The TMCA
Advertising
INTA in Sunny San Diego: A Quick Wrap-Up
Photo by Sarah Robertson The Dorsey Trademark, Copyright + Advertising team is back from the 2025 International Trademark Association Meeting. It was one for the books. We mixed and mingled with old and new colleagues and as well as our friends from around the world. In between all the meetings and social events, we did manage to attend a few of the important panels and of course, our committee meetings. Here are the highlights: AI-Driven Advertising: Copyright Issues in the New Frontier – This was a lively and engaging panel that focused on managing the chaos that the burgeoning use of AI by companies and independent contractors has caused relating to ownership and authorship of AI-created content. The panel several times reiterated the mantra: Be Fair, Be Bold, Be Reasonable. They encouraged companies to ask whether they actually need to own the content that is created. They also discussed contract clauses “from the wild” and pointed out what works and what can be unreasonable. The most important takeaway was to make sure that whoever is using AI to create content is documenting the process carefully, regardless of whether it is a vendor or an employee. This is because the Copyright Office will require an explanation as to the use of AI to determine whether, and how much of, a work is registrable. USPTO Update: Fireside Chat with Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and USPTO Acting Director Coke Morgan Stewart – Acting Director Stewart answered questions about the PTO’s direction under the current administration. She indicated that the USPTO has explained to the administration that as a fee generating agency – rather than a taxpayer funded agency – the USPTO should not be subject to current cost-cutting measures. Despite this, Acting Director Stewart believes the agency can continue to reduce pendency and maintain quality without filing open positions. She also indicated the USPTO is looking into the use of AI to help with review of design marks and to detect fraud. Our neighbors to the North, the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO), also provided updates about the examination process and efficiency, indicating that they hoped to clear their backlog in just a few months. Greenwashing, Greenhushing and Sustainably: INTA’s Brands and Sustainability Committee met at this year’s conference to discuss the hot topics of greenwashing and greenhushing. If you are not familiar, greenwashing is essentially the false marketing of green/environmental or sustainable claims. Most recently, we’ve seen a lot greenwashing in the context of aspirational claims, namely brands striving to be carbon neutral or reduce their emissions by a certain year. Greenhushing, on the other hand, is when brands do good for the environment, but don’t publicize it. Greenhushing can occur for various reasons including, fear of accusations of greenwashing, consumer perception that “green” products are more expensive or inferior, or even for political reasons. While we didn’t make any promises or claims, the committee was proud to support a digital business card initiative and encourage the use of reusable water bottles to help make the conference more sustainable for all. Crafting Successful Agreements with Branding Agencies: A roundtable discussion took place between practitioners from Canada, the UK, and US on how brands can best partner with their creative agencies and areas of best drafting practices for agreements between the two. Discussion of the scope of services and consideration of AI-generated work product dominated the conversation, including how best to allocate risk created by the use of AI particularly where this work product is specifically contemplated or where influencers are involved. Discussion of the extent of preliminary clearance work members of the group were carrying out on behalf of agencies, or that agencies were otherwise expected to conduct, also took place. An overall downward trend in full, in-depth trademark search orders more generally, as shared by the one of the leading search companies present, was also covered. The unique risks attached to working with smaller agencies, including the absence of enterprise software licenses, was also discussed. Law and Policy | Rules of the Road in Engaging with Celebrities, Influencers, and Fans: This session brought a global perspective to how companies interact with and negotiate with celebrities and influencers in relation to the promotion of their brands. The panelists focused on how they prioritize and make use of time and resources depending upon the nature and length of a promotion, as well as the potential impact of the promotional activities on their brands. Interestingly, in Argentina, many companies create specific scripts that must be used by influencers to help minimize regulatory and legal risks. Aside from potential pitfalls in agreements, the panelists also discussed deepfakes and artificial intelligence and the impact on their promotional activities and on their brands, as well as issues with poor influencer behavior and even taxation issues. Truly, an ever-evolving area as technology becomes even more intwined in the influencer landscape. Successfully Mediating IP Disputes: Key Insights and Practical Tips – INTA’s ADR Committee hosted a panel discussion on trademark mediation, highlighting the growing value of mediation in resolving IP disputes. Panelists emphasized its advantages over litigation, including lower costs, reduced risk, and the opportunity for creative, business-focused solutions. They discussed the qualities of effective mediators, such as neutrality, communication skills, and business acumen, and considered whether mediators should propose solutions or simply facilitate dialogue. The consensus favored a balanced approach that maintains neutrality while offering constructive suggestions. The discussion also addressed the importance of preparation, confidentiality, and having decision-makers present. Challenges of virtual mediation were noted, including distractions and reduced engagement, as well as the supportive but limited role of AI. Real-world examples illustrated the need for mediators to guide the process while allowing parties to retain control over outcomes. Annual Review of Trademark Cases: Always an attendee favorite, this session featured an overview of trademark decisions over the last 12 months lead by Theodore Davis of Kilpatrick Townsend and John Welch of The TTABlog fame. Notable decisions include those upholding the validity of the Lanham Act’s “names clause” (requiring written consent to register a mark containing a person’s name) under the First Amendment (Vidal v. Elster, 602 U.S. 286 (2024)), confirming that inaccurate patent claims may provide grounds actionable false advertising claims (Crocs, Inc. v. Effervescent, Inc., No. 22-2160 (Fed. Cir. 2024)), holding mere use of a party’s name in a judicial proceeding is not actionable under Lanham Act (Dieujuste v. Sin, No. 24-1522-cv (2d Cir. 2025)), confirming that the TTAB’s “something more” doctrine applies only to the relatedness of goods to services and not to goods to goods (In re Samsung Display Co., Ltd., No. 90502617 (T.T.A.B. 2024)), and clarifying that product color resulting from practicing an expired patent cannot also have trademark significance because the color is functional under the expired patent (CeramTec GmbH v. Coorstek Bioceramics LLC, No. 2023-1502 (Fed. Cir. 2025)). John Welch also recounted his top losing TTAB arguments, with the number one slot belonging to arguments that attempt to impart in real-world limitations to goods/services in an application/registration (since the TTAB typically only considers the goods/services as listed), and listed some of his pet peeves, such as using the word “trademark” as a verb (ironically used as such by the Supreme Court in its Elster decision).
May 27, 2025
Regulatory Compliance
Artificial Intelligence Launching Agentic AI in an Uncertain U.S. Regulatory Landscape
Are you ready to begin adding AI Agents to your human teams? You will soon be getting requests to do so. While business teams will be wowed by what AI Agents and their subagents can do, the artificial intelligence regulatory environment is increasingly uncertain, and we advise caution. Within its first few days, the new administration revoked the 2023 Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence (the “Old AI Executive Order”) – which had been intended to mitigate risks associated with AI technologies by imposing safety guidelines such as a watermarking system for AI-generated content. Next, the president issued a new executive order Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence (the “New AI Executive Order”), providing White House staff 180 days to develop a plan “to sustain and enhance America’s global AI dominance in order to promote human flourishing, economic competitiveness, and national security.” Under the New AI Executive Order, federal agencies are required to immediately review and suspend, revise, or rescind any prior governance and safety measures undertaken to comply with the Old AI Executive Order that are not consistent with the New AI Executive Order. Meanwhile, on January 21, the president announced a new $500 billion private sector deal, “The Stargate Project,” which is a new joint venture that relies on SoftBank, OpenAI, Oracle, and MGX as initial equity funders in a bid to rapidly expand U.S. AI infrastructure by building massive new data centers, first in Texas then in other potential sites across the country. In the same week, leading big tech companies including Oracle and OpenAI each announced the next phase of the AI revolution with the release of new AI Agents designed to autonomously handle specific tasks and ultimately “join the workforce and materially change the output of companies.” What Are AI Agents? While traditional AI chatbots using large language models (“LLMs”) are designed to respond to users within the AI system, the latest generation of advanced AI Agents (aka AI Super-Agents or Agentic AI) are now empowered to interact with computer, network, and internet environments to automate tasks. Open AI states that its new AI Agent, Operator, “can be asked to handle a wide variety of repetitive browser tasks such as filling out forms, ordering groceries, and even creating memes.” Accordingly, Operator “can ‘see’ (through screenshots) and ‘interact’ (using all the actions a mouse and keyboard allow) with a browser, enabling it to take action on the web without requiring custom API integrations.” By combining the power of LLMs with new technologies such as the Oracle Cloud Infrastructure and retrieval-augmented generation, Oracle’s AI Agents can interact with enterprise data and can apparently be used by companies to recruit qualified job candidates, perform complex customer data analytics, optimize call centers, and expedite legal, financial, and academic research tasks. AI Agents can be trained or instructed to follow the values of a user or business. Whether that can be consistently implemented remains to be seen. In testing, some AI systems have been shown to engage in “scheming” where they change results or take unexpected actions toward an ultimate goal set by the user. Although the usefulness of these technologies is undeniable, companies looking to deploy AI Agents should be aware of the legal risks and pitfalls that may accompany the use of these revolutionary new tools. Legal Challenges and Mitigation Strategies AI Agency Liability. In July 2024, a California district court allowed a case against HR and finance platform Workday to proceed, stating that an employer’s use of Workday’s AI-powered HR-screening algorithm may create direct liability for both the employer and Workday under the theory of agency liability. In this hiring discrimination case, the plaintiff alleged that his prospective employer delegated “traditional hiring functions, including rejecting applicants, to the algorithmic decision-making tools provided by Workday.” The court found that by designing an AI technology to make decisions that would normally be made by a live employee, Workday should be treated as an agent of the employer for purposes of liability so long as the employer actually relied on the AI technology in its hiring process. While this case is still making its way through the courts, AI Agent vendors and deployers could subsequently be exposed to both civil and criminal liability based on the actions of the AI Agent, a theory that had previously only been applied by the courts to the actions of live humans. AI Product Liability. Given the increased responsibility and autonomy being granted to AI Agents, it is possible that developers and deployers of AI Agents could also be required to contend with product liability claims. Manufacturers and sellers can be held responsible for injuries caused by defective or unreasonably dangerous products. If an AI Agent makes a poor and costly decision, a plaintiff may claim that the AI Agent was defectively designed and/or that the developer failed to adequately warn the plaintiff of the AI Agent’s limitations. This theory of liability is currently being tested in cases against AI-chatbot platform Character.AI. In the fall of 2024, the mother of a deceased minor in Florida brought a product liability case against the developers of Character.AI – an AI-chatbot role-playing platform that allows users to create and converse with AI-powered characters – alleging that her son died by suicide after becoming harmfully dependent on his relationship with his Character.AI companion “Dany.” In December, parents in Texas brought additional product liability claims, stating that, without warning, Character.AI chatbots exposed their children to hypersexualized content, self-harm, and violent behaviors, with one chatbot allegedly encouraging a child to kill his parents when they tried to limit his screen time. AI Contractual Considerations. Businesses seeking to onboard AI Agents should implement clear contractual provisions to allocate and manage risk. When reviewing warranties, limitations of liability, and indemnification clauses, companies should want to know if and to what extent the AI Agent vendor will indemnify the company for an AI Agent’s decision making, especially if those decisions are illegal or cause harm to end-users or others. Businesses should also consider who is responsible for training employees to use AI Agents safely and whether that training relates to the AI provider’s contractual liability. In addition to requiring compliance with emerging state and international AI regulations such as the Colorado AI Act and the EU AI Act, companies should also carefully contemplate intellectual property (“IP”) and data ownership, rules for algorithmic training inputs, and customization of standard liability shifting terms. Whereas typical software-as-a-service contracts usually address ownership of software and/or underlying data, AI Agent vendor contracts should also address IP-ownership of AI-generated content such as images, text, and even new software. Regarding algorithmic training inputs, companies must decide whether the AI Agent’s algorithm can train on company data, and if so, how such company data must be protected and stored. In addition, businesses should be wary of AI Agents violating third party terms of service which may prohibit access and use by bots. In non-negotiated use of Agentic AI, such as when a company deploys an off-the-shelf AI Agent from one of the major providers, companies should similarly review the provisions outlined above and weigh the ultimate risk of deploying this novel technology. AI Privacy and Cybersecurity Considerations. Using an AI Agent may result in the processing of enormous amounts of personal information as defined by state, federal, and international data privacy laws. For example, AI Agents designed to read and prepare automated responses to emails may digest any personal information contained in a user’s inbox, while an AI Agent designed to make investment decisions will process sensitive financial information about the user. By collecting such large amounts of personal information, companies may grow their cybersecurity attack target, as bad actors are typically attracted to companies known to collect large amounts of detailed and/or sensitive personal information. Furthermore, by deploying an AI Agent, a company in scope for comprehensive state privacy laws, such as the California Consumer Privacy Act, may be required to offer consumers the opportunity to opt-out of the AI-Agent’s automated decision making, while also disclosing to its consumers how their personal information is collected and used by the AI Agent, including whether their personal information subsequently trains the AI Agent’s algorithm. AI Agents that are not adequately directed and supervised could also perpetrate scams, develop vulnerable software code, or cause cybersecurity incidents, so human supervision and real-time monitoring will be essential to reduce legal risk, especially with initial uses of AI Agents. With the launch of AI Agents, concerns about AI scheming have become immediate. Adding AI Agents to your teams may have serious, unintended consequences and should involve significant testing and implementation of controls prior to and during use. Businesses will soon be training AI Agents in their corporate values and adding AI Agents to their teams. The way we work will never be the same.
February 11, 2025
Copyrights
Testing the Limits of Copyright Protection for A.I.-Generated Art – Colorado Artist Challenges Registration Refusal in Court
Two years ago, the Colorado State Fair’s annual art competition sparked controversy after awarding a blue ribbon to a work generated in part by A.I. Jason Allen, the artist responsible for the work, said at the time, “I won, and I didn’t break any rules.” The judges agreed, despite outrage from some that the work lacked artistic merit. While the fairground judges saw fit to credit Allen as author of the work, it remains to be seen whether the federal judiciary will do the same. The U.S. Copyright Office refused to register Allen’s work for copyright based on lack of human authorship, and Allen has recently filed suit in Colorado federal district court to reverse the Copyright Office’s decision. Allen’s case centers on the question of whether human authorship is present in A.I.-generated images where human input is limited to the textual prompts given to guide the A.I.’s work. Allen’s work, entitled “Théâtre D’opéra Spatial,” depicts Victorian performers looking out from a stage towards an otherworldly portal in a surreal synthesis of past and future. To create the work, Allen used Midjourney (an A.I.-driven text-to-image software) to generate an iterative series of images refined over the course of 624 prompting sessions undertaken by Allen. Allen then upscaled the resolution of the final image using Gigapixel AI and added additional elements using Adobe Photoshop. The Copyright Office has thus far taken a dim view of A.I-generated images. Last February, it partially canceled a copyright registration for a graphic novel upon learning that the novel’s images were produced by Midjourney. Although the text and arrangement of the images in the graphic novel were human authored, the Copyright Office concluded that the individual images themselves were not, and thus they could not be encompassed by the scope of the resulting copyright registration. Further guidance issued by the Copyright Office last March has reinforced this position. Applicants are now instructed to “disclose the inclusion of AI-generated content in a work.” Further, under this guidance, “AI-generated content that is more than de minimis should be explicitly excluded from the application.” The Copyright Office relied on its prior precedent in rejecting Allen’s application, which insisted upon copyright protection for his entire work—not just the elements he added manually to the base image via Photoshop. In Allen’s view, A.I. image generation is merely the latest technological innovation that artists can leverage to realize their creative visions. Just as human authorship exists in photographs captured by cameras and musical albums crafted in digital audio workstations, argues Allen, so too should human input be recognized as authorship in the generation of A.I.-assisted artworks using third-party tools. Although the Copyright Office has not yet answered Allen’s complaint, its rejection letter provides a framework for its likely defense. In that letter, the Copyright Office quoted Midjourney’s website disclosure in asserting that “Midjourney does not interpret prompts as specific instructions to create a particular expressive result, because Midjourney does not understand grammar, sentence structure, or words like humans.” Relying on this understanding of Midjourney’s processing of prompts, the Copyright Office reasoned that, “when an AI technology receives solely a prompt from a human and produces complex written, visual, or musical works in response, the ‘traditional elements of authorship’ are determined and executed by the technology—not the human user.” Thus, the Copyright Office concluded, the traditional elements of authorship in Théâtre D’opéra Spatial were determined by Midjourney, not Allen. While it remains to be seen whether the Copyright Office’s position will prevail in federal district court (Allen also posits in his complaint that the court should approach the question “with a fresh set of eyes” post-Loper Bright, the recent case where the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the judicial rule of interpretation that directs courts to defer to agency interpretations of statutes), other countries have already begun grappling with the issue. For example, last year, the Beijing Internet Court ruled that an A.I.-generated image was copyrightable, holding that a picture generated by using over 100 textual prompts met China’s copyright requirements that a work be original and demonstrate “intellectual achievement.” And in the UK, where “computer-generated works” are protected and authorship is granted to “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken,” A.I.-generated images could presumably achieve copyright protection (although determination of ownership in such cases may be complicated). Allen’s complaint raises important questions about the role of A.I. image generation and the human inputs and/or manipulation involved in the creative process. Who actually forms the image that results from the prompting process? Are there elements of authorship that A.I. solely controls, which other technologies—such as cameras—do not? And if there is a line between human- and A.I.-authored works, where should it lie? As software tools like Midjourney evolve and become more widely accessible, the practical need to delineate between the roles of humans and machines in the creative process will only increase. Yet as these tools likewise become more responsive to human input, this line-drawing may become even harder. We’ll report further as this case progresses.
October 24, 2024
Regulatory Compliance
Parlez-vous Français? New Language Requirements in Effect in Québec in June 2025
Established through the Charter of the French Language, French is the official language of the Province of Québec. The Charter applies to businesses located in Québec and to other businesses providing services and selling goods in this province, making the use of French mandatory in connection with these business activities. Historically, the Charter has provided for a “recognized trademark” exception to this French language requirement for registered and known (but unregistered) trademarks in Canada. In these cases, the “recognized trademark” may appear on goods, advertising, signage and commercial publications in a language other than French (unless the French version of the mark has been registered, in which case use of this French version remains mandatory). In addition, where the “recognized trademark” exception applies to use on signage or on the face of a building, it must also feature indications on the same visual plane that informs consumers and passersby of the nature of the business in the French language. This is referred to as the “sufficient presence of French” requirement. In May 2021, the provincial government of Québec introduced (and later passed, in May 2022) an amendment to the Charter, referred to as “Bill 96,” which changes how “recognized trademarks” are treated in commerce and business. As of June 1, 2025, the scope of the “recognized trademark” exception will be restricted to registered trademarks, and inscriptions on products, on public signage and in commercial advertising. As a result, the “recognized trademark” exception will no longer be triggered by unregistered trademarks. Currently, where the “recognized trademark” exception does not apply, the Charter requires that products, packaging, and related informational documents (instruction manuals, for example), and commercial publications (including websites and social media) public signage and commercial advertising, must be in French, or in French and another language so long as the “other language” is not given heightened focus in comparison to the French language. This includes font size, use of color, positioning, and overall size. With the understanding that unregistered trademarks will no longer be an exception to this rule, this would require active steps by trademark owners to obtain registrations for trademarks, in order to continue to benefit from the exception, or to otherwise potentially implement significant updates to all impacted materials. For registered trademarks that feature generic or descriptive terms in a language other than French, the descriptive or generic term will need to be translated into French and appear on the product or on a medium permanently attached to the product. At this time, it is unclear how “generic” or “descriptive” may be interpreted in this context, or frankly, precisely what “medium permanently attached to the product” means. Additionally, where the “recognized trademark” exception is not available, the rule currently is that signs, posters, and billboards must be in French, or in French and another language so long as the French is featured in a predominant manner, with a greater visual impact than the other language. Thus, the current impact of Bill 96 is that both unregistered trademarks and registered trademarks appearing on public signage will be required to change from a “sufficient presence of French” to a “markedly predominant” use of the French language, meaning that the French language must have a greater visual impact than the text in the other language. For businesses who seek to comply with Bill 96 by seeking new trademark registrations, a challenge here is that the Canadian Intellectual Property Office has significant delays in the examination of trademark applications (as of this writing, approximately 43 months). This makes it very difficult for businesses to come into compliance via new trademark applications by the current June 1, 2025 implementation date. This tension between the compliance deadline and registration speed has been broached with CIPO by Canadian practitioners. In terms of next steps, we encourage interested parties with registered and unregistered trademark rights in Canada to review their business activities and trademark portfolios to determine: Whether new trademark applications should be filed. If so, if new applications are filed featuring pre-approved goods and services from CIPO’s manual, it may be possible to reduce the examination time from 43 months to about 21 months. Taking action now may make it possible to meet requirements by June 1, 2025. Expedited examination is also available under certain prescribed circumstances. Whether the loss of the “recognized trademark” exception will require changes to product packaging (generic/descriptive terms, unregistered trademarks), related documentation, commercial publications, and public signs visible from outside buildings. Bill 96 expands the government’s powers of enforcement and all Québec residents will have standing to seek injunctive relief and damages. The potential business risk in Canada is therefore considerable, and taking action toward compliance now is recommended. We will keep our readers updated on further guidance in connection with the impact of Bill 96.
July 24, 2023
Cannabis
Scaling Cannabis Brands Nationally – the Highs (and Lows)
Late last month, Dorsey led a panel at the inaugural Investing in Women Cannabis Pioneers – The Brand Builders investor conference put on by Roth. The panel was made up of female business leaders at Bhang, Leafly, Insa, Tilray and Hollister Biosciences discussing the topic of scaling cannabis brands nationally across state lines despite current legal and regulatory hurdles. As more and more states legalize cannabis (with New York now on the list), establishing a national cannabis brand has never been more important. But cannabis companies still face significant obstacles to doing so. Since cannabis in many forms remains federally illegal, cannabis companies are generally barred from selling product across state lines. Being forced to rely on cannabis grown within different states creates quality control issues, which makes giving consumers across the country the same product experience more difficult. Cannabis companies are also subject to state and/or local packaging and distribution requirements that differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and packaging regulations can be subject to change on a moment’s notice. On the advertising side, many outlets available to traditional consumer packaged goods are off limits. Use of social media platforms is severely restricted and other online tools such as advertising keywords are unavailable. Television, radio, billboard and print ads are generally prohibited unless at least 85% of the audience is reasonably expected to be 21 years of age or older. To overcome these hurdles, and to scale nationally, the panelists discussed the importance of creating a strong brand story that resonates with consumers and transcends state differences. The panel also discussed the importance of building brand awareness at the grassroots level, for example, by investing heavily in education at the dispensary or “budtender” level. Content creation through written editorial and educational materials for consumers was also very important. Because federal trademark registration generally remains unavailable for anything “plant touching,” the panelists reaffirmed existing trademark protection strategies of seeking federal registration for informational services, merchandising items and other non-plant goods and services. State trademark registration, which has gained importance for cannabis companies, even though the legal presumptions and other benefits conferred are arguably limited, was also mentioned, along with common law protection. The panelists generally remarked at the creativity and additional investment that was required to build successful brands, and how hard it is for cannabis companies to build trust with consumers. Finally, the panelists weighed in on the opportunities presented by recent adult use legalization in New York. 20,000 new jobs were anticipated to be created within the first 18 months of legalization and the projected market size is $4 billion, likely surpassing Canada and becoming the world’s second-largest legal market after California. One panelist described the New York market as being the largest illicit cannabis market in the world, with most product supplied currently coming from California. Legalization was viewed as eventually suffocating the black market that currently exists.
October 25, 2021
Right of Publicity
New York Post-Mortem Statutory Right of Publicity Set to Take Effect
A new post-mortem right of publicity bill that was signed into law by Governor Cuomo on November 30, 2020, will soon take effect on May 29, 2021. The new law recognizes post-mortem rights of publicity in New York for the first time. Broadly speaking, no right of publicity exists at the federal level and so those rights must be gained through state statutes and/or common law. Under the present regime, New York protects living people against the unauthorized use of their personality (i.e., their name, portrait, picture and voice) through its right of privacy statute, Sections 50 and 51 of New York’s Civil Rights Law - Article 5. This is actually the longest standing right of publicity law for the living in the U.S., having been originally passed in 1903. But the rights conferred in New York have, until now, disappeared at death, similar to many other U.S. states. Under the new law these rights will finally be granted in New York through the passing of a new provision in Section 50 of New York’s Civil Rights Law - Section 50-F. This new section adds two types of rights – a more traditional post-mortem right of publicity granted to deceased personalities, and a second, more unusual provision related to digital replicas (such as holograms) applicable to deceased performers. Who qualifies for post-mortem rights? Two types of deceased individuals (not corporations) – a “deceased personality” and a “deceased performer”- qualify for post-mortem protection under the new law. A “deceased personality” is a natural person who is domiciled in New York at the time of their death and whose name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial value either at the time of their death or because of their death. So a deceased personality need not have commercialized their personality or identity prior to their death in order to qualify for protection if the way in which they die makes them famous. A “deceased performer” is also a natural person who dies domiciled in New York but who, at the time of death was regularly engaged in acting, singing, dancing or playing a musical instrument. Athletes would not fall under the definition of “deceased performer,” and it’s unclear whether retired or amateur performers would qualify. For both categories, only those who pass away after the new statute takes effect in May 2021 are protected. What rights do they get? Under the new law, a deceased personality can protect their name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness against the use of these on or in products, merchandise or goods (or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of these or services), without prior consent. This right is akin to protection against false endorsement, and is viewed as narrower than that given to the living, who are protected against uses of their persona for “for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade” more broadly. Based on this, advertising or trade uses other than those specifically listed, such as uses in creative works, are likely allowed. Deceased performers are protected against the unauthorized use of their digital replica in a scripted audiovisual work as a fictional character (such as a movie), or in live musical performances (such as a concert), without consent, if the public is likely to be misled into thinking it was an authorized use. But a conspicuous disclaimer in the credits of a scripted audiovisual work and making clear that the use of the digital replica was unauthorized will avoid liability. How long do the new post-mortem rights last? The length of protection is 40 years after death. This is less than states such as California, which provides protection for 70 years, but more than other states such as Tennessee, which has an initial 10 year term. Free speech considerations A major obstacle to passing rights of publicity laws are First Amendment concerns. The new law robustly addresses free speech concerns by permitting a number of fair uses such as parodies, satires, criticism or commentary, news, and historical works. It also permits uses in literary and other artistic works, and works that are newsworthy, educational or in the public interest. It also excludes uses in sports programs among other uses. Some exceptions to these exceptions apply. What else? Transferability, Descendibility and Registration The new law also makes explicit that the post-mortem publicity rights granted are freely transferable and descendible. It also provides a mechanism for owners of a deceased person’s rights to register their claim with the New York Secretary of State in order to be able to bring a claim. Looking ahead This new law is viewed favorably by celebrities, unions such as SAG-AFTRA and others who have advocated for years for New York to come into line with other states, and to prescribe by statute rights not otherwise recognized under New York common law. As the law goes into effect, it may result in a narrower expansion of rights than anticipated, given its various limitations as written. So it remains to be seen how meaningful the law is in practice and whether other legal avenues commonly relied upon to protect celebrities after death, such as trademark protection under the Lanham Act, confer stronger and broader rights overall.
April 26, 2021
Advertising
#AdLaw - A Quick Wrap-Up From The 2020 ANA/BAA Marketing Law Conference
Last week we quickly pivoted from watching the 24/7 "Map Show" to spending our screen time learning at the ANA 2020 Marketing Law Conference. It was a great three days in Chicago in our pajamas of educational seminars. If you didn’t make it this year, don’t worry – here’s a quick wrap-up of the highlights: Influencers – This has been a hot topic at the law conference for many years now. So you may be asking, haven’t we already covered influencers from every possible angle? You might think so, but there are still lessons to be learned in influencer advertising and things in this area are always changing. But some things never change - the keywords for influencers and the advertisers who hire them are transparency and flexibility. Influencer contracts are highly recommended, the more specific the better, so that influencers understand very clearly what’s expected of them. Also, did you hear that #ad is back? It is transparent, simple and works in almost any situation, but influencers and brands have long shunned it, while lawyers loved it. Are we finally all going to agree on something? Consumer Reviews – With access to brick and mortar stores limited in 2020, online shopping and consumer reviews became increasingly important. For that reason we are often fielding questions from clients about using consumer reviews in advertising. The quick take from the conference is that advertisers should be careful about filtering or reordering reviews on their own sites. Original Content – How are media companies creating and promoting original content during the pandemic? In-house counsel from new and old media discussed. Production of film and television has mostly resumed, but with strict testing and physical distancing protocols. In many cases, studios are also using remote recording or asking talent to step into the role of videographer at home. To promote content, COVID-friendly solutions included sending influencer boxes (with proper posting guidelines, of course), creating virtual concert and art experiences, and drive-in viewings. Bottom line: creative people are finding creative solutions to the pandemic’s challenges. Promotions – Most promotions, sweepstakes, contests, and games have gone virtual, and yes, state laws around promotions still apply in addition to platform rules, so remember to check both to ensure compliance with all applicable laws. Remember the basic tenets of promotion law, which is to remove at least one of the following elements to avoid an illegal lottery: prize, chance, and consideration. Beware that even a giveaway or gift with purchase can potentially create the element of chance if supplies are limited. Product Claims and Labeling – Claim substantiation was a focal point this year, particularly concerning food, beverage, and nutritional supplement labeling, as many warning letters have been sent and lawsuits filed against companies that produce products with claims of mitigating the novel coronavirus and promoting additional health benefits or immunity from a number of ailments. Remember that implied claims are scrutinized along with express claims, so look to the context as well as the wording to make sure that you aren’t communicating anything about the product that is unsubstantiated. CBD and Alcohol Marketing – While the FDA continues to work on regulations governing CBD, uncertainty surrounding the marketing of CBD products remains. FDA has been taking enforcement action against sellers of products containing CBD making health, drug and/or false claims. However, it is generally tolerating sales of CBD products, such as tinctures, gummies and dietary supplements, where no such claims are being made, even if the products are technically unlawful under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. In actions involving CBD product claims, courts are making inconsistent rulings on whether to stay those actions until the FDA’s regulations are issued. On the alcohol side, the impact of the pandemic on longstanding ways of doing business may end up having a beneficial effect in causing a reconsideration of the archaic U.S. regulatory structure for the sale and marketing of alcoholic beverages (i.e., the current three tier system of producers/distributors/retailers) as well as standards for the advertisement and marketing of alcoholic beverages. Looking Ahead to 2021 – Aren’t we all?! In 2021, we can expect that the FTC will be releasing an updated version of its Endorsement Guides to address the changes (especially in social media) since the last version released in 2009. Will we see aggressive enforcement following the release of the updated guides? Maybe, but it is clear that the FTC and other regulators are expanding their enforcement focus beyond just advertisers to others in the chain, such as influencers, ad agencies, PR agencies, publishers and even retailers. The NAD is also looking ahead to 2021 and we can likely expect to see NAD-initiated actions in new industries – potentially consumer electronics or appliances and other areas that we don’t often see in competitor challenges at the NAD. We hope to see everyone in person on November 15, 2021 in San Diego!
November 18, 2020
Advertising
FTC Report on Social Media Bots and Deceptive Advertising
Illustration by Jason Raish – Used With Permission We have previously blogged about the rise of computer generated imagery (CGI) influencers, which are one form of social media bots currently invading the online world. Bots are automated software that perform actions using a set of algorithms. Social media bots run on social media platforms and are generally online accounts that automatically generate posts and otherwise simulate human behavior. Legitimate uses include chatbots that provide automated customer support. But harmful or fraudulent uses of social media bots are widespread and can involve the creation of fake accounts that amplify false or deceptive product reviews, or that artificially inflate a company’s online following, among other misuses. Over 37% of all Internet traffic is reported to be the work of bots. With this backdrop, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced in July 2020 that it had sent a report to Congress on the topic of social media bots and deceptive marketing. The report was in response to direction the FTC had received from Congress late last year asking the FTC to describe for the United States Senate Committee on Appropriations “the growing social media bot market as well as the use of social media bots in online advertising” and “how their use might constitute a deceptive practice.” S. Rept. 116-111, 116th Congress, 1st Sess. at 70-71 (Sept. 19, 2019); see 165 Cong. Rec. S7206 (Dec. 19, 2019). Here are some highlights of the FTC’s report to the Committee: The malicious use of social media bots is “cheap and easy” and “hard for platforms to detect,” and so remains a “serious issue.” 90% of social media bots are used for commercial purposes. Improper commercial use occurs when influencers use them to boost popularity, or online publishers use them to increase the number of clicks an ad receives (thus increasing revenues), among other misuses. Examples of past enforcement action against social media bots by the FTC includes a 2019 complaint against Devumi, a company that sold fake followers, subscribers and views to people trying to artificially inflate their social media presence. The FTC also took action in 2018 against three different online dating services that were alleged to have fake profiles or to be using bots on their sites. The FTC’s enforcement action demonstrates "the ability of the FTC Act to adapt to changing business and consumer behavior as well as to new forms of advertising." But the FTC pointed out that its authority to stop the spread of social media bots is limited by the powers given to it under that Act, which would require it to show in any given case that the use of social media bots constitutes a deceptive or unfair practice in or affecting commerce in order for the FTC to take action. It is unclear from the report how much the FTC will be prioritizing enforcement action against social media bots. However, a follow-up statement from FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra on the report made clear that the FTC views the social media platforms to be engaging in insufficient policing and that “a comprehensive solution may require the imposition of specific requirements to increase accountability and transparency” possibly with the intervention of Congress. Commissioner Chopra also made clear that the FTC could explore “writ[ing] rules to ensure there is accountability for undisclosed influencer connections and deceptively formatted ads” and must “also fundamentally reform its approach to fake reviews.” Given the increased reliance by companies on social media marketing and online sales in the pandemic era, we expect that deceptive and unfair online marketing issues will continue to be a significant problem requiring further regulatory action.
October 14, 2020
Copyrights
Take Two: Photographer’s Copyright Suit Over Embedded Instagram Post is Revived
We recently blogged about an April 2020 decision of the federal court for the Southern District of New York, which dismissed a copyright infringement suit brought by Stephanie Sinclair, a Pulitzer-Prize winning photojournalist, against the online publisher and entertainment platform, Mashable. Mashable had embedded a public Instagram post of Sinclair’s featuring one of her images in one of Mashable’s news pieces, after unsuccessfully approaching Sinclair for a license. Judge Wood dismissed the case at that time based on the Court’s view that Instagram’s terms granted a valid sublicense of Sinclair’s photo to users of Instagram’s application programming interface (API), such that Mashable was free to embed the photo using this API. On June 24th, Judge Wood revised her ruling on a motion for reconsideration filed by Sinclair. The Court did not change its earlier holding that, by agreeing to a combination of Instagram's Terms of Use, Privacy Policy and Platform Policy, Sinclair had authorized Instagram, through such terms, to grant API users a sublicense to embed Sinclair’s Instagram content. But the Court reconsidered its prior view that Instagram had actually exercised its right to grant such a sublicense to Mashable and other API users. According to Judge Wood, while “courts may find a license on a motion to dismiss where the terms of the governing contracts are clear”, the Court held that the following language of Instagram’s Platform Policy was, in fact, insufficiently clear to warrant a dismissal of Sinclair’s suit since it was open to more than one interpretation: “[Instagram] provide[s] the Instagram APIs to help broadcasters and publishers discover content, get digital rights to media, and share media using web embeds.” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Wood held that the Court “did not give full force to the requirement that a license must convey the licensor’s ‘explicit consent’ to use a copyrighted work.” Judge Wood also brought her holding into line with a June 1 decision of the Southern District court in McGucken v. Newsweek, another copyright case involving the use of an embedded image, which held that the terms of Instagram’s Platform Policy were insufficiently clear to warrant the dismissal of McGucken’s claims against Newsweek. The revival of the case comes on the heels of a statement made by Instagram in early June to the digital publication Ars Technica that “[w]hile our terms allow us to grant a sub-license, we do not grant one for our embeds API." Instagram has also disclosed possible changes to its platform to allow content creators to disable embedding even if their images are posted publicly. It remains open whether fair use considerations, or the server test, which provides that websites that display copyrighted images without authorization are not liable if that image is retrieved from a third-party server and not hosted by the website’s own server, and which has been upheld by the Ninth Circuit, may continue to shield online publishers against infringement.
July 8, 2020
Copyrights
#igers Beware - Embedded Instagram Post Found Not To Infringe Copyright
A recent decision of the Southern District of New York shields digital publishers from copyright infringement when embedding public Instagram posts in news pieces posted online. In the case, Stephanie Sinclair, a Pulitzer-Prize winning photojournalist focusing on gender and human rights topics, sued the online publisher and entertainment platform Mashable in 2018 for using her image of a mother and child in Guatemala without permission in a piece that Mashable ran on female photographers featuring Sinclair’s photo along with the photos of others. Masahable approached Sinclair for a license to use the photo. When she refused, Mashable embedded a public Instagram post of Sinclair’s featuring the photo instead. Embedding refers to the incorporation of content, such as a photo, into digital media, whereby the photo is stored on a remote server (here, Instagram’s) while being displayed elsewhere (here, Mashable’s website). Unhappy with Masahable’s embedded post that resulted in her photo still being displayed, Sinclair sued for copyright infringement. Analyzing Instagram’s terms of use, Justice Wood held that Sinclair’s display of her photo on her public Instagram account gave Instagram the right, under those terms, to validly sublicense the photo to third parties such as Mashable to display on their sites through embedding. As noted by Justice Wood, Instagram uses an “application programming interface” (or API) to let third parties access and share content posted by other users whose accounts are set to ‘public’ mode, and Instagram’s terms expressly state that “[a]ll content that users upload and designate as ‘public’ is searchable by the public and subject to use by others via Instagram’s API.” Since Instagram’s API enables its users to embed publicly-posted content in their websites, by agreeing to these terms, Sinclair gave third parties the right to use the API to embed her public Instagram posts in their websites, which is exactly what Mashable did in this case. Sinclair argued, among other things, such as the complexity and interconnectedness of Instagram’s policies, that it was unfair for Instagram to force her to choose between using Instagram in private mode only and letting her works be used for free. Although Justice Wood expressed sympathy for Sinclair’s dilemma, she held that she could not release Sinclair from the Instagram terms that she had adhered to: “[Sinclair] argues that it is unfair for Instagram to force a professional photographer like [her] to choose between 'remain[ing] in "private mode" on one of the most popular public photo sharing platforms in the world,' and granting Instagram a right to sub-license her photographs to users like Mashable. Unquestionably, Instagram’s dominance of photograph- and video-sharing social media, coupled with the expansive transfer of rights that Instagram demands from its users, means that Plaintiff’s dilemma is a real one. But by posting the Photograph to her public Instagram account, Plaintiff made her choice. This Court cannot release her from the agreement she made." Since news outlets frequently use embeds of Instagram photos to illustrate or build stories, the case provides some comfort that they can continue such practice, so long as the photos involved are posted in public mode. The decision can be viewed as a departure from a 2018 decision of the Southern District of New York, Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, which held that embedding an image is still a “display” that is capable of infringing copyright in an image. However, because Justice Wood dismissed Sinclair’s action solely based on the license contained in Instagram’s terms, her decision does not address that specific question as raised in Goldman and still unsettled in the Second Circuit.
April 28, 2020
Trademarks
Are Color Trademarks on Product Packaging Inherently Distinctive?
On April 8, 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a decision on an appeal from the refusal of registration of a color trademark by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. In this case, the applicant, Forney Industries, Inc., a maker of welding and machining tools and accessories, filed a trademark application in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office based on use in commerce of the color mark shown above, which Forney features on its product packaging. The Examining Attorney rejected the application on the ground that the mark was not inherently distinctive – and so not immediately eligible for registration - and only registrable on the Supplemental Register (the secondary register of the USPTO for marks potentially capable of acquiring distinctiveness), or on the Principal Register with adequate evidence of acquired distinctiveness. On appeal of the Examiner’s decision by Forney, the TTAB affirmed the refusal of registration, rejecting Forney’s argument that its proposed mark was inherently distinctive product packaging trade dress that was registrable without further proof. Forney subsequently appealed the Board’s decision to the CAFC. The CAFC vacated the TTAB’s determination that the color trademark as applied for was not inherently distinctive, and remanded the case to the TTAB for further consideration. The question the TTAB must now answer is whether, as used on product packaging, a mark consisting of a combination of colors, and the design those colors create, is sufficiently indicative of the source of the goods contained in that packaging, and thus inherently distinctive. The CAFC looked to three Supreme Court decisions that are seminal to the analysis of trademark protection for trade dress, color trademarks, product design, and product packaging, and reflect the long and complicated history in this area of U.S. trademark law: Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) -- Holding that product packaging, i.e., trade dress, is inherently distinctive under the Lanham Act, although the case is silent on how to assess whether such inherent distinctiveness exists. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) -- Holding that color trademarks used as part of product design can meet the legal requirements for trademark registration provided that the color marks have acquired secondary meaning in the minds of consumers. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) -- Holding that product design can never be inherently distinctive because consumers do not typically associate a product design with its source, and confirming its prior ruling in Qualitex that a color trademark, whether applied to a product or its packaging, cannot be inherently distinctive. The CAFC concluded that the TTAB had erred in two ways: 1) by concluding that color-based product packaging marks (as opposed to color-based product design marks) can never be inherently distinctive marks; and 2) by suggesting that a multi-color mark must be associated with a well-defined peripheral shape or color in order to be inherently distinctive. Using these cases as guideposts, the CAFC found that the Supreme Court had not gone so far as the TTAB had with respect to the treatment of a color mark on product packaging (as distinct from use on product design). Rather, the CAFC held that color marks (and particularly multi-color product packaging marks) can in fact be inherently distinctive when used on product packaging, depending upon the character of the color design. To support its holding, the CAFC pointed to a 2016 decision of the 10th Circuit, which also involved Forney, for its finding that “the use of color in product packaging can be inherently distinctive in appropriate circumstances.” The TTAB’s job now is to assess whether Forney’s product packaging can be viewed as inherently distinctive, and thus source identifying, applying certain factors laid out in a 1977 federal case holding, Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977). These factors are: 1) whether the trade dress is a “common” basic shape or design; 2) whether it is unique or unusual in the particular field; 3) whether it is a mere refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods; and, 4) whether it is capable of creating a commercial impression distinct from the accompanying words (note: this factor is not applicable in this case). Other cases also support the proposition that the overall combination of elements will determine whether product packaging identifies the products as originating with a known source, and that a color combination used in conjunction with a particular geometric pattern can be a valid trademark. Will Forney’s color trademark on it product packaging ultimately be found to be inherently distinctive? We will keep you informed of the TTAB’s final holding.
April 17, 2020
Advertising
FDA a Buzzkill for 15 CBD Companies
On November 25, 2019, the Food and Drug Administration sent a wave of warning letters to fifteen CBD companies claiming they are breaking federal food, drug, and cosmetic laws based on their current CBD product marketing and labelling. Prior to this, the FDA had separately sent letters to seven other CBD companies in 2019 and to only one CBD company in 2018. A comprehensive list of CBD-related warning letters sent by the FDA can be found here. The FDA accompanies the most recent letters with a press release and a revised Consumer Update discussing the FDA’s potential concerns about CBD. As in the past, these letters targeted companies marketing CBD products to treat diseases or claiming that CBD has therapeutic uses for humans and/or animals. The letters also target companies that market CBD products as dietary supplements or as an additive to human and animal foods. At their most basic, the FDA’s objections are rooted in the agency’s interpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), which the FDA claims precludes CBD from being classified as a dietary supplement because CBD is also an active ingredient in the drug Epidiolex. The FDA also takes the position that, under the FDCA, CBD products could be viewed as new, unproven drugs where a company promotes use of CBD for curing and treating diseases and ailments. Despite the FDA’s fairly aggressive position and action in issuing the warning letters, the FDA’s press release indicates that it continues to “explore potential pathways for various types of CBD products to be lawfully marketed.” The FDA plans to provide an update on its progress regarding the agency’s approach to these products “in the coming weeks.” As of the time of writing this post, the FDA has not issued a further update. However, these statements still show signs of a potential reversal or at least softening of the FDA’s treatment of CBD. So, what lessons can CBD companies learn from these letters in hopes of avoiding the ire of the FDA? First, just because a company did not receive a letter from the FDA, that does not necessarily mean it is in compliance with the FDA’s current interpretation of the FDCA or that it won’t receive a letter in the future. The FDA has a limited enforcement budget and appears to continue to target offenders making extreme performance claims about CBD. Second, making statements about perceived health/wellness benefits of CBD products is a major no-no. And this doesn’t just apply to obviously extreme claims, such as stating that CBD may cure cancer. It also applies to less extreme statements about CBD performance, such as claiming that CBD products help with “skin rejuvenation” or “joint & muscle relief” or referring to CBD products as “dietary supplements” or food. Companies would be well served by implementing multi-level review processes (including external review where feasible) to ensure marketing materials, packaging, and websites do not fall on the wrong side of this line, at least until the FDA issues further and more specific guidance. Dorsey will continue to monitor the FDA’s actions and updates in this area.
December 30, 2019
Copyrights
A Man Walks into a Bar… And Fair Use Is Found
It is no secret about the proliferation of copyright lawsuits that have been filed over the past four years over the unauthorized use of photos online, many against media companies that seek to shield themselves from liability with a fair use defense. A large number of these suits (over 1,600 at last count) have been brought by New York-based plaintiff’s lawyer Richard Liebowitz. A photo use lawsuit filed in August 2018, which was the subject of a recent decision on a motion to dismiss, Yang v. Mic Networks, Inc., is no exception. In that case, a photographer by the name of Stephen Yang took a photo of an executive by the name of Dan Rochkind in a Manhattan bar. The New York Post licensed the photo for use as part of a piece that it ran on April 12, 2017 about Rochkind’s dating experiences under the title “Why I Don’t Date Hot Women Anymore.” For reasons that can be readily gleaned from its title, the story engendered significant criticism. Mic Networks covered the criticism in its own next day story “Twitter is skewering the ‘New York Post’ for a piece on why a man ‘won’t date hot women’” in its Mic online publication. As part of its piece, Mic included a screenshot of the New York Post article and the upper half of the licensed photo as it appeared as part of the Post’s original story. After unsuccessfully demanding payment for publishing his photo, Yang sued Mic in the Southern District of New York for copyright infringement. Mic filed a motion to dismiss, citing fair use, and the court agreed. On the motion to dismiss, the court ran through the four factors that make up a fair use analysis in the copyright realm -- (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work -- but focused, as many fair use analyses tend to do, on whether Mic’s use was transformative, which is a prong of the first factor. The court found Mic’s use of the photo to be transformative for three reasons. First, the screenshot clearly served to illustrate why the original article had been controversial and was accompanied by Mic’s commentary too. Second, the Mic article not only commented on Rochkind and the controversy, but also used the screenshot to both criticize and mock the original Post article, which was a much different purpose than that the original use of the photo. Third, the Mic story used the photo to paint Rochkind in a “harshly negative light”, while the original use of the photo was to paint him in a positive or neutral light, which is transformative. The court did consider other factors, such as the fact that the screenshot was used by Mic for commercial benefit, and that Mic had cut off part of the photo, removing a photo credit to Yang, which could support a finding of bad faith. The court also dismissed as implausible Yang’s assertion that Mic should have used embedded tweets of the original photo, or taken its own photo of Rochkind instead. Taking into account all factors, the court dismissed the case, finding Mic’s use to be clearly fair and transformative. Yang has filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision and Mic also has a motion for attorneys’ fees and sanctions pending as of the date of this post.
November 5, 2019
Copyrights
Third Circuit Analyzes Work for Hire and Assignment Requirements and Explains Why the Distinction Matters
When a judicial opinion refers to a “bitter feud”, a plaintiff “beset by acrimony”, and a “rock star” banker who “faced his peripeteia” (we looked it up for you –it’s Greek for “reversal of fortune”), you know there’s gotta be a good story behind a copyright dispute. That is indeed the case in TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, a recent Third Circuit decision that provides an in-depth analysis about whether the copyright in a business book manuscript co-authored by a former bank CEO is owned by his bank employer as a work for hire or by assignment – and why the distinction matters. The appellate court concludes that a letter agreement “deeming” the manuscript a work for hire, without more, could not make it so unless it meets the specific requirements of the work for hire provisions of the Copyright Act. The court further held that rights in the work were in fact assigned by that letter agreement, even though the word “assignment” was never mentioned. The man at the center of this copyright drama is Vernon W. Hill II, the founder of Commerce Bank, who led and grew the institution from 1973 until it was acquired by TD Bank in 2007 for $8.5 billion. In 2006, Hill decided to write a book about his business philosophy. Commerce Bank supported this endeavor by hiring a collaborator to help him write the manuscript and by entering into an agreement with the Portfolio Division of Penguin Books. In the publishing agreement with Portfolio, Commerce Bank was defined as the “Author”, and represented and warranted that it was the exclusive owner of all rights in the manuscript. Hill signed an accompanying letter agreement in which he agreed that “the Author [i.e., Commerce Bank] will fulfill all obligations of the Agreement.” Hill also guaranteed that the “Work is a work made for hire within the meaning of the United States Copyright Law and that the Author is the owner of Copyright in the Work and has full power and authority to enter into the Agreement.” Hill’s manuscript was finished in 2007, but then the relationship between Hill and Commerce Bank “soured” and TD Bank acquired Commerce Bank shortly after. The manuscript was never published, and by 2008, Commerce Bank terminated its publishing agreement with Portfolio. Several years later, Hill decided to co-author another book about the founding of a bank in the UK, which was published in November 2012. TD Bank learned about this new book published by Hill, “suddenly registered” its copyright in the 2007 unpublished manuscript and sued Hill for copyright infringement. Interestingly, TD Bank admitted during the litigation that “at most 16%” of the 2012 book infringed the 2007 unpublished manuscript and that it had no intention of ever publishing the 2007 manuscript. On a motion for summary judgment, the district court concluded that because the letter agreement “deem[ed] the work to be a work for hire,” it was a work for hire, vesting the copyright in the 2007 manuscript in Commerce Bank as Hill’s employer. Although the district court initially declined to issue an injunction, it did so a year later after Hill continued to promote the 2012 book and TD Bank presented evidence of irreparable harm. Hill then appealed. Work for Hire - Back to the Basics On appeal, the Third Circuit overturned the district court’s holding that the 2007 unpublished manuscript was a work for hire. Revisiting the basics of what constitutes a work for hire, which often get overlooked or conflated with an assignment or transfer, the appellate court laid out the work for hire provisions of the Copyright Act (summarized here). These say that a work can be considered a work for hire in only one of two ways. The first is where a work is created by an employee within the scope of employment. The second is where a work is specially ordered or commissioned, but only if it falls within nine specifically enumerated categories of works (including a contribution to a collective work or part of a movie). As the court put it, these are “two mutually exclusive means”, with “the first for employees, and the second for independent contractors.” Applying these two statutory provisions to the operative facts, the Third Circuit held that the 2007 manuscript did not meet the second definition because Hill was not an independent contractor and the manuscript did not fall within any of the nine enumerated categories of works. As for the first part of the definition, Hill was an employee of Commerce Bank when the manuscript was authored, but to be a work for hire, the manuscript would have had to have been created within the scope of his employment. The district court had correctly recited these principles but then went in a different direction, holding that TD Bank owned the rights to the 2007 manuscript based on the letter agreement, which deemed the manuscript to be a work for hire. The Third Circuit rejected this approach, holding that “a bare statement that a particular work is ‘for hire’ says nothing about the scope of any individual’s employment and cannot suffice on its own. Had Congress intended to permit parties to ‘deem’ works by employees as ‘for hire’, it would have so specified” in the statute. Wrong Label – Same Outcome The appellate court then explored whether TD Bank had acquired rights in the 2007 manuscript by assignment, rather than as a work for hire, emphasizing both the technical distinctions and practical consequences between the two. In particular, the court highlighted that a work for hire vests both authorship and ownership in an employer or principal, effectively removing any rights from the creator of the work, whether as employee or independent contractor. In contrast, where there is an assignment, the creator of the work, as author, still “retains certain non-waivable rights to cancel the transfer after 35-40 years” and, for some types of works, certain waivable moral rights too. The court highlighted that these fundamental differences explain why an employee’s work created outside the scope of employment cannot simply be “deem[ed] for hire.” The Third Circuit next concluded that “although it affixed the wrong label”, the lower court was correct in finding that TD Bank owned the 2007 unpublished manuscript because the letter agreement operated as an assignment, even though the word “assignment” was not expressly mentioned in the agreement. Specifically, the appellate court found that Hill’s commitments in the letter agreement, including “Hill’s assurance that the manuscript ‘is a work made for hire’” (even if it was insufficient to render it a work for hire), and acknowledgement that Commerce Bank was the owner of copyright, “denote[d] an intent to relinquish his interest in the copyright”, when considered as a whole, under both the Copyright Act and New York law. As the court explained, to constitute an assignment, an agreement “need not comply with any formalities or invoke particular language to constitute an assignment; any writing will suffice as long as ‘the assignor has, in some fashion, manifested an intention to make a present transfer of his rights to the assignee.’” Although the court’s assignment holding ultimately turned on the specific language used in the letter agreement, the decision highlights important basic distinctions and requirements between work for hire and assignment provisions that need to be kept in mind if businesses want to retain ownership and control of employee work product and creative output. Concluding its analysis of the ownership of the 2007 manuscript, the court stated that while the letter agreement constituted a valid assignment, the question remained whether it could also be considered a work for hire under the first part of the statutory definition because it was written by Hill within the scope of his duties as a bank employee. The Third Circuit outlined the legal test that should apply, but found that it had an insufficient factual record before it, leaving it open whether the parties wished to address the issue on remand (and thus prolong their bitter litigation). The Third Circuit reiterated the potential legal advantage to TD Bank of a work for hire finding, which would then remove Hill’s right to terminate the rights transferred by assignment. The Third Circuit’s analysis and holdings help to cement basic copyright ownership principles, particularly in the corporate context, where documents providing for the transfer of rights in creative output to a corporation often simply deem a work to be a work for hire, without specifying anything more, such as the category of work involved (in the case of an independent contractor), or the scope of the employment duties within which the work falls (in the case of an employee). The decision also highlights the importance of having a clearly expressed assignment provision in an agreement to transfer rights to an employer if it is likely a work will not be “deemed” a work for hire.
August 19, 2019
Trademarks
Give Me Aphukenbrake* – USPTO Issues Examination Guide on Treatment of Scandalous Marks Following Supreme Court Case
We recently posted about the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 24th holding in Iancu v. Brunetti, which upheld a ruling that the Lanham Act’s bar on the registration of scandalous or immoral marks is unconstitutional because it violates the right to free speech. On July 3rd, the USPTO issued written guidance via Examination Guide 2-19 outlining how it will handle applications for marks previously subject to the scandalousness bar following the Brunetti decision. For pending applications for which the USPTO had issued an advisory refusal under the scandalousness provision, and which the USPTO had suspended until the Brunetti litigation was resolved, the USPTO will lift the suspensions and continue the examination of these applications for any other requirements or refusal. For applications that previously went abandoned after being refused registration under the provision, and which are beyond the deadline for filing a petition to revive, a new application can be filed. Going forward, the USPTO will no longer refuse registration or cancel a registration based on “immoral” or “scandalous” matter, and the portions of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure that relate specifically to such matter (§1203) will no longer apply. As to timing, the terms of the Guidance will go into effect at least 25 days after the decision, or on July 19, 2019, at the earliest, after the Brunetti case returns to the agency. A number of applications for marks that would otherwise have been subject to the immoral or scandalous standard have already been filed. It remains to be seen whether legislative action will be taken to create a more narrowly-crafted provision that will only bar marks that are obscene, vulgar or profane instead. *APHUKENBRAKE is a mark of Some Spider, Inc. that was previously barred as scandalous.
July 23, 2019
Trademarks
Some CBD Trademarks Are Now Federally Registrable Based on New Guidance from the USPTO
The United States Patent and Trademark Office will now allow federal trademark registration for marks used on some hemp-based products, including those containing hemp-derived CBD, except for foods, beverages, dietary supplements, or pet treats. On May 2, 2019, the USPTO issued Examination Guide 1-19 for the examination of federal trademark applications covering cannabis and cannabis-derived goods and services. The guide comes in the wake of the December 20, 2018 Farm Bill, which among other things, explicitly removed hemp (a type of cannabis) and its byproducts from the definition of “Marihuana” in the Controlled Substances Act and broadened the pilot program to allow for more widespread non-academic cultivation of hemp. The Farm Bill created tension with the USPTO’s longstanding practice of outright denying or, in the case of CBD products, sometimes postponing the examination of, any application with a whiff of cannabis on the ground the goods or services cannot be used lawfully in commerce (which is a requirement for federal registration). The brand new Examination Guide acknowledges that marks used on hemp products (including CBD) produced lawfully under a state pilot program, which controls the means by which hemp may be grown and processed within a given state, are not illegal under the Controlled Substances Act and so should also be registrable. But the Guide identifies another potential ground for refusing hemp-based CBD products as unlawful based on guidance from the FDA. The Farm Bill explicitly preserved the FDA’s authority to regulate certain types of products containing cannabis and cannabis-related compounds. The FDA has indicated that it believes the sale of foods, beverages, dietary supplements, or pet treats containing CBD (regardless of how derived) to be illegal under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (click here). Thus, based on the FDA’s statements, the USPTO has indicated that it will not allow registration of foods, beverages, dietary supplements, or pet treats containing hemp-derived CBD on the ground they cannot be lawfully used in commerce, unless or until the FDA’s position changes. Importantly, the USPTO has indicated that its guide applies only to applications filed after the passage of the Farm Bill on December 20, 2018. For applications filed on or before December 20, applicants can amend their filing date to December 20, 2018, based on the USPTO’s view that applicants could not have legally sold or had a good faith intent to legally sell any CBD or cannabis-derived product prior to the passage of the Farm Bill. This change in USPTO policy opens up new potential registration opportunities for cannabis brands. For example, smokable products are conspicuously absent from the USPTO’s list of prohibited CBD goods. Thus, companies selling smokable hemp-derived CBD products may have a good case for federal registration. Additionally, for cannabis brands selling products derived from both hemp and marijuana, it potentially presents an opportunity to obtain federal registration for the federally-legal components of their businesses. Although the FDA currently maintains it is illegal to sell foods, beverages, dietary supplements, or pet treats containing CBD, it is taking steps that could indicate a change to its approach. The FDA is holding a public hearing on May 31 for stakeholders in the cannabis industry and is forming a high-level working group to explore pathways for legally selling and marketing food and dietary supplements containing cannabis, including hemp-derived CBD. If and when the FDA changes its approach for these products, this could open the door for widespread federal registration of hemp-based CBD products.
May 9, 2019
Advertising
Ad Agency Liability: FTC Continues To Focus on Agency Role in Ad Campaigns
Recent articles in Forbes and National Law Review highlight that the Federal Trade Commission continues to have advertising agencies in its sights when it comes to the role that agencies play in creating deceptive ads. While the FTC’s enforcement activity against businesses whose products or services are being advertised is frequent and well known, many are unaware that the FTC is also empowered to take action against advertising agencies who participate in deceptive ad campaigns on behalf of their clients. What’s more, advertising agencies can’t claim ignorance about the contents of a campaign as a get out of jail free card. In particular, as included in the FTC’s online advertising guide for businesses and as reflected by recent FTC enforcement activity, which we discuss below, agencies have an affirmative duty to independently check information used to substantiate advertising claims and cannot simply rely on an advertiser’s assurances about the claims made. At the forefront of the FTC’s recent actions to hold ad agencies liable is a 2018 settlement entered into by Minneapolis-based Marketing Architects with the FTC and the State of Maine, which included a $2 million fine, the largest fine ever set against an ad agency. Marketing Architects specializes in creating direct response radio and TV ads, including radios ads with interactive voice response support inviting consumers to purchase products. Over the period January 2006 – February 2015, Marketing Architects developed these types of radios ads for a weight loss supplement company called Direct Alternatives, which advertised a number of purported weight loss products under the names AF Plus, Puranol, Final Trim and others. As laid out in the complaint filed by the FTC and the state of Maine, among the claims made in the radio ads were that “AF Plus is an amazing PROVEN breakthrough in weight loss” and that “th[e] product is proven and can cause dramatic weight loss.” A fictional company spokesperson also made statements such as “In six months of taking Puranol, I’ve already lost 30 pounds.” In reality, Marketing Architects did not have any substantiation for any of the claims made in the ads and did not find out from its client Direct Alternatives if any such substantiation even existed. Marketing Architects also engaged in other deceptive activity such as presenting the ads as objective news reports or public service announcements. The unprecedented $2 million dollar fine set as part of the FTC and the state of Maine’s settlement, was, at least in part, due to the fact that Marketing Architects had been the target of a prior FTC complaint for its ads for another client, and that it actually knew that its current advertising for Direct Alternatives’ AF Plus product was misleading and unsubstantiated. However, it’s worth noting that the FTC is able to impose liability on ad agencies in less extreme circumstances, including not only where an agency actually knew that an ad contains false or deceptive claims, but also where it should have known that an ad contains these types of claims. The imposition of liability on ad agencies by the FTC and state attorney general offices shows the critical importance of ad agencies conducting an independent legal review of the advertising that they create for clients, and for making appropriate inquiry into a client’s ability to provide or develop appropriate substantiation for claims made about the performance or quality of the goods or services being advertised, as early as possible in the ad creation process.
April 30, 2019
Trademarks
PTO Proposes Requiring Foreign Trademark Owners to Obtain U.S. Counsel
On the heels of launching its expedited cancellation program to clear deadwood from the Trademark Register, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has now pivoted to a related area: deadwood prevention. The PTO has issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that, with one exception, would require foreign-domiciled trademark applicants, registrants and parties to a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board proceeding to be represented by licensed U.S. attorneys. The PTO justified this proposal based on the growing number of applications filed by foreign individuals and entities with fraudulent or inaccurate information. In particular, the PTO called out both the submission of mocked-up or digitally-altered specimens to support false claims of use of the mark in the United States and the foreign advisors who promote such a practice. As the number of foreign applicants surges, especially foreign applicants without U.S. counsel of record, current rules give the PTO no effective means of preventing this misconduct. The PTO called the scale of the problem “massive” and estimated the number of “total tainted applications” to be in the “tens of thousands.” Such tainted applications drive up the cost of clearing and registering marks for other trademark owners, impede prosecution of legitimate applications and reduce the value of registered marks to consumers. The PTO hopes to improve the integrity of the Trademark Register by involving practitioners who are familiar with its requirements and who can be disciplined if they engage in tactics designed to circumvent such requirements. Perhaps to ward off charges of favoritism, the PTO pointed out that many countries, including Brazil, Chile, China, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, South Korea, and the European Union’s Intellectual Property Office, already impose a similar counsel requirement. For applications filed that do not comply with the rule, the PTO seeks comments on whether it should (1) defer examination until the applicant appoints U.S. counsel who can then review the application for conformity to U.S. law or (2) conduct a complete examination and include the requirement for U.S. counsel among other issues in the office action. The only exception to the U.S. representation rule would be for countries that have reached an official understanding with the PTO to allow substantially reciprocal privileges to U.S. practitioners representing U.S. entities in their trademark office. Currently only the United States and Canada have such an understanding. Should the new rulemaking be implemented, its practical impact would be to prevent Canadian patent agents from representing Canadian owners in new trademark matters at the PTO. However, Canadian trademark agents and attorneys could continue to do so. Canadian patent agents could also complete handling pending U.S. trademark matters. For Madrid applications, implementation of the rule may be delayed until such time as the system of the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Office, where such applications are first made, can be updated to allow U.S. attorneys to be designated. The PTO has issued a warning that foreign filers are already trying to circumvent the proposed rulemaking by sending email solicitations to U.S. attorneys offering to pay to use their contact information. The PTO may have to add security measures to its filing system to ensure that U.S. attorney information is not used fraudulently. The new rulemaking is one component of a larger effort by the PTO to ensure the accuracy of the Trademark Register. Besides the expedited cancellation pilot program mentioned above, other PTO initiatives include revisions to the language of the post-registration declaration of use forms to highlight the ongoing use requirement and the random audits of post-registration maintenance filings. The comment period is open until March 18, 2019. Watch the TMCA for updates regarding this rulemaking and related PTO deadwood-clearing initiatives.
February 26, 2019
Licensing
Updated Draft of California’s Cannabis Regulations Could Stifle IP Licensing
As the U.S. cannabis market continues to grow at an extraordinary pace, a number of celebrities and companies have extended their names or brands to cannabis products via partnerships with licensed growers and dispensaries. On the celebrity side, these partnerships include Willie’s Reserve (Willie Nelson), Bob Marley (Marley Natural), Whoopi Goldberg (Whoopi & Maya) and Snoop Dogg (Leafs by Snoop). But recent modifications to draft regulations in California threaten to restrict the ability of celebrities or companies to lend their names or brands to cannabis products sold in those states where adult or medicinal cannabis use is legal via intellectual property licensing arrangements to licensed sellers. The proposed new rules, from the three state licensing authorities that regulate medicinal and recreational cannabis in California—the Bureau of Cannabis Control (“BCC”), the California Department of Public Health (“CDPH”) and the California Department of Food and Agriculture (“CDFA”)—came out in October as an update to the draft regulations that had been previously published in July. Among the updates contained in these proposed new rules is one that stands out for its potentially restrictive impact on brand and other types of IP licensing in the cannabis space. While the regulations already require all commercial cannabis activity (other than authorized retail activity) to be conducted between licensed operators, the BCC’s updates to the draft regulations go further to provide that cannabis license holders cannot conduct commercial cannabis activities on behalf of, at the request of, or pursuant to a contract with any person that is not licensed under the Act. The listed prohibited commercial cannabis activities are now defined to include the manufacturing or packaging of cannabis goods according to the specifications of a non-licensee, as well as packaging and labeling cannabis goods under a non-licensee’s brand. These updates are most likely intended to seek to curb the ability of unlicensed cannabis businesses to conduct regular business through licensed businesses by selling white-labeled products to such licensed businesses or otherwise. However, the proposed changes could potentially have far-reaching implications for any authorized cannabis operators and IP licensors engaging with these companies who have an existing license deal or are considering entering into an operating relationship. With the requirements for obtaining a cannabis license so arduous, a licensing deal seemed to be an easy option for non-licensees to get their brand into the cannabis industry. But with the new restrictions, non-licensees may not have a direct licensing option to get their brand onto cannabis goods. While authorized cannabis operators and non-licensees may be able to turn to more complex contractual structures in order to continue to do business together, parties will need to tread carefully. The deadline for public comment on the BCC’s changes was on November 5th. It remains to be seen whether the BCC’s proposed changes will ultimately be incorporated into the proposed rules and, eventually, continue through the formal rule making process until they are adopted as non-emergency regulations.
December 6, 2018
Advertising
#MarketingLaw – Update from the 2018 ANA/BAA Marketing Law Conference
The TMCA is back from the 2018 ANA/BAA Marketing Law Conference, Upping Your Game: Pragmatic Business and Compliance Strategies. While in Chicago, we had the privilege of obtaining a comprehensive review of this year in marketing law and gained some insight into the areas of focus for enforcement of marketing laws. We also were witness to the season’s first snowflakes. While we cannot recreate the snowflakes here, we give you a run-down of some of the key take-aways from the conference. Privacy: The buzz word for the entire conference and top of mind for all attendees. Privacy topics included the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, anticipated developments at the state law level, and the potential for federal law preempting state regulation. Recommendations to implement “privacy by design” abound. Given the inconsistencies between statutes and the compliance headaches that come from a “checkbox” approach to compliance, in-house counsel from countless organizations touted a change in thinking about privacy. They recommended viewing privacy as a competitive advantage and building privacy into the planning process to enable a proactive approach. To do this, a few suggestions by panelists included: An Integrated Legal Department: Legal’s involvement should occur early on. Rather than thinking of Legal as a stopping point for final sign off, Legal should be involved from the beginning. This facilitates the integration of privacy considerations and processes into the new program, campaign, or product, and helps ensure that any data gathered up-front is usable. Data Mapping: When developing and implementing a privacy program, determine where data is kept, what data is being collected, what is being done with that data, and why the data is valuable. Also consider whether the data is necessary or just nice to have. Compliance “Tweaks”: Determine what needs to be done differently with respect to compliance. The general consensus by in-house counsel at the conference was that applying the strictest standard across the board is not necessarily the best approach for business. Recommendations included setting a floor and treating outliers separately, as needed. Knowledge Management: Identify and define a group of individuals within the company who have an understanding of the data collected, stored, and used, and who can be consulted about these topics when determining compliance needs or implementation. Well-Documented Consent: Design appropriate privacy and notice/consent into the process and maintain documentation of that consent. Not having documentation of consent is as good as not having consent. Technological Hurdles: Cautionary tales were exchanged over the fact that compliance solutions can involve technical aspects that are potentially difficult to implement and/or involve many moving parts both internally and externally. Such factors should be accounted for when determining and implementing compliance mechanisms. “Truth” in Advertising: In an era of “fake news” and alternative facts, the question posed is: What content can be trusted? Influencers and consumer reviews are playing an ever-increasing role in consumer decision-making—a bi-product of the social media age. The presence of undisclosed sponsored posts and paid reviews, as well as bots and fake accounts, undermines truth in advertising and erodes consumer trust. Consequently, consumer reviews, insider rating, and substantiation are big targets for the NAD, FTC, and state AGs. Other targeted areas of enforcement include affiliate marketing and lead generation. The OmniChannel: Retailers gathered to discuss expansion of the customer experience and the switch from a retail-centric focus to a consumer-centric one. The OmniChannel is about creating a seamless shopping experience. This approach focuses on building customer loyalty and providing the same service and experience regardless of channel. Panelists generally agreed that this seamless experience for the consumer is much more difficult to implement from the legal perspective, and their companies have made a conscious effort to integrate legal into the business side. Panelists shared approaches taken by their various legal departments; suggestions included using legal questionnaires to gather information from the business side, building relationships with partners and affiliates based upon solid grounds, using data mapping as a key tool, and implementing privacy by design. The Shared Economy: The community-based business model brings with it issues of trust and social values. Pioneers in this area discussed what it means for consumers to be users and providers, and how the corporate entity can successfully enable peer-to-peer interactions. The integration of policy and marketing was a focus. Topics included: implementation of community guidelines that empower hosts and providers rather than taking the role of management; thoughtfully regulating third-party content to prevent hate speech, privacy violations, and IP violations; using “relevance” and the Communications Decency Act § 230 as a tool; and understanding the role of consumer reviews in building and sustaining trust in the platform. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA): For those of you who follow our Consumer Financial Services Blog, you already know that the TCPA is having a banner year. Developments spanned from the ACA International ruling issued by the D.C. Circuit in March, to legislative activity on Capitol Hill (discussed here and here), the FCC’s numerous requests for comment and an Omnibus II on the horizon, and now the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Pdr Network v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, No. 17-1705, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 6754, at *1 (Nov. 13, 2018) (considering whether the Hobbs Act requires a district court to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the TCPA). This area of relative uncertainty and constant change was a recurrent reference across presentations and a complete topic for a breakout session. Everything from the shifting definition of ATDS to recycled cell phone numbers and abusive plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel was fair game. Cannabis Marketing: Our own Sarah Robertson participated in a panel on cannabis marketing in the U.S. and Canada. The panel covered the regulatory framework for and, in some cases, the significant constraints placed on, the sale and advertising of cannabis in the U.S. and Canada, from the lawyers’ perspectives, and also from those of a cannabis producer and agencies operating in the packaging design and digital marketing worlds. Overall, the schedule was packed, the topics were robust, and the participation was plentiful. We look forward to next year’s ANA/BAA Marketing Law Conference in sunny San Diego (November 4-6, 2019), and hope you can join us there.
November 15, 2018
Advertising
Bot or not? The Rise of CGI Influencers
In the not too distant past, consumer product brands hired celebrity figures to act as their official ambassadors. These celebrities appeared in traditional media such as TV commercials and celebrity interviews in print publications, as well as online. Jamie Lee Curtis spooning up Dannon Activia yogurt comes to mind. But with the exponential growth of social media over the past ten years, brand power and influence has shifted away from celebrities to influencers such as bloggers, YouTubers and other everyday people who have developed niche expertise and authority. This "peer-to-peer marketing" is seen as being more authentic and relatable, which, based on the current consumer demand for authenticity, now better drives consumers to buy things. As we have covered extensively here, here and here, enforcement efforts of the Federal Trade Commission have been focused on appropriate disclosures for these social media influencers since their material connections to a consumer brand and the honesty of their brand experiences are not easy for consumers to discern. So what is next on the brand influencer horizon in light of the rise of automated technology such as avatars and chat bots? Computer generated image (CGI) influencers. These CGI influencers in fact already exist. Take Miquela Sousa, also known as Lil Miquela, a 19 year old Brazilian American avatar, who has amassed 1.4 million followers on Instagram as at the time of this post. Lil Miquela is an Instagram model and singer, and is dressed by fashion brands such as Fendi, Chanel and Versace and has also appeared in magazine spreads and music videos. Until Lil Miquela's account was attacked by another avatar, Bermuda @Bermudaisbae in April 2018, when Lil Miquela disclosed that she was a CGI, few people were aware that she wasn't a real human. Both Lil Miquela and Bermuda are said to be products of a California robotics and AI firm named Brud. Other examples of CGI influencers are Shudu, who is the "world's first digital supermodel" and whose posts featuring make-up products such as Rihanna's Fenty Beauty have garnered tens of thousands of likes. Shudu was created by the London based photographer, Cameron James Wilson. CGI influencers such as Lil Miquela are attracting attention and expected to increase in number. Their primary appeal is their ability to let brands avoid some of the challenges that human influencers can bring, such as the high payments they command and the sometimes unpredictability of human influencers' behavior, which can result in FTC violations, reputational harm and more. CGI influencers also allow brands to control the look and personality of their brand ambassadors, with the goal, in some cases, of appealing to a broader range of audiences. An open question is how the FTC disclosure requirements will apply in the CGI context, and whether CGI influencers should follow the same rules as human influencers. A threshold question that equally applies to other automated technologies, such as customer service chat bots, is whether a CGI influencer must disclose that they are not human. If a reasonable consumer would not be aware that the influencer is a digital creation, then such a disclosure may be necessary. A second is whether an avatar would have to disclose that there is a material connection between it and the consumer products that it is featuring and/or that the avatar’s posts are ads. Although the FTC hasn’t issued formal guidance on CGI influencers, FTC guidance on the related worlds of augmented and virtual reality point to this being required. The FTC has also been fairly consistent and persistent in requiring disclosure of relevant material connections, no matter how the connection has come about. And an FTC spokesperson has commented publicly that advertisers using CGI influencers should clearly identify their posts as ads. Yet another issue is whether the product experiences of the avatar can ever be true so as to meet the FTC's testimonial requirements that endorsements reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser. Some believe that it is the opinion of the creator of the CGI influencer that is actually being professed. Others argue that the FTC’s Guides do not apply to CGI influencers at all, since these Guides only apply to an “individual, group, or institution.” The former is the more likely standard that the FTC would adopt. All of this remains to be seen if or when the FTC issues further guidance on the consumer advertising practices of CGI influencers as they become more prevalent or enforcement action is taken.
October 31, 2018
Trademarks
Only in Canada, eh? Canada's Broad Interpretation of Trademark "Use" Gives U.S. Retailers A Big Leg Up
Two recent decisions of the Federal Court of Canada pave the way for U.S. and other non-Canadian businesses to secure and maintain trademark rights for their retail or hotel operations even where they do not have a bricks and mortar presence in Canada. In the first decision, Dollar General Corporation v. 2900319 Canada Inc., 2018 FC 788, which came out in July, the Federal Court of Canada overturned a decision of the Registrar to expunge Dollar General's trademark registration for its DOLLAR GENERAL house mark for retail variety store services for non-use. Dollar General has a chain of retail stores and makes direct ecommerce sales in the U.S. But Dollar General doesn't have any stores in Canada and doesn't ship directly to Canadian customers either. The only “service” that Canadians could access was Dollar General's website or app which has product and store information, and recipes and coupons. They could also make purchases online but only by shipping to the U.S. or paying a third-party shipping agent to bring those purchases to Canada. The Registrar had found that Dollar General was not using its mark for its variety store services because purchases could only be made in the U.S. or through a shipping agent. But on appeal, the Federal Court adopted a more liberal view as to "use" and found that Dollar General's ancillary interactions with Canadians through its website were enough to allow it to maintain its retail store service trademark rights. The second decision, Hilton Worldwide Holding LLP v Miller Thomson LLP, 2018 FC 895, came out just two months later. Here, Hilton owned a Canadian registration for its WALDORF-ASTORIA mark for its exclusive hotel services. Following a non-use challenge, the registration had been expunged because Hilton did not have a physical hotel location in Canada. Instead, Hilton operated a branded interactive website, a worldwide registration service, customer offers and discounts, and a loyalty program, all of which were accessible by Canadians. Hilton appealed the decision to expunge. Similar to Dollar General, the Federal Court of Canada found that the type of ancillary services Hilton was engaging in with its Canadian customers was enough to demonstrate use of its mark for hotels. This liberal interpretation of "use" of a trademark for services confirms that U.S. and other non-Canadian businesses have broader latitude to gain and maintain trademark rights for retail and hotel services in Canada even if they don't have a physical presence there, and they are only offering ancillary or incidental services. While each case will ultimately turn on its facts, online interactivity with Canadians through a website or app is generally a sign that services are being rendered in Canada under current law.
October 23, 2018
Copyrights
Large Number of Works Set to Enter the Public Domain in 2019
An interesting article by The Atlantic highlights the large number of classic works that are set to enter the public domain on January 1, 2019. Hundreds of thousands of works, including old classics such as Noël Coward’s London Calling! musical and Charlie Chaplin’s film The Pilgrim, which were first published in 1923, are set to have their applicable copyright term expire. This is a result of patchwork amendments to the Copyright Act, which retroactively extended copyright protection and, in particular, the Sonny Bono Act of 1998, which fixed a copyright term of 95 years (up from the prior extension of 75 years) to any work published between 1923 to 1977.
April 11, 2018
Trademarks
Cannabis Shirt Battle Costs Iowa State Almost $1M
We previously posted about a four year legal battle that arose from a refusal by Iowa State University to let its school logos be used on t-shirts by an on-campus pro-cannabis group, and the free speech implications of this refusal. In that case, ISU was found at both the district court and appellate levels to run afoul of the First Amendment because its refusal violated free speech rights of the students involved. By way of update, the State of Iowa has now been ordered by a federal district judge in the Southern District of Iowa to pay nearly $1 million in damages based on ISU's actions regarding its school logos. The state had already agreed to pay $150,000 to the individual plaintiffs in that case, as well as $193,000 for the plaintiffs' legal fees on appeal. The recent order addresses the award of the plaintiffs' legal fees at the district court level, setting these at $598,00. The high financial penalty faced by the State of Iowa reflects the special considerations surrounding cannabis branding as well as state agency trademarks. The decision on appeal can be found here.
April 4, 2018
First Amendment
de Havilland vs Feud - FX Wins Round in California Court of Appeal
It is hard to imagine that any one person could initiate separate lawsuits resulting in decisions of substantial importance to the entire U.S. entertainment industry. And when that person is iconic actress Olivia de Havilland – best known for her roles in “Gone With the Wind,” “The Heiress” and dozens of other films from Hollywood’s golden age – and the time between those two decisions spans more than seventy years, the scenario seems even more farfetched. But Ms. de Havilland is indeed the plaintiff whose 1944 lawsuit against Warner Brothers resulted in the decision that effectively broke the control movie studios then exercised over their talent, and she is also the plaintiff whose 2017 lawsuit against the FX Networks cable channel has now resulted in a decision that confirms the wide-ranging ability of filmmakers to depict real people like de Havilland in entertainment properties like the miniseries “Feud.” Television producer Ryan Murphy created “Feud: Bette and Joan” as the first installment in a series of television docudramas dedicated to chronicling famous real-life feuds. Airing in 2017, this first installment, starring Susan Sarandon and Jessica Lange, portrayed the bitter rivalry between film stars Bette Davis and Joan Crawford, and how that rivalry was the product of the way Hollywood studios, dominated by men, treated women – especially older actresses. De Havilland was a longtime friend of Davis and a fellow actress with her at Warner Brothers in the 1930s and 1940s. In “Feud,” de Havilland, portrayed by the actress Catherine Zeta Jones, appears in a fictitious interview conducted at the 1978 Academy Awards ceremony, in which she comments on the rivalry between Davis and Crawford, and the problems women in Hollywood encountered during their era. (Kathy Bates, portraying the late actress Joan Blondell, also appears in a similar, fictitious interview.) In addition, “Feud” shows Davis and de Havilland together in the past, including at the 1964 Academy Awards ceremony and during the making of the film “Hush … Hush, Sweet Charlotte,” in which de Havilland replaced Crawford as Davis’ co-star. Over eight episodes of “Feud,” the de Havilland character appears in only seventeen minutes of screen time – 4.2% of the series as a whole. Notwithstanding the brevity of her portrayal, de Havilland, now age 101 and a longtime resident of Paris, France, sued FX and related defendants for violations of her rights of publicity and privacy, as well as false light, arguing that no one has the right to portray her in a film or otherwise without her permission, such that the mere inclusion of her in a fictionalized docudrama like “Feud” violated her rights. She also argued that she was presented in “Feud” as a person who spread malicious gossip, and who used the word “bitch” to describe her sister, the equally iconic actress Joan Fontaine. (While the relationship between de Havilland and Fontaine could itself be the subject of a whole other installment of “Feud,” Murphy has announced that the next airing will be entitled “Feud: Charles and Diana”). FX and the other defendants immediately moved to strike de Havilland’s complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, relying heavily on the First Amendment and the argument that filmmakers and the authors of creative works have the right to depict actual persons in docudramas like “Feud,” but their motion was denied. The trial court held that the realistic portrayal of de Havilland was insufficiently transformative, such that no First Amendment defense to de Havilland’s right of publicity claim was available under California law. The trial court also held that a reasonable jury could conclude that de Havilland’s portrayal in “Feud” cast her in a false light with respect to her use of vulgar terms like “bitch” to describe Fontaine, and the repeating of gossip (specifically, about the drinking habits of Frank Sinatra). Working under an expedited appeal schedule due to de Havilland’s advanced age, three California court of appeal judges rejected the trial court’s findings, holding that the First Amendment protects FX’s portrayal of de Havilland in a docudrama without her permission. The court held that the right of publicity cannot be used to control a celebrity’s image by censoring disagreeable portrayals consistent with First Amendment and free speech considerations. The court also held that de Havilland’s portrayal in “Feud” was transformative, particularly her appearance in the interview “framing device” that articulates the series’ broader concerns about the treatment of aging women, especially in Hollywood. Finally, the court rejected de Havilland’s false light claim, finding that, with one possible exception, she was portrayed more favorably than any other person appearing in “Feud.” The court also held that de Havilland’s claims of damage resulting from her alleged portrayal as a gossip who used inappropriate language were not cognizable, in light of prior interviews de Havilland had given over many decades recounting lighthearted stories about the peccadillos of others, including her co-stars, and her documented use of the words “dragon lady” to describe her sister. So what’s next? Under California’s anti-SLAPP law, the defendants can recover attorneys’ fees and costs from de Havilland, but she has vowed to appeal further. In addition, her lawyers have characterized the appellate court’s ruling as an “industry decision” written by a judge who used to work for NBC and the firm representing FX. So it seems that there will be yet another episode of “Feud: de Havilland v. FX” coming soon to this blog. Stay tuned!
April 2, 2018
Trademarks
Cannabis Branding and Free Speech Considerations
A recent out-of-court settlement following an 8th Circuit decision in Gerlich v. Leath highlights some of the unique legal issues that surround the branding of products in the cannabis space. In 2012, two students at Iowa State University (ISU), Paul Gerlich and Erin Furleigh, secured approval from ISU’s trademark licensing office to use the ISU school mascot, "Cy the Cardinal," and other identifying marks and logos of the school on t-shirts that the students planned to print and sell. The students were the leaders of the ISU chapter of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), an advocacy group that promotes the legalization of marijuana for responsible use by adults. The ISU chapter of NORML was an officially-recognized student group and the t-shirts were designed to raise awareness of NORML. The t-shirts displayed the school mascot as part of the NORML acronym, along with a marijuana leaf and the slogan “Freedom is NORML at ISU.” The students started selling their shirts and placed a re-order. But the school revoked its trademark licensing approval after a front page article in a local newspaper about the school's approval of the t-shirts prompted an angry reaction from state lawmakers and public officials. The Trademark Office of the school also swiftly rewrote its trademark guidelines to ban the use of school logos on shirts that promote dangerous, illegal, or unhealthy products and illegal drugs. After subsequent versions of their t-shirts did not receive ISU approval, Gerlich and Furleigh sued four ISU administrators, including the then-president and director of trademark licensing, in the federal district court for the Southern District of Iowa on First Amendment and other grounds, claiming that the administrators took specific action at the students and subjected the students to scrutiny that wasn’t placed on other student groups. The district court ruled that the administrators at ISU ran afoul of the First Amendment because their trademark decisions violated the students’ right to free speech. On appeal, the 8th Circuit agreed and confirmed that denying the students access to the school’s trademarks – such as Cy the Cardinal mascot - as members of NORML discriminated against them based on their pro-cannabis viewpoint. The 8th Circuit maintained its holding after a rare grant of rehearing. Last month, the State of Iowa agreed to pay $150K to Gerlich and Furleigh and $193K in legal bills to the two firms representing them in order to settle the students’ claims. The settlement deal covers damages and legal fees at the appellate level, but further payments may still have to be made for the trial phase of the case. Because ISU is a state university, the case involved complex issues of viewpoint discrimination under First Amendment case precedent that might not apply in a private context. However, the case illustrates that, along with the complex and uncertain regulatory scheme currently governing the commercialization of cannabis in the U.S., other considerations such as trademark policies that take into account free speech considerations may come into play in a trademark licensing context when state action is involved.
February 13, 2018
First Amendment
Yelp! Negative Online Consumer Review Protected as Opinion, Not Actionable Libel
We have discussed here before new federal legislative protections that are in place to give consumers wide latitude to post online reviews of businesses, whether they be good or bad. A recent decision of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York in Crescendo Designs, Ltd. v. Reses, provides additional protection for online consumer reviews, confirming that a negative online consumer review can be a protected opinion, rather than unlawful libel. Crescendo Designs, a custom home theater system installation business, installed an expensive system in Reses’ beach home. Dissatisfied with the results when she claimed the system failed and Crescendo didn’t come back quickly enough to resolve the problem, Reses posted a negative review of the system and the services she received on Yelp.com. In her review, she described what went wrong and commented “Terrible service if something goes wrong!”. Crescendo Designs filed a lawsuit claiming, among other things, that the online review constituted libel, i.e., a published statement of fact that was false and damaging to its reputation. The Supreme Court, Suffolk County granted Reses’ motion to dismiss and Crescendo Designs appealed. On appeal, the Appellate Division confirmed the lower court’s finding that the Yelp website review was not actionable as libel, because the review was an expression of opinion by a dissatisfied customer, rather than a published assertion of fact, which is required to maintain a libel claim. It held that “[r]ather than sifting through a communication for the purpose of isolating and identifying assertions of fact,” the courts should “consider the content of the communication as a whole,” and “look to the over-all context in which the assertions were made” to determine “whether the reasonable reader would have believed that the challenged statements were conveying facts about the libel plaintiff.” Taking into account the context in which the review was made and viewing the content of the review as a whole, the court found that “a reasonable reader would have believed that the writer of the review was a dissatisfied customer who utilized the Yelp website to express an opinion.” Yelp reviews have not always been held to be protected expressions of opinion. For example, a Staten Island court in Technovate v Fanelli awarded $1,000 in damages to a floor refinishing business against a consumer based on her Yelp review, which contained words such as “scam,” “con artist” and “robs,” finding that the review crossed the line from opinion to libel. As with libel claims asserted against traditional publications, an online review will not be shielded from liability if it contains statements of fact or a combination of fact and opinion deemed to be false and injurious.
July 13, 2017

