Samuel Flitton

On March 31, USDA announced that the U.S. Forest Service will relocate its headquarters from Washington, D.C. to Salt Lake City, bringing roughly 260 positions and the agency's top leadership to the Intermountain West. For Utah, a state with more than 8 million acres of national forest land and a roughly $9.7 billion outdoor recreation economy, this is a significant development. Utah Is Already at the Table The relocation does not arrive in a vacuum. In January 2026, Utah finalized a 20-year cooperative agreement with the Forest Service giving the state a substantially larger role in managing its national forests, covering decisions about logging, grazing, recreation, wildlife, and forest restoration. The Forest Service's Intermountain Regional Office has been based in Ogden for decades. That office will close under the reorganization, but the new national headquarters in Salt Lake City places an even higher level of decision-making authority in the state. What the Reorganization Looks Like The restructuring goes beyond a change of address. All nine regional offices will close, replaced by 15 state directors and six new "operational service centers" around the country. The full transition is expected to take about a year, with employee relocations beginning this summer. Implications for Utah Businesses Utah was the first state to create a dedicated Office of Outdoor Recreation, and companies like Cotopaxi, Backcountry, Vista Outdoor, Amer Sports, Osprey Packs, and Rossignol are headquartered or have major operations here. Outdoor recreation is a major contributing sector to the state's economy and supports around 75,000 jobs. For businesses that depend on access to national forest land for recreation, grazing, timber, or resource extraction, having Forest Service leadership in Salt Lake City could mean faster engagement with the agency's top decision-makers and new contracting opportunities as the agency builds out its Utah presence. At the same time, existing Forest Service contractors should prepare for potential disruptions as contracting officers relocate and the organizational structure is redrawn. The Public Lands Backdrop The announcement lands in the middle of an active debate about federal land ownership in Utah. The federal government owns roughly two-thirds of all land in the state, and Senator Mike Lee has repeatedly pushed for the sale of federal public lands, most recently through an amendment to the budget reconciliation bill last summer that was ultimately withdrawn after bipartisan backlash. Some observers have raised concerns about locating the agency's headquarters in a state whose elected officials have challenged the constitutionality of federal land ownership. Others argue the move simply puts leadership closer to the land it manages. Rep. Celeste Maloy of Utah's 2nd Congressional District, who sits on the House Natural Resources Committee, welcomed the relocation, saying it could improve responsiveness on wildfire and land management. What to Watch Several open questions remain: whether the Forest Service will experience the same kind of workforce attrition that followed USDA's Kansas City relocation during the first Trump term; whether Congress will raise legal objections to the move; how the shift to a state-based management model will affect tribal relations; and whether Utah's expanded cooperative agreement becomes a template for other states or a flashpoint over state influence on federal land decisions. For businesses, governments, and organizations with a stake in how Utah's public lands are managed, this reorganization is worth watching closely.

_*]:min-w-0 gap-3 !gap-3.5"> On March 26, the Trump administration issued an Executive Order titled "Addressing DEI Discrimination by Federal Contractors" that represents perhaps the most significant operationalization to date of the administration's campaign against DEI. The order requires federal agencies to incorporate new anti-DEI certification clauses into contracts, contract-like instruments, and subcontracts within 30 days, meaning the April 26 deadline is fast approaching. What's New The EO introduces a mandatory contract clause requiring federal contractors and subcontractors to certify they will not engage in "racially discriminatory DEI activities," which the order defines as disparate treatment based on race or ethnicity in recruitment, employment, contracting, program participation, or the allocation of an entity's resources. That definition is notable: it's the clearest articulation the administration has offered to date of what it considers impermissible DEI. The order also grants the government broad audit authority, requiring contractors to make their books, records, and accounts available for compliance reviews, with few express limitations on scope. Prime contractors must monitor and report subcontractor noncompliance. And noncompliant parties face serious consequences: contract termination, suspension or debarment, and False Claims Act liability, including treble damages and qui tam exposure. Why It Matters The scope of who qualifies as a "federal contractor" or "subcontractor" under this EO remains unclear, but could sweep in tens of thousands of entities, including universities, healthcare providers, small businesses, and even vendors and suppliers to prime contractors. The order also creates potential tension with existing federal programs like the SBA's 8(a) program and state-level requirements for affirmative action plans or disadvantaged business enterprise participation. What to Do Now Federal contractors should be taking steps now to prepare. Our colleagues Chris DeLong, Matt Gillespie, Alex Hontos, and Eric Weisenburger break down the order's key provisions, open questions, and practical compliance guidance in their full client alert: New DEI-Focused Executive Order Implements Expansive Audit Authority and Imposes DEI Certification Obligations on All Federal Contractors, Subcontractors. For questions about how the EO may affect your organization, please contact any member of Dorsey's Government Contracts or Labor & Employment teams.

With the current surface transportation law set to expire on September 30, 2026, Congress is moving deeper into work on the next multi-year reauthorization bill. House and Senate committees have been holding oversight hearings and stakeholder discussions as they prepare legislative text expected later this year. The House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee has identified reauthorization as a top priority for 2026, with a goal of advancing a bipartisan bill before the deadline. In the Senate, the Environment and Public Works Committee continues reviewing how the current law has performed and assessing potential updates to formula funding, project delivery, and program structure. Several key policy issues are shaping negotiations: Funding Levels and Formula Allocations – States and industry groups are advocating for stable, inflation-adjusted formula funding to preserve purchasing power and allow long-term planning. Project Delivery and Permitting Reform – Streamlining environmental reviews and improving interagency coordination remain central themes as lawmakers look for ways to reduce delays and cost uncertainty. Freight and Supply Chain Infrastructure – Freight corridors, logistics hubs, and port connectivity continue to be focal points, particularly as Congress evaluates economic competitiveness priorities. Federal-State Balance – Policymakers are debating how much flexibility states should have in deploying federal transportation dollars versus maintaining federal standards and oversight. The timeline remains tight. Committees are expected to continue hearings and stakeholder engagement through the spring, with draft legislation potentially emerging mid-to-late summer. If Congress does not complete reauthorization before September 30, short-term extensions could be necessary. For states, local governments, contractors, and infrastructure-dependent industries, early 2026 is a critical window. Funding levels, eligibility rules, and permitting reforms decided in this cycle will shape infrastructure planning and investment for the next five years or more.

  President Trump is imposing new tariffs effective on Tuesday, February 24, under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (“Section 122”). The Section 122 tariffs replace the tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), and that the Supreme Court on Friday found unlawful. Does a solid legal footing exist for the Section 122 tariffs? Given the amount of money at issue for U.S. businesses, it is not hard to imagine a new wave of litigation attacking Section 122, and again seeking refunds of Section 122 duties collected. Section 122 is a blank slate. President Trump is the first president to impose tariffs under Section 122, and indeed the first president to take any action under Section 122 according to the Congressional Research Service.[1] No court opinions thus exist that have examined executive action under Section 122. As discussed below, however, the court opinions relating to the IEEPA tariffs indicate that trade deficits are a valid basis for temporary tariffs under Section 122. Whether Section 122 will survive closer scrutiny is, ultimately, impossible to predict given the lack of any precedent or past practice as to Section 122’s scope. Basis for New Section 122 Tariffs. The new Section 122 tariffs and the prior IEEPA tariffs identified longstanding, persistent, and large trade deficits as justifying action. In particular, President Trump issued an executive order under IEEPA to address the longstanding U.S. trade deficit, and to authorize the global reciprocal tariffs.[2] Section 122 allows the imposition of tariffs “to deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payment deficits” or to “prevent an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange markets.”[3] In issuing his proclamation on Friday evening imposing Section 122 tariffs, President Trump cited the longstanding and persistent deficit as justifying the action. Thus, “[r]estricting imports through the surcharge imposed in this proclamation is required to address the fundamental international payments problems within the meaning of section 122 that I have found to exist.”[4]   Section 122 Discussion in IEEPA Litigation. In the IEEPA litigation, the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) relied heavily on Section 122 to find that the IEEPA tariffs were unlawful. The CIT found that Section 122 “removes the President’s power to impose remedies in response to balance-of-payments deficits, and specifically trade deficits” from IEEPA’s scope of authority.[5] Section 122 is a “non-emergency statute with greater limitations”[6] compared to IEEPA.  The CIT, accordingly, said that Section 122 effectively displaced any tariff authority that might be read into IEEPA, at least with respect to trade imbalances. “Trade deficits…can be directly impacted by mechanisms such as import quotas and tariffs, as authorized by Section 122.”[7] The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) affirmed the CIT judgment, and also used Section 122 as context for interpreting IEEPA. The CAFC majority opinions cited Section 122 for the proposition that Congress delineated tariff authority carefully, and subject to procedural and durational limits.[8] The majority opinions of the Supreme Court said nothing particularly about Section 122, except to say that numerous U.S. trade statutes place limits on the duration, amount, and scope of tariffs.[9] While the Supreme Court majority opinions did not reference Section 122 at all, Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent did. He cited Section 122, along with other statutes, as providing “expansive” power to the President to impose tariffs.[10] Justice Kavanaugh also cited Section 122 to diminish the importance of the Supreme Court’s IEEPA decision: “with respect to tariffs in particular, the Court’s decision might not prevent Presidents from imposing most if not all of these same sorts of tariffs under other statutory authorities.”[11] Thus, from Justice Kavanaugh’s perspective, Section 122’s broad authority created an alternative to IEEPA that could be used to implement global tariffs. Whether Section 122 is Vulnerable to Lawsuit. All of the above is to say that IEEPA litigation suggests Section 122 is a basis to impose global tariffs to remedy trade deficits.[12] Not a lot more can be said than this, as of today. Any reviewing court of Section 122 tariffs would have to confront a dearth of authority on Section 122. There is no existing Section 122 practice, nor are there any cases directly reviewing executive action under Section 122. A reviewing court presumably would have to afford the President at least some discretion in determining the circumstances under which Section 122 is appropriately used. President Trump’s Section 122 proclamation cites to findings of the executive branch as to the scope, severity, and impact of trade deficits. It is unlikely that a reviewing court would meaningfully subject those findings to judicial review. President Trump’s Section 122 proclamation exempts certain goods from tariffs. A potential plaintiff might argue this framework does not provide a uniform “surcharge” in the words of Section 122. The Section 122 tariffs apply to goods from all countries,[13] including those for which the United States has a trade surplus.  This might be argued to be a “surcharge” in excess of what is necessary. Section 122 does allow, but does not seem to require, the President to exempt countries from tariffs if they have large and persistent trade surpluses.[14] Conclusion. To conclude, the Section 122 tariffs are novel, as were the tariffs under IEEPA. However, unlike the IEEPA tariffs, a potential plaintiff will have to go deeper than saying the statute does not permit tariffs. Section 122 explicitly permits tariffs. The CIT, CAFC, and Supreme Court discussion of Section 122 in the IEEPA litigation suggest that Section 122 is an avenue for President Trump to impose global tariffs to address the U.S. trade deficit. Whether that authority is lawfully exercised remains to be seen.

Washington has grown accustomed to governing by continuing resolution. This year looks different—until it doesn’t. As Congress advances remaining appropriations bills in “minibus” packages, lawmakers are closer than they have been in years to completing the annual funding process through something resembling regular order, even as a dispute over the Department of Homeland Security bill has revived the risk of a partial government shutdown. That tension—real progress alongside real instability—makes this a useful moment to revisit how the appropriations process works and why engagement still matters. Under federal law, Congress is expected to enact twelve annual appropriations bills before the fiscal year begins on October 1. The process starts with a budget request from the Administration and a topline budget set by Congress, followed by allocations to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Those allocations are subdivided among appropriations subcommittees, each of which drafts a bill and accompanying report language governing specific agencies and programs. While bill text establishes funding levels, report language often carries significant policy weight by directing agency priorities, implementation, and congressional intent. When the House and Senate advance different versions of a bill, or bundle multiple bills into minibuses, those differences must be resolved before final passage. Historically, this occurred through formal conference committees, but in modern practice it more often happens through a structured exchange of amendments between the chambers. That process is constrained by rules, which limit what can be added or modified late in the process. As a result, many policy disputes are resolved indirectly through funding limitations or explanatory statement language rather than changes to statutory text. In recent years, appropriations have not so much failed as quietly collapsed into a cycle of continuing resolutions. Missed deadlines have turned temporary funding into a governing strategy, freezing priorities in place and constraining agencies’ ability to respond to new needs. In some years, Congress has effectively funded the government on autopilot. What makes this year notable is that lawmakers are attempting to break that pattern by negotiating remaining bills through minibuses. But the margin for error is razor thin: compressing the process at this stage means a single unresolved dispute can rapidly undo months of progress and disrupt funding for multiple agencies. Those dynamics heighten the risks for stakeholders. In Utah, federal appropriations underpin defense installations, research universities, water and land management efforts, infrastructure projects, and technology development. When funding is unpredictable, awards are delayed, planning timelines compress, and coordination among federal, state, and local partners suffers. Against that backdrop, several major funding areas now taking shape through ongoing House and Senate negotiations help illustrate what is at stake for Utah businesses and institutions: Water & Infrastructure: Energy and Water appropriations provide roughly $10.4 billion for Army Corps of Engineers civil works, holding funding near prior year levels despite pressure for deeper cuts. Western water funding survived negotiations largely intact, reflecting bipartisan recognition that water reliability remains a growth constraint for states like Utah. Energy & Critical Minerals: Department of Energy funding of approximately $49 billion preserves non-defense energy programs after proposals to scale them back. Final agreements favored grid modernization, nuclear programs, and critical minerals—areas where Utah has emerging economic and national security relevance. Public Lands & Tourism: Interior appropriations maintain funding for public lands management and provide about $3.3 billion for the National Park Service, despite ongoing debates over federal land use and agency staffing. For Utah’s outdoor recreation and tourism economy, flat funding avoids the operational disruptions seen under continuing resolutions. Research & Innovation: Commerce, Justice, Science funding rejects steep proposed reductions to agencies such as NSF, NASA, NOAA, and NIST, preserving the federal research base that supports Utah’s universities, startups, and defense-adjacent technology firms. Oversight language reflects political concern about accountability rather than retrenchment. Housing, Health & Workforce (House-passed): Labor/HHS/Education and Transportation/HUD bills modestly increase or hold funding year over year while sidestepping major structural changes proposed earlier in the process. Final outcomes remain unresolved, but the House position signals an effort to restrain spending without triggering sharp disruptions in housing development, public health, or workforce pipelines. As work continues on fiscal year 2026 bills, attention is already turning to fiscal year 2027 appropriations. Funding priorities and report language are developed well in advance of final votes, and Members of Congress rely heavily on stakeholder input during this phase to fine tune and tweak the appropriations bills. Our team helps clients navigate this process, including preparing funding priority requests and engaging with Utah’s federal delegation. In a system that often appears broken, understanding how appropriations work, and when to engage, remains essential to making the most of the funding opportunities.