments to ensure that the independence of Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) judges cannot be challenged under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. In subsequent posts, we will address changes to Letter of Protest and office action response procedures during the application examination process and new procedural mechanisms for challenging the validity of registrations based on lack of commercial use of the registered mark. Clarification on Presumption of Irreparable Harm for Obtaining Injunctive Relief The TMA clarifies that when seeking injunctive relief on a claim for trademark infringement, a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm is created upon a finding of trademark infringement at trial, or upon a showing of likelihood of success on the merits for preliminary injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order. The rebuttable presumption also applies to claims of unfair competition, false advertising, dilution or cyberpiracy under Section 43 of the Lanham Act. An amendment to the Lanham Act was needed due to a Circuit split regarding the standard for injunctive relief in trademark infringement cases following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, which eliminated a similar presumption of irreparable harm in patent cases. In trademark cases decided since eBay, Circuit courts have ruled inconsistently on whether the four equitable factors for obtaining an injunction should be weighed in each case, or whether irreparable harm should be presumed once there is a finding of infringement or a likelihood of success is shown for purposes of obtaining expedited relief. This split encouraged forum shopping and undermined the consumer protection purposes of the Lanham Act. The TMA now codifies in the Lanham Act a nationwide uniform standard that the presumption should be applied in trademark cases. Thus, the Act reduces the evidentiary burden on trademark owners for obtaining injunctive relief to protect their trademark rights and prevent consumer confusion. Protection of Administrative Law Judges Serving on the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board The TMA also contains a provision giving the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office considerably more power over the administrative law judges of the TTAB. The amendment to Section 18 of the TMA clarifies that “the authority of the Director under this section includes the authority to reconsider, and modify or set aside, a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.” This provision should avoid the problem highlighted in the 2019 Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew decision of the Federal Circuit. The court in that case held that Patent Trial and Appeal Board judges were not subject to sufficient oversight and supervision by the USPTO Director to be considered inferior officers under the Appointments Clause, and thus were unconstitutionally appointed since they had not been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The TMA amendments confirm that TTAB judges are inferior officers, which should immunize them from any application of the Arthrex holding. Stay tuned for further TMCA posts on other important changes to the Lanham Act coming your way under the TMA.
January 5, 2021
Copyrights
Fair Use Mashup Theory Ga-Fluppted by Ninth Circuit
Just in time to steal ComicMix’s Christmas, the Ninth Circuit recently held that the bookmaker’s mashup story Oh, the Places You’ll Boldly Go! (which combines elements of the Dr. Seuss book Oh, the Places You’ll Go! with Star Trek) is not a defensible fair use under copyright law. The opinion reverses in part a summary judgment ruling by the District Court for the Southern District of California, which we wrote about here. Seuss Enterprises had sued ComicMix for copyright and trademark infringement over Boldly, which features Star Trek characters set in a Seussian world highly reminiscent (and in some instances directly copied from) Go! and other works by Dr. Seuss. The TMCA featured a Seuss-styled introduction to the case here. ComicMix was able to eliminate Seuss’s trademark and associated unfair competition claims on a motion to dismiss. Next, on summary judgment, the district court concluded that ComicMix’s work constituted fair use (and thus defeated Seuss’s copyright claim) because the book was a highly transformative “literary and pictorial ‘mash-up.’” Seuss appealed both decisions. Beginning with its own riff on a quote from Go! (“mash-ups can happen to you”), a unanimous Ninth Circuit panel concluded that none of the four fair use factors favored ComicMix and reversed the district court. Considering the all-important transformative-use factor, the court concluded that “[a]lthough ComicMix’s work need not boldly go where no one has gone before, its repackaging, copying, and lack of critique of Seuss, coupled with its commercial use of [Dr. Seuss’ work], do not result in a transformative use.” Next, the court found that the creative nature of Go! tilted in favor of Seuss. With respect to the amount and substantiality of the work copied, ComicMix “extensive[ly] and meticulous[ly]” copied Go!, and statements in the record showed that ComicMix could have created Boldly without this sort of “wholesale copying.” Finally, the court held that ComicMix’s book “targets and usurps” Seuss’s potential market, including because it intentionally aimed to capitalize on the same graduation market as Seuss. Although Seuss may have gotten its green eggs, it didn’t get its ham. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Seuss’s trademark claim. That analysis focused on whether the federal Lanham Act even applies given that the alleged infringing mark is the title of ComicMix’s Boldly. Under the Rogers test, a Lanham Act claim applies only if the allegedly infringing title of an artistic work is (1) not artistically relevant to the underlying work or (2) explicitly misleads consumers as to the source or content of the work. The test was not satisfied because the title helped to achieve ComicMix’s artistic purpose and did not explicitly mislead consumers. The question now is whether ComicMix will seek further review and, if so, whether the Supreme Court will take up the issue. Until then, we leave you with some further Seussian stylings: We wrote ’bout it before, so you’ll want to hear more, Of the rulings on mashups and smashups galore. So come round once again, and listen my friend, To a story that could be quite far from the end. Now, the first-level court, in its SJ report, Found a combo of works a sufficient retort To the claims of the Seuss shouting, “This ain’t fair use! A mashup, transformative? That’s far, far too loose!” Undeterred by a loss from that first-level boss, Seuss went back to work to perfect its next toss. De novo review, don’t you know that it’s true, Can provide quite a different result when it’s through. So appeal Seuss did file ’gainst the judgment reviled, In hopes to proceed to the coveted trial. The Ninth was enthused (and slightly amused), And its notions of fair use downright disabused. “A mashup you say? We don’t see it that way. You took all of their content, and that’s not okay. Your work doesn’t transform and quite far from the norm, In the mind of book buyers ’twill cause a s***storm.” “So go back to the start and take this to heart, Fair use isn’t accomplished by jamming some parts Of a couple of works with some relative quirk Together like some sort of drunk soda jerk.” ’Fore this wears to the bone and again you do groan, I believe that its time that we leave this alone. So, we’ll try to be curt yet remain quite alert, And we’ll see if the masher is granted its cert.
December 31, 2020
Copyrights
The Name Lives On: the eCommerce Rebirth of Brick and Mortar Brands
The impact of COVID-19 restrictions and precautions, combined with trending consumer preferences to shop online, is fueling bankruptcy filings of well-known brick-and-mortar brands. As customers bid farewell to fond strip mall haunts, savvy and imaginative purchasers reap the benefits by snapping up household names like RadioShack, Pier 1 Imports, and Toys “R” Us. The retail market is poised for a restructuring of its own kind—a shift of major brand names into exclusively ecommerce businesses. General Wireless Operations, Inc. dba RadioShack, Inc., which emerged from a bankruptcy in 2018, is a recent example. In November, Retail Ecommerce Ventures (“REV”) purchased the rights to use RadioShack’s brand, private label names, and website in the U.S. and certain other countries. REV has earned a reputation for acquiring distressed retail brands, like Pier 1 Imports, dressbarn, Modell’s Sporting Goods, and Linens ’n Things. Transformations from bankrupt brick-and-mortar to .com are often accomplished through the acquisition of a debtor retailer’s intellectual property from its bankruptcy estate. For instance: Last week, REV won a bankruptcy auction for the intellectual property, domain names, social media accounts, and other assets of Stein Mart with a $6 million bid. It announced plans to relaunch Stein Mart as online-only. Last year, Marquee Brands, purchased the ecommerce business, intellectual property, and other assets of Destination Maternity Corp., which includes the brands Motherhood Maternity and A Pea In The Pod, from Destination Maternity’s chapter 11 estate. Marquee partnered with liquidation specialists Gordon Brothers and Hilco Merchant Resources, on the winning $50 million bid, which included the rights to operate store-closing sales for all remaining physical locations. In 2018, lenders of Toys “R” Us acquired the intellectual property and other assets of the famed toy retailer after the assets were marketed in a bankruptcy sale process. With the exception of two shopping mall locations, Toys “R” Us now operates entirely online. In August, Hong Kong-based Newtimes Group purchased the assets of women’s clothing retailer and former bankruptcy debtor Coldwater Creek from the estate created by an assignment for the benefit of creditors. So-called “ABCs” are a state-law governed alternative to federal bankruptcy options. The Newtimes Group purchase agreement allocated over 93% of the $12.2 million purchase price toward intellectual property, with the remainder allocated toward inventory. As these sales illustrate, an insolvent, big-name retailer’s most prized asset is often its brand. Trademark-protected names, logos, patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and data have become more significant with the rise of ecommerce. The upside for purchasers who shell out millions for intellectual property and related assets includes generating income through licensing and royalty transactions, without the overhead associated with brick-and-mortar stores. Assets obtained through bankruptcy and other distress-type sales are often discounted, adding to the appeal of “brand shopping” for investors. Advantages specific to bankruptcy sales include the ability to acquire assets free and clear of most liabilities, the ability of the debtor to assign executory contracts (i.e., contracts where the parties have performance still outstanding) to a purchaser, a relatively quick sale process, and the protection of a federal bankruptcy court order. The sale process typically transpires in accordance with court-approved sale procedures, which contemplate marketing of the assets, a bid process, an auction, and approval of the sale through an order after a hearing, all with related deadlines. The bankruptcy court often approves sales of assets free and clear of liens, claims, and other encumbrances, provided that applicable non-bankruptcy laws permit such sales. The court’s order operates as an injunction that bars the debtor’s creditors from bringing claims against the purchaser. Bankruptcy debtors have the power to determine whether they will continue to perform and “assume” or refuse to perform and “reject” executory contracts. Assumed contracts can be assigned to third parties, even if—with some exceptions—those contracts contain non-assignability clauses. A debtor-seller’s assignment of assumed, favorable contracts to a purchaser facilitates the immediate continuation of operations and beneficial relationships upon closing of the sale. Conversely, bankruptcy debtor can reject an executory contract, which functions as a breach and leaves the counterparty with a claim it can file against the bankruptcy estate for damages arising from the breach. Notably, under the Bankruptcy Code and case law, most intellectual property licensees may continue using licensed IP for the duration of their license agreements, regardless of a debtor licensor’s rejection of the agreement. Prospective purchasers interested in capitalizing on brand sales in the wake of an online shopping surge, or otherwise considering purchasing assets from a distressed company or bankruptcy estate, should seek qualified counsel to navigate the sale process and negotiate and execute on their bids.
December 11, 2020
Advertising
#AdLaw - A Quick Wrap-Up From The 2020 ANA/BAA Marketing Law Conference
Last week we quickly pivoted from watching the 24/7 "Map Show" to spending our screen time learning at the ANA 2020 Marketing Law Conference. It was a great three days in Chicago in our pajamas of educational seminars. If you didn’t make it this year, don’t worry – here’s a quick wrap-up of the highlights: Influencers – This has been a hot topic at the law conference for many years now. So you may be asking, haven’t we already covered influencers from every possible angle? You might think so, but there are still lessons to be learned in influencer advertising and things in this area are always changing. But some things never change - the keywords for influencers and the advertisers who hire them are transparency and flexibility. Influencer contracts are highly recommended, the more specific the better, so that influencers understand very clearly what’s expected of them. Also, did you hear that #ad is back? It is transparent, simple and works in almost any situation, but influencers and brands have long shunned it, while lawyers loved it. Are we finally all going to agree on something? Consumer Reviews – With access to brick and mortar stores limited in 2020, online shopping and consumer reviews became increasingly important. For that reason we are often fielding questions from clients about using consumer reviews in advertising. The quick take from the conference is that advertisers should be careful about filtering or reordering reviews on their own sites. Original Content – How are media companies creating and promoting original content during the pandemic? In-house counsel from new and old media discussed. Production of film and television has mostly resumed, but with strict testing and physical distancing protocols. In many cases, studios are also using remote recording or asking talent to step into the role of videographer at home. To promote content, COVID-friendly solutions included sending influencer boxes (with proper posting guidelines, of course), creating virtual concert and art experiences, and drive-in viewings. Bottom line: creative people are finding creative solutions to the pandemic’s challenges. Promotions – Most promotions, sweepstakes, contests, and games have gone virtual, and yes, state laws around promotions still apply in addition to platform rules, so remember to check both to ensure compliance with all applicable laws. Remember the basic tenets of promotion law, which is to remove at least one of the following elements to avoid an illegal lottery: prize, chance, and consideration. Beware that even a giveaway or gift with purchase can potentially create the element of chance if supplies are limited. Product Claims and Labeling – Claim substantiation was a focal point this year, particularly concerning food, beverage, and nutritional supplement labeling, as many warning letters have been sent and lawsuits filed against companies that produce products with claims of mitigating the novel coronavirus and promoting additional health benefits or immunity from a number of ailments. Remember that implied claims are scrutinized along with express claims, so look to the context as well as the wording to make sure that you aren’t communicating anything about the product that is unsubstantiated. CBD and Alcohol Marketing – While the FDA continues to work on regulations governing CBD, uncertainty surrounding the marketing of CBD products remains. FDA has been taking enforcement action against sellers of products containing CBD making health, drug and/or false claims. However, it is generally tolerating sales of CBD products, such as tinctures, gummies and dietary supplements, where no such claims are being made, even if the products are technically unlawful under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. In actions involving CBD product claims, courts are making inconsistent rulings on whether to stay those actions until the FDA’s regulations are issued. On the alcohol side, the impact of the pandemic on longstanding ways of doing business may end up having a beneficial effect in causing a reconsideration of the archaic U.S. regulatory structure for the sale and marketing of alcoholic beverages (i.e., the current three tier system of producers/distributors/retailers) as well as standards for the advertisement and marketing of alcoholic beverages. Looking Ahead to 2021 – Aren’t we all?! In 2021, we can expect that the FTC will be releasing an updated version of its Endorsement Guides to address the changes (especially in social media) since the last version released in 2009. Will we see aggressive enforcement following the release of the updated guides? Maybe, but it is clear that the FTC and other regulators are expanding their enforcement focus beyond just advertisers to others in the chain, such as influencers, ad agencies, PR agencies, publishers and even retailers. The NAD is also looking ahead to 2021 and we can likely expect to see NAD-initiated actions in new industries – potentially consumer electronics or appliances and other areas that we don’t often see in competitor challenges at the NAD. We hope to see everyone in person on November 15, 2021 in San Diego!
November 18, 2020
Trademarks
9th Circuit: Counterfeiting Claim Requires Court to Evaluate Likelihood of Confusion by Comparing Products as a Whole, Not Just Identical Marks. (Except When Maybe It Doesn’t.)
Does the Lanham Act require a plaintiff to show a likelihood of confusion to prevail on a counterfeiting claim? And if so, should the court simply compare the marks at issue, or look beyond them to the products themselves and other marketplace factors bearing on likely confusion? In the Ninth Circuit at least, the answer to both of these questions is now a clear yes. Except, as discussed below, when it isn’t. Summary Although the Ninth Circuit has previously held that Section 1114 requires a likelihood of confusion for a trademark infringement claim, it had never expressly held that a counterfeiting claim requires such a showing. That changed when the appellate court issued its recent decision in Arcona v. Farmacy Beauty. The Ninth Circuit also held that even assuming the marks at issue are identical, there is no presumption of confusion if the products at issue are not identical, before adding in a footnote that there “may be times the mark itself is so strong in the marketplace” that an identical mark could be confusing even if the products are different. Facts and Background The facts and procedural posture are straightforward. Arcona, Inc. sued Farmacy Beauty for trademark infringement and related causes of action based on its rights in the registered trademark “EYE DEW” for skincare products. The district court granted summary judgment for Farmacy, finding that a reasonable consumer would not confuse Farmacy’s skincare product with Arcona’s because their respective packaging featured different shapes, design schemes, text, and colors as well as distinguishing house marks. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Lanham Act requires a likelihood of confusion based on a comparison of the products as a whole, and other marketplace factors such as third party use of the plaintiff’s mark, rather than confining the analysis to a comparison of the identical marks on their own. Practice Points Why does this decision matter? In short, the Lanham Act gives plaintiffs more leverage in trademark disputes when their allegations involve a counterfeiting claim because such claims allow plaintiffs to seek treble and statutory damages, as well as attorney’s fees. Counterfeiting claims often arise when there’s little factual dispute as to the similarity of the marks. As a result, defendants not only face greater exposure, they can have less room to maneuver. But by confirming that plaintiffs cannot take the likelihood of confusion element of their claim for granted even if the marks at issue are identical, the Ninth Circuit created more opportunities for factual disputes that can cut in defendants’ favor. This, in turn, can reduce the leverage plaintiffs benefit from in these situations. The Ninth Circuit also left breadcrumbs for defendants hoping to argue that their identical marks are not counterfeit. In a footnote, the appellate court noted that the district court’s grant of summary judgment appeared to be based in part on its finding that “EYE DEW” was not itself a counterfeit as that term is defined under Section 1127 of the Lanham Act. The district court appeared to construe Section 1127 to allow a court to look beyond the mark and examine the product as a whole in determining whether the “spurious mark” is “identical with, or substantially indistinguishable” from the registered mark. The Ninth Circuit declined to resolve this issue on appeal, but left open the possibility that accused infringers can dispute that a seemingly identical mark is a counterfeit if the product it is attached to cuts against such a finding. Taken together, the Ninth Circuit gave defendants two viable paths to defeat allegations of counterfeiting even when the marks are identical: (1) argue that the mark is not counterfeit, and (2) argue that even if it were, consumers are unlikely to be confused. Although not earth-shattering, the decision has the potential to shift leverage away from plaintiffs toward defendants in cases involving allegations of counterfeiting based only on the use of an identical mark. The Fine Print This may sound like a decision that unambiguously favors defendants, but the Ninth Circuit gave a little something to trademark owners as well. Despite rejecting the premise that confusion can be presumed and insisting that confusion must be assessed by examining the whole product at issue, the appellate court acknowledged in a footnote that there may be times the mark itself is so strong in the marketplace that “the use of an identical mark by itself may cause consumer confusion, even if other aspects of the products are different.” It remains to be seen how lower courts will interpret that guidance, but we can expect this footnote to receive a lot of attention from brand owners eager to avoid the consequences of the holding in this case.
November 11, 2020
Copyrights
Who – What – Where? Trademark and Copyright Venue in 2020 and Beyond
In recent years, commentators have discussed patent venue ad nasuem in the run-up to and following the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in TC Heartland. In a nutshell: after TC Heartland restricted the circumstances under which venue can be found proper for patent cases, plaintiffs brought fewer cases in the Eastern District of Texas. (Before TC Heartland, the Eastern District of Texas achieved a measure of notoriety as the preferred forum for patent plaintiffs.) Not as few as might have been expected, however, as the Eastern District of Texas strained to hold onto jurisdiction by, for example, ruling that the presence of a computer server means a defendant can be “found” in the jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit, however, rejected that view. As expected, the District of Delaware has seen a huge influx of cases, while the California districts have seen fewer than expected. The most noteworthy recent development is the rise of the Western District of Texas, which is now seeing large new numbers of patent filings. But what is happening on the copyright and trademark front? Although there is no equivalent to TC Heartland on which we can hang any conclusions about forum shopping, there are some notable trends highlighted below. On the copyright side, the biggest shift in 2020 is a notable decrease in cases filed in the Southern District of New York in 2020. The Southern District of New York is currently annualizing to have 40% fewer copyright cases in 2020 than in 2019, bringing it roughly back to its 2016 level. Has the apparent bubble of large cases there burst? The chart below, showing cases filed in each calendar year, illustrates the camel hump of cases that appears to be tapering off. On the trademark side, the biggest change is the steep rise in cases filed in the Northern District of Illinois. The Illinois 2020 filings are on pace to be more than double the number filed in that district in 2017, and for the first time far outnumber the filings in the Central District of California. By contrast, the other top four jurisdictions—the Central District of California, Northern District of California, Southern District of Florida, and Southern District of New York—are seeing a decline in cases filed. The irony is that the most popular jurisdictions for copyright and trademark cases are also among the busiest districts, with the largest number of judicial vacancies and cases per judge. For example, the District of New Jersey has six judicial vacancies—two of which have been empty for over five years—and weighted caseloads of over 1,000 filings per judgeship. The Central District of California has seven judicial vacancies, and nearly 700 cases per judgeship. Will litigants begin selecting judicial districts that have a lower caseload, or will they opt to stay with the tried-and-true jurisdictions? Only time will tell. And in this year, more than any other, we know that our vision is not 20-20.
November 5, 2020
Trademarks
Infringers Beware! .Com gTLDs Now Supported by Trademark Clearinghouse
In the ever-raging battle against trademark infringers gobbling up domain names for squatting purposes, trademark owners received a new tool in their arsenal, thanks to a recent update with the Ongoing Notification Service of the Trademark Clearinghouse (TMCH). The TMCH is a centralized database of verified trademarks, built into the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers’ (ICANN) program for new generic Top-Level Domains (gTLD). Among its other responsibilities, ICANN oversees the introduction of new gTLDs, or as we more commonly know them, internet domain name extensions—e.g., .biz., .net, .edu, etc. Since October 2013, ICANN’s gTLD program has enabled hundreds of new gTLDs to gain usage on the internet. With the introduction of each new gTLD, however, there comes a risk that third parties will register domain names that infringe trademark rights, whether intentionally for squatting purposes, or unintentionally. To protect trademark owners, the TMCH database provides trademark owners with information helpful to enforcing their rights against infringing domain names when they are registered on a gTLD. For instance, if a trademark owner registers their trademarks in the TMCH database, whenever someone registers a domain name that matches the trademark records in the TMCH, the new domain name registrant is alerted that there are existing trademark rights in the database that it may be infringing. The new registrant then has to affirmatively acknowledge the trademark owner’s rights prior to completing the registration. If the domain name registration is completed, the TMCH notifies the trademark owner that a domain name was registered. This is an immediate flag of possible trademark infringement. In the past, the TMCH supported most internet domain name extensions—.de, .net, .pro, etc.—but to the frustration of trademark owners, it did not support the most common one of all: .com. Therefore, anytime a new .com domain name was registered, registered trademark owners would not be notified if that new domain contained potentially infringing terms. As of late August 2020, however, the TMCH began alerting its subscribers whenever a potentially infringing .com domain name is registered. With that change, the TMCH became even more useful for trademark owners.
November 4, 2020
Licensing
Accurately Depicting Athletes in Video Games: The Royal Rumble Continues
If you are a fan of legal decisions about professional wrestlers, tattoos, video games or video games about professional wrestlers with tattoos, 2020 has been an exciting year for you. This past Spring, in Solid Oak Sketches, LLC v. 2K Games, Inc., Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed a copyright claim filed by a tattoo owner against 2K Games for its realistic depiction of several tattooed NBA players in the NBA 2K series of video games. While that decision ticked off the boxes for tattoos and video games, professional wrestlers were conspicuously absent. Fortunately, two courts have recently issued decisions to fill that void. The first is a non-precedential, but still interesting Third Circuit decision, and it’s worth stating its colorful name in full: Lenwood Hamilton a/k/a Hard Rock or Skip Hamilton v. Lester Speight, a/k/a Rasta the Urban Warrior, a/k/a Augustus “Cole Train” Cole; Epic Games, Inc., Microsoft, Inc., a/k/a Microsoft Corp.; Microsoft Studios; and The Coalition. With so many aliases and nicknames, one would be forgiven for incorrectly assuming the mafia or superheroes were involved in this case. In fact, plaintiff Lenwood Hamilton is a professional wrestler and former football player, as is one of the defendants, Lester Speight, who is also the voice actor for Augustus Cole, an alien-fighting soldier in the Gears of War series of video games published by Microsoft. Microsoft also received an alias, but presumably has never wrestled professionally. Like other celebrities have sometimes done, Hamilton saw a character in a video game, in this case Augustus Cole, and felt like he was “looking in a mirror.” Accordingly, he filed a complaint alleging that the defendants had violated his right of publicity by using his likeness without his authorization. The district court granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor, holding that their use of the character was protected by the First Amendment. On appeal, the Third Circuit considered whether the alleged depiction of Hamilton “is the very sum and substance of the work in question” or “whether the product containing [the plaintiff’s] likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant[s’] own expression.” The Court held that while there were similarities between Hamilton and Cole (e.g., skin color, facial features, hairstyles, etc.), no reasonable jury could conclude that Hamilton is the “sum and substance” of Cole. Other differences (e.g., Cole serves in the military and fights exotic aliens, but Hamilton has apparently done neither of those things) showed that Hamilton is at most one of the “raw materials from which [Cole] was synthesized.” Thus, the defendants pinned Hamilton’s claims to the mat and walked away victorious, metaphorically waving an absurdly large belt over their heads. The second case, Alexander v. Take-Two Interactive Software Inc., et al., relates to the full trifecta of legal topics: professional wrestlers, video games, and tattoos. Plaintiff Catherine Alexander filed suit against the defendants, which include, among others, video game company Take-Two and World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. (“WWE”) for their roles in creating the WWE 2K series of video games. Alexander is a former tattoo artist responsible for six tattoos on professional wrestler Randy Orton. Ms. Alexander has registered copyrights for five of the tattoos. The WWE 2K games contain realistic depictions of WWE wrestlers, including Orton and his tattoos. Take-Two has a license from WWE to depict WWE wrestlers in its games, and the license permits WWE to reject character designs if they are inaccurate. Thus, had Take-Two inaccurately depicted Orton’s tattoos, WWE would have rejected his character design. However, Alexander never licensed her tattoo designs to anyone, and negotiations in 2009 between WWE and Alexander for rights to the tattoos fell through. When Alexander saw her designs being used in the WWE 2K games, she sued for copyright infringement. Alexander moved for summary judgment as to copying, which the court granted since there was no real question that Take-Two had accurately copied the designs from Orton. Defendants also moved for summary judgment, arguing that three affirmative defenses apply: (1) implied license, (2) fair use, and (3) de minimis use. The court found that there were triable issues of material fact regarding the scope of any implied license, as it was unclear whether Alexander and Orton discussed permissible forms of copying, distribution, and sublicensing. In addition, the court found that there were disputes of material fact precluding summary judgment as to fair use, including the defendants’ purpose in using the tattoo designs, whether defendants’ use was sufficiently transformative, and whether there was market harm to Alexander. Finally, the court denied summary judgment as to the de minimis use defense because (1) the defendants provided no authority showing that de minimis use is a viable defense in the Seventh Circuit and (2) the defendants had copied the tattoos in their entirety. The Alexander court’s conclusion seems to be at odds with the Solid Oaks Sketches decision, which had very similar facts and legal issues. Surprisingly, despite the similarities and recentness of the Solid Oaks Sketches decision, the Alexander decision does not mention it. Alexander was previously set for trial during the week of October 19, 2020, but it has been rescheduled to February 16, 2021 due to COVID-19. That means that we will need to wait at least a few more months to find out whether there could be a budding split between the Second and Seventh Circuits with respect to realistic depictions of tattooed celebrities in video games.
October 28, 2020
Trademarks
TTAB Weighs in on Registrability of CBD Trademarks
In a precedential decision earlier this year, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board thinned some of the haze surrounding the registrability of trademarks for hemp-derived CBD products. In line with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office guidelines issued last year, the Board confirmed that marks covering food and dietary supplements containing hemp-derived CBD are not currently registrable. The decision involved an application for the mark CW covering “hemp oil extracts sold as an integral component of dietary and nutritional supplements” owned by the company behind the “Charlotte’s Web” strain of cannabis, which some may recognize due to national news coverage of its efficacy in treating seizure disorders. The record contained evidence that the applicant sold versions of the goods containing both CBD derived from marijuana (defined as cannabis containing more than 0.3% THC and which is illegal under the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”)) and from hemp (defined as cannabis containing less than 0.3% THC and which is no longer illegal under the CSA). This dual use prompted the examining attorney to refuse the application on the ground the goods cannot be used lawfully in interstate commerce because they constitute foods that are per se illegal under the federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”) and on the ground that the goods are illegal under the CSA. Eschewing the CSA, the Board focused its review on the legality of the goods under the FDCA. Consistent with FDA guidelines, the Board concluded that the CBD oil sold by the applicant qualifies as a food that is subject to the FDCA. The Board further concluded that the CBD oil cannot be a lawful food or dietary supplement under the FDCA because CBD is an active ingredient in the drug Epidiolex, and the FDA’s general rule is that a biologic (such as CBD) cannot be marketed as food or a dietary supplement if the biologic is part of a clinical investigation. In response, the applicant attempted to invoke an exception to the FDCA by arguing that CBD was marketed as a food/dietary supplement before these clinical investigations were underway. The Board rejected this argument on the ground the evidence submitted, which consisted of conclusory statements from the Hemp Industries Association supporting the position, were self-serving and not probative. The decision is also notable for what it does not say. Specifically, the Board did not outright reject the legality of the mark on the ground it is used with goods deemed unlawful under the CSA, which would have been a much easier needle to thread given the applicant’s use of the mark with marijuana byproducts. This tends to confirm that unlawful use of a mark with one type of product does not necessarily prohibit registration of a mark with another lawful product. Additionally, the Board did not completely foreclose the possibility of registering marks for hemp-derived CBD in connection with foods or dietary supplements. To the extent there exists evidence that supports invoking the FDCA’s exception based on marketing of CBD prior to clinical trials, registration may be achievable. And the FDA could always change course in how it treats CBD products. Indeed, organizations such as the National Industrial Hemp Council have submitted comments urging the FDA to consider CBD as “generally recognized as safe” for consumption. If the FDA were to take this approach, it would almost certainly clear the path for federal registration of marks for food and dietary supplements containing CBD. We’ll continue to monitor the FDA’s treatment of CBD products and any impact it might have on the registrability of marks in this space.
October 27, 2020
Copyrights
Supreme Court Cert Denial Closes Book on Storied VARA Dispute
By Eco84 - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=17846929 As you may recall from our prior posts regarding the advisory jury verdict and subsequent district court ruling in the 5Pointz litigation (Cohen et al v. G&M Realty LP et al.), in 2018, Judge Block in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that a developer whitewashing famous exterior aerosol (or “graffiti”) art, in the space commonly known as 5Pointz, constituted a willful violation of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), and awarded the artists $6.75 million in damages. In February of this year, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. As the Second Circuit explained, the crux of the parties’ dispute on appeal was whether the works at 5Pointz were works of “recognized stature,” because VARA gives “the author of a work of visual art” the right “to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature” and provides that “any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.” The appellate court concluded that a work is of recognized stature when it is one of high quality, status, or caliber that has been acknowledged as such by a relevant community. It went on to note that the most important component of stature will generally be artistic quality; the relevant community will typically be the artistic community—i.e., art historians, art critics, museum curators, gallerists, prominent artists, and other experts. The appellate court stated that recognized stature is necessarily a “fluid concept.” Applying the above-mentioned standard, and evaluating the evidence submitted at trial, the Second Circuit held that the district court’s findings supporting its “recognized stature” ruling were not clearly erroneous, and thus must be upheld. In doing so, the appellate court also rejected the developer’s argument that temporary works, such as graffiti art that may later be painted over with new art, cannot achieve recognized stature. The Second Circuit also agreed with the lower court’s findings of willful violation, and its maximum statutory damages award resulting therefrom. Among other reasons, both the lower court and Second Circuit were persuaded that the whitewashing of the works was done without any genuine business need to do so, but rather was an “act of pure pique and revenge” toward the artists that had sued him to preserve the work. In July of this year, the developer filed a petition for writ of certiorari with U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the imposition of liability on a finding that the works were of “recognized stature” violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the undefined statutory term is unconstitutionally vague. Based on the same vagueness argument, the developer also argued that the finding of willfulness, and accompanying maximum statutory damages, also violated the Fifth Amendment. Earlier this month, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. As is typical, the Court did not provide any reasoning for the denial, which leaves in place the lower court’s $6.75 million damages award. The Supreme Court’s denial closes the book on a lengthy chapter in art law history. The rulings of the lower courts can be seen as a strong recognition of graffiti and street art as a major category of contemporary art that may enjoy protection under VARA.
October 26, 2020
Copyrights
Google v. Oracle: What We Learned from Oral Argument
On October 7, 2020, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Google v. Oracle, a decade-long battle challenging Oracle’s claim to own copyrights in certain aspects of its Java software platform that Google implemented in Android phones without taking a license. We’ve been tracking this case since last December, with deep dives on each of the questions presented to the Court: (1) whether copyright protection extends to software interfaces, and (2) whether, as the jury found, Google’s use of Oracle’s software interfaces in the context of creating a new computer program constitutes fair use. Over approximately ninety minutes on the record, the Justices peppered counsel with more than 50 questions on these topics that, on balance, signaled skepticism of Google’s positions on each of the issues before the Court. Scope of Copyright Protection Before considering the first question the Court will address, recall what this case is not about. The Court will not decide whether computer programs can be protected under the Copyright Act—that’s answered by the plain text of the Copyright Act itself, which confirms that they can. Instead, the question is narrower: is there a subset of computer code that is so functional that it cannot be protected by the Copyright Act? Google says yes, and puts Oracle’s declaring code in that category. But despite widespread industry support for Google’s position, the Court seems poised to reject this argument. Method of Operation Under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), copyright protection extends to original works of authorship, and § 101 expressly lists computer programs among the works of authorship that can be protected. But, per § 102(b), copyright does not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery” embodied in the work. As we detailed in March, Google asks the Court to distinguish declaring code (i.e., the computer code that “declares” what the computer program will do, which Google alternately refers to as “software interfaces”) from implementing code (i.e., the computer code that actually performs the task stated in the declaring code), arguing that although implementing code may be protectable, declaring code is not because it is a method of operation. More specifically, Google takes the view that declaring code is distinguishable from implementing code because it is a software interface—a set of commands that instructs a computer what to do, not how to do it. Google’s argument that declaring code does not warrant copyright protection is premised on the proposition that it is purely functional and not expressive. According to Google, because declaring code allows one program to efficiently communicate with another, it constitutes an essential building block of software development that allows different computer programs to seamlessly communicate with each other. In its briefing and at oral argument Google analogized the dispute to Baker v. Selden, a Supreme Court decision from 1880 holding that a copyright in a book about an improved system of book-keeping did not entitle the author to prevent others from using the ledger system described in the book. A problem with Google’s reliance on Baker—beyond the disorienting leap from 19th century bookkeeping to smartphones— is that Google didn’t copy just the idea of using declaring code or the functions performed by the declaring code, it copied the expressive content of the declaring code. That is not true of the ledger system described in Baker. As Oracle put it, “this case would be like Baker if we were trying to block others from using their own [declaring code] to organize their own prewritten programs. But [Oracle] wrote its own specific layout and filled in the blanks 30,000 times over. We seek to protect only that fully realized expression.” The Justices struggled with Google’s reasoning. Justice Roberts noted that Oracle was attempting to protect its “particular expression,” and not the functionality of the declaring code. Justice Thomas wondered why § 101’s identification of computer programs as protectable did not end the inquiry, while Justice Alito worried that Google’s argument that declaring code is a method of operation would put all computer code at risk of losing copyright protection. Justice Gorsuch deemed Google’s decision to “mov[e] past” its § 102(b) argument a “wise move given the fact that 101 says computer programs, including statements or instructions, in order to bring about a certain result, may be copyrighted.” Justice Kavanaugh wondered whether Google was still making the method of operation argument while pressing Google on why its reasoning would not swallow the Copyright Act’s protection for computer programs. Justice Breyer found it “pretty tough” to understand how declaring code differed from any other computer program. Justice Kagan noted that she was “a little bit surprised or confused” by the arguments made by Google, which appeared to abandon § 102(b) in favor of the merger doctrine (discussed below). And Justice Sotomayor worried that Google could not draw a “clean line” to define a method of operation in the context of source code. Despite all that, Google had at least one bright moment when Justice Sotomayor implied in a question posed to Oracle that it is well-settled that declaring code is not copyrightable. She further summarized the industry’s understanding of that precedent as: “they can copy only what’s necessary to run on the application, but they have to change everything else.” She then asked: “Why should we change that understanding?” Oracle disputed Justice Sotomayor’s interpretation of this precedent and argued that not a single court has drawn such a distinction between declaring and implementing code. It does seem a stretch to state that the decisions referenced by Justice Sotomayor held declaring code is not copyrightable, and in its briefing, even Google did not argue so. In fact, Google acknowledged in its petition that “the courts of appeals are deeply divided on the appropriate standard for determining the circumstances under which a software interface is copyrightable.” Aside from Justice Sotomayor’s remarks, the Court seemed skeptical that software interfaces—as distinct from other types of computer code—are unprotectable methods of operation. Merger Doctrine Even if declaring code is not a method of operation, Google argues it should be excluded from protection by the merger doctrine. Under the merger doctrine, if an idea can only be expressed in one (or very few) ways, then the expression of the idea “merges” with the idea and cannot be the subject of copyright protection. The merger doctrine is intended to prevent one entity from claiming ownership over an idea merely because it was the first to discover the only way to express it. A classic example illustrating the merger doctrine is the rules to a game. A rule can be expressed in writing, and thus can be protected by copyright. But if that rule is so basic that granting copyright protection would preclude the use of the underlying idea itself in other games, then the merger doctrine denies copyright protection because to hold otherwise would be to grant a de facto copyright to the idea itself. Google’s argument that the merger doctrine should apply to declaring code is premised on the fact that there is only one way to write Oracle’s declaring code, and thus granting Oracle a copyright to it would preclude others from using the functionality it describes. But Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart (arguing on behalf of the United States in support of Oracle) zeroed in on a weakness in Google’s position. Acknowledging that there is only one way to write the declaring code, he argued that Google’s premise is circular because Google defines the underlying function—i.e., the idea that the declaring code’s expression would need to monopolize for the merger doctrine to apply—as invoking implementing code in response to the calls made by the declaring code. This is a problem for Google because under § 302(a), copyright protection arises from the time of the work’s creation, and when Oracle’s predecessor-in-interest wrote the declaring code there were no ideas independent of the code itself that the declaring code could have monopolized. And, per Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, the dispute arose not because Oracle’s declaring code is the only way to accomplish the functions it expressed, but because Oracle’s particular way of expressing it became popular among developers. Deputy Solicitor General Stewart then offered the Court a bright-line rule: the merger doctrine should apply to computer code if a particular line of code is, without regard to the “acquired expertise of other actors, the only way to make the computer perform a particular function.” By this reasoning, the merger doctrine does not apply where, at the time the code was written, there were multiple options available to whomever wrote it. Here, again, the Court struggled with Google’s position. Judge Roberts noted that there are “a lot of ways” to write the functions ultimately expressed by the declaring code when Oracle wrote it. Justice Sotomayor pressed Google to explain how it could acknowledge that the merger doctrine does not apply to implementing code, while insisting that it applies to declaring code. Justice Kagan observed that the problems Oracle solved with its declaring code could have been solved in other ways, but Oracle “happened to come up with a particularly elegant one.” Justice Gorsuch echoed his colleague, characterizing Google’s argument as a “wish to share the facilities of a more successful rival because they’ve come up with a particularly elegant or efficient or successful or highly adopted solution.” Justice Kavanaugh criticized the circularity of Google’s argument, noting that Google appeared to “define the relevant idea” in terms of what it copied, adding—no doubt to the consternation of any engineers who might have been listening—that “[y]ou’re not allowed to copy a song just because it’s the only way to express that song.” In the end, the Court seemed receptive to the argument that because at the time Oracle created the declaring code it could have written it in many other ways to achieve the same functionality, the merger doctrine should not be invoked to deny Oracle copyright protection to its declaring code. Fair Use On the second issue before the Court, i.e., whether, as the jury found, Google’s use of Oracle’s software interfaces in the context of creating a new computer program constitutes fair use, the Justices revealed less through their questioning. The Four-Factor Test The Justices spent comparatively little time probing the individual fair use factors under § 107. Of the four factors, the Court seemed most interested in whether Google’s use of Oracle’s declaring code in Android (a smartphone, as opposed to a desktop, operating system) was transformative. Justice Thomas wondered what a transformative use might look like in the context of source code, which by its nature is intended to operate the same way in each environment in which it is used. Picking up on this theme, Justice Sotomayor seemed dissatisfied by Oracle’s argument that adopting Java for the smartphone environment was not transformative. Justice Kagan took it one step further, wondering whether transformative use “isn’t the right question here, although it is in other contexts.” Taken together, these questions hint at the possibility that the Court will comment on how lower courts should consider the purpose and character of the use of computer code in future fair use analyses. Standard of Review Substance aside, procedural questions loom large over how the fair use issue came to the Court. Before the hearing, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on whether the Federal Circuit applied the proper standard of review when it reversed the jury’s determination finding fair use. In sum, Google argues that the Federal Circuit should have applied the more deferential “reasonable juror” standard to the jury’s finding of fair use, rather than the de novo standard of review. Oracle responds that the Federal Circuit correctly reviewed the findings de novo, but that it is immaterial which standard of review applies because the Federal Circuit also found that “no reasonable jury” could have found in Google’s favor on fair use. Thus, Oracle contends it would have prevailed even if the Federal Circuit had formally applied the more deferential standard of review. Although the conventional wisdom appears to be that the Federal Circuit did something unusual when it overturned the jury’s finding of fair use, each side took pains to establish the other’s desired outcome as unprecedented. Google reiterated that before the Federal Circuit’s decision in this case, “no prior appellate court ever overturned a fair use verdict.” Oracle, however, countered that “[n]o court has found fair use or upheld a fair use verdict where a copyist copied so much valuable expression into a competing commercial sequel to mean the same thing and serve the same purpose as the original.” Indeed, Oracle challenged the premise and the weight that should be afforded to the uniqueness of the Federal Circuit’s decision overturning the jury’s finding of fair use, noting that Google could only identify 5 cases that went to a jury on the issue of fair use in the last 30 years. In contrast, in the same timeframe, over 100 fair use cases were decided as a matter of law on summary judgment. Oracle also stressed that there is nothing about fair use that prevents an appellate court from overturning a district court’s determination and referenced cases in which appellate courts did just that. At the hearing, however, the Justices directed less attention to procedural questions than anticipated, and the Court offered few clues as to which way it might rule on this aspect of this case. The most overt statement came from Justice Alito when—echoing Oracle—he asked what he should do if he finds that factors 1 and 4 of the fair use analysis “weigh very heavily” against Google, and that as a result a jury “couldn’t reasonably find” in Google’s favor. Industry Impact If you’ve managed to wade through the ins-and-outs of this dispute, you may still be wondering why it is so hotly contested. The reason, in part, is its potential to profoundly affect how engineers do their jobs throughout the software industry. What the rather doctrinal questions before the Court tend to obscure, and what many amicus briefs filed by computer scientists, scholars, and representatives of the software industry passionately argue, is that a ruling in Oracle’s favor may force tens of thousands of engineers to abandon longstanding practices that include reusing declaring code without a license. Per the amici, doing so will make the process of coding computer programs less efficient, will stand in the way of innovation, and will hurt consumers. So while Google stands alone as the petitioner, many engineers see the company as a proxy for their own concerns. Oracle, of course, has its own policy advocates, though they tend to focus at a higher level of abstraction on the incentives the Copyright Act is intended to promote and protect. The Court is well aware that its decision will reach beyond the narrow questions before it, and each Justice devoted attention to the policy concerns expressed by the parties and many amici. Several Justices, however, appeared to downplay the stakes. Justices Kavanaugh and Alito appeared to dismiss concerns that the “sky will fall” if the Court rules in Oracle’s favor. Sticking with the same metaphor, Justice Sotomayor in turn dismissed concerns that the sky will fall if the Court rules in Google’s favor. If there is one broad takeaway from the case, it is that there is a significant disconnect between how lawyers and judges focused on the text and ostensible purpose of the Copyright Act view this dispute, and how the engineers who will be most directly affected by the Court’s decision view it. When you strip away all the legal doctrines and technical jargon, Google v. Oracle is just another reminder that law and policy do not always align in a way that those affected by it find intuitive. Conclusion The questions above are now for the Court to answer. We will provide another—perhaps final—update, unless the Court remands on fair use, once the opinion issues in 2021.
October 22, 2020
Trade Dress
Jack Daniel’s Seeks "Relief" from Supreme Court Following Spat with Dog Toy Creator
Is humor protected speech? Although the answer might seem like an obvious yes, a dog toy maker’s Jack Daniel’s bottle lookalike dog chew toy with poopy puns blurs the line between freedom of expression and the protection of famous marks. In 2014, VIP Products LLC began selling a dog chew toy designed to look like the Jack Daniel’s whiskey bottle, but bearing the name “Bad Spaniels.” In place of the “Old No. 7 Sour Mash Whiskey” that can be found on the famous whiskey bottle, VIP Products’ dog toy humorously states “Old No. 2. on your Tennessee Carpet.” Jack Daniel’s issued a cease and desist letter, which resulted in VIP Products dragging the whiskey maker into court. VIP Products filed a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona seeking the court to declare that Bad Spaniels did not infringe or dilute any trademark rights and that Jack Daniel’s trade dress and bottle design were not entitled to trademark protection. Jack Daniel’s filed federal and state law counterclaims for infringement and dilution by tarnishment of its trademark and trade dress. After a four-day bench trial, the District of Arizona found in favor of Jack Daniel’s. On January 29, 2018, the district court issued its ruling which held that Jack Daniel’s had established the likelihood of consumer confusion and established that the Bad Spaniels dog toy likely tarnished the reputation of Jack Daniel’s trademarks by linking a product for human consumption with dog poop. Notably, the District of Arizona specifically rejected VIP Products’ defense that its Bad Spaniels chew toy merited heightened First Amendment protection. VIP Products filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. On March 31, 2020, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision. It did not disturb the district court’s factual findings that VIP Products’ use of the Jack Daniel’s trademarks and trade dress created a likelihood of confusion. Rather, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Bad Spaniels dog toy merited heightened First Amendment protection, and therefore vacated the district court’s judgment in favor of Jack Daniel’s and remanded the case for further proceedings. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that the Bad Spaniels dog toy—although “surely not equivalent of the Mona Lisa”—was an “expressive work” because it communicated a “humorous message.” Because of this finding, the Ninth Circuit used the Second Circuit’s framework in Rogers v. Grimaldi to analyze whether the Bad Spaniels dog toy violated the Lanham Act. In Rogers, actress Ginger Rogers claimed that a movie titled “Ginger and Fred” violated Section 1125(a) of the Lanham Act by creating a false impression that the actress had sponsored the movie. The Second Circuit rejected this claim and reasoned that the expressive element of a movie title warranted more protection than the labeling of ordinary commercial products. Thus, the Rogers’ analysis requires a plaintiff claiming trademark infringement to prove not only a likelihood of confusion, but also that the defendant’s use of a trademark is “not artistically relevant to the underlying work” or “explicitly misleads consumers as to the source or content of the work.” On September 15, 2020, Jack Daniel’s filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. In its Petition, Jack Daniel’s highlights the Court of Appeals circuit split regarding the treatment of trademark infringement claims when the use of a famous mark in a commercial product is humorous. As the Petition remarks, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits do not require a heightened analysis for trademark infringement claims with respect to the humorous use of marks in commercial products. Per Jack Daniel's, the Ninth Circuit diverged from these circuits by requiring Jack Daniel’s not only to establish likelihood of consumer confusion for trademark infringement, but also to demonstrate that the use of the mark is either “not artistically relevant to the underlying work” or “explicitly misleads consumers as to the source or content of the work.” As the Petition points out, the Second Circuit has refused to extend the Rogers’ analysis to claims involving the humorous use of a mark to sell a competing product. Although Jack Daniel’s does not argue that the Bad Spaniels dog toy competes with its famous whiskey, nevertheless the whiskey maker argues that the dog toy is sold in such a way that consumers are likely to associate it with Jack Daniel’s. The Petition states that the Bad Spaniels dog toy is sold through several retailers that also sell Jack Daniel’s licensed merchandise, and further, VIP Products’ promotional materials feature the dog toy along with a real Jack Daniel’s bottle, all of which could lead to a false conclusion that the two products are related. The Ninth Circuit sidestepped the commercial product aspect of the dog toy. Instead, relying on Rogers, the Ninth Circuit held that although VIP Products used Jack Daniel’s trade dress and bottle design to sell its Bad Spaniels dog toy, the use was nonetheless “noncommercial” because it conveyed a “humorous message” and therefore was entitled to First Amendment protection. Eyes are on the Supreme Court to see if it weighs in on the issue of whether humorous products are entitled to First Amendment protections, and whether it will extend the Second Circuit’s analysis for trademark infringement claims of “expressive works” to VIP Products’ humorous dog toys.
October 19, 2020