Dorsey Work Watch
Now that a court has enjoined the FTC Non-compete rule, can employers go back to business as usual?
Employers who wish to enter into non-compete agreements with their employees breathed a collective sigh of relief on August 20, 2024, when a federal district court struck down the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) new nationwide ban on non-compete agreements (the “Non-Compete Rule” or “Rule”). Although for now the Federal Trade Commission Act does not prohibit the use of non-compete agreements, employers should be vigilant in seeking to comply with other federal laws and the laws in all fifty states which continue to govern the enforceability of non-compete agreements. In this month’s column, we will analyze the court’s decision striking down the Non-Compete Rule and provide a brief overview of the patchwork of state laws that apply to non-competes. We will conclude by offering some practical suggestions for employers who wish to use non-compete agreements for their workers in compliance with law. Injunction of the Non-Compete Rule In Ryan, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 3:24-cv-00986 (N.D. Tex.), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas concluded that the FTC exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the Non-Compete Rule and that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious. The court set the Rule aside, preventing it from taking effect shortly before its effective date of September 4, 2024. The Ryan decision prevents the FTC from enforcing the Non-Compete Rule against any company nationwide. The FTC estimates that one in five American Workers—or approximately 30 million workers—is subject to a non-compete agreement. With few exceptions, the Non-Compete Rule would have prevented employers from entering into non-compete agreements with workers, and would have required employers to rescind existing non-compete agreements for all workers except senior executives. The Rule therefore would have rescinded tens of millions of non-compete agreements. It also would have prohibited employers from falsely representing to workers that they were subject to a non-compete clause. The FTC classified each of these practices as “an unfair method of competition” under the Rule. See 16 C.F.R. § 910. The court in Ryan conducted its analysis pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). As the Supreme Court recently explained in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, the APA was enacted “as a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in the legislation creating their offices.” 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2261 (2024) (quotations omitted). The APA proscribes procedures for agency action and delineates the contours of judicial review of such action. When reviewing an agency action, the APA requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be [inter alia] . . . arbitrary and capricious” or “in excess of” statutory authority. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(C). In concluding that the FTC exceeded its statutory authority in implementing the Non-Compete Rule, the court held that the FTC lacks substantive rulemaking authority with respect to unfair methods of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The court rejected the FTC’s position that Section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers it to create substantive rules regarding unfair methods of competition. The court described Section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act as a “housekeeping statute,” which authorizes the FTC to promulgate procedural, rather than substantive, rules. The court also held that the Non-Compete Rule is “unreasonably overbroad without a reasonable explanation,” rendering it arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The court noted that the Non-Compete Rule is broader than any state law, and that the FTC failed to provide evidence or a reasonable basis to support the imposition of such a sweeping ban, rather than targeting specific, harmful non-competes. The court also criticized the FTC for failing to sufficiently consider less disruptive alternatives to a nationwide ban on non-competes. The FTC currently is considering an appeal. It has until October 19th to appeal the district court’s decision. If the FTC appeals, it will face an uphill battle. The appeal will be decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and ultimately the United States Supreme Court, both of which have recently issued decisions curtailing the power of federal agencies. Any appeal will also unfold against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Loper Bright, overruling precedent under which courts afforded deference to a federal agency’s interpretation of its own power, commonly referred to as “Chevron deference.” Thus, courts will not afford deference to the FTC when considering its legal arguments in support of the agency’s authority to promulgate the Non-Compete Rule. Although the court in Ryan set aside the Non-Compete Rule, the decision does not prevent the FTC from continuing to bring enforcement actions against employers who use non-compete agreements. The FTC remains free to target conduct it considers to be unfair methods of competition by adjudicating the merits of individual non-compete agreements on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, although no federal law comprehensively addresses the enforceability of employment non-compete agreements, other federal agencies, including the Department of Justice—through its Antitrust Division—and the National Labor Relations Board, have taken hostile positions towards non-compete agreements and other restrictions on employee mobility and have sought to rein in their use. Proposed legislation to ban or limit non-compete agreements has been introduced in Congress several times in recent years, but such proposals appear to have made little progress. State Non-Compete Laws Now that a court has set aside the FTC’s Non-Compete Rule, employers should focus more of their attention on legislative and administrative actions by the states. In recent years, states have enacted a flurry of laws limiting the use of non-compete agreements. At least thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have statutes in place that restrict the use of non-compete agreements.[1] California, Oklahoma, North Dakota and Minnesota have near-total bans on non-compete agreements. Eleven states and the District of Columbia ban non-competes for low-wage workers. Eight states and the District of Columbia impose notice requirements that must be satisfied in order for non-compete agreements to be enforceable. In 2022, Colorado severely restricted the use of non-compete agreements and added a criminal sanction to its statute. Additionally, proposed legislation restricting the use of non-competes is pending in states across country. Many states restrict the use of non-competes in other ways. State common law imposes additional restrictions on non-competes, both in states with statutory restrictions and those without any. For example, state common law may govern issues such as the nature and adequacy of consideration, the enforceability of clauses allowing judicial reformation of overbroad agreements, and requirements that a non-compete agreement be reasonable in duration, geographic coverage and scope. A new statute restricting the use of non-competes in New York may be on the horizon. In 2023, the New York State Legislature passed a bill that would have prohibited most non-competes in New York. See Senate Bill S.3100-A. The bill would also have created a private right of action for workers to sue their employers to void unlawful non-competes and allowed them to recover up to $10,000 in damages. However, New York Governor Kathy Hochul ultimately vetoed the bill, after failing to negotiate an amendment to narrow the ban to apply to low and middle-income workers. Nevertheless, Governor Hochul has expressed support for a ban on non-competes for middle-class and low-wage workers, leaving open the possibility that more narrowly tailored non-compete legislation may be reintroduced in the future.[2] In addition to legislative activity at the state-level, state attorneys general may bring more enforcement actions against companies that use non-compete agreements, particularly for low-wage workers. In 2016, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman conducted high-profile investigations into the non-compete policies and practices of three major companies: Law360, a legal publishing company, Jimmy John’s, a gourmet sandwich chain, and Examination Management Services, a nationwide medical information services provider. As a result of these investigations, all three companies agreed to limit their use of non-compete agreements with respect to lower-level employees.[3] Practice Considerations In light of the decision in Ryan v. Federal Trade Commission, for now employers need not worry about compliance with the Non-Compete Rule, which would have required employers to notify millions of workers that their non-compete agreements were unenforceable. However, employers should continue to be mindful of potential government enforcement actions and compliance with state law. Employers should review their non-compete agreements and assess whether they are necessary to protect legitimate business interests, such as confidential information or goodwill. Employers should consider whether less restrictive means will suffice to protect their legitimate interests, including the use of garden leave (wherein an employer pays the departing employee not to compete during the restricted period), non-solicitation and confidentiality agreements, and policies and practices restricting the use and disclosure of confidential information. For multi-state employers, given the present patchwork of state laws governing non-compete agreements across the country, crafting a one-size-fits-all non-compete agreement for employees in different states is an increasingly complex task. Employers seeking to use a single form of agreement may craft agreements imposing a lowest common denominator approach, essentially allowing the most restrictive state laws to govern all or most of their workers. Even in such agreements, employers will often expressly exempt application to workers in states where non-competes are not enforceable, such as California. Employers may instead choose to use several forms of agreement to take advantage of the laws in states allowing restrictions that are more favorable to the employer. Employers using multiple forms of non-compete agreement will need to invest in training human resources and benefits professionals in charge of onboarding workers subject to non-competes on when and how the various forms of agreement should be used. Reprinted with permission from the October 3, 2024 edition of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL © 2024 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com – 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com. [1] Economic Innovation Group, State Noncompete Law Tracker: https://eig.org/state-noncompete-map/. [2] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/22/nyregion/kathy-hochul-veto-noncompete.html. [3] https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2016/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-jimmy-johns-stop-including-non-compete (Jimmy John’s and Law360); https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2016/ag-schneiderman-agreement-ends-non-compete-agreements-employees-national-medical (Examination Management Services).
October 10, 2024
My Employees Have Seen Too Much. Can I Make Them An Offer They Can’t Refuse?
It is common knowledge that employers have a vested interest in the confidentiality and discretion of their employees, especially in emerging or sensitive industries. Employers invest time and money into training employees on proprietary systems, expose employees to valuable trade secrets, and make employees privy to internal disputes that could be damaging if made public. Accordingly, it is common practice for employers to require their employees sign confidentiality or nondisclosure provisions, often referred to as NDAs, in their employee or severance agreements as a condition for employment. Nondisclosure provisions in standard form employee or severance agreements offer employers a quick and easy way to safeguard potentially valuable or risky information without having to implement more costly measures. Even before the recent AI boom, competitive industries like technology and financial services relied so heavily on nondisclosure agreements that they became a ubiquitous part of the employment process.[1] However, employers should be aware that, in addition to the federal Speak Out Act (42 U.S.C. § 19403), state laws regarding the enforceability of confidentiality provisions in employee agreements vary and have undergone significant transformations in recent years. In 2017, the #MeToo movement arose in North America and Europe, a digital social movement regarding the pervasiveness of sexual misconduct, particularly in the workplace.[2] In the wake of the #MeToo movement, nearly twenty states and the federal legislature enacted laws limiting the use of confidentiality provisions that would prevent a victim or witness of sexual misconduct from disclosing their experience. The extent and application of state restrictions on nondisclosure agreements varies wildly: for example, some states like Louisiana provide merely that nondisclosure agreements that preemptively prevent an employee from disclosing future sexual misconduct are unenforceable.[3] By contrast, other states, like California, make it an unlawful employment practice, and creates significant employer liability, for any employer that requires any employee to sign a nondisclosure agreement that has the effect of preventing that employee from disclosing any unlawful acts.[4] Moreover, even states that have not adopted statutory limits on nondisclosure agreements have common law doctrines limiting the enforceability of nondisclosure agreements that are overly broad or restrictive. Specifically, 19 states have adopted restrictions on employer nondisclosure agreements. Seven of those states, Arizona, Hawaii, Maryland, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia, restrict employers from enforcing nondisclosure agreements specifically related to sexual misconduct. While all seven states’ laws relate only to sexual misconduct, there are still notable differences in the degree of their restriction. Before the federal Speak Out Act was passed, other states chose to adopt an even lower level of statutory restriction. For example, Arizona’s law only restricts the enforcement of nondisclosure agreements that prohibit a party to the agreement from making a statement in a criminal proceeding related to sexual assault and does not prohibit enforcement of an agreement that would prevent a party from making a public statement.[5] For these laws, compliance with the federal standard generally will mean compliance with the state law. By contrast, other states have restricted enforcement of all nondisclosure agreements related to sexual misconduct, regardless of whether they were agreed to before or after the incident occurred. For example, the laws of Hawaii, Tennessee, Virginia, and Utah all restrict the enforcement of nondisclosure agreements regarding sexual misconduct that are a condition of employment, even if the agreement was entered into after the workplace dispute occurred. Importantly, all these laws reference the enforcement of a nondisclosure agreement that is required by the employer as a condition for employment. Accordingly, most (but not all) of these states allow the inclusion of nondisclosure agreements in settlements, so long as they are independent of employment with distinct consideration. Indeed, Utah’s law specifically provides that their statute does not prohibit nondisclosure clauses that relate to the amount of a monetary settlement, or at the request of the employee.[6] Other states have gone further and have restricted the enforcement of employer nondisclosure agreements for a range of conduct beyond sexual misconduct. California, Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington all restrict employer nondisclosure agreements that would prevent disclosure of certain types of unlawful conduct. For example, Colorado, Illinois, and Maine restrict the enforcement of nondisclosure agreements related to any unlawful employment practice, including and in addition to sexual assault. This is relevant because ‘unlawful employment practices’ include a range of conduct that might be difficult for an employer to predict. For example, Colorado’s law provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to “cause to be printed” an advertisement for prospective employment that indirectly discriminates on the basis of a protected class.[7] Intuitively, it may seem like common sense to draft a nondisclosure agreement that does not potentially restrict an employee’s disclosure of unlawful employment practices. However, when dealing with dense anti-discrimination statutes that don’t provide clear thresholds for liability, an overly broad nondisclosure agreement can easily restrict disclosure of an unlawful employment action, despite the employer’s best intentions. Furthermore, some states go even further and create liability for employers that require their employees to enter into statutorily prohibited nondisclosure agreements. California, Oregon, and Rhode Island all make it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to require their employees to sign a nondisclosure or nondisparagement agreement regarding certain unlawful acts. For example, California makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to require an employee to sign any “document to the extent it has the purpose or effect of denying the employee the right to disclose information about unlawful acts in the workplace.”[8] Furthermore, the California statute requires that all nondisclosure agreements contain language clarifying that nothing prevents the employee from disclosing conduct that they have reason to believe is unlawful.[9] An employer’s unlawful employment action under California’s statute exposes them to a civil cause of action and accompanying costs and damages.[10] When drafting nondisclosure agreements in states like California, employers should strive to carefully comply with the statutory restrictions to avoid significant liability. While the laws governing employers use of nondisclosure agreements have become increasingly complicated in recent years, there are a few longstanding principles that employers should keep in mind. Most importantly, no state restricts an employer from entering into a nondisclosure agreement for the purpose of protecting trade secrets and other proprietary information. Even California, which adopted extremely restrictive laws governing nondisclosure agreements, provides that their statute “does not prohibit an employer from protecting the employer’s trade secret proprietary information, or confidential information,” so long as the restrictions do not pertain to unlawful acts in the workplace.[11] In light of the recent changes to federal and state laws regarding the enforceability of employer nondisclosure agreements, employers should consider the following: Employers should avoid using the same standard form nondisclosure agreement for employees employed in different states. Employers should avoid drafting nondisclosure agreements that are overly broad and prohibit disclosure of information beyond what the employer intends to protect. For applicable states, employers should ensure that their nondisclosure agreements contain statutorily required disclosures that nothing prevent an employee from discussing instances of sexual misconduct, or other unlawful employment practices. [1] Shira Ovide, An Obsession With Secrets, The New York Times, July 27, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/27/technology/nondisclosure-agreements-tech-companies.html. [2] Amy Brittain, Me Too movement, Encyclopedia Britannica, Last Updated July 22, 2024, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Me-Too-movement. [3] LA HB161, 2024 Regular Session, Bill Text (2024), https://legiscan.com/LA/text/HB161/id/3011873. [4] Cal. Gov. Code § 12964.5(a)(1)(B). [5] Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-720. [6] Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-114. [7] Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402. [8] Id. Cal. Gov. Code § 12964.5(a)(1)(B). [9] Id. [10] Id. § 12965(a). [11] Id. § 12964.5(f).
October 7, 2024
What Are An Employer’s Rights Relating to Non-Employee Union Representatives On Their Premises?
Although employers are welcome to support their employees’ ability to meet with their union representatives, they are not required to grant nonemployee union representatives access to their property to do so. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., the Supreme Court held that while employers may not restrict the right of employees to discuss self-organization amongst themselves, no such obligation is owed to nonemployee organizers. The Court found no issue with an employer's posting on his property against nonemployee distribution of union literature, subject to narrow exceptions concerning inaccessibility and discrimination. For decades, however, employers have been subject to a "public space" exception. Board decisions had consistently held that nonemployee union representatives were permitted to enter and solicit union support and activities within private property, so long as the space in which they did so was one the public was invited to enter and they were not disruptive. This is no longer the case following the NLRB's 2019 decision in UPMC Presbyterian Hospital. One such space that had been subject to the “public space exception” was hospital cafeterias. Therefore, this issue arose when two nonemployee union representatives were escorted out of a University of Pittsburg affiliated hospital after meeting with a group of employees to discuss union and organization-related matters in the facility's cafeteria, which is open to the public. The hospital had consistently, up to that point and afterward, implemented a practice of removing nonemployees engaging in any form of solicitation or promotional activity. The NLRB, when confronting this case, set forth a new standard that dispelled any confusion on whether a “public space” exception grants nonemployee union representatives unfettered access to such places on an employer's premises. It stated that the National Labor Relations Act “does not require employers to permit the use of its facility for organizational activities when other means are readily available.” The fact that a space, such as a cafeteria, on an employer’s private property was open to the public does not mean a nonemployee must be allowed access for any purpose. To the extent that any previous Board law had created an exception, in addition to those created by the Court in Babcock that “requires employers to permit nonemployees to engage in promotional or organizational activities in public cafeterias or restaurants,” that decision was overruled. The Board, however, did make a note of the exceptions provided by the Supreme Court's decision in Babcock & Wilcox Co. There, the Court provided two very limited exceptions for when an employer may not restrict a nonemployee union representative from accessing their property: inaccessibility and discrimination. The first exception arises when a union representative cannot access employees through any other reasonable means. Thus, when there is no other avenue through which a nonemployee representative may communicate its message with employees, an employer's property right must give way. The second exception arises when an employer exercises his property rights in a discriminatory way. An employer may not restrict property access to a particular nonemployee union representative(s) when it does so for other nonemployee union representatives or permits similar conduct by others in similar relevant circumstances. For example, an employer may not grant access to other types of solicitations that are “similar in nature” while simultaneously denying access to nonemployee organizers. Note that another 2019 Board decision held that granting access to charitable or civic associations (i.e., Girl Scout cookie sales) would not open the door to allowing non-employee union representatives on the property. Notably, the Board has since clarified that its decision in UPMC Presbyterian Hospital does not allow employers to restrict the access of nonemployee union representatives if the union representatives have “a contractual right to access the employer’s property.” Hilton Anchorage, 2020 NLRB LEXIS 99, 117 (N.L.R.B. March 4, 2020).
September 23, 2024
What impact has New York’s expanded employee whistleblower statute had on the scope of workers’ protected activities, and what steps can employers take to mitigate the risks of whistleblower claims?
When an employer disciplines its employees, let’s say for unsatisfactory performance or misconduct, employees sometimes respond with accusations that the discipline illegitimately occurred in retaliation for conduct protected by law. For example, an employee may claim that the employer imposed discipline due to the employee’s previous expression of a concern relating to the employer’s compliance with law in conducting its business. Although the laws do not prohibit the employer from imposing discipline based on the employee’s performance or misconduct, the laws often do protect the employee’s right to express concerns about compliance with law. Managing such claims requires employers not only to untangle the conflicting factual assertions about the underlying reason for the discipline, but often requires the employer to sort out a complex web of statutes, each with different language and varying requirements for the assertion of a retaliation claim. As of 2022, New York became one of a number of states that have sought to strengthen the protection of employees’ rights to express concerns about their employers’ compliance with law. Under an amended New York Labor Law § 740, New York workers may now assert causes of action for alleged retaliation occurring due to complaints about a violation of a “law, rule or regulation.” Now, a violation of § 740 provides a right to a jury trial, the possibility of punitive damages for willful violations, civil penalties, a 2-year statute of limitations, and other relief not previously available as remedies for retaliation under myriad federal and state statutes. In this article we will analyze the broadened scope of § 740, as well as several recent court decisions that have addressed the expanded definition of the term “law, rule or regulation.” We will then propose several practices employers may consider when responding to employee concerns regarding their employers’ compliance with law. Labor Law § 740 Before amendment of New York Labor Law § 740 in 2021, the statute narrowly protected an employee who “discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in violation of law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety, or which constitutes health care fraud.” N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(a)(2) (2021). The law required the employee to show not only that the employee disclosed concerns related to public health, safety or healthcare fraud. It also required that the employer had actually violated the law. The 2021 amendment relaxed this standard. Now § 740 protects an employee who: “discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of law, rule or regulation or that the employee reasonably believes poses a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety.” N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(a)(2) (2024) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute now prohibits retaliation against an employee if the employee “reasonably believes” an employer activity, policy, or practice violates a law, rule or regulation or poses a danger to public health and safety. Law, Rule or Regulation Section 740 now defines “law, rule or regulation” to include “(i) any duly enacted federal, state or local statute or ordinance or executive order; (ii) any rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to such statute or ordinance or executive order; or (iii) any judicial or administrative decision, ruling or order.” N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(1)(c). This updated definition now includes within “law, rule or regulation” executive orders, judicial or administrative decisions, rulings or orders, and rules promulgated pursuant to executive orders. A number of courts have recently interpreted the term “law, rule or regulation” and have set some boundaries employers should consider as they evaluate their policies and practices. In Pierce v. Better Holdco, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177137 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2023), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged protected activity by raising complaints related to violations of the California and federal WARN Acts, misrepresentations regarding website traffic in a SEC filing, and misrepresentations of profitability to investors. The plaintiff, the vice president of sales, operations, and customer service, was placed on administrative leave and terminated after raising these concerns. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff did not allege that the employer did or even intended to violate the WARN Act and that § 740 no longer requires such allegations. The Court stated that the plaintiff needed to demonstrate only a reasonable belief that the WARN Act had been violated. Additionally, although the plaintiff did not explain how the SEC filing misrepresentation violated the law, the Court held that the statute still protected the employee for disclosing “a reasonable belief of a violation of law” to her supervisors. The plaintiff attempted to allege two additional acts of protected conduct related to false statements made in an email and misrepresentations made regarding the company’s platform. However, the Court held the plaintiff did not plausibly allege she reasonably believed a violation of law had occurred for either act. Another case from the Southern District of New York held that the plaintiff stated a claim for retaliation after raising concerns regarding certain legal requirements relating to a sales and consumption tax. In Collison v. WANDRD, LLC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110062 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2024), the plaintiff, a customer service 1099 employee later promoted to a financial management W-2 position, alleged that he raised concerns that his employer violated requirements related to sales and consumption tax filings on multiple occasions. Following expression of these concerns, the plaintiff faced adverse employment actions, including eventual termination of employment. The Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the retaliation claim. In contrast to the outcomes in Pierce and Collision, other cases have found that the concerns expressed by an employee fell outside of the definition of “law, rule or regulation.” In Zhang v. Centene Mgmt. Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68718 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2023), the Court considered whether certain policy statements issued by the New York Department of Health’s (“DOH”) Office of Insurance Programs constituted a “law, rule or regulation” for purposes of § 740. The plaintiff was a registered nurse care manager whose employer agreed to follow Managed Long Term Care (“MLTC”) Policy 16.06 promulgated by the DOH. The plaintiff reported her employer’s noncompliance with the Policy, resulting in a DOH investigation and restorative action. The plaintiff was terminated and brought an action for retaliation under § 740.The Court determined that MLTC Policy 16.06 provided guidance on regulations related to personal care services and was not a binding rule promulgated by statute or ordinance. The Court further evaluated the Policy under the amended definition of “law, rule or regulation,” including regulations promulgated by executive order or judicial or administrative decision, ruling, or order. In doing so, the Court cited to HC2, Inc. v. Delaney, 510 F. Supp. 3d 86, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), a pre-amendment case holding that COVID-19 guidances issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the New York City Department of Health were not “mandates or dictates” promulgated pursuant to the relevant administrative procedures governing federal and city regulations, and therefore lacked the force of law to predicate § 740 claims. Applying this logic, the Zhang Court held that the Policy was merely a notice provision or “directive” that did not give rise to a § 740 whistleblower retaliation claim. Retroactive Application Another issue with which courts are grappling under § 740 is whether the expanded definition of “law, rule or regulation” applies retroactively to conduct occurring before the amendment took effect on January 26, 2022. Courts are currently divided as to the retroactive application of the amendment. See Callahan v. HSBC Sec., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47106 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2024) (collecting cases). Courts allowing retroactive application point to the “remedial” nature of the amendment, finding a legislative intent to correct the “restrictive nature of the prior statutory requirements.” Id. at *17-18. Other courts find that the amendment’s broadened protections provide a new basis upon which to find relief and therefore cannot be applied retroactively. See Pisano v. Reynolds, 2023 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2573, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 23, 2023). Practice Pointers Now that the New York Legislature has expanded § 740 to cover an employee’s assertion of concerns regarding laws in addition to those related to public health, safety, or healthcare fraud, employers should consider implementing several best practices including the following: Ensure that employment policies include clearly defined channels of communication which allow employees to raise concerns to supervisory and management staff, including concerns falling outside of the scope of their specific jobs; Such policies should include “bypass procedures” which allow the employee to escalate concerns to more senior levels of management, to human resources, internal audit or compliance staff. Such bypass procedures are particularly appropriate in the event that the employee concern involves the employee’s direct supervisor or to members of senior management who may be conflicted about considering the employee’s concerns; Where the company does not have sufficient resources to create an effective bypass procedure, the company should consider whether members of the board of directors should be appropriate avenues for particular concerns; Train those in management and supervisory roles on how to document and address employee concerns effectively, or to refer such concerns to the right persons who are best able to address them; Keep management up to date regarding changes in industry regulations and employee protections, including those established by federal, state and local law, executive orders and rules promulgated under such laws; Address concerns from former employees and independent contractors, inasmuch as such persons are now within the scope of persons protected by § 740; and Understand that a lack of an actual violation of law is no longer a viable defense to a claim under § 740, and that an employee engages in protected activity if the employee “reasonably” believes that a violation of a “law, rule, or regulation” has occurred. Reprinted with permission from the August 7, 2024 edition of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL © 2024 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com – 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com.
August 11, 2024
How bad is bad enough to sue? The U.S. Supreme Court clarifies when a work transfer is “adverse” enough to support a lawsuit under Title VII.
The United States Supreme Court recently clarified the law that applies to federal workplace discrimination claims based on an employee’s allegation that he or she was transferred to a job they didn’t want for a prohibited reason. In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Justice Elena Kagan wrote for a unanimous Court and reversed the Eighth Circuit’s dismissal of a police sergeant’s sex discrimination complaint against the City of St. Louis. The sergeant alleged that her employer transferred her to a position that involved the same pay and rank, but with different (and to the sergeant, more unfavorable) job duties – and so violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For context, when there is no direct evidence of discrimination, courts apply a burden-shifting framework. That requires a plaintiff first to show a “prima facie” case: that they were a qualified member of a protected class, that they suffered an adverse employment action, and that the employment action was connected to their membership in a protected group. If the plaintiff meets this standard, the employer/defendant can provide legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons to explain the employment action, and the plaintiff then has the chance to show those reasons are false, or “pretext.” However, if a plaintiff fails to establish a “prima facie” case—if the employment action wasn’t “adverse,” for example—the case cannot proceed to the next phase, and judgment for the defendant is usually appropriate. That is exactly how the Eighth Circuit handled this case: because Muldrow was provided the same pay and rank after her transfer, her complaints did not rise to affecting the “terms and conditions” of her employment, and the court therefore granted judgment to the defendant and dismissed her action. The Eighth Circuit specifically found that her objections to the new job duties did not cause a “materially significant disadvantage” to Muldrow because they represented “only minor changes in [her] working conditions.” In Muldrow, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit, thereby expanding the circumstances in which a plaintiff can successfully sue an employer for transferring the plaintiff to a position considered less desirable, even though it brings the same pay, benefits, and seniority. The Court reached its decision based on the text of Title VII: employers may not “discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” While the parties agreed that Muldrow’s transfer implicated the “terms and conditions” of her employment, the Court broke with lower courts by finding that the term “discriminate against” does not require a showing of some special, significant harm: “‘Discriminate against’ means treat worse . . . . But neither that phrase nor any other says anything about how much worse.” (Slip. Op. at 6) (emphasis added). So, the Court reasoned that so long as a Title VII plaintiff alleges some harm resulting from a transfer, they have alleged an “adverse action” sufficient to establish a prima facie case. While the majority opinion provides little practical guidance, the ruling highlights some long-standing best practices for employers: Determine the specific reason for a transfer decision and document it. Under the Muldrow standard, it may be less likely defendants will be able to obtain dismissals based on the failure of a plaintiff’s prima facie case. Accordingly, employers must be prepared to explain their rationale for any transfer decision and back it up with documentation. If a business need justifies an individual’s transfer, ensure that reason is both sound and well documented. Use transfers carefully in personnel matters. Transferring an employee to a different division to cover a business need is straightforward enough. But when using transfers as a tool to eliminate workplace conflicts, employers should proceed extremely cautiously. To provide an example, it is typically unwise to transfer an employee who complains about coworkers harassing them without investigating and addressing any potential wrongdoing on the part of the coworkers. Where an employer transfers an individual and (a) it causes some harm to the employee and (b) the employer does not have a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason that explains the transfer in the face of an accusation that it was made because of a protected characteristic, then Title VII liability is possible.
April 22, 2024
Help! I have foreign national employees who were not selected in the H-1B registration lottery, what are their options?
The H-1B Electronic Registration Selection Process debuted in March 2020 for fiscal year 2021 H-1B cap-subject petitions. The barrier to entry dropped significantly with the introduction of the electronic registration selection process. Since then, we have seen an exponential increase in those vying for a coveted H-1B lottery selection. The odds for selection have decreased significantly. As such, it is imperative that employers incorporate back up options to maintain their talent pool of foreign nationals. Are there any options for immediate work authorization for foreign national employees who are still on student visas? Many foreign national students who graduate from a university in the United States are eligible to participate in twelve months of Optional Practical Training (OPT). Further, if the foreign national student has graduated with a qualifying STEM degree and their employer is registered with E-verify they could be eligible for an additional twenty-four months of STEM OPT. Day 1 CPT (Curricular Practical Training) is also an option that foreign nationals explore when they have run out of OPT and the alternative options below are not applicable. What about foreign national employees whose work authorization based on their student status is expiring? The US immigration system provides for several options to establish work authorization if certain criteria are met. It is important to evaluate the foreign national’s citizenship or nationality, intracompany transferees, extraordinary ability, and trainees, as set out below. Foreign National Citizenship or Nationality The H-1B1 is available to citizens of Chile and Singapore. The E-3 is available to citizens of Australia. The TN is available to citizens of Canada and Mexico. The commonality between the H-1B1, E-3, and TN revolves around the type of work being performed by the foreign national. These are visa classifications intended for professionals. Further, if the employing entity is owned by a foreign national it could be worth exploring whether an E-1 or E-2 is available. These classifications allow for traders (E-1) or investors (E-2) to register a company, if their country of nationality has a treaty with the United States that allows this, and they can demonstrate several other criteria. If so, they would be allowed to transfer certain employees to the US entity that share the nationality of the foreign national owner of the entity. Intracompany Transferee The L-1A nonimmigrant classification enables a U.S. employer to transfer an executive or manager from one of its affiliated foreign offices to one of its offices in the United States. The L-1B nonimmigrant classification enables a U.S. employer to transfer a professional employee with specialized knowledge relating to the organization’s interests from one of its affiliated foreign offices to one of its offices in the United States. Extraordinary Ability The O-1 visa classification is for individuals of extraordinary ability. The classification is split into the O-1A classification, which is intended for those with extraordinary ability in science, business, education, or athletics, and the O-1B classification intended for those with extraordinary ability in the arts. These visa classifications are often viewed as reserved for the best talent, but are more attainable than may be initially perceived. Trainees The J-1 program allows for a cultural exchange for certain foreign nationals with a degree or professional certificate and at least one year of work experience. This requires coordination with a third party sponsoring organization and the Department of State. Can we begin pursuing a green card for these employees? Yes, there are a variety of different green card paths available to employees, which include: PERM, National Interest Waiver, outstanding researcher or professor, extraordinary ability, and more. Employers must strongly consider the likelihood of securing nonimmigrant (or alternative) work authorization to bridge the gap for foreign nationals until they receive their green card. This is a complex landscape to navigate given the difficulty of assessing visa priority dates. Further, the underlying nonimmigrant status can affect the green card path. Not all nonimmigrant statuses are created equal. Some allow for “dual intent” which essentially allows the foreign national to intend to become a permanent resident without violating their nonimmigrant status. We understand that employers feel the pressures of competitive labor markets. Having a plan for foreign nationals is essential to attracting and retaining top global talent. As employers navigate the alternative options for employees who were not selected in this year’s lottery, members of Dorsey’s Immigration Group are prepared and ready to answer questions and provide advice.
April 4, 2024
What factors should employers consider in assessing whether their diversity, equity and inclusion practices comply with Title VII?
For decades employers have sought to promote diversity in their workforces. In recent years, employers have expanded these efforts by establishing policies and practices commonly referred to as diversity, equity and inclusion (“DEI”) programs. Employers have multiple objectives for adopting and maintaining DEI programs. Some do so in connection with their obligations as government contractors to pursue the goals of affirmative action. Other employers do so voluntarily and to pursue equal employment opportunity for members of historically disadvantaged groups. Many employers enhanced their DEI programs as part of their racial justice initiatives following the murder of George Floyd in 2020. Last year, the Supreme Court decided a case that may affect how employers administer and talk about their DEI programs. In Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College and Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina (collectively, the “SFFA decision”), 600 U.S. 181 (2023), the Supreme Court ruled that Harvard and the University of North Carolina violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the U.S. Constitution in their use of race in their admissions processes. Because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which governs private employers’ employment practices, holds important similarities to Title VI, many employment lawyers questioned how the SFFA decision applies to employers’ consideration of race in the employment context. A year later, media reports indicate that a number of employers have changed their DEI programs to avoid claims of discrimination by members of majority groups.[1] In this article we analyze cases decided both before and after the SFFA decision to illustrate how employers and the courts have considered race in implementing and assessing the legality of various diversity initiatives. We then propose several questions employers may consider to ensure legal compliance while also promoting their diversity objectives. Background Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;” or “(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). These prohibitions apply to members of both majority and non-majority groups. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976). Despite Title VII’s prohibitions, in certain circumstances an employee’s membership in a protected class can be a basis for an employment decision. In United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), an employer operated a training program that reserved 50-percent of openings in the program to Black employees until the racial composition of the workforce was commensurate with demographics in the local labor force. Brian Weber, a White employee, applied for the program but was denied admission. Weber alleged that he would have been entitled to a spot in the program but for his employer’s affirmative action plan, because he had more seniority than several admitted Black participants. Weber alleged he was subjected to race discrimination in violation of Title VII. The Supreme Court rejected Weber’s theory of Title VII liability. Acknowledging the potential for dissonance in finding that a statute enacted to eradicate employment discrimination prohibited employers from taking voluntary steps to ameliorate segregation in the workforce, the Court nevertheless acknowledged that such actions may run afoul of the text and purpose of Title VII. The Court adopted a three-part test. To be permissible under Title VII, the employer’s voluntary plan must (1) advance the statutory purpose of Title VII by “break[ing] down old patterns of racial segregation in hierarchy” in “occupations which have been traditionally closed to” individuals protected by the statute, (2) not “unnecessarily trammel the interests of [W]hite employees,” and (3) be “a temporary measure [that] . . . is not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.” 443 U.S. at 208. Revisiting the topic of affirmative action plans in Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Co., Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987), the Supreme Court clarified its analysis of Weber. Santa Clara County adopted a voluntary affirmative action plan that permitted individuals making hiring decisions to “consider as one factor” the sex of an otherwise qualified applicant when filling a position in a role where “women have been significantly underrepresented[.]” 480 U.S. at 620–21. The plan also provided diversity-related targets and explained how the County would continually monitor and adjust its plan. Paul Johnson, an employee who was passed over for an internal promotion in favor of a woman, brought a claim that the plan and the decision not to select him for the promotion violated Title VII. The Supreme Court upheld the plan, affirming the County’s attempts to correct the “manifest imbalance” in positions that were historically unavailable to women. The Court clarified that a “manifest imbalance” need not be so extreme as to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination. Moreover, the Court determined that the plan did not unnecessarily trammel on the rights of majority group employees because plaintiff had no “absolute right” to a promotion, he retained his job, and because “the sex of Joyce was but one of numerous factors [the hiring manager] took into account in arriving at his decision.” 480 U.S. at 638. Finally, the Court determined the non-permanent nature of the plan supported its validity: “the [County’s] plan was intended to attain a balanced work force, not to maintain one.” Id. at 639. DEI Programs DEI programs take many forms. These programs generally seek to create an environment of respect and fairness and to promote a more positive experience for all workers. Examples of DEI initiatives include conducting outreach to diverse students at college recruitment events, developing inclusive job descriptions and advertisements, establishing mentorship programs, creating summer fellowships, adopting executive compensation incentives, promoting affinity groups, improving diversity training, bolstering anti-discrimination policies and more robust dispute resolution processes. The purposes of such DEI programs bear many similarities to the purposes of the affirmative action plans addressed in Weber and Johnson where employers sought to reduce a “conspicuous . . . imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.” While employers always may pursue such objectives, employers also should consider lessons from recent litigation involving challenges to DEI initiatives. For example, in Young v. Colorado Dep’t of Corr., 2024 U.S. App. Lexis 5814 (10th Cir. Mar. 11, 2024), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a former White employee’s hostile work environment claim because a single instance of subjectively offensive DEI training was not, on the pleadings, severe or pervasive. Although the employer prevailed, the court criticized the employer’s DEI training materials as “troubling on many levels.” The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the training materials stated that “all whites are racist, that white individuals created the concept of race in order to justify the oppression of people of color, and that ‘whiteness’ and ‘white supremacy’ affect all ‘people of color within a U.S. context.’” Plaintiff also alleged that the training materials stated “white individuals are triggered by feelings of guilt and fear when confronted with ‘information about racial inequality and injustice,’ ” a “phenomenon” labeled as “white fragility.” The court observed that the messaging in these training materials “could promote racial discrimination and stereotypes within the workplace” and “encourage racial preferences in hiring, firing, and promotion decisions.” In De Piero v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5768 (E.D. Penn. Jan. 11, 2024), a district court found that allegations about certain of Penn State’s DEI initiatives sufficed to allege a racially hostile work environment. In that case the plaintiff, a writing professor, alleged among other things, that he was required to watch a “training video called ‘White Teachers Are a Problem,’” and a “’presentation and dialogue about critical race theory and antiracism’ that attacked ‘race neutrality, equal opportunity, objectivity, colorblindness, and merit’ and condemned ‘white self-interest.’” When the plaintiff raised concerns regarding such race-based statements to his supervisor, he was told that “[t]here is a problem with the [W]hite race” and that he should “broaden [his] perspective.” The court found that Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficiently specific and pervasive to establish a plausible claim for Title VII relief because the pleadings contained allegations of conduct which, if taken as true, showed race-based decisionmaking, stereotyping, and harassment. In ruling for the plaintiff, the court expressed the importance of caution when implementing DEI policies: “Training on concepts such as ‘white privilege,’ ‘white fragility,’ implicit bias, or critical race theory can contribute positively to nuanced, important conversations about how to form a healthy and inclusive working environment. . . But the way these conversations are carried out in the workplace matters: When employers talk about race—any race—with a constant drumbeat of essentialist, deterministic, and negative language, they risk liability under federal law.” Practice Pointers Employers should consider Weber, Johnson, Young and De Piero in assessing whether their DEI practices comply with Title VII. Specifically, employers should consider the following questions: Is the practice remedial? Is the employer seeking to correct manifest imbalances in the labor force among jobs that have been traditionally segregated? Will the practice unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-minorities? How will the employer ensure protection of the rights of non-minority employees? Who has access to the program or initiative? Are training and other opportunities available to individuals regardless of protected class? Does the initiative use negative language or stereotypes? Do training materials refer to protected characteristics with “essentialist, determinist, and negative language?” Will any members in a protected class be singled out? Has the practice been audited? Many employers now schedule annual or as-needed audits of employment policies and practices to ensure legal compliance and consistency with other employment policies. How will the employer document compliance with Title VII? What data will the employer collect to assess its processes, and when and how will the employer make those assessments? _________________________ [1] See Alexandra Olson et al., DEI backlash has companies quietly changing their programs to avoid wave of lawsuits alleging discrimination, Fortune, Jan. 15, 2024, DEI backlash has companies quietly changing their programs to avoid wave of lawsuits alleging discrimination | Fortune (last visited Mar 20, 2024). See also Max Abelson et al., Wall Street’s DEI Retreat Has Officially Begun, Bloomberg, Mar. 3, 2024, Goldman, JPMorgan Cut DEI Efforts Over Lawsuit Threats - Bloomberg (last visited Mar. 18, 2024); Simone Foxman, Business is Booming for DEI Lawyers as Corporate America Asks ‘What’s Legal?’, Bloomberg, Mar. 5, 2024, Business Is Booming for DEI Lawyers as Corporate America Asks ‘What’s Legal?’ - Bloomberg (last visited Mar. 18, 2024). Reprinted with permission from the April 2, 2024 edition of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL © 2024 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com – 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com.
April 3, 2024
What obligations do employers have in responding to employees’ objections to vaccine mandates following the Supreme Court’s decision in Groff v. DeJoy?
Winter weather brings renewed attention to seasonal vaccines—and to employers’ interest in encouraging employees to remain healthy and productive, including potentially through efforts to require or incentivize workers to be vaccinated. While not as widespread today as they were during the pandemic, such rules and incentives trigger legal obligations to provide reasonable accommodations to employees who assert that vaccinations contravene a sincerely held religious belief or are inadvisable—even harmful—given a pre-existing disability. This article explains the current legal landscape employers face in evaluating requests for accommodations on the basis of religion or disability. It begins by explaining the recently announced standards for assessing requests for religious accommodations and summarizing the longstanding standards for assessing requests for disability-related accommodations. This article then surveys three recent court decisions applying accommodation standards in cases involving vaccines, explaining the legal standards applied by the deciding courts; and concludes with best practices for employers evaluating requests for religious and disability accommodations in light of current law, both in the context of vaccines and otherwise. Religious Accommodations under Title VII Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits covered employers from discriminating against employees and applicants on the basis of religion (as well as race, color, sex, and national origin). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Prohibited discrimination on the basis of religion does not occur, however, in situations where the employer “demonstrates [it] is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a). Title VII does not define “undue hardship” or “conduct of the business,” which instead have been interpreted by the courts. The current standard for evaluating religious accommodation requests was set on June 29, 2023, when the United States Supreme Court decided Groff v. DeJoy. 600 U.S. 447; 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023). The Groff case involved an employee, Gerald Groff, who asked to be excused from Sunday work shifts that conflicted with his religious views of the Sabbath. 143 S. Ct. at 2286. When his requests were denied, Groff continued to decline to report to work, which led to ongoing discipline and his eventual resignation. Id. at 2287. Groff later sued, alleging that the Postal Service violated Title VII by failing to accommodate his religious practice and belief regarding the Sabbath. Id. The district court and Third Circuit ruled for the Postal Service, finding that exempting Groff from Sunday work caused an undue hardship on his employer under the then-applicable standard, which was that any burden on an employer that was “more than . . . de minimis” constituted “undue hardship” such that an accommodation could be denied. Id. Under that then-applicable standard, the circuit court’s reasoning was that changing Groff’s schedule would violate an agreement between the Postal Service and the union that represented Groff and unfairly burden other employees who would need to work his shifts. See id. The courts also indicated that Groff’s absences “imposed on his coworkers, disrupted the workplace and workflow, and diminished employee morale.” See id. The Supreme Court reversed. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court in Groff emphasized that Title VII focuses on “hardship,” a word choice that does not mean any mere burden. Id. at 2294. The Court further reasoned that the requirement that any hardship must be “undue” under Title VII indicated Congress’s intent that employers may have to bear meaningful costs to accommodate a religious employee. Id. Accordingly, the Court held, Title VII requires an employer seeking to deny an accommodation to demonstrate that the accommodation will substantially increase costs to its business—a significant change from the earlier standard, under which employers were effectively authorized to deny accommodations that required more than minimal cost of compliance. Id. at 2294-97. The Court then remanded the case for the lower courts to apply the standard set forth in the decision. Id. at 2297. Groff instructs lower courts to apply its standard on a case-by-case basis and assess proposed accommodations in a “common-sense manner,” with an eye on the “practical impact” of the accommodation in light of the size and nature of the employer’s business and all other facts on hand. The Court also clarified that employers may take into account the burdens an accommodation imposes on other employees as part of its assessment of the extent to which the accommodation affects the “conduct” of the employer’s business, id. at 2298 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), as long as those burdens affect the employer’s operations. Accommodations under the ADA The Supreme Court assessed the standard for reasonable accommodations related to disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) more than 20 years ago, in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402 (2002). Barnett dealt with the conflict between an employer’s seniority system and an employee’s request to be assigned to a vacant position before other coworkers who had greater seniority, and thus greater entitlement to the position. 535 U.S. at 394. Under Barnett, once an employee shows that a requested accommodation is “possible,” the burden shifts to the defendant employer to “show special (typically case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances.” Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402. Under the ADA, unlawful employment discrimination is defined to include the failure to make reasonable accommodations to the disability-related limitations of an otherwise qualified employee or job applicant, “unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12112. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has stated that “undue hardship” under the ADA “means significant difficulty or expense and focuses on the resources and circumstances of the particular employer in relationship to the cost or difficulty of providing a specific accommodation.” Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the ADA, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-reasonable-accommodation-and-undue-hardship-under-ada (EEOC Notice 915.002, October 17, 2002). “Undue hardship” refers not only to financial difficulty, but to reasonable accommodations that are unduly extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or those that would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business.” Id. Decisions Applying Groff in Vaccine Litigation Despite the similarities in the language of the “undue hardship” standards of the ADA and of Title VII, in Groff the Supreme Court rejected a request to use ADA cases in evaluating religious accommodations. Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2295-96. The Court also declined to ratify EEOC guidance regarding religious accommodations, given that it was issued “without the benefit of the clarification we adopt today.” Id. at 2296. The Court did, however, refer favorably to the previously issued EEOC guidance regarding religious accommodations, stating that the justices expected “little, if any, change in the agency’s guidance explaining why no undue hardship is imposed by temporary costs, voluntary shift swapping, occasional shift swapping, or administrative costs” if needed to provide a religious accommodation. Id. Groff was cited 50 times by federal courts across the country through November 28, 2023, including approximately 30 cases that addressed COVID-19 vaccine mandates. Among these, the following three cases are instructive to employers assessing the legality of vaccine policies. Bordeaux v. Lions Gate Ent., Inc., No. 2:22-cv-04244-SVW-PLA, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209626 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2023). In this case, the Central District of California expressly deferred deciding the employer’s motion for summary judgment on a Title VII religious-discrimination claim until after the Supreme Court decided Groff. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209626, at *2-3. With supplemental briefing on Groff, the court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that the actor’s requested exemption from a COVID-19 vaccine requirement created an undue hardship on the production company that did not re-hire her for a second season of a television program. Id., at *47-48. Focusing on the nature of the actor’s role on the program, the court concluded that her close, unmasked contact with other performers and crew members would expose those coworkers to a greater risk of COVID-19 infection and determined” “In and of itself, this safety risk constitutes an undue hardship.” Id., at *35-36. D’Cunha v. Northwell Health Sys., No. 23-476-cv, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 30612 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2023). This decision is the most recent federal appellate decision to apply Groff as of November 21, 2023. As with many cases surveyed since Groff, the plaintiff alleged both a religious-discrimination claim under Title VII and a disability-discrimination claim under the ADA, as she asked for a religious exemption from a COVID-19 vaccine mandate—and then a medical exemption after the religious exemption was denied. 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 30612, at *3. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of both the Title VII and the ADA claims. Id., at *8, 12. Applying Groff, the court noted that granting the requested exemption would have placed the hospital defendant in violation of New York State’s then-applicable 2021 mandate that all medically-eligible hospital personnel receive a COVID-19 vaccination and thereby exposed itself to potential penalties—which, in turn, would have been a burden “both ‘excessive’ and ‘unjustifiable.’” Id., at *8 (citing Groff, 143 S. Ct. at 2294). Lee v. Seasons Hospice, No. 22-CV-1593 (PJS/DJF), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174927 (D. Minn. Sep. 29, 2023). Here, the district court denied the private hospice defendant’s motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss two plaintiffs’ claims alleging failures to accommodate their religious beliefs and failures to accommodate their disabilities. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174927, at *11-12, 31. Applying Groff to the religious accommodation claim, the court found that its inquiry into defendant’s claims of undue hardship was necessarily fact-intensive—and so would require a factual record to decide, which was not available at the motion-to-dismiss stage of the case. Id., at *11-12. Best Practices for Employers Several best practices for employers responding to requests for accommodations arise from the Groff decision and those applying it, including: Assess requests for accommodations on a case-by-case basis. Employers should evaluate every employee’s request for an accommodation on its own merits, in light of the employee’s responsibilities and essential job functions. Consider alternatives. Determining that a requested accommodation poses an undue hardship does not end the analysis. If a requested accommodation is not feasible, employers reduce risk by working with the employee to determine if other, less burdensome accommodations would be effective from the employee’s perspective. Document factors that support decisions. As courts require employers to assess specific facts at issue with every employee’s request, employers should be ready to show that they have done such an assessment—through accurate documentation and recordkeeping. Reprinted with permission from the December 5, 2023 edition of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL © 2023 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com – 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com.
December 5, 2023
As Exempt Salary Thresholds Continue to Increase, What are Best Practices for Employers Deciding to Reclassify Employees as Non-Exempt?
Under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), employees are classified as “exempt” or “non-exempt.” Employers covered under the FLSA must pay non-exempt employees at least the minimum wage for every hour they work and overtime in accordance with applicable state laws. The FLSA exempts certain job roles, including administrative, professional, executive, highly compensated, outside sales, and computer professional employees, from the overtime pay requirements. Employees in these positions are classified as “exempt.” To qualify as an exempt employee, the position must meet certain tests regarding its job duties and pay above a salary threshold, the amount of which can vary among different state laws. Many states have their own test to determine whether an employee can be classified as exempt from overtime under state law. The state requirements are generally more difficult to meet than the federal requirement. For example, on January 1, 2023, six states, Alaska, Colorado, New York, California, Maine, and Washington increased the minimum salary requirement for an exempt position, effectively raising the bar for employers to classify some employees as exempt. More specifically, in Washington, employers must pay exempt employees $67,724.80 per year starting in 2024, while the federal minimum salary threshold is only $35,568.00 per year. By 2028, the Washington minimum salary threshold is expected to increase to $92,560.00, meaning that employers will be unable to classify any Washington employees making less than $92,560.00 as exempt. As such, for exempt employees that do not meet the minimum salary threshold, employers will have to decide whether to raise salaries in accordance with the requirements, or to reclassify those employees as non-exempt. That decision will depend on multiple factors, including how many hours those employees are working. If they are regularly working over 40 hours per week and would be entitled to overtime if classified as non-exempt, then it may be more cost effective to keep those employees classified as exempt and raise their salaries to meet the threshold. However, for employees that work less than 40 hours a week, an employer may consider reclassifying them as non-exempt, because the employer would likely not have any overtime obligations, considering the low number of hours worked by such employees. Before choosing whether to reclassify an employee, an employer should identify the current exempt positions within the company, review those positions’ job duties and salaries to determine whether they meet the FLSA and, if applicable, the state requirements for an employee to be exempt. It is good practice for an employer to conduct regular audits of these metrics, as the rules surrounding exempt workers can change. Even if an employer properly classifies an employee as exempt, state and federal laws can change – for example, the minimum salary threshold can increase – rendering a previously and properly classified employee, misclassified. The decision to reclassify an employee from exempt to non-exempt should be done thoughtfully and carefully. In preparation of this change, the employer should notify the payroll department and identify the newly reclassified employees and the effective date of change. In addition to alerting payroll of the effective date of change, the employer should provide affected employees an effective date. We recommend an effective date that falls on the start of a workweek and payroll cycle to minimize confusion. The period of notification and effectiveness will allow time for the employer to clearly and effectively communicate the change, the expectations, and answer employees' questions. Having some written document memorializing the reclassification is recommended (and in some states, is legally required), as it gives employees time to review the change and provides employers a way to document which employees read and understood the changes. In addition to providing new legal rights, moving from exempt to non-exempt brings with it new responsibilities for employees. For example, employees will need to start tracking their hours worked and following the employer’s policies governing how to request, track, and report overtime. Employers may want to consider requiring reclassified employees to undergo training on the newly-relevant policies and procedures. Moreover, certain requirements, such as paid sick leave or meal and rest breaks, only apply to non-exempt employees in certain states, so employees newly classified as non-exempt should also be informed of these additional benefits. When an employee is reclassified to non-exempt, employers should expect the employee to have questions. In addition to their questions, the employer should be prepared to address any employee perceptions or feelings of demotion. To minimize this, the employer can reassure the employee that the shift to non-exempt is simply a pay categorization, not a demotion. As a non-exempt employee, the employee may work overtime hours, if approved, and with that may come the opportunity to receive more compensation. Although this is a benefit as a non-exempt worker, the employer should still be receptive to questions or concerns a newly reclassified employee might have and be able to assist. As employers navigate reclassification, and other wage and hour issues, members of Dorsey’s Labor and Employment Practice Group are here and prepared to answer those questions.
November 16, 2023
Wage and Hour Issues
How is an already complex PERM recruitment process further complicated by EPT laws?
As we discussed in a recent post, equal pay transparency (EPT) laws are on the rise across the country. While complex in their own right, EPT laws introduce new risks and challenges for employers undergoing an already complicated recruitment process to hire foreign nationals through the Department of Labor’s (DOL) permanent labor certification process, or PERM. What is PERM? The United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) offers foreign nationals different pathways to lawful permanent residence (i.e., obtaining a “Green Card”) in the U.S. Relevant here, there are five employment-based (EB) visa preference categories, and of the five, the most common are EB-2 (for workers holding advanced degrees or who have “exceptional ability” in the sciences, arts, or business) and EB-3 (for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers). Employers tend to pursue these two preference categories because there is generally less subjectivity in the process compared to the other preference categories, which makes the process more predictable. A drawback, however, is that in most instances, the hiring of a foreign national in either EB-2 or EB-3 requires the employer to complete the PERM labor certification process, which is highly technical, lengthy, and complex regulatory recruitment process. Because U.S. immigration law requires that the hiring of a foreign national will not adversely impact U.S. workers, PERM regulations require a sponsoring employer to demonstrate that it has sufficiently tested the labor market and can attest that there are no qualified, able, and willing U.S. workers to fill the position in question. Overview of the PERM Labor Certification Process The PERM labor certification process is one of the most complex aspects of employment-based immigration. The entire process currently takes between fifteen to twenty-four months, which means that any mistake can derail the process and cause significant delays. Because many foreign nationals also rely on PERM to obtain additional extensions to their nonimmigrant statuses, these missteps can be detrimental to a foreign national’s continued work authorization. An employer begins the multistep PERM process by identifying the position to be filled and carefully drafting the position’s job description. This includes identifying the position’s duties, worksite location, minimum requirements, anticipated Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code, and wage level. It is important to get this step right because the job description is an integral component of the PERM application. Once the job description has been drafted, the employer submits a prevailing wage request to the DOL. The DOL, in about six months, issues a prevailing wage determination (PWD). A prevailing wage, which the DOL defines as “the average wage paid to similarly employed workers in a specific occupation in the area of intended employment,” is based on a number of factors, including the position’s title, worksite location, education, experience, and other requirements. It is the rate at which the employer must at least offer the position; the employer cannot advertise the position at a lower rate. The idea here is that a lower rate could discourage U.S. applicants from applying. Impact of EPT Laws on PERM Recruitment While EPT laws vary greatly by jurisdiction, a growing number of them require employers to disclose pay ranges in any advertisement for a job, with variations in content. The disclosure must be a good-faith expectation of the pay associated with the position, and must not be open-ended. In contrast, PERM regulations require that an employer include the wage information only on the Notice of Filing (NOF), which is a notice – not an advertisement – posted internally at the employer’s respective job site. The other forms of mandatory PERM recruitment (e.g., advertising the position in two Sunday newspapers, placing the job ad on the State Workforce Agency website, etc.) do not require disclosure of pay. However, employers undergoing PERM recruitment must now assess whether the advertisement for the position constitutes an advertisement or other posting under applicable EPT laws. In other words, EPT laws may mandate that pay information be listed in all forms of PERM recruitment. Moreover, an employer’s disclosure under EPT law, while made in good faith, may otherwise be problematic for PERM purposes if the lower end of the pay range falls short of the PWD. For purposes of PERM recruitment, a job posting with a wage range lower than the PWD will be deemed insufficient to demonstrate compliance with the PERM regulations. The DOL has consistently denied PERM applications where the wage range on the NOF was lower than the PWD, so it is likely the DOL would do the same with other types of recruitment. Accounting for Remote Positions As mentioned above, the worksite location is an important factor impacting the PWD. But what if the sponsoring employer is advertising a PERM position that will be remote? When a position allows for fully remote work from anywhere in the U.S., DOL guidance instructs that the employer should conduct PERM recruitment using the employer’s corporate headquarters as the location. By way of example, if a sponsoring employer has headquarters in California and submits a PERM application for a position that allows for fully remote work anywhere in the U.S., and the prospective employee for whom the application was submitted lives and works in Georgia, the employer must recruit in California to satisfy PERM requirements. Likewise, the PWD will also be based in California. Therefore, when the sponsoring employer advertises for the position, the wage range cannot be lower than the California-based PWD, even if the employer anticipates filling the position with a worker in Georgia. As a further illustration, if a sponsoring employer has headquarters in Missouri, and submits a PERM application for a remote position to be performed anywhere in the U.S., the PWD and PERM recruiting efforts will be Missouri-based. If the prospective employee for whom the position was submitted lives and works in Washington state, the Missouri-based employer could be covered by Washington’s EPT law, even though it is an out-of-state employer. Under Washington’s law, out‐of‐state employers with 15 or more employees (including at least one Washington‐based employee) are subject to the EPT law if the position could be performed by a Washington employee. Similar laws exist in California and New York City. Notably, a number of EPT laws require more than just disclosures of pay ranges. For instance, Colorado and Washington require disclosure of benefits and other compensation. So, sponsoring employers covered by a myriad of EPT laws may be wise to choose a broad approach to advertising, requiring them to include not only a pay range, but also a general description of certain benefits and other information to satisfy those laws’ heightened requirements. What Employers Should Do The Colorado Department of Labor (Colorado DOL) acknowledged the discrepancies between PERM regulations and Colorado’s EPT law and informally announced that it would not enforce the EPT law in PERM recruitment efforts. This informal announcement left immigration practitioners wondering whether other state DOLs would issue similar relief. To date, however, no other agencies (or states with EPT laws) have gone as far to say that they will not enforce their EPT laws in the context of PERM recruitment. The federal DOL, which administers PERM, has not updated the PERM regulations to incorporate language regarding whether or not practitioners must abide by the EPT laws to satisfy the PERM regulations. The PERM labor certification process is no doubt a complex maze of regulatory requirements. And while EPT laws surely complicate the process, the consequences of noncompliance can be significant. Employers who violate EPT laws are up against a number of different penalties and fines. Depending on the jurisdiction, employers can be subject to agency investigations, lawsuits and associated costs and fees, civil penalties ranging from $500 to $250,000, and more. As such, employers seeking a PERM labor certification should ensure compliance with all state and local laws (EPT or otherwise). Dorsey’s immigration and employment counsel are here to help your business determine how best to approach PERM recruitment in light of EPT laws.
October 25, 2023
What impact will the recently enacted New Jersey Temporary Workers’ Bill of Rights have on temporary staffing agencies and their clients?
A first-in-the-nation law that creates new legal protections for temporary workers recently took full-effect in New Jersey, despite opposition from the business community, a conditional veto by the governor and a legal challenge in federal court. The New Jersey Temporary Workers’ Bill of Rights (the “Act”) provides new protections for temporary workers in certain occupations and enhanced administrative oversight and regulation of temporary staffing agencies, referred to in the Act as “temporary help service firms” (“Firms”), and the companies at which their temporary workers are placed, the “third party clients.” N.J. Stat. § 34:8D-1—34:8D-13. The Act seeks to promote pay equity by requiring equal pay and benefits (or the cash equivalent thereof) for covered temporary workers relative to similarly situated direct-hire employees. The Act, however, imposes substantial obligations and costs on Firms and their third party clients. While the Act’s full impact on the temporary staffing industry remains to be seen, it may foreshadow things to come as other states consider new pay equity laws and other worker protections. A similar law has already gone into effect in Illinois. See 2023 Ill. HB 2862, ILL. P.A. 437. The Act took full effect on August 5, 2023. The legislature originally drafted the Act to apply to all temporary workers in New Jersey. However, Governor Murphy conditionally vetoed that version and recommended several changes. See Conditional Veto Statement, A.1474 (First Reprint), N.J. LEG. 3 (Sept. 22, 2022). While expressing support for the Act’s objectives, he recommended limiting its application to “those positions in the workforce at greatest risk of exploitation” in order to “ease the compliance burdens placed on the temporary help service industry, while ensuring that laborers in certain occupations subject to more extreme hardships receive due protection and consideration in enforcement.” The legislature accepted his recommendations, and Governor Murphy signed the Act into law on February 6, 2023. New Jersey’s Department of Labor and Workforce Development issued proposed regulations implementing certain sections of the Act on July 21, 2023. See N.J.A.C. 12:72-1–10. The agency may further amend these regulations following a 60-day public comment period. The Division of Consumer Affairs will enforce sections of the Act concerning the certification of Firms, and will be promulgate its own rules to implement those sections. Scope of the Act. Consistent with Governor Murphy’s recommendations, the Act applies only to “temporary laborers,” which comprise a subset of the over 127,000 temporary workers in New Jersey. See N.J. Stat. § 34:8D-1–8D-2. The Act defines a “temporary laborer” as “a person who contracts for employment in a designated classification placement with a temporary help service firm.” Id. § 34:8D-2. A “designated classification placement,” in turn, is the assignment by a Firm of a temporary laborer to perform work in specified occupational categories as defined by the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics. These occupational categories include: (i) certain protective service occupations (e.g., security guards, lifeguards); (ii) food preparation and service; (iii) building and grounds cleaning and maintenance; (iv) personal care and service (e.g., hairdressers, childcare workers, concierges); (v) construction; (vi) construction trades (e.g., electricians, carpenters); (vii) installation maintenance and repair; (viii) production (e.g., butchers, metal workers, drycleaners); and (iv) transportation and logistics. The proposed rules clarify that the Act applies to each Firm that “is located, operates, or transacts business within New Jersey.” N.J.A.C. § 12:72-1.1. They further specify that the Act applies to each temporary laborer who is employed by a covered Firm who either: (1) has been assigned to work in a designated classification placement in New Jersey; or (2) has been assigned to work in a designated classification placement outside of New Jersey, but who has his or her primary residence in New Jersey. The Act also applies to third party clients with whom Firms make designated classification placements. Pay equity. The Act requires that Firms pay temporary laborers no less than the average rate of pay and cost of benefits, or the cash equivalent thereof, as direct-hire employees of the third-party client, who perform the same or substantially similar work on jobs that require equal skill, effort and responsibility and that are performed under similar working conditions, i.e., “comparator employees.” See N.J. Stat. § 34:8D-7; N.J.A.C. § 12:72-2.1. The proposed rules add significant detail to the Act’s pay equity provision. See N.J.A.C. § 12:72-7. A Third party client must identify comparator employees from its own staff for each temporary laborer it uses, and supply the Firm with a list of the hourly rate of pay and cost of benefits for each one. The proposed rules provide detailed instructions for calculating the average rate of pay and cost of benefits. To calculate the cost per hour of benefits, the annual cost to the third party client of benefits for a direct-hire employee is divided by 2,080 hours. The Firm then uses this information to determine the hourly wage rate and value of benefits it must pay the temporary laborer, pursuant to a calculation method set forth in the proposed rules. The regulations define “benefits” to include health insurance, life insurance, disability insurance, paid time off, training and pension, that an employer provides in excess of what is required by law. N.J.A.C. § 12:72-2.1. The proposed rules list 12 principles for third-party clients to apply to determine whether a temporary laborer and a third party client employee are performing substantially similar work. N.J.A.C. 12:72-6.2. They provide that substantially similar work “should be viewed as a composite of skill, effort and responsibility performed under similar working conditions.” While job titles and job descriptions are relevant, the analysis should focus on the actual job duties performed. Experience, ability, education and training required to perform a job are relevant factors; but, the number of years of service (i.e., seniority) of a third party client employee and a third party client’s use of a merit system for compensation are not. Post-Employment Restrictions. Firms may not restrict a temporary laborer from accepting a “permanent position” with a third party client to which the Firm has assigned the laborer to work, or from accepting a “permanent position for any other employment.” See N.J. Stat. § 34:8D-7. Although Firms may not prohibit third party clients from directly hiring their temporary laborers, they may charge third party clients a placement fee. The proposed rules set forth the method to use to determine the maximum placement fee that may be charged. N.J.A.C. 12:72-6.2. Certification. In recognition of the “large, though unknown, number of unlicensed temporary help service firms that operate outside the purview of law enforcement,” N.J. Stat. § 34:8D-1(a), the Act requires all Firms who make designated classification placements to obtain certification to do so from the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs. Id. § 34:8D-8. Anti-retaliation. Under the Act, a rebuttable presumption of retaliation arises if a Firm terminates or imposes disciplinary action on a temporary laborer within 90 days of the temporary laborer’s exercise of rights protected under the Act. N.J. Stat. § 34:8D-10. Enforcement. The Act authorizes the commissioner to issue penalties for non-compliance. It also allows temporary laborers to bring individual or class action lawsuits against Firms for violations of this Act. The Act imposes joint and several liability on Firms and third party clients for the violation of multiple provisions. New Hire Notice and Recordkeeping Requirements. Whenever a Firm agrees to send a temporary laborer to work in a designated classification placement, it must provide that worker with a new hire notice at the time of dispatch. N.J. Stat. § 34:8D-3. The new hire notice must contain detailed information, including, among other things, the name of the temporary laborer; the name and contact information for the Firm, its workers’ compensation carrier, the third party client and the Department; the nature of the work to be performed; the wages offered; the length of the assignment, if known; whether any special clothing, protective equipment, or training are required and who will bear such the costs, and whether a meal or equipment will be provided and their costs, if any. Firms also must keep detailed records for each designated classification placement they make. Third party clients must remit time records for temporary laborers to Firms to enable them to satisfy their recordkeeping requirements. N.J. Stat. § 34:8D-4. Payment of Wages and Itemized Wage Statements. Firms must provide temporary laborers detailed itemized wage statements either on the laborer’s paycheck stub or a form approved by the commissioner. N.J. Stat. § 34:8D-6. The wage statement must contain the name and address of each third party client for whom the temporary laborer performed work, information on the number of hours worked, the rate of pay for each hour, the total pay period earnings, the amount and purpose of each deduction made, and the maximum placement fee the Firm may charge a third party client for directly hiring the temporary laborer. The Act also imposes several regulations on the payment of wages to temporary laborers, including with respect to the method and frequency of payments. It prohibits deductions for cash-checking fees, criminal background checks, consumer credit reports and drug tests, and regulates the amount of deductions for meals and equipment. N.J. Stat. § 34:8D-6. It also requires a Firm to pay a temporary laborer who is contracted to work at a third party client, but is not used by the third party client, a minimum of four hours at the agreed upon rate of pay, or a minimum of two hours if the temporary laborer is contracted to work at another location during the same shift. Transportation. Firms and third party clients may not charge a fee for transportation they provide to temporary laborers to transport them to or from a worksite. N.J. Stat. § 34:8D-5. A Firm may not require a temporary laborer to use transportation the firm provides, and if it does provide transportation, it must adhere to basic safety requirements. Public Policy Objectives: The “findings and declarations” section of the Act states that the share of Black and Latino temporary workers far outstrips their proportion in the workforce and that they are heavily concentrated in low-wage occupations. See N.J. Stat. § 34:8D-1. Further, full-time temporary workers earn 41% less than direct-hire employees, and are far less likely to receive employer-sponsored retirement and health benefits. Although the Act seeks to address these societal problems, it also disincentivizes companies from using temporary laborers due to increased regulatory burdens and costs. In apparent recognition of the negative financial impact the Act may have on Firms, the Department also identified a countervailing effect on the creation of more permanent jobs, anticipating that some third-party clients will determine that it is now more advantageous for them to hire permanent employees rather than continuing to use temporary labor. _________________________ Reprinted with permission from the October 3, 2023 edition of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL © 2023 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com – 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com.
October 6, 2023
What’s New In The Evolving Area Of Pay Equity Requirements?
As we discussed in a prior post, pay equity is a rapidly evolving area of significant import to employers. Women, people of color, and individuals with disabilities continue to earn significantly less than non-Hispanic white men for the same work. The disparity is even more dramatic for individuals at the intersections of those underpaid groups. Anti-discrimination laws exist but, for a variety of reasons, they have not been enough to close these pay gaps. In an effort to promote pay equity, states and localities are requiring employers to take certain steps as part of their recruiting process. Since our last update, a number of new laws have passed or gone into effect that relate to issues such as pay transparency and the use of salary history. Laws Already In Effect The Rhode Island and Washington pay range disclosure requirements referenced in our prior update went into effect on January 1, 2023. Rhode Island’s prohibition on salary history inquiries went into effect on the same date. California’s new pay transparency law also went into effect on January 1, 2023. Employers with fifteen or more employees are now required to disclose a pay scale in all job postings. The pay scale must set out the salary or hourly wage that the employer reasonably expects to pay a successful applicant. In addition, all employers, regardless of size, must provide (1) the pay scale for a posted position upon request by an applicant and (2) the pay scale for an employee’s current position if requested by the employee. Effective February 12, 2023, Albany County joined the list of jurisdictions in New York requiring that employers disclose the minimum and maximum pay rate when posting open positions, including promotion and transfer opportunities. Laws Effective In 2024 Colorado is expanding its pay transparency law, effective January 1, 2024, to require disclosure of salary ranges to current employees for positions within their expected career progression. Hawaii has enacted its first pay transparency law, effective January 1, 2024, requiring employers with fifty or more employees to include a pay range that “reasonably reflects the actual expected compensation” in job postings. The requirement does not apply to internal transfers or promotions. Minnesota has enacted salary history ban which becomes effective January 1, 2024. After that date, employers may not inquire about, require disclosure of, or consider pay history for purposes of determining an applicant’s compensation. A Columbus, Ohio ordinance prohibiting employers from inquiring about and using salary history information during hiring goes into effect on March 1, 2024. Laws Effective in 2025 Effective January 1, 2025, Illinois law will require that postings by employers with fifteen or more employees include a pay range that the employer “reasonably expects in good faith to offer for the position, set by reference to any applicable pay scale, the previously determined range for the position, the actual range of others currently holding equivalent positions, or the budgeted amount for the position, as applicable.” The requirement applies to all positions that may be performed, even in part, in Illinois and all positions which report to a supervisor located in Illinois. Some of the requirements of these laws, particularly those that purport to dictate behavior outside the jurisdiction where they are enacted, are almost certain to face legal challenges as states begin to enforce them. Employers are advised to check for new laws in this area that may apply to them and keep an eye out for updates. Employers may also want to consider engaging in a pay equity study to help ensure compliance with applicable laws.
October 4, 2023
Disability Discrimination
Are Employers Required to Make Commuting Accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act?
The answer to this question is unclear, and federal courts continue to disagree. The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to employees with disabilities, so long as the accommodations do not create an undue burden for the employer or pose safety risks. In analyzing accommodation claims, courts must address each of these inquiries. A longstanding federal circuit divide over employers’ duty to provide commute accommodations recently intensified. The current divide—dubbed a “soft split” by some—is largely the result of the individualized and fact-specific nature of ADA accommodation cases. Given the courts’ reliance on specific facts in each case, the conflicting rulings may be reconciled through future decisions issued by the circuit courts, without resort to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in EEOC v. Charter Communications, discussed below, illustrates this willingness to distinguish and reconcile its own ADA accommodations decisions. Requiring Accommodations: The Second and Third, and now Seventh, Circuits The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits, in 1995 and 2010, respectively, held that under the ADA, employers are required to accommodate workers with disabilities in their commutes to and from work. In Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, the Second Circuit noted that the ADA does not provide a closed-end definition of “reasonable accommodation.” Based in part on the ADA’s legislative history, the Second Circuit concluded that employers may be required to help pay for the parking spot of “an otherwise qualified disabled employee” who experiences difficulty walking in order to minimize the distance the employee must walk in order to get to work. The Third Circuit, in Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., similarly concluded that employers must provide schedule changes to accommodate employees’ vision-related driving barriers. The Seventh Circuit echoed this conclusion in July 2023, in EEOC v. Charter Communications, a case involving an employee with cataracts who requested a temporary change in his work schedule so he could start and end work two hours earlier while he found a home closer to his workplace. The Seventh Circuit noted that, “[m]odified work schedules . . . appear in the ADA’s legislative history.” Quoting Third Circuit cases, the Seventh Circuit sought to strike a balance between employees’ and employers’ interests, and further stated that “[a]n employer is not required to bend over backwards to accommodate a disabled employee or expend enormous sums in order to bring about a trivial improvement in the life of a disabled employee. Instead, the duty of reasonable accommodation is satisfied when the employer does what is necessary to enable the disabled worker to work in reasonable comfort.” In reaching its decision in Charter Communications, the Seventh case analyzed its 2008 decision, Filar v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago. In Filar, the court held that the employer was not required to provide accommodations to minimize or eliminate transportation barriers to employees. But this decision, like others in the ADA accommodations space, was tied closely to the facts of that case. There, the employee was a substitute teacher for schools throughout Chicago who had a hip condition that prevented her from walking long distances and prevented her from driving. She requested to work only at locations “within minimum walking distance from public transportation.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the teacher’s claim, explaining that her request was administratively unreasonable and “too barebones” given the hundreds of schools she may have worked at and over ten-thousand bus stops she may have used. The Seventh Circuit distinguished Charter Communications from Filar by explaining that the employee’s accommodations in Charter Communications would not have imposed any unfair or too-costly burdens on the employer to the point of creating undue hardship. In addition to considering its past ruling in Filar and decisions from the Second and Third Circuits, the Seventh Circuit in Charter Communications analyzed—and distinguished—decisions from the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. Eschewing Accommodations: The Sixth and Tenth Circuits The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, in 2012 and 2021, respectively, held that employers are not required to provide their employees accommodations surrounding transportation barriers, reasoning that such barriers are external to the workplace, or that providing accommodations would constitute preferential treatment for employees with disabilities. The Sixth Circuit case, Regan v. Faurecia Automotive Seating, Inc., involved an employee at an automotive supplier with narcolepsy. When she began working at the supplier, she lived 24 miles from her workplace, but she later moved 79 miles away, resulting in a two to four hour commute. She requested a work-schedule change, which her employer denied. The employee challenged the denial as being an adverse employment action in the form of constructive discharge. The Sixth Circuit concluded that this denial was “not a significant change in employment status,” and that her commute was “a mere inconvenience” insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. In Unrein v. PHC-Fort Morgan, Inc., the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of commute accommodations as it pertained to a clinical dietician who became legally blind during the course of her employment at a medical center. Like the employee in Regan, the dietician had a long commute to work—120 miles round trip—which she could no longer complete on her own following her diagnosis. As an accommodation, she requested “a flexible schedule to accommodate her transportation,” which was unpredictable, involved her reliance on friends and family, and resulted in her inability to guarantee when she would be physically present at the medical center. Following 15 months of the flexible-schedule accommodation, the medical center determined that the dietician’s erratic schedule disrupted her ability to carry out her essential job functions, and that the issue of a transportation barrier was outside its purview as an employer. The Seventh Circuit in Charter Communications considered but distinguished the facts of that case from Regan and Unrein, explaining that “[t]he plaintiff in Regan had chosen to move much farther away from her job, and that choice aggravated the effects of her disability on her ability to commute safely,” and that “[t]he plaintiff in Unrein was asking for an accommodation that would have made it impossible for her to meet the essential job function of being physically present on a reliable schedule.” Conclusion Conflicting decisions in the federal circuits are often resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court. Given the absence of bright-line rules in ADA accommodations cases and the recent willingness of the Seventh Circuit to distinguish its earlier ruling on a commute-accommodations case, however, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits may be open to making similar refinements to their ADA accommodations decisions. To guard against ADA-accommodations claims, employers should ensure that their employees, regardless of the presence of a disability, are able to perform their essential job functions, and employers should be able to clearly identify and be able to justify those functions to their employees and to a fact finder. They should also continue to engage in interactive discussions with employees about accommodations, including those related to commuting, and carefully evaluate the costs and hardship associated with individual accommodation requests.
September 14, 2023
Background Checks
Recreational Marijuana Legalization, Drug Testing Trends, and Considerations for Employers
Minnesota is now the 23rd state (in addition to Washington D.C. and Guam) to legalize recreational marijuana in some form or another. Minnesota joins a growing list of states taking action on marijuana policy. With nearly half of the states now permitting adult-use of marijuana, what trends and laws should employers consider when revising or adopting drug testing policies? To provide background, more Americans have access to legal recreational marijuana than any time before. While possession or use of marijuana remains illegal at the federal level, 162 million Americans now live in a jurisdiction that allows adult recreational use. That figure does not include the millions more who live in states with robust medical marijuana programs, or places where limited amounts of THC (the psychoactive component of cannabis that produces a “high”) is permitted in certain CBD products (the non-psychoactive ingredient derived from cannabis). And the 2018 Farm Bill, which legalized the production of industrial hemp as an agriculture product, set a national standard allowing products with up to 0.3% THC by dry weight to be sold nationally. Needless to say, the status of marijuana as a consumable product has changed dramatically since Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize recreational adult use of the product in 2012. Because use and possession of marijuana has only been legalized on a state (and not federal) basis, employers with nationwide footprints have adjusted to various statutory schemes enacted in the states as it applies to drug testing for marijuana. While no state requires that employers let employees consume, possess, or produce marijuana at work, the similarities in approach end there. Least Restrictive Approaches. Many states enacting recreational marijuana laws have taken a “hands-off” approach to employment drug testing. These states, including Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, and Oregon, allow employers to continue to take adverse employment actions on the basis of employee drug tests showing THC. While marijuana is recreationally legal in these states, employers largely retain discretion to prohibit use of marijuana by employees and test for it accordingly. Of course, employers must continue to abide by state-specific drug testing laws, many of which are highly technical statutes requiring strict compliance. However, in these states, the status quo allowing employers to test for marijuana is essentially intact. More Restrictive Approaches. Another slate of states have adjusted their workplace drug testing statutes, or separately provided for workplace considerations when legalizing recreational marijuana. A common approach among these “middle-tier” states is to prohibit employment actions based on an employee’s lawful, off-site, non-working hour use of marijuana. Illinois and Maryland have both adopted this approach, which appears aimed at balancing an employer’s legitimate interests in ensuring no drug use at work against an employee’s state right to consume marijuana products recreationally. Other states have began to move away from pre-employment testing (or employment actions based on those tests) for marijuana altogether. For example, New York and Minnesota employers generally may not test for marijuana unless specifically authorized by statute to do so. In New Jersey and Nevada, an employer may continue to test for marijuana, but cannot base employment decisions on the results of a positive marijuana drug test. New Testing Limitations. Finally, a few states have chosen to take a different approach by limiting “traditional” drug testing itself in favor of “active impairment” drug testing. By way of background, when an individual consumes cannabis, the metabolic or digestive process creates non-psychoactive cannabis metabolites (“NCM”). These non-psychoactive metabolites are essentially a by-product of the “high,” leaving a substance that remains in an individual’s system even after the individual no longer is actively experiencing the effects of cannabis. The presence of NCM in a person’s drug testing sample will usually trigger a positive result in most “traditional” drug tests. However, because NCM can stay in a person’s body for days, weeks, or even months after the last use of cannabis, testing for NCM doesn’t necessarily establish if a person is actively impaired. Recognizing this, California and Washington have enacted laws prohibiting “traditional” drug testing that tests for the presence of NCMs. Instead, employers in California and Washington (beginning on January 1, 2024 in both states) will need to use different tests, which detect for the presence of THC in an individual, which would establish active impairment. General Exceptions. Even as states move to curtail drug testing for marijuana in some or all circumstances, it’s important for employers to always consider the usual laundry-list of exceptions that allow employers to test and make employment decisions based on the results of a positive drug screen. For example, many states (such as New Jersey and New York) have express carve-outs on their testing restrictions when an employer is party to a federal contract. Many states also permit or require testing in specific trades, usually healthcare, childcare and education, and certain transportation industries. And of course, employers subject to United States Department of Transportation’s drug testing requirements must continue to comply, regardless of state law stating otherwise. For each general rule limiting an employer’s right to drug test, understand there are typically numerous exceptions and carve-outs, all different on a state-by-state basis. Additionally, many states otherwise limiting an employer’s right to conduct pre-employment drug screens for marijuana continue to permit reasonable suspicion or random testing for marijuana in some cases. Takeaways. In light of the constantly changing legal landscape surrounding recreational marijuana and testing for it, employers with nationwide workforces face difficult decisions. Employers have a few options to consider when revising or implementing new drug testing policies: Is testing for marijuana important for your organization? Due in part to the rapid advancement of marijuana legalization and the corresponding increase in public acceptance of cannabis use, some companies—such as Amazon, the NBA, and Caesar’s Entertainment—have chosen to abandon marijuana testing altogether. Of course, before making the jump to voluntarily end marijuana drug testing, employers should consider whether any employees face mandatory testing under state or federal law. In addition, some employers will need to consider safety implications of moving away from cannabis drug screens. Some employers may also wish to continue marijuana drug screens out of an abundance of caution, given cannabis remains federally illegal. What happens when an individual does test positive for marijuana? Employers should consider their own approach when employees or applicants actually do test positive for marijuana: What laws apply? (In Minnesota, for example, employers are prohibited from taking an adverse employment action based only on a positive marijuana result.) Further, is it an automatic deal-breaker? Or does the organization frequently decline to take adverse action on that basis? One question to ask is, what information have you learned about the individual based on the test result? It is no longer the necessarily the case that a marijuana test reveals whether someone is “law abiding.” Overall, it may be worthwhile and cost-effective to remove marijuana from testing panels. Can you manage a workplace without testing for marijuana? For some employers, a pre-employment drug screen and the potential for future random or reasonable suspicion testing was an effective performance management tool. But given the restrictions on “traditional” drug testing and the highly specialized requirements across several states, some employers are looking to manage employee performance without drug tests. For example, some employers are addressing workplace cannabis impairment through performance management approaches. Where an employee is frequently late to work and their work product quality decreases, there is a clear performance issue, whether it is caused by workplace drug impairment or not. Employers who move to this more “holistic” approach to managing performance should be careful to establish objective guidelines of performance that are unacceptable, whether caused by drug use or not. Although the law of marijuana legalization and drug testing is constantly changing, employers should remember the principles that have not changed: performance management need not always include drug testing, employers have a right to maintain a safe and drug-free workplace, and drug testing for marijuana is still required for some industries and job titles under state and federal law.
September 6, 2023
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
What do employers need to do to comply with the PUMP Act and the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act?
In recent years, the United States has faced an epidemic of maternal mortality and worsening maternal health disparities and ranks well beyond its industrialized peers on these metrics. In response, many employers have taken steps to promote maternal and child health during the critical period of infancy and new parenthood. These steps include more generous paid parental leave, better access to quality lactation spaces, and more flexible work options. At the end of the 2023 legislative session, Congress continued this momentum on a national scale and passed changes to the Providing Urgent Maternal Protections for Nursing Mothers Act (“PUMP Act”) and the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (“PWFA”). The PUMP Act and the PWFA join other federal laws, such as the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”)—all of which provide protections for pregnant and nursing employees. Employers will want to understand how these new pieces of legislation fit in with existing laws to provide protections for pregnant and nursing employees in order to comply adequately with their heightened requirements. The Providing Urgent Maternal Protections for Nursing Mothers (“PUMP”) Act Under the FLSA, employers must provide nonexempt employees with reasonable break time to express breast milk for up to one year after a child’s birth. The PUMP Act expands existing accommodations for breastfeeding employees under the FLSA by granting employees control over when breastfeeding breaks are necessary. In this vein, employers must provide reasonable break time to nursing employees each time the employee needs to pump while at work for one year following a child’s birth. The frequency, duration, and timing of breaks will vary depending on factors related to the nursing employee and child. Accordingly, the employer and employee may agree to a certain schedule based on the employee’s need to pump. Should the employee’s pumping needs change, the agreed-upon schedule may need to be adjusted over time. The time a nursing employee takes as a break to pump is compensable if it would be compensable under the FLSA; that is, if it is a break lasting 20 or fewer minutes. These specifications extend to remote workers; remote workers are entitled to lactation breaks on the same basis as if they were working onsite. The PUMP Act also expands the ACA, which required employers to provide employees “reasonable break time” and a private space to pump “other than a bathroom” for one year after a child’s birth. Under the PUMP Act, a space for an employee to pump must be (1) shielded from view; (2) free from intrusion from coworkers and the public; (3) available each time the employee needs it; and (4) not a bathroom. The PUMP Act largely took effect on December 29, 2022, but enforcement of the PUMP Act, including additional changes and protection from the 2023 legislative session, took effect on April 28, 2023. The PUMP Act covers all employers. Employers with fewer than 50 employees may seek an exemption from the PUMP Act if compliance with its provisions would impose “undue hardship” on the employer. “Undue hardship” is determined by evaluating the burdens of compliance against “the size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the employer’s business.” Certain airline, railroad, and motorcoach industry employees are exempt from the protections provided by the PUMP Act. Employees who believe an employer has violated the PUMP Act may either file a complaint against the employer with the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) or file a lawsuit against the employer in federal court. Generally, an employee must inform an employer of its failure to comply with the PUMP Act and provide the employer 10 calendar days to reach compliance prior to taking action with the DOL or in federal court. The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (“PWFA”) The PWFA expands federal protections for pregnant and nursing workers. It requires covered employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” to a worker’s known limitations related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions—regardless of whether the condition amounts to a “disability.” In this vein, the PWFA does not apply more stringent standards than the ADA in terms of what constitutes a “disability” or a “reasonable accommodation.” Instead, the PWFA adds one more category that requires reasonable accommodations. Pregnancy-related conditions contemplated under the PWFA include complications of pregnancy and childbirth, such as diabetes, depression, and preeclampsia; medical conditions and other related events including lactation, miscarriage and pregnancy loss, fertility treatment, and menstruation; and the standard physical changes that occur during and after pregnancy and childbirth. A non-comprehensive list of reasonable accommodations under the PWFA includes flexible work hours, the ability to sit or drink water, closer parking to work locations, exemption from strenuous activities, and appropriately sized uniforms and safety apparel. Under the PWFA, employers may not: Require an employee to accept an accommodation without engaging in an interactive dialogue with the employee about the accommodation; Deny job or other employment opportunities to a qualified employee or applicant based on that person’s need for reasonable accommodation; Require an employee to take leave if another reasonable accommodation may be provided that would allow the employee to continue working; or Retaliate against an individual or interfere with an individual’s rights under the PWFA. Public and private sector employers with 15 or more employees must comply with the PWFA. But an employer need not provide a reasonable accommodation if doing so would cause the employer an “undue hardship.” The PWFA became effective on June 27, 2023. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) began accepting charges on June 27, 2023 for violations occurring on or after that date. The EEOC has also stated that it will issue further PWFA regulations by December 27, 2023. In addition to the PUMP Act and the PWFA, states and localities are increasingly instituting similar and more employee-protective laws, which are not preempted by these new federal laws. Employers would be well-served by revisiting and revising their applicable policies and procedures to account for these greater protections for their pregnant and nursing employees. Please contact your local Dorsey labor and employment attorney for assistance with questions related to legal developments in this area.
August 30, 2023
What is the current standard used by the National Labor Relations Board to determine if a worker is an employee or an independent contractor?
Each government agency has set its own standard for determining whether a worker is properly classified as an employee or an independent contractor. Employers need to take into account the tests used by different federal agencies as well as those used by different states.1 The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or the “Board”) has, yet again, changed its standard for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. On June 13, 2023, the Board issued its decision in The Atlanta Opera, Inc., which overruled its 2019 decision SuperShuttle DFW, Inc. and returned to its prior standard laid out in its 2014 decision, FedEx Home Delivery. As we have discussed in other NLRB posts, the NLRB positions often change when the U.S. presidents change.2 In order to understand the difference between the two NLRB standards, and which standard is currently in place, it is worth noting that both standards apply the same 10-factor test taken from common law. These ten factors are: the extent of control which, by the agreement, the employer may exercise over the details of the work; whether or not the worker is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; the skill required in the particular occupation; whether the employer or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; the length of time for which the worker is employed; the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of employer and employee; and whether the principal is or is not in business. In addition to the above listed factors, the Board has also analyzed whether the worker in question can demonstrate that they have a significant entrepreneurial opportunity for profit or loss. Specifically, the Board would look at whether the worker could work for other companies, hire their own employees, and had a proprietary interest in their work. In SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., the Board found that the main, “animating principle” of the test should be the entrepreneurial opportunity for profit or loss. This reading of the standard generally favored employers, because it made it more likely that workers would be found to be independent contractors. However, now that the Board has returned to its prior standard under FedEx Home Delivery, the entrepreneurial opportunity for profit or loss factor will not be afforded the same level of consideration. Rather, the Board now will look at all factors, including entrepreneurial opportunity, equally when determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. The Board’s return to its earlier rule likely means that more workers will be found to be employees rather than independent contractors. Similarly, the standard under the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) is in flux. Currently the DOL test looks at the following six factors in determining a worker’s classification: opportunity for profit or loss depending on managerial skill; investments by the worker and the employer; degree of permanence of the work relationship; nature and degree of control; extent to which the work performed is an integral part of the employer’s business; and skill and initiative. As of this posting, the DOL has indicated it plans to propose a new rule for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The DOL had issued a rule on the independent contractor test in 2021 that narrowed the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to focus on two core factors: (1) the nature and degree of control over the work and (2) the worker’s opportunity for profit and loss. The DOL considered these factors more probative and afforded them more weight than any other factors under the test. The 2021 rule was officially rescinded on October 13, 2022. Under the new proposed rule, the DOL will determine a worker’s classification based on a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of the economic reality of the worker’s relationship with the employer. Specifically, the test focuses on whether the worker is economically dependent on the employer for work or is in business for him- or herself. The test does not explicitly analyze each of the six factors laid out above, but rather takes a more comprehensive approach in examining the relationship between the worker and the employer. The proposed rule further designates the consideration of investment on the part of the worker as an independent factor, clarifies the analysis of the control factor (specifically by discussing how scheduling, supervision, price setting, and the ability to work with others should be considered), and returns to a traditional analysis of whether the worker’s work is integral to the employer’s business. It is expected that this new rule will make it more likely that workers will be classified as employees rather than independent contractors. So what does all of this mean for employers? Since each new standard under the NLRB and the DOL will make it more likely that workers will be classified as employees rather than independent contractors, employers should examine the job duties of their workers and consult with counsel to ensure that they continue to be classified correctly. 1 For example, the test used by California is described here: What Do Employers Need to Know Following the Passage of California's New Law on Independent Contractor Misclassification? | Quirky Questions (quirkyemploymentquestions.com) 2 See this prior article for another recent example: The NLRB Reverses Course (again) on Employee Outbursts and Protected Concerted Activity | Quirky Questions (quirkyemploymentquestions.com)
August 7, 2023
What risks do employers face by excluding coverage for gender affirming care in their health plans?
In recent years, courts have ruled upon a growing number of cases arising from delivery of and payment for gender affirming care. At the same time, state legislatures have passed a variety of laws aimed at such services. Some states enacted affirmative legal protections for patients and providers (e.g., Colorado, Illinois, and Minnesota) while others sought to restrict or prohibit services available in their states (e.g., Alabama, Arkansas, and Florida). Within the past two years alone, more than 30 states have enacted legislation regarding gender affirming care. Litigants continue to challenge many of these laws in court. The law governing restrictions placed on the delivery of gender affirming care will continue to develop as litigants’ challenges work their way through the legal system. But even now, federal courts have provided guidance for the prudent employer and third-party administrator to evaluate their own policies regarding health care plan coverage for gender affirming care. Because a number of courts have held that a health care benefit plan’s denial of coverage for gender affirming care discriminates against individuals on the basis of sex when physicians opine that those treatments are medically necessary, health plan sponsors should consider whether to prophylactically eliminate plan provisions that unconditionally exclude coverage for transgender benefits. In this article, we provide an overview of the law governing the availability of gender affirming care, we discuss how the law affects benefit plans, and we offer practical suggestions for employers as they evaluate how to structure their health care benefit plans. Terms Gender affirming care means the provision of health care to transgender people in an effort to align their gender expression (external characteristics and behaviors) with their gender identity (innate, psychological sense of gender). Gender affirming care may include mental health counseling and additional medical interventions such as puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, or surgery. Gender affirming care treats gender dysphoria, i.e., the distress caused by the discrepancy between a person’s gender expression and their gender identity. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, recognizes gender dysphoria as a mental health condition. Gender dysphoria can cause anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation. Accordingly, the American Academy of Pediatrics, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American College of Physicians, American Medical Association, and American Psychiatric Association have expressed support for treatment of gender dysphoria with gender affirming care. Legislative Background Although many in the medical community have expressed support for gender affirming care, a number of states have sought to restrict the practice, particularly for minors. In 2021, Arkansas became the first state in the country to ban gender affirming care for transgender minors. Since then, at least 12 other states have restricted gender affirming care for minors and/or adults, and at least 30 states have introduced similar legislation in 2023. Should they become law, states may enforce these restrictions through a variety of means, including criminal, civil, and/or professional penalties for clinicians who provide services, and in some instances, penalties for parents of children who support their children’s access to services. Patients, parents, and physicians have challenged these recent legislative efforts in court. Plaintiffs commonly argue that governmental bans on gender affirming care discriminate on the basis of sex and therefore violate their equal protection and due process rights. The federal courts have generally treated these arguments favorably by either partially or permanently blocking state laws in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, and Kentucky. But see L.W. v. Skrmetti, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 17234 (6th Cir. July 8, 2023) (refusing to block Tennessee’s ban on gender affirming care while Sixth Circuit considers an expedited appeal). For example, in Doe v. Ladapo, plaintiffs challenged Florida’s statute and rules that sought to prohibit transgender minors from receiving puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99603 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2023). Plaintiffs argued that the laws discriminated on the basis of sex because the same treatments were legal in other contexts, e.g., treating a natal male adolescent with testosterone. The court agreed with plaintiffs’ arguments, reasoning “[g]ender identity is real,” “[t]he widely accepted standard of care calls for evaluation and treatment [of gender dysphoria],” and Florida’s purported justifications for the challenged legislation “are largely pretextual.” Insurance Background Lawsuits involving gender affirming care extend beyond the recent challenges to state legislation. A number of transgender individuals and/or their parents/guardians have sued employers and third-party administrators related to health insurance policies that exclude coverage for transgender benefits, either categorically or by excluding specific treatments for gender dysphoria (e.g., limiting or excluding surgical benefits). Plaintiffs commonly allege violations of the Affordable Care Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Affordable Care Act (Section 1557) includes broad civil rights protections in health care, barring discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability. The Obama administration interpreted Section 1557’s ban on sex discrimination to bar discrimination based on gender identity. In 2020, the Trump administration reversed course. But in 2021, the Biden administration restored the Obama administration’s interpretation in Executive Order 13988, bolstered by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), in which the Court recognized that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination in employment on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the basis of gender identity. Like Title VII, Section 1557 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and extends that prohibition to health programs or activities that receive federal funding. The phrase “health program or activity” includes federally funded contracts of insurance; Section 1557 therefore prohibits sex discrimination in certain health insurance contracts. Schmitt v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Washington, 965 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2020); but see Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Azar, 513 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1136 (D.N.D. 2021) (holding that health insurers are subject to Section 1557 only for the parts of their operations that receive federal funding). Increasing Litigation Since 2017, several federal courts have found that blanket exclusions for gender affirming care violate federal law. One such case is C.P. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227832 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2022). In C.P. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, plaintiffs—a transgender boy of 17 and his mother—argued that Blue Cross violated Section 1557 when it administered a self-funded health care plan, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., that categorically excluded from coverage transgender benefits. Plaintiff C.P. had gender dysphoria and sought hormone therapy treatment, and later, chest reconstruction surgery. Blue Cross initially covered the hormone therapy by mistake; it later notified plaintiff C.P. that subsequent treatment would not be covered. The relevant exclusionary language provided: “Transgender Reassignment Surgery Not Covered: Benefits shall not be provided for treatment, drugs, therapy, counseling services and supplies for, or leading to, gender reassignment surgery.” Importantly, the plan at issue generally covered care for hormone therapy, mastectomies, and chest reconstruction if that care was considered medically necessary for diagnoses other than for gender affirming care. In granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the court relied on Bostock and Ninth Circuit precedent to conclude that the plan discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of Section 1557. The trigger for denial of coverage was a diagnosis of gender dysphoria; according to the court, gender dysphoria cannot be understood without reference to sex.1 The court also determined that Blue Cross’s arguments regarding the purported lack of medical consensus for gender affirming care were “immaterial” because (1) “[Blue Cross] did not base the decision to deny care on medical necessity but on [plaintiff] C.P.’s . . . transgender status,” and (2) the treatment at issue would be considered medically necessary under Blue Cross’ own medical necessity policy. In Fain v. Crouch, 618 F. Supp. 3d 313 (S.D. Va. 2022), plaintiffs—transgender individuals who received healthcare through the West Virginia Medicaid Program—also challenged the plan’s exclusion of surgical treatment for gender dysphoria. Unlike the plan in C.P. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, the plan here covered some treatments for gender affirming care, such as mental health counseling and hormone therapy. Plaintiffs brought equal protection and Section 1557 claims. The court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment because the challenged exclusion denied medically necessary surgeries for transgender people that the same plan covered for reasons other than gender dysphoria. The court was not persuaded that the plan’s coverage of some transgender benefits, like hormone therapy, was a defense to plaintiffs’ claims. Relying on Bostock, the court stated: “Simply because the [plan] does not discriminate in all aspects does not permit it to discriminate narrowly against transgender surgical care.” Id. at 326. Practice Pointers Although the rules applicable to the provision of and payment for gender affirming care continue to develop, employers should assess how recent cases may be instructive to them. As noted above, a number of federal courts have recognized that categorical denial of coverage for transgender benefits constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex that triggers the protections of Section 1557 and federal anti-discrimination laws. Employers, therefore, should consider on a prophylactic basis whether to eliminate from their group health plans categorical exclusions of transgender benefits. Similarly, employers should think carefully about policies that label gender affirming care as “cosmetic” or “elective,” descriptions of the medical treatments which result in exclusion of the care from coverage. In particular factual circumstances where the care was considered medically necessary, some courts have considered such practices discriminatory. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Precynthe, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21516 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 9, 2018) (summarizing case law in which courts determined transgender benefits were not merely cosmetic treatments, but, instead, medically necessary treatments to address serious medical disease). Employers also should think carefully about excluding coverage for specific services to treat gender dysphoria if those same services are covered in other contexts, e.g., if a plan excludes coverage for medically necessary mastectomies to treat gender dysphoria while covering the same procedure for non-gender dysphoria related diagnoses. See, e.g., Fain v. Crouch, 618 F. Supp. 3d at 326. Finally, employers should monitor developments in the state laws. In stark contrast to recent federal jurisprudence, states such as Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, and Oklahoma have pending bills that affirmatively bar insurers from offering coverage for gender affirming care. Texas, Wyoming, and New Hampshire have pending bills that categorize gender affirming care as child abuse under state law. 1The plan at issue was the Catholic Health Initiatives Medical Plan. Accordingly, Blue Cross also argued that it was protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) because the plan was based on sincerely-held religious beliefs. The court rejected Blue Cross’s defense on the ground that the RFRA is inapplicable in cases where the government is not a party. But see Religious Sisters of Mercy, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 1122 (granting coalition of Catholic entities permanent injunctive relief pursuant to RFRA from provision or coverage of gender affirming care). Reprinted with permission from the August 2, 2023 edition of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL © 2023 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com – 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com.
August 2, 2023
California Questions
What Does the California Attorney General’s New Investigative CCPA Sweep Mean for California Employers?
On July 14, 2023, the California Attorney General announced an investigative sweep targeting CCPA compliance efforts by “large California employers.” The Attorney General’s Office sent inquiry letters to the large California employers “requesting information on the companies’ compliance with the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) with respect to the personal information of employees and job applicants.” The CCPA did not always cover employee data. The CCPA largely exempted employee data from its framework. Before January 1, 2023, the CCPA only required covered employers to (a) safeguard employee data, and (b) provide a notice to employees, job applicants, owners, directors, officers, medical staff members, and contractors describing the categories of employee data collected and how the employee data is used. However, California voters approved the California Privacy Rights Act (the “CPRA”) on November 3, 2020, which amended the CCPA and eliminated the employee exemption. Effective January 1, 2023, covered employers’ obligations to comply with the CCPA as it relates to employee data expanded significantly. CCPA-covered employers’ employee data privacy obligations now include, among other things, drafting or amending compliant service provider agreements and establishing processes for handling employees’ requests to exercise their rights to access, delete, and opt out of the sale and sharing of employee data. There is some degree of uncertainty as to how California employers can shape their CCPA compliance efforts. The CCPA regulations do not clearly address employee data, and the California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA) recently acknowledged the lack of clarity in the CCPA regulations at a May 2023 meeting. The CPPA considered revising the CCPA regulations and/or adding exceptions for employee data, given that “the current purposes are not really designed for employee[] [data],” as one CPPA member noted. Several other states exempted employee data from their own comprehensive consumer data privacy laws: Virginia, Colorado, Connecticut are currently in effect, and Utah, Texas, Montana, Iowa, Tennessee, and Indiana have enacted new laws to take effect in the next few years. California remains the only state to extend its data privacy law to employee data. Hopefully, the CPPA’s November 2023 meeting will bring clarity for California employers’ compliance efforts. What does the California Attorney General’s CCPA investigative sweep mean for California employers? The investigative sweep is a reminder that the CCPA’s statutory requirements, including those that apply to employee data, are enforceable, even though the Superior Court of California issued a ruling delaying enforcement of the new CCPA regulations until March 29, 2024. Note: The post California Attorney General Announces New Investigative Sweep Targeting CCPA Compliance for “Large California Employers” first appeared on TheTMCA.com
July 31, 2023
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Reverses Course on Remote I-9 Verification and Issues New Form I-9
As we previously wrote, in May, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) announced an end to employers’ ability to remotely inspect I-9 documents (an accommodation made during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic) on July 31, 2023. This meant that employers would no longer have the option to complete I-9 document verification remotely for those employees working remotely because of the pandemic, and employers who previously completed I-9 document verification needed to re-verify those documents in person by the end of August 2023. Wisely, employers throughout the U.S. began to take steps to ensure compliance. On July 21, 2023, both DHS and ICE reversed course and issued a final rule permitting remote I-9 verification for employees under certain circumstances, even if those employees are not remote workers. Employers that choose to take advantage of remote I-9 verification (referred to by ICE as the “Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination”) will be required to follow a specific verification procedure set forth in the final rule and will be subject to additional recordkeeping requirements. The final rule, which was officially published on July 25, 2023 and takes effect August 1, 2023, also includes the issuance of a new Form I-9 that employers must use as of November 1, 2023. What employers are eligible for the Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination? At this time, ICE indicates that the Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination is only available to employers enrolled in, and in good standing with, E-Verify. In addition, any new E-Verify employers and users must complete the free E-Verify tutorial available as part of the E-Verify enrollment process. The tutorial includes fraud awareness and anti-discrimination training. Are eligible employers required to use the Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination for all new hires? No, the final rule indicates that employers have some discretion. For example, an employer could choose to utilize the Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination for remote or out-of-state employees but still use traditional I-9 document verification for on-site employees. That said, employers that choose to utilize the Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination must do so on a non-discriminatory basis. In other words, employers cannot offer the Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination for some workers and not others in the same situation. What are the steps in the Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination? Within 3 business days of an employee’s first day of employment (the same timeline as in-person verification), the employer (or its authorized representative) must: First, examine copies (front and back, if the document is two-sided) of Form I-9 documents or an acceptable receipt to ensure that the documentation presented reasonably appears to be genuine. Second, conduct a live video interaction with the individual presenting the document(s) to ensure that the documentation reasonably appears to be genuine and related to the individual. During the live video interaction, the employee must re-present the Form I-9 documents previously provided to the employer. Third, complete the corresponding box on the new Form I-9, indicating that the employer utilized the Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination. ICE reminded employers that they are liable for errors on the Form I-9, so employers should make sure they are checking the proper box if the alternative procedure is used. Fourth, retain copies of the documentation (front and back, if the document is two-sided). Employers must then make these documents available to the government in the event of an audit or investigation. What are the new recordkeeping requirements for the Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination? As set forth above, employers utilizing the alternative procedure are required to retain clear and legible copies of all documents presented by the employee seeking to establish identity and employment eligibility for the Form I-9. As a reminder, employers using traditional in-person verification methods are not required to retain copies of documents, but if the employer voluntarily chooses to do so, the employer must retain copies on a non-discriminatory basis. Is the Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination set in stone or will there be additional changes? The final rule indicates that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security will monitor the use of the new procedure and may announce changes or additions to the procedure as time goes on. What are the changes to the Form I-9? The new Form I-9 is now available on USCIS's website, and includes the following changes: condenses Sections 1 and 2 to a single page; will be fillable on tablets and mobile devices; moves the Section 1, “Preparer/Translator Certification” area to a separate, standalone supplement that employers can provide to employees where applicable; moves Section 3, “Reverification and Rehire,” to a standalone supplement that employers can print if or when rehire occurs or reverification is required; revises the Lists of Acceptable Documents page to include some acceptable receipts as well as guidance regarding automatic extensions of employment authorization documents; reduces the number of instruction pages; and includes the checkbox indicating use of the Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination. When do employers have to start using the new Form I-9? USCIS issued the new Form I-9 on August 1, 2023. Employers may use the current version of the Form I-9 through October 31, 2023, though if an employer is utilizing the Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination, it must use the new Form I-9 so that it can check the proper box. All employers—regardless of document examination method—must use the new Form I-9 beginning November 1, 2023. Failure to use a proper Form I-9 can result in employer liability. What should employers do now? If you are an employer and want to utilize the new Optional Alternative Procedure for Document Examination, you should do the following: Make sure you are enrolled in, and in good standing with, E-Verify. Complete the required training through E-Verify. Ensure that you have the technology necessary to receive employment verification documents, conduct live video interactions, and retain employment verification documents. Starting August 1, 2023, use the new Form I-9.
July 26, 2023
Why Employers Everywhere Should Care About Florida’s New Immigration Law
On July 1, 2023, Florida’s new law regulating immigration within the State of Florida became effective. Known as FL 1718, the law is far-reaching and will significantly affect most employers in the state. Especially affected are the agriculture, landscaping, hospitality, and construction industries which traditionally cannot meet their employment needs through the recruitment of U.S. workers or foreign workers with a U.S. employment authorization. Whether this law, and those enacted by other states that may follow Florida’s lead, will stand up to federal court scrutiny, remains to be seen. Because immigration law is constitutionally vested in the U.S. Congress, federal courts often strike down or limit state and local laws intended to “supplement” or contradict federal immigration law. My company is not headquartered in Florida but we have workers there. How will the new law impact us? Companies whose headquarters are not based in Florida, but have employees in Florida, need to comply with FL 1718 immediately. This law does the following: Mandates the use of E-Verify by employers with over 25 employees; Gives state law enforcement the ability to enforce immigration laws; Requires hospitals accepting Medicaid to collect and maintain information about their patients’ immigration status; Restricts access to Florida driver’s and certain professional licenses; Criminalizes the transportation of undocumented workers into the state of Florida; and Adds civil and criminal penalties for violations of the law’s provisions. How is Participation in E-Verify Mandatory? E-Verify is a voluntary federal program employers may use to verify an employee’s identity, immigration status, and whether the employee is authorized to work in the U.S. The E-verify system does not provide an enforcement mechanism or assess penalties for non-compliance. Instead, it relies on the U.S. Department of Labor and other federal regulators to enforce violations. The new Florida law not only requires that most employers participate in E-verify, it also and creates its own penalties-and-fines system for violations. What About Transporting Workers to Job Sites? One of the bill’s provisions makes it a crime in Florida to transport an undocumented individual into the state. While it is already a federal crime to aid and abet an undocumented worker, Florida is adding an additional level of potential liability and punishment by including transportation of workers in its definition of human trafficking when the employer knows, or should have known that the worker is unlawfully present in the U.S. For example, assisting employee travel to a job site from another state into Florida could result in Florida charges for “human smuggling” against not only the employer, but also the person providing transportation. A second degree felony under Florida law, human smuggling can carry a 15-year prison sentence. The new law also expands Florida’s RICO statute to include human smuggling in the definition of a racketeering activity. Federal RICO statutes initially were enacted to combat mafia activity. What are the Hospital Reporting Requirements? Another provision of the law requires hospitals to inquire about a patient’s immigration status and report the data. This provision applies to hospitals accepting Medicaid, and hospital systems operating in Florida must report their data quarterly to the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration. Hospitals are not required to report personal patient information. Under the new law, the Agency must report the estimated cost of uncompensated care for immigrants not lawfully present in the U.S. by March 1 of each year. Anyone hospitalized in Florida may be subject to this provision, including workers injured on the job, workers who temporarily reside in Florida during the workweek, or workers located in Florida for the duration of a long-term project. Not only does it impose a significant burden on hospital systems operating in Florida (whether headquartered there, or not), the provision could expose an employer to liability as well, should hospital personnel relay employment statistics to the state as part of its reporting burden. Under What Standard Could an Employer be Held Liable? The Florida law casts a wide net to include a range of activities that constitute violations, going even further than employers’ obligations under federal law (see our prior postings regarding employers’ federal obligations to verify work authorization linked here and here.). The law states that a person cannot knowingly employ, hire, recruit, or refer, for either themselves or another (attention, job contractors and recruiters!) someone not authorized to work. While the law requires that a person act “knowingly,” the definition of “knowingly” is untested. Penalties escalate depending upon the violations and the number of workers involved, and a business could lose its license to operate in the state. The law imposes criminal penalties and prison sentences up to five years for violations. Are Employers Required to Cooperate with Immigration Enforcement? Federal I-9 regulations require employers to verify employment eligibility within three business days of when an employee begins working for pay. While the U.S. Department of Labor may conduct random site audits, Florida’s new law authorizes state law enforcement agencies, including all local police departments, sheriff’s offices, and state patrols, to conduct random audits to determine compliance with the law, without cause. Sustained noncompliance can result in the state canceling the business’s license. What are the Restrictions on Driver’s Licenses? Florida will not fund the mechanism or agency expense to issue identification documents for undocumented immigrants. When other states issue driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants, Florida considers them to be invalid. The new law states that law enforcement officers must issue a citation to anyone without lawful status driving in Florida with a lawful license issued by another state. For example, if you employ an undocumented worker from Minnesota to deliver a load of grain to a location in Florida, you and your driver are at risk of citation. Florida law enforcement authorities can stop and detain your employee and report the employee to federal authorities, since under the new law the state does not recognize the driver’s license issued lawfully to your employee by the State of Minnesota. Currently, the National Conference of State Legislatures notes that 19 states issue these licenses. These states—California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Washington—issue a license if an applicant provides certain documentation, such as a foreign birth certificate, foreign passport, or consular card and evidence of current residency in the state. What Else do Employers Need to Know About the New Law? FL 1718 requires that, when a state agency has custody of someone to whom U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has issued an “immigration detainer,” the agency must take a DNA sample from the detained person. Directed at sanctuary cities, Florida’s new law also prohibits any law that restricts any Florida law enforcement agency from sending employment eligibility information to a federal immigration agency. So, if in the past, the city in which your business operated in Florida did not cooperate with law enforcement, it will now be forced to cooperate. What Should Employers Do? Even if your business neither operates in Florida nor hires employees in Florida, it is still prudent to consider the ways that this law could affect your company and employees. And, if your business does operate in any way in Florida, you must ensure compliance with this new law immediately. Additionally, a number of other states have enacted or are considering enacting immigration-related laws that are likely more restrictive than federal law or require some reporting obligation to ICE. We anticipate that before Florida’s new law is challenged in court, other states may take similar steps. The authors kindly acknowledge the analysis of FL 1718 provided by the American Immigration Lawyers Association in AILA Doc. No. 23053300.
July 13, 2023
Minnesota Has Gone “All In” on Marijuana Legalization — What Does This Mean for Employers?
Around this time last year, Minnesota legalized edible products containing hemp-derived tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). Now, Minnesota has gone “all in”—becoming the 23rd state to legalize the recreational use of marijuana and cannabis products. While personal use is not legal until August 1, 2023, several employment provisions in the bill take effect on July 1, 2023. The legalization of recreational marijuana involves significant amendments to two Minnesota statutes: the Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act (DATWA) and the Consumable Products Act (CPA). The DATWA outlines how and when employers can require employees to undergo drug or alcohol testing, and the CPA protects employees against discrimination or discipline if a drug or alcohol test comes back positive for off-duty use of lawful consumable products. As employers prepare for the impacts of legalization, here are some answers to frequently asked questions: Are any jobs exempt from the new restrictions on drug testing? Yes. Although the 2023 amendments to DATWA specifically exclude marijuana and cannabis products from the statute’s definition of “drugs,” several jobs are exempt from this amendment. This means that cannabis and its metabolites are still considered a drug under DATWA for certain employees and employers (and of course, marijuana is still illegal under federal law). The following positions are unaffected and may still be subject to testing for cannabis under the amended Minnesota law: Peace officers, Firefighters, Positions where impairment would threaten a person’s health or safety, Positions within the health care, child care, education, and social work industries requiring interaction with patients, children, or vulnerable adults, and Positions created by federal grant, regulated by the Department of Transportation, contracted by the federal government, or otherwise governed by federal drug testing requirements. Can employers still conduct pre-employment cannabis testing for new applicants? No. Employers are no longer allowed to screen job applicants for cannabis as an employment condition unless otherwise required by state or federal law, and they cannot discriminate against or refuse to hire an applicant solely because of a positive test result for cannabis. Can employers still include cannabis in random drug screens for existing employees? Yes. In Minnesota, employers may only randomly screen 1) employees in safety-sensitive positions and 2) professional athletes who are subject to certain collective bargaining agreements. These covered employees may still be subject to random testing for cannabis, drug, or alcohol use. Is there any situation in which an employer can test employees for marijuana or cannabis products? Yes. Employers are allowed to prohibit the use, possession, or distribution of cannabis products, including medical marijuana, while working or on work premises. So, even though employers are not allowed to discriminate against employees or applicants for off-duty marijuana use under the CPA, there are certain circumstances where testing for cannabis products is allowed. An employer may test employees when it has a reasonable suspicion that an employee: Is under the influence of drugs or alcohol; Violated written work rules contained in the employer’s drug testing policy which prohibit the use, possession, sale, or transfer of cannabis and certain related substances; or Caused or sustained an injury or work-related accident. The 2023 amendments do not require employers to permit employees—even employees enrolled in the medical cannabis program—to be under the influence of marijuana or cannabis products at work. Critically, all cannabis testing must be done pursuant to an employer’s written, DATWA-compliant policy. Should employers revise their written drug and alcohol policies? YES! If an employer wishes to discipline an employee for cannabis use, possession, or distribution while at work, the employer must have a clear and written policy that conforms to DATWA requirements. At a minimum, drug and alcohol policies must define: Who is subject to testing under the policy; When drug or alcohol testing may be required or requested; The rights of employees or applicants to refuse testing and the consequences of refusal; What disciplinary or other personnel actions can be taken based on positive test results; The rights of employees or job applicants to explain any positive results or pay for a confirmatory retest; and All appeal procedures. Once a policy is adopted, employers must provide written notice of their drug and alcohol policy to all job applicants and employees, including notice that a policy was adopted posted “in an appropriate and conspicuous location on the employer’s premises.” Because marijuana will become a “lawful consumable product” under Minnesota law effective August 1, 2023, employers who wish to discipline employees for on-the-job cannabis use will need to revise their policies accordingly.
July 5, 2023
New York State’s Amended Pay Transparency Law
Pay transparency laws are on the rise across the country. New York is currently one of four states and a growing number of municipalities to enact laws requiring employers to disclose salary and wage ranges in job advertisements. California, Colorado and Washington also require salary and wage range disclosures in job advertisements. Other states, including Connecticut, Maryland, Rhode Island and Nevada, require employers to disclose salary and wage ranges to candidates at some point during the hiring process or upon request, although they stop short of mandating such disclosures in job advertisements. More states and municipalities are likely to follow as similar pay transparency bills make their way through various state and local legislatures. New York’s Pay Transparency Law, New York Labor Law § 194-b (the “Law”), takes effect on September 17, 2023. It was enacted in December 2022, and subsequently amended in March 2023. The amendments altered and clarified the Law in significant ways, including with respect to its extraterritorial reach and former recordkeeping requirements. Employers with operations in New York, as well as employers outside of New York with remote or hybrid workforces, will soon need to determine whether, and to what extent, they are covered by the Law, and begin taking steps to comply with it. Fortunately, many employers who are currently subject to similar pay transparency laws in other states and municipalities, including New York City, will have a head start. Who is covered by the Law? The Law provides for broad coverage. In the age of remote and hybrid work, the Law’s reach will undoubtedly extend beyond New York’s state lines. The Law applies to employers with four or more employees who advertise for jobs that will be (i) physically performed, at least in part, in New York; or (ii) physically performed outside of New York if the position reports to a supervisor, office or other worksite in New York. Employers will therefore need to assess reporting structures, employee residences and work travel requirements in order to determine whether the Law will apply to their job advertisements—particularly those for remote and hybrid positions. What constitutes a covered job “advertisement”? The Law applies to external advertisements for jobs as well as advertisements for internal promotion and transfer opportunities. When the Law was amended earlier this year, the legislature clarified its scope by defining the term “advertise.” The Law broadly defines “advertise” to mean: “to make available to a pool of potential applicants for internal or public viewing, including electronically, a written description of an employment opportunity.” This definition appears to encompass both formal job postings as well as informal written descriptions of employment opportunities that are made available or distributed to potential applicants. However, purely oral communications concerning jobs and internal opportunities are not covered. What does the Law require? The Law requires employers to disclose in covered job advertisements the minimum and maximum annual salary or hourly wage they in good faith believe is accurate for a position at the time of posting, and a job description if one exists. Notably, the Law does not require disclosure of non-salary or non-wage compensation such as overtime, incentive compensation or benefits. If a position is compensated solely based on commissions, employers must include a statement to that effect in the job advertisement. In a positive turn of events for employers, the recent amendment removed the recordkeeping requirements that were contained in the original version of the Law. Further clarification on the Law is expected prior to its effective date. The Law directs the New York Department of Labor to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the Law. The New York Department of Labor should issue regulations, and likely guidance on the Law as well, as we get closer to the September 17, 2023 effective date. What are the consequences for non-compliance? The Law does not provide for a private right of action. Instead, a person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of the Law may file a complaint with the New York Department of Labor for an investigation and determination of an appropriate remedy, if any. The Law provides that an employer who fails to comply with the Law “shall” be subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for a first violation, $2,000 for a second violation and $3,000 for a third and subsequent violations. The assessment of civil penalties is therefore mandatory in the case of noncompliance. What do employers need to do? As September approaches, employers in New York and employers outside of New York that offer hybrid and remote positions should evaluate whether, and to what extent, their job advertisements will be covered by New York’s amended pay transparency law, and begin preparing salary and wage ranges to include in covered job advertisements. It is also a good time for employers to consider whether their job advertisements may be subject to similar pay transparency laws in other states, including California, Colorado and Washington.
June 23, 2023
Should employers who maintain an ongoing practice of paying workers severance benefits implement a formal written ERISA plan to govern the award of severance?
Following the Federal Reserve’s interest rate increases and the resulting volatility in the stock markets, economists and government officials continue to debate whether the country will experience a hard or soft landing, or no landing at all. While some sectors of the economy remain strong, others have begun to see layoffs. In the face of this uncertainty, employers facing the prospect of downsizing would be wise to take steps now to minimize the financial risks from litigation by workers who suffer loss of employment. Employers planning reductions-in-force frequently seek to reduce their exposure to employment litigation by offering affected workers severance benefits in exchange for waivers of their employment litigation claims. While some businesses maintain formal policies governing their severance pay practices, others choose to provide discretionary severance benefits on a case-by-case basis. Employers in this latter group often are surprised to learn that offering workers severance pay on an ad hoc basis can itself lead to claims for additional severance benefits. Employees frequently have argued in litigation that an employer’s informal severance practice actually created a welfare benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (“ERISA”). In this article we discuss the legal standards courts apply in deciding whether an employer’s past practice of providing severance pay establishes an ERISA plan, and we offer practical suggestions for employers considering layoffs to mitigate the risk of unexpected liability for severance. Background Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to set the standard for most retirement and welfare benefit plans established by private employers. Id. at § 1002(3). By enacting ERISA Congress sought to protect the interests of participants and their beneficiaries in receiving promised benefits. For this reason, ERISA empowers a participant or beneficiary of an employee benefit plan to bring a civil action to recover benefits due. 29 U.S.C. § 1132. ERISA defines an employee welfare benefit plan as (1) any plan, fund, or program, (2) established or maintained (3) by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, (4) for one of the purposes enumerated, (5) for participants or their beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. §1002(1). Factors (2) through (5) generally can be satisfied with respect to an ongoing informal severance pay practice. Courts, however, have struggled in determining whether Congress intended the words “plan, fund or program” to include an ongoing, informal severance pay practice. In Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372-73 (11th Cir. 1982) the Eleventh Circuit held that an employer established an ERISA plan if a reasonable person would be able to ascertain (1) the intended benefits, (2) the intended beneficiaries, (3) the source of financing and (4) the procedures for receiving benefits. In the years immediately after Donovan, the Supreme Court decided two cases that clarified the situations where employers established ERISA plans by making certain types of payments to employees upon termination of employment. In Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 119, (1989) the Supreme Court acknowledged that states traditionally regulated payment of wages, and therefore held that the vacation pay practice in that case did not fall within the scope of ERISA. In Ft. Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12 (1987) the Supreme Court held that a severance payment made as a “one-time, lump-sum” did not create the need for an administrative operation and thus did not constitute an ERISA plan. Following Morash and Ft. Halifax, courts nevertheless have continued to cite to Donovan in analyzing whether an informal practice to offer severance pay constituted an ERISA plan. See, e.g., Grimo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 34 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying Donovan); Baldo v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 48 Fed. Appx. 10, *11 (2d Cir. Oct. 4, 2002) (same). Administrative Scheme Courts in the Second Circuit have moved away from a strict application of the Donovan factors, focusing more on the frequency and “past practice” of making severance payments and the existence of an ongoing administrative scheme. In Okun v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 793 F.3d 277, 279 (2d Cir. 2015) the Second Circuit identified the following considerations to help courts determine whether there is an ongoing administrative scheme: whether there is managerial discretion in the plan administration; whether a reasonable employee would perceive an ongoing commitment by the employer to provide benefits; and whether the employer was required to analyze the circumstances of each employee's termination separately. In Wimberly v. Automotivemastermind Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12344, 2021 WL 230299, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2021), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York applied these factors to find that an offer of a lump sum amount to one employee as severance pay did not establish an ERISA plan. Wimberly arose out of the discharge of an employee who billed expenses to other persons’ rooms while attending a sales conference for his employer Automotivemastermind Inc. (“aM”). When confronted about the hotel charges, the plaintiff refused to sign his warning and commenced a petition for pre-action discovery (“Petition”) to discover the identity of his accusers and clear his name. Shortly after plaintiff filed his Petition, aM terminated his employment. aM offered the employee six weeks of severance pay in exchange for dismissal of his Petition and his execution of a waiver and release of claims. The plaintiff refused, and instead claimed aM owed him severance under a “plan” which aM denied. The Wimberly plaintiff asserted that aM had a plan within the meaning of ERISA because two former aM employees allegedly received offers of severance upon termination of their employment. Unpersuaded the Wimberly court reasoned that this fact alone does not establish an ongoing administrative program because aM's offers of severance, to the plaintiff and the two other employees were based on a simple arithmetical calculation, obviating any need for managerial discretion or ongoing administrative efforts. Then relying on Ft. Halifax, the Wimberly court found that there was no ongoing commitment to provide benefits considering the one-time nature of the severance offer. Moreover, the complaint allegations supported that aM and its managers made an ad hoc determination that a severance payment in exchange for the release of all claims would facilitate a speedy dissolution of their relationship with the plaintiff and his pending Petition. Employment Agreements In contrast with Wimberly, other courts have held that arrangements affecting only one employee may establish an ERISA plan. For example, in Thomas v. Command Alkon Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89149, *9 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2023) the court found that an employment agreement providing severance if the employee resigned for good reason was an employee benefit plan with an administrative scheme subject to ERISA. In Thompson, the employee worked with Libra Systems, Inc. which was purchased by Command Alkon in November 2020. During the sale negotiations, Libra’s owners insisted that Command Alkon enter into an employment agreement with Thompson for a fixed period. Command Alkon agreed to that offer. The employment agreement also provided Thompson severance pay if her employment ended prior to the fixed period for good reason. Before the end of the fixed period, Thompson asserted that she had good reason to terminate her employment. Thompson sought severance pay, but the employment agreement provided for severance pay only if she executed a waiver and release of claims. Thompson did not execute a waiver and release, but still claimed entitlement to severance in the amount of $467,424.62. The Thompson court reasoned that there was an administrative scheme, because Thompson’s eligibility to collect severance pay was set forth in the employment agreement, which turned on whether she resigned with good reason, and Command Alkon exercised managerial discretion in categorizing the circumstances of the termination of the employment agreement. Although the employment agreement applied only to Thompson, the court cited various cases in sister circuits which support the proposition that contracts with one employee can constitute an ERISA plan, provided that an “administrative scheme” is established. Tips to Avoid Liability Employers should consider whether their past practices for paying severance inadvertently has crossed the legal threshold for the creation of an ERISA plan. If the past practice has established an ERISA plan, employers may have unwittingly subjected themselves to ERISA’s reporting and disclosure obligations which come with penalties for non-compliance. For example, ERISA requires that the plan be in writing, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1), that participants be given summary plan descriptions, Id., § 1024(b)(1); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.102-2, 25.20.102-3, that a claims procedure be established, 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b), that a plan administrator make certain documents available for examination by plan participants and beneficiaries, 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104(b)(1), and that the administrator file a Form 5500 with the U.S. Department of Labor. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-1. An employer's failure to file a Form 5500 may result in a civil penalty of up to $1,000 per day from the date of noncompliance. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). If a violation of ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements is deemed willful, the employer may be subject to criminal liability, including a fine of not more than $5,000 for an individual or $100,000 for non-individuals and up to one-year imprisonment. Id. at § 1132(c)(2); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1131. An employer with an ongoing practice of paying severance to terminated workers and which thereby risks subjecting itself to ERISA should consider implementing a written plan and otherwise complying with ERISA’s requirements. First and foremost, such an employer demonstrates its adherence to and respect for the law. Further, such an employer avoids the risk of incurring penalties and costly enforcement actions by the U.S. Department of Labor which enforces ERISA’s requirements. Similarly, by having a written plan an employer may improve its employee relations by awarding of benefits to workers who experience loss of employment. An employer with a written plan also may control the circumstances when severance will be paid through careful drafting. For example, employers can preclude an award of severance pay if the employer terminates employment upon a sale of the business or upon outsourcing a business unit, where the buyer or a contractor offers comparable employment to the worker following termination. An employer may preclude or reduce an award of severance where the employer provides its workers pay in lieu of notice under the WARN Act or similar state laws. An employer also can preclude the employees with individual employment agreements from “double dipping” so that they do not receive severance both under the plan and under their individual agreements. A plan may preclude severance pay for employees terminated “for cause” or who voluntarily resign. Finally, a plan may require as a condition to an award of severance that the employee first sign a release of all claims against the employer. Armed with a written plan, employers also benefit from ERISA’s preemption of state law. Thus, employers can avoid claims for liquidated damages under state wage payment statutes, or for punitive damages under the common law. ERISA also allows employers to draft clauses according them broad discretion in interpreting their plans, and courts have upheld such clauses absent interpretations deemed arbitrary and capricious. Reprinted with permission from the June 6, 2023 edition of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL © 2023 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com – 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com.
June 6, 2023
Labor Law
The General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), Jennifer Abruzzo, has recently issued two memorandums significantly changing how employers must draft separation agreements and opining on the enforceability of noncompetition agreements. Can she do that?
Abruzzo has been busy. Within the last few months, she has issued two notable memorandums that could have significant impacts on how employers must comply with the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). It is important to note that certain provisions of the NLRA apply to all employers, not only those that currently have unions or are facing union election petitions. What was the first memorandum? Abruzzo issued a memorandum on March 22, 2023 in response to the NLRB’s decision in McLaren Macomb, 372 NLRB No. 58 (N.L.R.B. February 21, 2023). (We analyzed that decision in detail in another Quirky Questions blog post, linked here; in sum, the NLRB held in McLaren that an employer offering a separation agreement with non-disparagement and confidentiality provisions was inherently coercive, and therefore was facially a violation of the NLRA.). One important thing to note: the logic and reasoning of McLaren likely apply equally to settlement agreements that resolve litigation brought by a former employee, in addition to separation or severance agreements entered at the time an employee’s employment ends. The General Counsel’s memorandum in response to McLaren went beyond explaining the ruling. Instead, Abruzzo took the position that the decision not only applied to future separation agreements, but also applied retroactively – meaning that, in her view, employers who tried to enforce non-disparagement and confidentiality provisions in agreements with previously departed employees faced the risk of an unfair labor practice (“ULP”) charge under the NLRA. The memorandum also asserted that employers may maintain non-defamation clauses in separation agreements, but those clauses must be “narrowly-tailored, justified,” and “limited to employee statements about the employer that meet the definition of defamation as being maliciously untrue, such that they are made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.” Finally, the memorandum outlined Abruzzo’s position that other provisions in separation agreements that might interfere with an employee’s Section 7 rights under the NLRA include non-compete clauses – a point on which she expanded earlier this week. What was the second memorandum? The second memorandum was issued on May 30, 2023, and expanded upon Abruzzo’s view that non-compete clauses violate the NLRA. In this memorandum, Abruzzo asserted that employers that require and enforce non-compete agreements with employees run afoul of the NLRA. Abruzzo believes that non-competition agreements chill an employee’s exercise of their Section 7 rights under the NLRA, because “employees know that they will have greater difficulty replacing their lost income if they are discharged for exercising their statutory rights to organize and act together to improve working conditions; employees’ bargaining power is undermined in the context of lockouts, strikes, and other labor disputes; and, an employer’s former employees are unlikely to reunite at a local competitor’s workplace, and, thus be unable to leverage their prior relationships—and the communication and solidarity engendered thereby—to encourage each other to exercise their rights to improve working conditions in their new workplace.” Abruzzo also argued in the memorandum that non-competition agreements discourage employees from exercising Section 7 rights because (1) any employees’ threats to resign in connection with demanding better working conditions will be seen as “futile” by the employer, since the employer knows the employee lacks access to other employment opportunities; (2) employees will refrain from actually resigning following a threat to do so in demanding for better working conditions; (3) employees are unable to seek or accept employment with competitors to obtain better working conditions; (4) employees are unable to solicit their co-workers to work for a competitor to obtain better working conditions; and (5) employees are unable to see employment with the goal of engaging in protected activity, such as union organizing, with other employees at their employer. While Abruzzo indicated there may be “special circumstances” in which a non-competition agreement is reasonable, such as protecting proprietary or trade secret information, or narrowly-tailored provisions “that clearly restrict only individuals’ managerial or ownership interests in a competing business, or true independent-contractor relationships,” she maintained that for the most part non-competition agreements are unenforceable. Abruzzo also categorically believes that an employer’s justification for a non-competition agreement will likely never be reasonable when the agreement is with “low-wage or middle-wage workers who lack access to trade secrets or other protectible interests, or in states where non-compete provisions are unenforceable,” and that “a desire to avoid competition from a former employee is not a legitimate business interest that could support a special circumstances defense.” Do Abruzzo’s memoranda carry the force of the law? No. In fact, the press release for the memorandum regarding McLaren includes a disclaimer stating that the McLaren memorandum represents Abruzzo’s views, not those of the NLRB. With that said, it is important to understand that Abruzzo’s memoranda are directives to NLRB prosecutors across the country, who now will be expected to view confidentiality provisions, non-disparagement provisions, and non-competition agreements as potential ULPs under the NLRA which, in turn, subject employers accused of the ULP to a range of sanctions that have been expanded by Abruzzo during her term in office. Finally, employers should also remember that non-competition agreements are under increasing scrutiny and greater legal restrictions across the country. In January 2023, the Federal Trade Commission proposed a rule banning almost all non-competes (on that proposed rule, our previous commentary is linked, here). The FTC received a substantial number of comments on that proposed rule. In addition, many states have passed recent legislation banning or limiting non-compete agreements, including a law that will take effect in the state of Minnesota on July 1, 2023.
June 2, 2023
California Questions
EEOC, Other Federal Agencies Set the Pace for Employers Using AI in the Workplace
It is safe to say that the use of artificial intelligence (AI) went mainstream in 2023. With the widening acceptance of AI, dozens of industries have raced to adopt the technology into various operations at a staggering pace – including adopting AI in human resources (HR) processes in the workplace. But, employers and HR departments should keep pace with federal agencies seeking to mitigate risks associated with AI in the workplace. AI in the Workplace AI in the workplace is moving at a fast clip. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), as many as 83% of employers, and as many as up to 99% among Fortune 500 companies, are using some form of AI to screen or rank candidates for hiring. The use of AI in the workplace is not new from an HR perspective. Employers have long been able to use AI to perform certain HR functions in the recruiting process, such as resume screening. But now, employers can use AI for other recruitment functions, such as administering personality and aptitude tests or analyzing video interviews. Once workers are on-boarded, employers can use AI to help with worker safety, protection, management, and productivity through real-time locating systems and other technologies. Federal Agencies’ Guidance With the introduction of AI comes great benefits, several federal agencies seek to cut in on potential consequences by issuing guidance, requesting information, and devising plans for AI in the workplace in the following ways: On January 26, 2022, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued a trade release announcing an update and expansion of a chapter in the OSHA Technical Manual on Industrial Robot Systems and Industrial Robot System Safety. The update notes that advances in AI boost the abilities and uses of robot systems in industrial applications. The revisions add current “technical information on the hazards associated with industrial and emergent robot applications, safety considerations for employers and workers, and risk assessments and risk reduction measures.” On May 12, 2022, the EEOC issued its guidance on AI “discuss[ing] how existing ADA requirements may apply to the use of [AI] in employment-related decision making and offers promising practices for employers to help with ADA compliance when using AI decision making tools.” The same day, on May 12, 2022, the Department of Justice reported issued guidance that “outlines issues that employers should consider to ensure that the use of software tools in employment does not disadvantage workers or applicants with disabilities in ways that violate the ADA.” On October 31, 2022, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) General Counsel issued a memorandum recommending that the NLRB “apply the Act to protect employees, to the greatest extent possible, from intrusive or abusive electronic monitoring and automated management practices that would have a tendency to” interfere with protected concerted activity. On January 10, 2023, the EEOC issued a draft strategic enforcement plan which announced that the agency would focus “on employment decisions, practices, or policies in which covered entities' use of technology contributes to discrimination based on a protected characteristic. These may include, for example, the use of software that incorporates algorithmic decision-making or machine learning, including artificial intelligence; use of automated recruitment, selection, or production and performance management tools; or other existing or emerging technological tools used in employment decisions.” On May 1, 2023, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) announced that it will be releasing a public request for information (RFI) “to learn more about the automated tools used by employers to surveil, monitor, evaluate, and manage workers.” The OSTP states that responses to the RFI “will be used to inform new policy responses, share relevant research, data, and findings with the public, and amplify best practices among employers, worker organizations, technology vendors, developers, and others in civil society.” On May 18, 2023, the EEOC issued its guidance explaining the application of Title VII to an employer’s use of automated systems, including AI, noting that the scope of the guidance “is limited to the assessment of whether an employer’s ‘selection procedures’—the procedures it uses to make employment decisions such as hiring, promotion, and firing—have a disproportionately large negative effect on a basis that is prohibited by Title VII.” Employers should expect to see more federal guidance on AI as technologies continue to develop. What Employers Can Do to Stay in the AI Race With federal agencies’ guidance in mind and an expectation of more regulation to come, employers should take proactive steps to ensure the use of AI in the workplace keeps pace with developing law. These steps include: Understanding that AI in the workplace is governed by several different laws, including privacy laws, data security laws, and anti-discrimination laws at the state and federal levels. Considering including references to the use of AI in the recruiting, hiring, and employment process in employment policies and notices. Partnering with HR, IT, and legal counsel to ensure that AI practices remain competitive while compliant with local and federal law. For additional information on employer considerations before using AI and automated decision-making systems in the workplace, check out a previous Quirky Questions article on the topic. The idea that AI can create numerous benefits in the workplace seems to be gaining traction. Federal guidance issued in 2022 and 2023 signal that regulation of AI in the workplace will strive to keep up with the strides made in technological advances. Employers and HR can stay ahead of the curve by keeping abreast of, and following, regulations applicable to their company.
May 18, 2023
At Will Employment
The NLRB Reverses Course (again) on Employee Outbursts and Protected Concerted Activity
What happens when an employee starts yelling at the boss, makes profane social media posts about work, or engages in other “abusive conduct?” In many cases, employers can follow their own policy and impose discipline if appropriate. But, where profanity and heated outbursts come up in the context of complaints about the terms and conditions of the employee’s job, the issue quickly becomes far more complicated. On May 1, 2023, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or the “Board”) released a decision addressing employee outbursts in Lion Elastomers, LLC, 372 NLRB No. 83. Overturning a 2020 decision which itself overturned several prior NLRB decisions on employee outbursts, the Board in Lion Elastomers, LLC reinstated a series of tests to determine when and how an employee’s workplace outbursts can be actionable. What employee rights were involved in the decision? Most employees have a right to engage in “concerted activity” under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). That means employees have the right to, among other things, discuss the terms and conditions of their employment with others, engage in union-related activity, and, where appropriate, go on strike. The rights afforded to employees under Section 7 are not, however, absolute. A long line of cases address when an employee may lose the protection of Section 7 by engaging in “abusive conduct,” such as vulgarity, name-calling, or other outbursts. For more information, see our prior posts on Concerted Activity in 140 Characters or Less, and a Profanity-Laden Rant Against a Supervisor (and others). How has the NLRB decides whether an employee outburst constitutes Section 7 concerted activity? Over time, the NRLB adopted a number of tests for determining when an employee steps outside of the protection of Section 7. The prior tests, based on the decisions in Atlantic Steel, Clear Pine Mouldings, and Pier Sixty, sometimes considered the totality of circumstances, the nature of the outbursts, whether the outburst was provoked, or whether the outburst was coerced. In 2020, however, the NLRB overruled these various tests and held that rather than examine the circumstances of the employee’s outbursts, the test should be the employer’s motive. In that case, General Motors, LLC, 369 NLRB No. 127, the NLRB held that test that should be used is whether the employer was motivated by an anti-union animus or whether it merely sought to enforce its anti-profanity policies. One presidential transition and two NLRB appointments later, the Board shifted course. The Board’s May 1, 2023 decision in Lion Elastomers, LLC overturned General Motors, LLC, in effect reinstating the Atlantic Steel, Clear Pine Mouldings, and Pier Sixty tests. The Board’s lengthy explanation for its turn of course rejects General Motors as a sharp departure from federal law, and incongruent with the policy underlying the NLRA. Specifically, the Board read heavily into language from the United States Supreme Court acknowledging labor disputes “are ordinarily heated affairs,” and that an employee’s Section 7 rights are not necessarily dependent on an employer’s anti-union bias. What is the NLRB’s current standard? So where does that leave employers today? The NLRB’s Lion Elastomers, LLC decision provides a short rule: “[C]onduct occurring during the course of protected activity must be evaluated as part of that activity—not as if it occurred separately from it and in the ordinary workplace context.” That means employers can’t strictly apply their profanity or obscenity policy as written if the conduct at issue touches on some conduct protected by the NLRA. To provide an easy example: an employee who curses at the boss during a union negotiation meeting is probably engaged in protected activity, and therefore protected by the NLRA. Employers must examine what kind of protected activity is at issue. For different situations—such as picketing, negotiations, or off-work social media usage—the NLRB has adopted different standards. If employee conduct on the picket line is at issue, employers should consider whether, under all the circumstances, non-strikers would have been coerced or intimidated by the picket line conduct under the Clear Pine Mouldings standard. If the issue involves outbursts towards management, the Atlantic Steel test requires employers to consider: (1) the place of the discussion, (2) the subject matter of the discussion, (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst, and (4) whether the outburst was provoked by the employer’s unfair labor practices. And, where the “abusive conduct” involves social media, employers need to consider “the totality of the circumstances” under Pier Sixty. What should employers do now? All this to say that employers should be cautious when dealing with potentially abusive conduct by an employee that could be part of NLRA protected activity. To be proactive, employers should take a few key steps: Implement a Clear, Written Policy. As always, employers should have a written policy governing offensive or vulgar language in the workplace. The policy should inform employees of the rules regarding the use of profanity in their interactions with customers, clients, or other members of the public, colleagues, and superiors, and the policy should make the consequences for violations clear. Enforce the Policy Consistently and Uniformly. Having a policy is great, but it’s just as important to implement the policy fairly. Failures to enforce anti-profanity policies in the past can tie an employer’s hands when faced with conduct that may be clothed in NLRA protection. Importantly, consistent enforcement includes ensuring managers and supervisors comply with the policy. Avoid Limiting Protected Activities: The enforcement of a policy against profanity in the workplace must be balanced against an employee’s right to engage in NLRA protected activity. For employers, that means carefully considering the context in which the objectionable conduct occurs: is there any angle of the conduct or language which touches on an employee’s Section 7 rights, or is the conduct unrelated and distinct from any concerted activity? NLRB rules generally go back-and-forth during different presidential administrations. For now, the Board’s decision in Lion Elastomers, LLC restores the pre-2020 status quo for employers with respect to abusive employee conduct. Once again, employers must ensure they balance their own interest in maintaining workplaces free of profanity or abusive conduct against the legitimate rights of an employee to engage in concerted (and sometimes heated) activity, which may involve profanity.
May 17, 2023
Back to the Past: In-Person Document Inspection for I-9 Forms Resumes
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is ending employers’ ability to remotely inspect I-9 documents on July 31, 2023. Employers will have an additional 30 days, until August 30, 2023, to ensure that all required physical inspection of identity and employment eligibility documents is completed. All U.S. employers must complete a form I-9 for every employee working in the U.S., regardless of the employee’s citizenship status. The employee must complete Section 1 of the I-9 on or before their first day of employment and provide documents to the employer proving U.S. employment authorization and identity within three days of starting employment. For an overview of the I-9 compliance process, please review our guide, previously posted on the Quirky Questions blog. Generally, this process must be completed in-person to permit the employer to “physically” inspect the documents, as required by the statute and regulations. During the COVID-19 pandemic, ICE recognized that providing these documents in person could be impossible, given that many states and workplaces shut down. In March 2020, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in cooperation with ICE, announced that employers could inspect the employee’s I-9 documents remotely if these employees were working remotely because of the pandemic. This waiver of the in-person inspection was temporary and always required that employers eventually review these documents in-person. In addition, the waiver was never available to ordinary field or remote employees who were not working remotely because of the pandemic. As noted in our earlier guidance, ICE announced additional extensions during which employers could inspect documents remotely. With the Biden Administration’s announcements to the end of the Public Health Emergency associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, ICE also announced that the remote inspection flexibility will end on July 31, 2023, and employers will have a 30-day grace period to review all previously remotely inspected documents. With the end of the remote inspection policy, employers must return to their I-9 physical document-inspection protocol as soon as possible to avoid any compliance issues on August 30th. It would be wise to re-educate onboarding personnel on inspecting I-9 documents in-person and completing the I-9 form to avoid common compliance issues, such as: Asking for too much information, such as whether the person is a U.S. citizen; Accepting documents that do not satisfy the employer’s obligation, such as accepting a USCIS receipt notice when the actual approved document is required; Not having the right combination of documents when the employee should present both an identification and a work-authorization document; Not correcting employee errors, such as checking an incorrect box; Failing to sign and date the form, or failing to follow up on missing or expired documents; and Receiving a letter from the Social Security Administration noting an error with the employee’s name and Social Security Number, and then failing to respond to the letter. Inaccurate I-9 forms can also become a liability for mergers and acquisitions. The consequences can be quite severe, delaying or shelving the transaction until the company brings all I-9 forms into compliance with the laws and thereby guarantee the absence of any liability due to noncompliance. Finally, because ICE can decide to audit a company’s I-9 forms at any time, it is extremely important that employers start taking extra precautions with inspecting documents and completing the forms properly now. We outlined best practices for auditing I-9 forms during a webinar earlier this year. Companies returning to in-person document inspection amid normal operations should take the time to understand the I-9 process and review supporting I-9 documents completed over the past couple of years for compliance. Companies in the midst of a merger or acquisition should inspect current I-9 files and ensure compliance going forward. Dorsey’s immigration team is ready to assist employers audit I-9 files before ICE. Embrace the end of all-things (well, most things) pandemic related and start the second half of 2023 by being ready to transition back to in-person reviews of employee I-9 documents.
May 11, 2023