.

To Arbitrate or Not to Arbitrate: That is the Question

September 28, 2023

by Kent J. Schmidt and Richard H. Silberberg

Download as a PDF

Share this page

Managing litigation risks includes thinking about the process and forum by which commercial disputes will be resolved. Yet, there is no consensus among business transactional and trial lawyers on whether arbitration provisions are advantageous in most commercial transactions. In this episode, Dorsey Partner Richard Silberberg and Dorsey Partner/Podcast Host Kent Schmidt tackle the topic of arbitration provisions and discuss how to approach the question of whether and how to agree to an arbitration.

Read the ABA Litigation Journal article mentioned in this episode of SharkCast: Debunking Misperceptions: The Upsides of Commercial Arbitration by Richard Silberberg and Neal Eiseman.

This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

Transcript

Voiceover
Welcome to another episode of the SharkCast on Litigation Risks Management, where we explore why businesses are so frequently sued and how to mitigate and navigate the dangers lurking in these risky waters.  Join us now as we welcome our host, Kent Schmidt, Litigation Partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.

 Schmidt
I’m pleased to be joined in this episode of SharkCast by my partner, Richard Silberberg. Rich is an exceptional trial lawyer, resident in our firm’s New York office, and so Rich, I’d like to welcome you to the SharkCast microphone. It’s a pleasure to have you here.

Silberberg
Thanks, Kent. It’s great to be here with you today.

Schmidt
Well, Rich, we’ve worked together now for well over 20 years and I’ve learned a lot from you over these two decades, including second-chairing cases with you out here in California as well as some work in New York and elsewhere around the country. And, in addition to your storied career as a litigator, I’ve always known you as an accomplished arbitrator, of course, you’ve never been an arbitrator for any of my cases. That, that would create a very significant conflict. But, I value the opportunity I’ve had many, many times to call you up about arbitrations that I have and to pick your brain about potential arbitrators in the selection process as well as the nuances of some very, very complicated arbitration questions that we grapple with from time to time. So, thank you for all of that and all of the contributions you’ve made to my work and I thought it would be great to have you as a guest to talk about arbitration in general.

Silberberg
Yes, I recall that we recently collaborated on an LLC derivative proceeding in arbitration that was pending before an American Arbitration Association three-arbitrator panel. What I remember most about that is that there were some particularly thorny procedural issues.

Schmidt
Well, that was not too long ago and we won’t get into some of those nuances today. Instead, what I’d like to focus our attention on today is the process of arbitration and perhaps a little more specifically, the decision that lawyers and those that are involved in negotiating agreements face on whether to arbitrate a particular decision and how to craft arbitration provisions in a commercial agreement, anticipating a dispute down the road. And that is something I know you’ve written about and talked about at length and you have some views on, so, we’ll get into that. But before we do, just for our audience, can you give me an estimate of how many arbitrations you have been involved in as a panelist, not including ones in which you’ve been a lawyer, an advocate for one side, but on the panelist side? How many arbitration do you think you’ve done over your career?

Silberberg
I would say that over the last 30 years or so, I have arbitrated approximately 350 cases and they are approximately split down the middle; 50% of them have been sole-arbitrator cases and about 50% have been as a member of the three-arbitrator panel.

Schmidt
And, so what, what percentage would you say, in relative recent years, is your practice comprised of arbitration as a panel, or, or I guess including that as a mediator?

Silberberg
I would say, in the last few years, it’s been approximately 30% of my practice.

Schmidt
Okay, well, that’s a significant amount of experience, so you speak with some authority when you talk about arbitration. I recently read an article that you co-authored with Neil Eisman entitled, “Debunking Misperceptions: The Upside of Commercial Arbitration.” I guess that gives away some of your bias, in favor of, of arbitration. You’re a fan of arbitration as a way to adjudicate and resolve commercial disputes. So we’re going to get into that. But, as a preview from that article, or from your own experience, can you summarize for us some of the common misconceptions and objections that you hear from clients or other practitioners about commercial arbitration?

Silberberg
I’d be happy to. Just a word at the beginning about what prompted the article that Neil and I wrote for the ABA Litigation Journal. Back in 2015, there was a series of front page articles in the New York Times that were very critical of arbitration. And, a lot of those of us who arbitrate cases on a regular basis were dismayed regarding a lot of the factual errors that were contained in those articles. And those articles were actually the forerunner to additional pieces that ran in the mainstream press about the secrecy of arbitration and about other disadvantages, at least perceived disadvantages, of arbitration. So, Neil and I thought that it was time to try to set the record straight with respect to some of the more obvious misperceptions about arbitration and we succeeded in having that article published. It still stands as one of the few pieces of any consequence that talk about the upsides of arbitration as opposed to the narrative that you sometimes see in the press. And I should make the point, Kent, that some of the most significant criticisms of arbitration are leveled not so much at commercial arbitration, which is what I do, but at consumer arbitration and employment arbitration. The reason for that is that in recent years, there have been some procedural mechanisms that parties have injected into arbitration agreements, in the consumer and in the employment context, which make it very difficult for consumers and employees to arbitrate cases jointly. These arise from what we call class action or class arbitration waivers. That problem doesn’t exist in commercial arbitration, where you are essentially looking at a dispute between two businesses. So, commercial arbitration is sometimes referred to as business to business or B2B arbitration. And there a lot of the types of criticisms that appeared in the New York Times and elsewhere really don’t apply. Similarly in employment and consumer arbitrations one of the criticisms is that the arbitration takes place behind closed doors in secret. Well, that’s not as much of a concern for commercial parties, because commercial parties are not really interested in having third parties become knowledgeable about their private transactions.

Schmidt
I was just going to interject. It’s not only not a concern, it’s one of the main attractions that that commercial parties tend to, in my experience, tend to like about arbitration is keeping things off of the PACER docket.

Silberberg
Well, that’s exactly right, Kent. And if we were creating a plus and minus chart for advantages and disadvantages of commercial arbitration for commercial parties, preserving confidentiality would be on the plus side of that chart.

Schmidt
Right. Well, I’ve had also the experience of, assuming that you’re going to be able to get things filed under seal even in state court, and that the courts are going to sign off on that, but in recent years, I’ve experienced courts being very stingy with their sealing orders and essentially saying that look, the public has a right to know you’re using taxpayer dollars to litigate a claim in either state or federal court. And, other than the secret sauce, highly proprietary type of information, all of this is gonna come in and it causes a lot of heartburn among the business unit.

Silberberg
That’s exactly right. As a matter of fact, I once arbitrated a case involving a presidential campaign. And in my award, I specified that to the extent that the matter had to be referred to a court for any purpose, it ought to be filed under seal, and when the matter arrived in court, the clerk of the court did seal the document. But when it appeared before the judge later that day, the judge began the hearing by saying, I don’t believe that things should be secret. I’m lifting the sealing of this document.

Schmidt
Remarkable. So the judges are Richard who?

Silberberg
Essentially yes.

Schmidt
Richard Silberberg’s gonna tell me that I gotta seal this.

Silberberg
Essentially, Kent, I think that you might have had a source within the courtroom because that’s by and large what was said.

Schmidt
Yeah, well, judges don’t like to be told what to do by lawyers or outside arbitrators, I guess is the take away there.

Silberberg
Exactly. You do not wear the robes.

Schmidt
That’s right. Well, you’ve summarized some of the objections to arbitration in this article, and I commended it to our listeners to take a look at. But let me throw out another hesitation that sometimes I hear and I, and I’ve actually raised this in discussing with clients, whether or not to arbitrate, and that is that there’s a perception that the arbitration process is easier because it can be a little more casual in terms of the pleading requirements and access to getting to the resources, to getting the case off the ground, and you don’t have to, you know, dot the I’s and cross the T’s on filings and all the forms that are required to get a case filed and off the ground in state or federal court. And so by making the process easier for a party, particularly a party that’s maybe predisposed to be a little more litigious and assert claims, are you paving the way for claims to be filed by making, by agreeing that it would be subject to arbitration?

Silberberg
I don’t think so and I’ll tell you why. Perhaps this will be a common theme of our conversation going forward here. If you craft your arbitration clause properly, you can protect against a lot of the perceived disadvantages of arbitration, and this is one of them. So you can, in dealing with what you are concerned may be a litigious counterparty, insert a clause in your arbitration provision stating that the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees. So if you are of the belief that your counterparty may be prone to bringing meritless claims, seems to me that the risk of perhaps having to pay the other side’s attorneys’ fees acts as an effective deterrent against filing claims that don’t have merit.

Schmidt
Are there other provisions that can be inserted into an arbitration clause to address the particularly litigious counterparty, if you are going to agree with arbitration?

Silberberg
Yes. Let’s say you are concerned about a counterparty that is going to act during the arbitration in a way that’s going to expand your legal costs. So you can deal with that by being specific in terms of what discovery is allowed and what discovery will not be allowed. For example, you could state in your arbitration clause that discovery shall be limited to document production. You could say in your arbitration clause that there shall be no depositions. And make no mistake about it, arbitrators are bound by that. If the arbitrator thinks that, well, I think depositions might have been helpful in this case. If the parties have stipulated in their arbitration agreement that there shall be no depositions, the arbitrator doesn’t have any discretion to vary from that agreement. The arbitrator’s authority stems solely from the arbitration agreement itself. So, those are some of the things that you could do to deal with a particularly litigious party. Another thing you could do is put a time limit on the duration of the arbitration. You could say that the period between the filing of the case and the final hearing shall be no more than X months for example.

Schmidt
Mm-hmm.

Silberberg
So, there are a number of things that you could do to try to protect against what a particularly litigious counterparty might do to expand your costs.

Schmidt
Those are, those are helpful. One of the other topics that you addressed in the article has to do with cost of arbitration, is it really more cost effective? I think your answer you just gave about shortening the process is helpful, but what about these arbitration fees that could be very, very significant. I had an arbitration recently, I think you’re aware of this, in which one of the panel members and the three-arbitrator panel was at an hourly rate of I think $1400. Thankfully it wasn’t the arbitrator that we chose in the three-arbitrator panel, so we weren’t on the hook for that but accomplished, well-respected arbitrators could have a very significant hourly rate and if you move to a three-arbitrator panel, you are paying essentially one and a half of those arbitrators’ time. And AAA I think has recently instituted a policy, where at least the default requirement is that you estimate how long the arbitration hearing is going to be. It might be nine months or a year from now, and the parties post their amount with AAA and it can be a very, very significant amount. You can end up having to post an amount of six figures or more, depending on the arbitration costs. So how can those costs be addressed in order to respond to that concern?

Silberberg
Several ways. Number one, you mentioned in your example, Kent, that if you are paying the compensation of three arbitrators, and you have to pay it in advance, it could create a cash flow crunch for the client, for the party. And, what I would suggest, is that parties revisit the notion that they actually need three arbitrators. There have been some studies done that have shown that the cost of having three arbitrators is not three times the cost of one arbitrator. It’s five times the cost of one arbitrator. Because it’s not just the time that those arbitrators are devoting to shared activities like appearing at a hearing, speaking on the phone about a discovery issue, or what have you, it’s also the time that it takes to arrange conferences, differentials in the amount of time that is spent by arbitrators and preparing. Some arbitrators prepare more fulsomely than others. So I would argue that one good arbitrator is just as good, if not better, than a panel of three arbitrators. So that’s one way to cut your cost. A second way to cut your cost is to indicate in your arbitration agreement that you want certain limitations placed upon the arbitral process. It may be that there are certain issues that you don’t want arbitrated, that should be outside the scope of the clause. It may be that you, as we discussed before, limit the amount of discovery. It won’t surprise you, I’m sure, to learn that arbitrators’ biggest contribution of time during the course of the proceeding is sometimes dealing with discovery disputes, just like magistrate judges and to the extent that you can cut back on that, it’s going to result in lower cost. The other thing I would say though, is that with regard to deposits, you can often work out a staggered payment plan with the arbitral provider, whether it’s the AAA or otherwise, to have those payments track the stages of the case. So it’s not necessarily true that the payment for the hearing needs to be made at the beginning of the case. So I would encourage parties to pursue those discussions as well.

Schmidt
One of the points that you just mentioned that really resonates with me as a litigator, is a more streamlined process for resolving discovery disputes. You know, here in California the State Court motion to compel requirements are so onerous, I think they’re intentionally so to discourage those motions. They have all of these separate statements required and declarations and so forth, when the process that’s typical of the arbitration equivalent of a motion to compel is a letter brief. It gets right to the point without all of the bells and whistles that the State Court rules require and you know, magistrate judges that you’re matters in federal court can be just as efficient sometimes if they are creative, but not all of them are. But that’s something I see a lot, that the letter brief is so much easier for all parties and therefore reduces the litigators billable time on those cases.

Silberberg
Agreed, and my personal practice is that when I issue a comprehensive case management plan at the beginning of the case, I say with respect to discovery that you should meet, confer in good faith and only then seek my intervention. But if you need to do that, you should send me a letter. In which each side presents its side of the issue. Now I will tell you that there are cases when I don’t even require that.

Schmidt
Mm-hmm.

Silberberg
There are cases that are very complicated, involve huge amounts of money, and that these letters, if I were to permit them would go on for 25-30 pages. So what I do is, I, in those situations, I ask the parties to send me an e-mail in which they, with a broad brush, tell me what the issues are and then we get on the phone, or the video, and we may talk for an hour and a half or two hours, but at the end of that two-hour investment, every issue has been resolved, sometimes through compromise, sometimes by ruling. But you cannot compare the cost of a 2-hour Zoom session with the kind of multi-layered submissions that are required in court on a standard motion to compel.

Schmidt
Very good, and I’ve experienced that first hand as well with a very good and creative arbitrator. And I, by the way, I want to interject here that I don’t want our listeners to think that because I’m the one raising all of these issues and objections to arbitration that I am predisposed against arbitration. I’m a believer in efficient and well thought out arbitration processes, but I do like playing devil’s advocate with you, Rich, and so let me come at you with one more objection. So you and I practice together a long time and we, your practice, like mine, is more often on the defense side than the plaintiff’s side just by the nature of our work and our firm, and I know that, like me, when you get a new case in the door, one of the first things you think about on the defense side is can I take a run at a motion to dismiss, and if not a motion to dismiss, can I take a run of defensive motion for summary judgment. That’s a big part of our practice, this dispose of claims early at the pleading stage. In my experience it’s very difficult to get an arbitrator to throw a case out early in the process. I’ve been most recently on the happy side of that of being a claimant and avoiding a motion to dismiss by a three-arbitrator panel. But it’s just sort of the reality in my experience that if you’re on the defense side, you pretty much have to plan on going to an evidentiary hearing rather than getting the case tossed. If that’s the mindset of a party anticipating they’d be on the defense side rather than affirmative claim side, is that a basis to not agree to an arbitration provision?

Silberberg
Again, I would say no and for the following reasons. Number one, I think it’s important to distinguish between a pre-answer motion to dismiss in arbitration and a motion for summary determination which would be equivalent to a motion for summary judgment in court. Let’s talk about the pre-answer motion first. I would agree that most arbitrators are reluctant to grant a pre-answer motion to dismiss because those types of motions attack pleadings, and there are no required pleading elements in arbitration. You can start an arbitration literally with a one-page form, in which you fill out certain specific information about the names of the parties, the names of the adversaries and their counsel, and e-mail it or upload it to a website. But if you do have something on the face of the pleading, such as it is, such as a date of the transaction which is outside the statute of limitations, then I think an arbitrator will entertain that as part of a pre-answer motion, and if the case is stale I think the arbitrator will throw it out. Now let me move to the other type of dispositive motion, which would be the equivalent of the motion for summary judgement. I will concede that years ago there was a fair amount of antagonism toward the notion of granting summary judgment motions and arbitration. There was a general feeling that everybody is entitled to his or her quote day in court, even though it’s not a courtroom, and that everybody should get a hearing. That is no longer true. All of the arbitral providers’ rules now recognize that dispositive motions can be entertained in arbitration. Just as an illustration, the AAA applicable rule is Rule 34, and that rule states that if a prospective movement establishes to the arbitrators satisfaction that the motion has legs, that it’s likely to prevail and that it will narrow or completely eliminate the issues to be tried, then the arbitrator is likely to entertain that motion, and if it’s supported amply, grant that motion. There was a time when I rarely saw dispositive motions and arbitration. I will tell you that I cannot remember the last time that I did not see a dispositive motion in arbitration. I get them in every case. So, I think there’s been a sea change with regard to that issue, but let me add one other point and I think that that is relevant to a lot of what we’re discussing. If you have a concern about whether an arbitrator is going to be willing to even look at a dispositive motion, there is a way to flesh that out, and I think most parties and most litigants are not aware of this. And that is if you are searching for an arbitrator, if both sides are charged with the obligation to select one, let’s just say for this example, you can interview that arbitrator together and you can ask questions that are not devoted to the merits of the case but are devoted to the arbitrators practices. For example, you could ask an arbitrator could you tell me whether you have any predilection against ruling on dispositive motions. And if the arbitrator is being candid, he or she will say I don’t like them, or if it’s a good motion I see no reason to require the parties to go to hearing. And I think that issue about interviewing arbitrators carries over to a lot of other concerns that people may have. This is the one overriding advantage of arbitration and that is you get to select your decision maker. You can’t do that in court.

Schmidt
I’ve never had the opportunity to call up a Federal District Court judge and try to interview them on what they’re gonna be like on the case going forward, even if I had the power to choose another judge. In contrast, that’s a great point about the, an advantage of arbitration and the selection process, which is a very, very important process in arbitrating any case. Well, let me throw out one other objection to arbitration that relates to this dispositive motion, and I do this with some trepidation because I don’t want any of you or your brother and sister arbitrators out there to take offense or think this is coming from me necessarily, but I’ve heard this objection that ties with the dispositive motion objection and that is follow the money. So you imagine an arbitrator next fall is looking at a six-week arbitration and he or she has started thinking about what the fees are gonna be and they’re thinking about their budget and what the summer home they want to be building and so forth or whatever their financial plans are. And in the meantime they get an arbitration motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss to throw the whole case out. And think about that in contrast to a judge who’s doesn’t necessarily have a financial incentive, but if there’s any incentive the judge has on a dispositive motion, it’s to avoid having to overcrowd a docket, get one more case cleared from his or her docket. Is there any basis in your view as to this concern that financial incentives for arbitrators will result in fewer opportunities to throw cases out on the defensive side rather than having the proceeding go to a protracted hearing that could be very financially advantageous for the arbitrator?

Silberberg
So let me make two points in responding to that question, which I think is a fair one. Number one, there are good arbitrators and there are not so good arbitrators, and it’s certainly possible that an arbitrator might approach a dispositive motion that way and feel that the motion will short circuit the case in a way that will result in less fees. I think that to the extent that that exists, it’s in a very, very small percentage of cases. And I think the more important point to be made here is that the arbitration community is a very small one, and those of us who serve as arbitrators are often asked about whether we have recommendations for arbitrators to serve in cases that we are unavailable for, litigants who have experience before certain arbitrators, or certainly consulted by their partners and associates about experiences that they’ve had with particular arbitrators, and word gets around when an arbitrator is perceived as putting their personal interests over the needs of the case. And those arbitrators tend not to get reappointed. They tend to go way down the list when arbitrators are selected. So I think it’s a natural selection process, and to the extent that it has occurred, I think it’s shameful, but it doesn’t happen very often.

Schmidt
I think that’s a good answer. Obviously, we can’t speak to every single arbitrator out there, but if you go through the process carefully in this selection process of arbitrators, you can avoid those types of issues, and that’s a very important process. We discussed a number of issues and objections that have been raised on arbitration. I think a common refrain that I hear in your answers is the importance of crafting an arbitration provision with a knowledge and understanding of how to address some of these concerns and mitigate some of these risks. I hear that as a frequent refrain. What are some creative arbitration provisions that you’ve seen a transactional lawyers, perhaps with input from their litigator friends, add into commercial agreements that end up being very smart and helpful, perhaps some that we haven’t mentioned already?

Silberberg
So, Kent, I’m gonna answer that from the back end moving forward, and that is you referenced transactional lawyers speaking with litigators or in particular litigators who have served as arbitrators in crafting an arbitration clause. I wish that happened more frequently. I believe it happens in a small minority of cases. There have been situations in which I’ve been consulted by my corporate colleagues and we discussed the client’s needs and concerns, and we craft a very specific arbitration clause to meet those needs. However, I believe that more frequently, and this conclusion is based upon what I see in arbitration provisions every time I open a new agreement in a new case, is I see an arbitration provision that looks like its placement was the result of a transactional lawyer saying to an associate 15 minutes before the agreement is completed, go get me an arbitration clause.

Schmidt
Or maybe saying to ChatGPT in our [UNINTELLIGIBLE].

Silberberg
Correct, correct, exactly. And the arbitration clause that the associate or ChatGPT comes back with is perfectly fine. It’s what we call the standard plain vanilla clause. It’s got about five lines to it. But the problem with it is that when the dispute arises, it’s actually inadequate to deal with the particular concerns that the client has. So the time to start thinking about the type of arbitration issues that we’ve been talking about is when you’re drafting the clause. And some of the things that you should give attention to in drafting it are things like the confidentiality of the proceeding. It might surprise your listeners to know that arbitration is not by definition confidential. It is private, meaning that it takes place outside the public eye, but it is not by definition confidential unless the parties agree that it should be. So for example, if one party wanted to go out on the street corner and get on a soapbox and hold an impromptu press conference about what’s going on in the arbitration, that party can do that without fear of retribution or reprisal or penalty. So I think one thing that commercial users in particular should be sensitive to is the idea of preserving confidentiality through the agreement, particularly if there are trade secrets involved or IP or transactional policies and procedures that that company would like to maintain out of the public eye. Another is what we touched on earlier, the number of arbitrators. If you don’t say anything about the number of arbitrators, then the governing rules will apply, and if those happen to be, for example, the American Arbitration Association rules, those rules prescribe when you get one arbitrator and when you get three. If you want to change that up and countermand it, you need to provide specifically for the number in your clause. Same thing with the venue of the arbitration.

Schmidt
A lot of cost tied to those issues as we’ve already addressed, if you’re concerned about cost, that’s a line item to focus on.

Silberberg
Exactly right. The venue with the arbitration is another. If you don’t agree, then there’s gonna be a dispute later on about what the proper place is. Is the proper place where the parties have their principal place of business? Well, suppose they have their principal place of business in two different places. Suppose the transaction that gives rise to it occurred in a third place. So you’re gonna have a dispute that costs money. The mode of hearing, we haven’t talked about this specifically, but you know since COVID a lot of hearings have been held either completely remotely or virtually and others have been conducted in a hybrid fashion, that is partly in person and partly by video conference. If you wanna preserve the opportunity to do one or the other, say so in the agreement. That gives the arbitrator a guidepost and it takes one other thing off the table for the arbitrator to decide. We talked about the specific limits on discovery that you could put in a clause. I won’t belabor that. Same thing with the exclusions of certain issues that you might wanna carve out for a court determination or a prevailing party attorneys’ fees provision. There are others, but these are illustrations of the things that one should consider in drafting a clause.

Schmidt
Well, and you also think about the dynamics of a relationship and usually when parties are getting ready to do a deal together, the seas are calm, the champagne is clinking, hey, we’re about ready to sign this very significant commercial deal, and that’s the time to start thinking about these things rather than when the parties are adverse to one another and getting ready to head into arbitration and then in that instance, you know, the posture is well, if you want this, then I definitely don’t want that. And the acrimonious nature of the core underlying dispute then spills over into everything from venue to mode of hearing, and it becomes difficult to reach an agreement. Is that your experience as well?

Silberberg
That’s precisely right.

Schmidt
It strikes me that transactional lawyers and litigators need to be collaborating on these issues more and more. A big part of your practice, does it involve getting involved in the transactional side of things and advising on arbitration provisions?

Silberberg
It is not uncommon for excellent litigators in excellent firms not to be terribly experienced with arbitration, and arbitration is a very different animal than litigation. And what I find myself doing with some frequency is consulting with my litigation partners with regard to procedural issues, as well as substantive issues that arise in the arbitration context.

Schmidt
I wanna return to this theme of using the arbitration and pre-arbitration process as a way to slow parties down who are heading toward pulling the trigger on costly adversarial proceedings. In some instances, I’ve seen arbitration provisions that do not specify the administrator JAMS or AAA or the forum to, by which the arbitration is gonna be heard, and instead leave that open, hoping that perhaps in the process of discussing and meeting and conferring on the proper arbitrator and even the venue, there will be discussions that lead to a resolution. What do you think about those provisions that leave that open rather than designating JAMS or AAA or some other forum for the arbitration administration?

Silberberg
I’m not a big fan, and I’ll tell you why. Number one, if those kinds of issues, namely the identity of the agency that’s going to administer the arbitration are left open and the parties have to go to court in order to have clarity with regard to the selection of such a provider, generally speaking, the courts don’t like to be handed that kind of a dispute. There are a lot of reasons for that. Sometimes judges don’t wanna be in a position of being perceived as showing favoritism toward one arbitral provider over the other. Sometimes a judge will say, you know, what do I know about the differences between one provider and another? You guys work it out. You selected arbitration, you decide. So I’m not sure that that’s a very efficient way of holding things at bay, and if that is the object, I am a much bigger fan of what is sometimes referred to as a step arbitration clause, or stated better a step dispute resolution clause.

Schmidt
Alright. What’s that? What, what’s that provision?

Silberberg
A step dispute resolution clause would start with a provision that indicates that within a certain number of days of the dispute being raised between the parties, that senior level executives of the two businesses will exercise good faith to try to reach a resolution by themselves. And the second step that the provision would address is in the event that the negotiation is unsuccessful, that the parties will go to non-binding mediation, and then and only if the mediation is unsuccessful will the parties go to arbitration. So if the goal is to have some kind of a cooling-off period right after the dispute arises, I think that’s a much more efficient way of approaching the issue. And let me add that it’s a particularly good approach if there is a possibility that the relationship between the parties is going to continue beyond the resolution of the dispute. So, for example, if a dispute arises in the midst of a supplier/dealer relationship and the parties simply can’t resolve it, they are much better off with a step dispute resolution clause which holds out hope that a mediated or negotiated settlement can be reached then if they were to just go straight to arbitration, because once you go to arbitration, as you know, people’s positions tend to become more rigid and the ability to continue to deal with each other, subsequent to the issuance of an award, that one party will see as a win and that the other party will see as a loss is compromised.

Schmidt
Yeah, I can see that. I’ve experienced that, those type of dynamics in dealing with clients, and I do like these ideas of ways, the metaphor that comes to mind is that it’s like throwing a log on a train that’s heading down track to try to slow things down so that you have to stop and pause and get the log off before you head to litigation, and many times that, as you say, cooling-off period can result in the case being resolved and save both sides a great deal of money and time and attention, that better use to advance their business. Well, we…

Silberberg
Kent, let me, let me, if I may, your comment made me think of another tool that arbitrators use who create that same opening for resolving a case before an award that will perpetuate ill feeling. And that is that arbitrators will often implement something called the mediation window in the case management plan. So at the beginning of the case that case management plan is issued. It’s akin to a Rule 16 scheduling order in federal court, and sometime in that plan, and it can come at different times, but in mine it comes sometime after document production, there is a gap, and that gap is intended to enable the parties to think about whether they should seek a mediated resolution of the case. And it’s not a requirement that they mediate ‘cause an arbitrator cannot direct parties to mediate, but it’s a time period that is not populated with other deadlines and is intended as a cooling-off period in which parties can assess the strengths and weaknesses of their case based upon the documents that have been produced and allow the parties to at least approach each other if it seems appropriate to do that.

Schmidt
This seems like a very helpful tool to encourage resolution, or at least the exploration of a potential resolution. That’s about all the time we have to talk shop, Rich. But we’re now to the point in the episode that we like to call the Deeper Dive, and in the time that remains, we’d like to learn a little bit more about you as a person. One question that I’m fond of asking colleagues from time to time is if you weren’t a lawyer, what career path do you think you would have chosen. And the answers are often journalism, a lot of people had studied journalism before they went to law school. A number of people that thought about perhaps pursuing an MBA or becoming a CPA, those other type of professions that I would say are adjacent to the legal profession. But I think based on my prior knowledge, your answer is a little different than the typical profession that is similar to the practice of law. So, Rich Silberberg, if you weren’t a lawyer today, what profession do you think you would have chosen?

Silberberg
Well, I can tell you that I did have that discussion with myself a very long time ago prior to the time that I applied to law school, and the choice that was facing me at that time was whether I should try to pursue a career as a professional tennis player. Believe it or not, when I was a junior player, that is when I was 16, 17, 18 years old I was pretty good, good enough to travel around the country and to Canada to play competitive tennis.

Schmidt
So this is in college years?

Silberberg
I did.

Schmidt
Okay.

Silberberg
I played in college, and I also taught at private tennis academies during the summers between my college years. And that was all a product of the fact that when I was growing up as a kid, I found myself on the tennis court, you know, seven or eight hours a day.

Schmidt
So where did you grow up? I know you’re in New York now. Did you grow up in [UNINTELLIGIBLE]?

Silberberg
I grew up on, I grew up on Long Island…

Schmidt
Okay.

Silberberg
…and my parents were a member of a tennis club and basically I was there from 8:00 in the morning till 8:00 at night every day during the summer, and you can’t help but, you know, develop some skills if you put in that much time. So bear in mind this was at a time when the US Open was played on grass and tennis rackets were made of wood. But be that as it may, I did consider pursuing that, and I’m glad in the end that I did not, because the names that you see in televised tennis matches, and even one level below that visibility if you follow tennis, they are less than 1% of the players that are trying to make ends meet as tennis players. The overwhelming preponderance of tennis players who are devoting their lives to that as a profession, are those that are living week to week, tournament to tournament, trying to cover their expenses, to travel from one place to another.

Schmidt
That’s a grind.

Silberberg
So like anything else, it’s a grind. But I did face that decision at one point.

Schmidt
And has tennis been a part of your recreational life since then? Do you still play or have you played, you know, over your career as a lawyer?

Silberberg
Hardly at all, interestingly enough. I’ve taken up golf in more recent years because a client, actually the CEO of a major client, once told me in response to my telling him that I was a tennis player, he frowned at me and he said tennis is not good for developing business because you are competing with the person on the other side, and if that person is a prospective client, you can’t win. So he steered me in the direction of golf, which he said is very collaborative.

Schmidt
Well, you know, I hate to disagree with a very senior client, or senior person in management at a client, but golf has not been good for my client development career, and it’s for one reason. I’m constantly, whenever, whenever, I used to take clients golfing a fair amount, and whenever I’m on the golf course with the client I had this recurring thought in my mind. I hope that the client doesn’t think that my golf game is some sort of proxy or indication of how effective I am as a litigator and as a lawyer and a trusted advisor. Because if that’s the case, then I will have one less client by the time I finish this round of golf. So you know, I think there’s a natural tendency to think this is a winner or this is a loser, and so when I’m with clients golfing I have that pressure I put upon myself. It’s not the client, it’s me, but apparently your golf game, or perhaps your thought process doesn’t inhibit you from enjoying golf with clients.

Silberberg
Well, I have to say I share the same concern that you have, Ken, and I do feel pressure every time I get on a golf course with a client to at least make a credible showing.

Schmidt
And I’m sure you do. Well, our time is up for today, but turning back to the question of arbitration. To arbitrate or not to arbitrate, that is the question. What is the one take away, Rich, that you’d like to leave with our listeners today on the topic of arbitration?

Silberberg
I believe that arbitration is a viable alternative to litigation, and should be considered by parties when they are deciding upon an appropriate dispute resolution process for an individual situation. There are a lot of common misperceptions about commercial arbitration. I believe that some of them are simply non-meritorious. But some have some validity, and those can be addressed by the disputants in a well-crafted arbitration clause, rather than simply selecting a plain vanilla clause off the shelf that may not be suitable for the particular context of the dispute.

Schmidt
Rich, that’s a great word for us. We’ll leave it there. Thank you so much for being a guest on SharkCast. I’ve enjoyed our conversation and really appreciate you taking the time.

Silberberg
It’s been great to be with you, Ken. Thanks very much.

Schmidt
That’s all the time we have for today. Thank you for listening. I’m indebted to the extraordinary team at Dorsey for making this podcast and episode possible. For many more resources on this and other litigation related topics, please go to the website litigationrisks.com, where more information can be found, including a book on managing litigation risk written by yours truly. Until next time, my friends, this is yet another reminder that there are a lot of sharks swimming out there in the murky waters, so swim safely.

Voiceover
This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone.  Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things.  The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only, and not those of Dorsey & Whitney.  This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

Firm Highlights

News

Real Estate Attorney Alexis Olsen Joins Dorsey in Phoenix

Attorney Alexis Olsen has joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP as Of Counsel in the Real Estate group in Phoenix, the law firm announced today. Alexis focuses her practice on large-scale residential, mixed-use, and multi-asset development projects as well as multi-state commercial leasing transactions. She guides clients through sophisticated acquisitions, dispositions, leasing, entity structuring, investment strategies, and due diligence matters. She has structured co-investment arrangements that drive capital deployment into housing subdivisions nationwide and has represented both landlords and tenants in commercial leasing transactions involving office, retail, industrial, and specialty-use properties, including cannabis dispensaries. Alexis received her J.D. from Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law and her B.A. from the University of Arizona. Alexis comes to Dorsey from Squire Patton Boggs. “Alexis strengthens Dorsey’s real estate capabilities at a time when Phoenix remains one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic real estate markets in the country,” said Scott Jenkins, Dorsey’s Phoenix office head. “Her addition further enhances our deep bench of 12 real estate attorneys in Phoenix and reflects our continued investment in serving clients throughout Arizona and supporting their real estate transactions and objectives across the country. We are thrilled to welcome Alexis to Dorsey.” “Joining a firm with such a deep bench of experienced attorneys in the Phoenix office, especially in the Real Estate group, presents an exciting opportunity not just for my own professional growth, but for the clients we service,” said Alexis Olsen. “I look forward to building on this strong foundation, growing our national practice, and delivering top-tier service to our clients.”

News

37 Dorsey Attorneys Named 2026 Top Lawyers by Minnesota Monthly

Minnesota Monthly has recognized 37 Dorsey attorneys across 27 practice areas as 2026 Top Lawyers in Minnesota. Honorees are selected through a peer nomination process and a curated survey of practicing attorneys in Minnesota, who identify leading lawyers across a range of practice areas. Administrative / Regulatory Law Jennifer Coates Antitrust Law Michael Lindsay Banking & Financial Service Law Peter Nelson Copyright Law  Jeffrey Cadwell Corporate Law  Robert Hensley Robert Rosenbaum Criminal Defense: White-Collar  Beth Forsythe Edward Magarian RJ Zayed Health Care Law  Claire Topp Immigration Law  J. Mike Sevilla Insurance Law  Daniel Brown Intellectual Property and Patent Law  Stuart Hemphill International Trade Law  Jonathan Van Horn Labor and Employment Law  Edward Magarian Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Land Use & Zoning  Jay Lindgren Marcus Mollison Litigation – Antitrust  Michael Lindsay F. Matthew Ralph Jaime Stilson Litigation – Commercial  Michael Lindsay Litigation – Construction  Eric Ruzicka Litigation – Intellectual Property  Peter Lancaster RJ Zayed Litigation – Labor Employment Benefits  Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Litigation – Trusts and Estates  William J. Berens Theresa Bevilacqua Bridget Logstrom Koci Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions  James K. Langdon Mergers & Acquisitions Law  Keith Ahlgren Rachel Benedict Brian Burke Morgan Helme John Jorgenson Brian Moore Robert Rosenbaum Jonathan Van Horn Bri Whiting Municipal Law Jay Lindgren Nonprofit/Charities Law Claire Topp Securities / Capital Markets Law Cam Hoang Robert Rosenbaum Securities Regulation Theresa Bevilacqua James K. Langdon Tax Law William J. Berens Trusts and Estates Jennifer Ede Bridget Logstrom Koci Sonny Miller Kiley Petty Henry

News

Patent Partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic Join Dorsey in Palo Alto

Patent partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic have joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Palo Alto, the international law firm announced today. Al Araiza works with clients to develop and implement patent strategies that align with corporate objectives, supporting growth initiatives, financing efforts, and successful exits, including initial public offerings and acquisitions. He advises on building, managing, and optimizing patent portfolios across a broad range of emerging and frontier technologies, with depth in wireless communications, artificial intelligence, and energy innovation. Before practicing law, Al gained engineering experience in the defense industry, working on energy system modeling and communications circuitry design. He also conducted biomedical research, with findings published in peer-reviewed journals. He has been recognized in the IAM Patent 1000 for his work advising clients on patent strategy and portfolio development. Al received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law, his M.E. in Biomedical Engineering from Tulane University, and his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from UCLA. Lena Petrovic works across the software and hardware industries to develop clear, well-supported patent applications. She guides clients through the prosecution process and advises on global trademark and copyright matters, including licensing and portfolio management. Lena regularly supports clients developing technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, fintech, cryptography, interactive and immersive experiences, and digital media, and works with companies in entertainment, gaming, and sports. Before practicing law, Lena spent a decade at Pixar, where she contributed to major films including The Incredibles, Ratatouille, WALL‑E, and Brave. Lena received her J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law, her M.S. in Computer Science from Princeton University, and her B.S. from California Institute of Technology. “Al and Lena bring a practical, technical, and business-focused approach informed by extensive experience working with technology companies, startups, and investors,” said Gina Cornelio, Patent Practice Group Co-Leader. “We are thrilled to welcome them to the Patent team and our growing Palo Alto office.” “Dorsey’s Patent practice is dedicated to understanding each client's business deeply, tailoring patent strategies that directly advance their goals,” said Al Araiza. “We are proud to join this outstanding team and look forward to driving success for our clients.”

Insights

The Long-Awaited Public Infrastructure Financing Solution for Development in Arizona

Every developer who has taken raw Arizona ground to a finished project knows the largest upfront cost other than the land price is almost always the cost to install the public infrastructure. Water, sewer, stormwater, streets, dry utilities, and the fiber backbone all have to be in the ground before a single lot closes or a building opens. That capital is deployed early and generates no return for years. For decades the standard workaround has been the Community Facilities District (CFD). That tool has grown materially harder to use, for reasons cited below, and House Bill 2999, signed in June 2026 and now codified as Chapter 40 of Title 48, is Arizona's response. Some Background I have spent a good part of my career on the other side of this problem. In the 1990s and early 2000s I served as general counsel of SunCor Development Company, one of Arizona's most active master-planned community developers, where we used Community Facilities Districts to finance hundreds of millions of dollars of major infrastructure across Arizona in cities such as Goodyear, Phoenix, Tempe, Litchfield Park, and Prescott Valley. For its time the CFD was an effective structure, and a great deal of what is now on the ground in those communities was financed with this tool. Unfortunately, CFDs have over time become considerably harder to use. Successive legislative amendments have layered on tax-rate ceilings, homebuyer disclosure obligations, and added procedural steps. Another drag on the use of CFDs is that formation of them runs through the municipality, where approval can turn as much on local politics as on the merits of a project. Developers now routinely are asked to absorb delay and uncertainty that a project's economics cannot support, which is a large part of why Arizona has fallen behind Colorado, Texas, and Utah in getting infrastructure financed. A better tool was needed, and Chapter 40 is it. How a SAID Improves on a CFD A State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID) keeps what worked about the CFD: tax-exempt, property-secured, non-recourse infrastructure financing — while shedding much of what made the CFD cumbersome. Its principal advantages over a traditional CFD: Administrative formation. A SAID is formed by the Arizona Finance Authority against fixed statutory criteria, through a yes-or-no compliance review on a sixty-day clock, rather than through the discretionary approval of a city council or a board of supervisors. Insulation from municipal politics. Because formation is a state-level compliance determination, a meritorious project is far less exposed to local political headwinds than it is under the CFD process. Landowner control of the board. A SAID is governed by a board of the landowners — appointed at formation, then elected on an acreage basis. In a typical municipal CFD, the city council sits as the district board; here, the developer controls governance. Advance funding of impact fees. A SAID can use bond proceeds to advance-pay municipal development impact fees, unlike CFDs, removing one of the largest upfront cash burdens in a project. A uniform, statewide process. The criteria are the same regardless of jurisdiction, replacing the municipality-by-municipality variation that has made CFD outcomes hard to predict. Flexible boundaries. A district may include noncontiguous parcels in the same county within five miles of one another, which fits phased and multi-tract development. Capped cost and a fixed timeline. Authority fees to form a district are capped at $15,000, and a complete petition must be acted on within sixty days. The full range of bonds. A SAID may issue general obligation, special assessment, revenue, and refunding bonds, secured solely by district property and creating no obligation for any other taxpayer. What is a SAID A SAID is a special taxing district that the owners of a development form to finance public infrastructure with tax-exempt bonds: general obligation bonds, special assessment bonds, and revenue bonds. The bonds are secured only by the property inside the district and are repaid over the long term, with terms up to 30 years. They do not affect the credit of the city, the county, or the State, and they create no obligation for any taxpayer outside the district. In practical terms, a SAID lets you finance horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of writing the check at the front end. The maximum ad valorem rate securing general obligation bonds is capped by statute at $5.00 per $100 of net assessed limited property valuation, with a limited step-up to cover a debt-service shortfall. SAIDs Work for Commercial as Well as Residential Development The SAID bill drew most of its press as a housing-affordability measure, and it appears to be a strong one. It is the first Arizona district statute to let bond proceeds advance-fund municipal development impact fees, which pulls one of the largest upfront cash burdens off a homebuilder's pro forma. But the statute's eligible infrastructure categories apply with equal force to commercial, industrial, and mixed-use projects. An industrial or logistics project can finance roads, rail crossings, sidings, and grade separations. A life-sciences or technology campus can finance its water, sewer, roads, and broadband the same way a subdivision can. Read Chapter 40 as a general-purpose infrastructure finance platform, not a subdivision-only device. How Formation Works A SAID is formed administratively by the Arizona Finance Authority. The Authority reviews the petition for compliance with the statute; it is a yes-or-no review against fixed criteria, not a discretionary negotiation with a city council or a board of supervisors, and it runs on a sixty-day clock once a complete petition is filed. Formation requires the written consent of 100% of the landowners in the proposed district and an engineer's certification that public infrastructure costs will exceed $5 million. The district may include noncontiguous parcels so long as they lie in the same county and within five miles of the district's other property, which accommodates phased and multi-tract development; if any part of the district sits inside a municipality, the whole district must stay within that municipality's limits or planning area. The Authority's fees to form a district are capped at $15,000. Issuing bonds requires a district election. Governance Simplified A SAID is run by a three-member board. The initial directors are named in the petition; after that, directors are elected by the landowners on an acreage basis as ownership diversifies. Board service runs with ownership; a director must either hold fee title inside the district or be an individual designated by a fee-title owner; and corporations, partnerships, and other entities may hold that ownership, vote as owners, and designate the individual who serves. A district has no power of eminent domain and no zoning authority, and directors may not be officials or employees of the municipality in which the district sits. What a SAID Does Not Do It finances; it does not entitle. Zoning, platting, rezonings, use permits, and the specialized approvals a manufacturing or life-sciences facility may need all remain with the local jurisdiction and proceed on their own track. The financing and entitlement timelines should be coordinated with formation of the SAID, but they are separate processes. Two substantive limits are worth flagging at the planning stage. First, electric power is largely outside the tool: the statutory definition of public infrastructure does not reach power generation or transmission, and broader energy infrastructure was removed from the bill during the Senate amendments. A power-intensive user should not assume a SAID will carry its electrical load. Second, where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the district cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility upon completion. Our Take For most master-planned residential work, and for a wide range of commercial and industrial development, a SAID will be the most efficient infrastructure-financing structure Arizona has offered. The right time to evaluate it is early in the acquisition and pre-development process, while the capital stack, the development agreement, and the entitlement strategy are still being set. Once the district's boundaries, general plan, and financing parameters are set, it is cumbersome at best to bring those into conformance later. Our Dorsey team has begun advising our developer clients on SAID formation on residential, commercial, and industrial projects statewide. If you would like us to assess whether a SAID fits a project you are working on, please reach out.

Insights

Litigation Privilege Does Not Automatically Protect Communications with Funders: The Commercial Court Clarifies the Limits of Privilege in the Context of Litigation Funding

In Uber London Ltd & Ors v Garry White & Ors; Mishcon de Reya LLP [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that documents created to help a funder decide whether to invest in a claim will not ordinarily attract litigation privilege. This means that information a firm gathers while acting for a funder can later fall within the control of the claimants it goes on to represent in the same matter. Background The Claimants (a claim group of over 10,000 individual London black cab drivers and the assignee of two former minicab operators) alleged that the Defendants (three companies in the Uber group) obtained and retained their private hire operator's licence through an unlawful means conspiracy alleged to involve fraud. Because the claims were issued outside the ordinary six-year limitation period, the Claimants relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, contending they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud before June 2018. A preliminary issue trial was listed to determine the question of whether the Claimants discovered, or could have discovered with reasonable diligence, the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment only after June 2018. The Claimants were represented by Mishcon de Reya ("MdR"). However, before MdR’s engagement with the individual drivers had begun, in late 2017 it was engaged by the litigation funder Harbour to investigate the merits and value of the potential claim. During that stage, MdR corresponded extensively with Harbour and with the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association ("LTDA"), a black cab drivers' trade association. MdR was not formally engaged by the Claimants until October 2018 onwards. Once the proceedings had started, the Defendants sought disclosure of communications exchanged between MdR and Harbour before the engagement of MdR by the Claimants (the "Harbour Communications"). This included correspondence between MdR and Harbour, communications with the LTDA, and documents held on MdR's file opened in Harbour's name in connection with the potential claim. The Claimants resisted disclosure on four grounds: (i) that the documents were not relevant; (ii) on the grounds of litigation privilege; (iii) that the documents were outside their control; and (iv) that disclosure occurring so close to trial would be disproportionate. Judgment (i) Were the Harbour Communications relevant to the preliminary issue? The Court held that the Harbour Communications were likely to contain relevant material, on two bases. First, where the Claimants or the LTDA had communicated directly with MdR, that material could shed light on individual Claimants' actual knowledge of the alleged facts. Secondly, what MdR and Harbour had discovered during their investigation could inform the question of what a Claimant could reasonably have discovered at the time (even though the Defendants accepted that MdR's knowledge could not simply be imputed to the Claimants). (ii) Were the Harbour Communications protected by litigation privilege? As set out in the classic cases of Three Rivers (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 and WH Holding Ltd v E20 Stadium LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2652, communications between parties or their solicitors and third parties for the purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation are privileged when the following conditions are satisfied: Litigation must be in progress or in reasonable contemplation. The communications must have been made for the sole or dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The litigation must be adversarial, not investigative or inquisitorial. The Court rejected the Claimant’s claim to be able to withhold the Harbour Communications on the basis of litigation privilege. The Court confirmed that litigation privilege protects only communications created for the dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The Court found that Harbour had instructed MdR so that Harbour could decide whether to fund the proceedings. As such, the dominant purpose of the communications was in relation to funding, not the conduct of litigation. This was distinguished from the situation where an individual litigant who takes its own funding decision. In that situation, the decision whether to fund and the decision whether to litigate are one and the same, made by the person who will actually be the claimant, and so it forms a part of that person's conduct of their own litigation. In contrast, a third-party funder's commercial decision whether to fund someone else's claim is not necessarily part of conducting that litigation. The fact that litigation privilege can, in principle, be claimed by a non-party funder (as recognised in the case of Al Sadeq v Dechert [2024] EWCA 28) did not assist Harbour, since there was no evidence it intended to play any role in the litigation itself beyond funding it. Communications between Harbour and MdR did remain capable of attracting another kind of privilege: legal advice privilege, because of the solicitor-client relationship between Harbour and MdR. But communications with third parties such as the LTDA were not automatically protected in the same way. (iii) Were the Harbour Communications within the Claimants' control? The Court also rejected the argument that the Harbour Communications sat outside the Claimants' control because they belonged to Harbour and not the Claimants. The Court’s reasoning was that once the individual Claimant drivers became MdR's clients, MdR also owed them a duty to disclose material information. That included information that MdR had originally acquired while acting for Harbour. As held in the case of Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood (a firm) [2005] 1 WLR 567, a solicitor owing duties to two clients cannot simply prefer one over the other, and it was unrealistic to suppose MdR would investigate the same claims for Harbour, then represent the Claimants, while disregarding everything it had already learned. The obvious commercial expectation was that this earlier work would be used to advance the Claimants' case. MdR sought to rely on a confidentiality clause in a 2024 retainer agreement between it and RGL Management Ltd (a claims management company acting on behalf of the Claimants) to argue that it was relieved of any duty to disclose information obtained while acting for other clients. The provision stated that MdR may "have acted for persons in the same or similar sector as yours and by agreeing to the terms of this letter you agree that will have no duty to disclose to you any confidential information that we have obtained, or might in the future obtain, from acting for such persons or which is derived from any other source". The Court rejected this on several grounds. Claimants who had already become MdR's clients had an existing right to information in the Harbour Communications where it was relevant to their claims before the 2024 retainer agreement. If they were to surrender that right, it would have required their informed consent (also required under the SRA Code of Conduct). The Court found no evidence that such informed consent had been given. The terms had simply been made available to the Claimants through a portal, with no indication that Claimants understood they were giving up existing rights to relevant information. The Court found that even if the terms had been contractually binding, that would not have amounted to informed consent. In addition, the wording of the clause was not sufficiently clear to show that the Claimants had agreed to waive access to this information. (iv) Was disclosure reasonable, proportionate, and necessary at this stage? The Claimants argued that it was neither reasonable nor proportionate for disclosure to be given at such a late stage (approximately two weeks before the start of the preliminary issue trial) and that it was not necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings. The Court rejected this, but it drew a distinction between two categories of documents within the Harbour Communications: Documents bearing on the actual knowledge of the individual drivers, including communications with the LTDA, were not privileged, likely straightforward to review, and directly relevant to the preliminary issue. Their disclosure was ordered as reasonable, proportionate, and necessary. Documents reflecting only MdR's or Harbour's own assessment of the merits were of more marginal, indirect relevance and largely likely to fall under legal advice privilege. A review to isolate the smaller pool of non-privileged material in this category would be time-consuming for limited benefit, so this was excluded from the order. Key Points to Note The judgment is an important reminder of several practical points: However closely a funder is involved in evaluating a claim's merits, litigation privilege will only apply to communications where the sole or dominant purpose of the communication is the conduct of litigation, not the funder's own decision on whether to finance it. Unless that communication separately attracts legal advice privilege, it may need to be disclosed. The same considerations apply to other communications. For example, in RBS Rights Litigation [2017] 1 WLR 3539 the argument that an After the Event (ATE) policy was subject to litigation privilege was rejected on a similar basis. Whilst in this case, there was no dispute as to whether litigation was in contemplation, it is important to note that litigation privilege will not automatically apply to the investigative stages of a claim, i.e. before litigation is in contemplation. Even where litigation is reasonably contemplated, the dominant purpose test must still be satisfied. Material created primarily for fact-finding, risk assessment, or other investigative purposes will not attract litigation privilege unless those activities are actually undertaken for the dominant purpose of conducting the litigation. (See The Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2017] EWHC 1017 (QB)). When engaging a law firm, clients should ensure that they understand whether the firm has previously obtained information about their claim while acting for another party (for example, a funder or another interested party) and how that information will be handled. Any restrictions on the firm’s ability to share relevant information with the client should be explained clearly at the outset, including what information may be withheld and why. If this decision raises questions about your own funding arrangements, disclosure strategy, or privilege position, please get in touch with our Commercial Litigation team.

Insights

State Affordability Infrastructure Districts (SAIDs) — A Financing Tool for Taiwanese Investment in Arizona Science and Technology Parks

If you have developed a facility inside one of Taiwan's science or technology parks, you are accustomed to the one-stop-shop of government planning the park and delivering the roads, water, power, and other infrastructure before your building is even constructed. In the United States, including Arizona, land development generally does not work that way. In Arizona, the cost of infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, power, and the digital backbone, typically falls on the private landowner and is incurred up front before operations generate revenue to offset that cost. For a company entering the Arizona market, this is often the largest and earliest capital burden of the entire project. Arizona recently created a tool that provides a more cost-effective way for landowners and developer to finance some of that infrastructure. House Bill 2999, signed into law June 2026 and codified at Chapter 40 of Title 48 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, establishes the creation of a State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID). How a SAID Works Landowners are now able to use a SAID to finance public infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, parking, lighting, communications, rail sidings and signalization, and similar improvements, through tax-exempt bonds. The bonds are repaid over up to 30 years and secured solely by the property within the SAID. No city, county, or state credit is pledged, and no obligation falls on other taxpayers, and therefore no city, county, or state approval other than from the Arizona Finance Authority (AFA). In effect, a SAID lets you spread the cost of horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of funding it entirely at the outset. And tax-exempt bonds often offer a lower interest rate than taxable or other types of financing. How a SAID is Formed A SAID is formed upon the filing of a petition with the AFA. The petition must include the finance plan, general plan, estimated costs, maximum tax rate, appraisal, bond counsel certificate, consultant list, petitioner experience, legal description, title report, and other materials. While the landowner is required to provide notice to the local governing jurisdiction, local governing jurisdiction does not have the right to approve or deny. The petition is reviewed administratively by the AFA through a standards-based process. For an inbound investor without long-standing local relationships, an objective, criteria-driven process is a meaningful advantage to the overt political process associated with other financing districts in Arizona. Formation requirements. A SAID requires consent from 100% of landowners within the proposed district; public infrastructure costs must exceed $5 million (easily met at any real scale); the district property must all be in the same county and need not be contiguous provided that noncontiguous property is located within five miles of the district's other property; and the board is initially appointed by the forming owners of the SAID district, later transitioning to election as ownership diversifies. Actual bond issuance requires an election of the SAID property owners. Ownership and corporate structure. Consent rights and board seats run with title. If you hold the Arizona land through a U.S. blocker beneath your Taiwan parent, the standard model for Taiwanese/Arizona real estate and operating investment, the U.S. property-holding entity, rather than it’s corporate parent, is the landowner of record for the district. Before formation, our Dorsey team will confirm that you have the proper corporate structure and board mechanics to be compliant.  Board composition has no citizenship or residency requirement. This is a common concern for foreign investors, and the statute answers it cleanly. Under A.R.S. § 48-7004, a director must either hold fee title to real property in the district or be an individual designated or appointed by a fee-title owner. Corporations, partnerships, and other business entities are expressly permitted to be those owners, to vote as owners, and to designate an individual to serve. There is no requirement that a director be a U.S. citizen or resident. So your U.S. property-holding entity, as landowner of record, can appoint whichever of your principals you choose, including a Taiwan-based individual, as the three-member board.  Power infrastructure limitation. The enacted definition of "public infrastructure" in A.R.S. § 48-7001 does not include electrical power generation or transmission. The reference to electrical facilities appears only as components of lighting and traffic-control systems, and the Legislature removed broader energy infrastructure from the definition during the Senate amendments. A SAID will likely not finance the high-load power infrastructure required for semiconductor fabrication, data storage, or heavy manufacturing.  Water infrastructure within a current utility CC&N. Where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the SAID cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility on completion. Entitlements and zoning: The determination of entitlements, zoning, and other land use permitting, as well as construction permitting for a technology or manufacturing facilities remain with the local jurisdiction and run on a separate track. Our Dorsey team will help you coordinate the financing and entitlement timelines together. Our Dorsey team works regularly with Taiwanese and other Asia-Pacific companies entering the Arizona market. If a SAID fits your project, we can structure it for your cross-border ownership.

Insights

Alaska HB 126: What Changes for Alaska Native Corporations, Proxy Filings, and Annual Reports

Alaska House Bill 126 (HB 126), sponsored by Representative Neal Foster and passed by the 34th Alaska Legislature, is now law. The bill changes which Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) must file proxy and annual report materials with the State of Alaska, and makes it easier to reinstate certain dissolved Village Corporations. For many smaller Village Corporations, the practical result is less public disclosure. For shareholders, advisors, and the public, it means some financial information that used to be available through the State will no longer be readily obtained. This eUpdate explains what HB 126 does in plain terms, walks through the practical trade-offs, and answers common questions. 1. What HB 126 Changes The old rule Under prior law (Alaska Statutes Sec. 45.55.139), an Alaska Native Corporation had to file its annual report, proxies, and proxy statements with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities (the Division) if it had more than $1 million in assets and 500 or more shareholders on its current rolls. A filing ANC was also required to follow the Division’s proxy rules (3 AAC 08.305 through .365), which require specific disclosures such as top 5 executive compensation, and related-party transactions. Because these filings are treated as public records, they gave non-shareholders, including the public and the press, visibility into ANC financial information that is not filed with the SEC. The new rule HB 126 changes how the 500-shareholder test is measured. Now, the asset test is removed, and the shareholder count is based on how many shareholders the corporation originally enrolled when it was formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), not how many it has today. As shares have passed down through families over the decades, some Village Corporations that started with fewer than 500 shareholders now have more than 500 recordholders. Under the old current-count test, when those corporations had crossed the threshold, they had to file. Under the new original-enrollment test, they do not. Who is affected Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders are the main beneficiaries. They no longer have to file proxy and annual report materials with the Division or follow the Division’s proxy regulations at 3 AAC 08.305 through .365. Two groups must continue to file as before: all twelve ANCSA Regional Corporations, each of which enrolled more than 500 shareholders at creation, and all Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders. As reported by the Alaska Beacon, when the bill was under consideration, the Division identified 59 corporations then filing, expected at least seven village corporations to become exempt, and was reviewing roughly 30 more. 2. Practical Analysis HB 126 reduces a real compliance burden for smaller Village Corporations, which now need not spend time and money on State filings. In coming years, the exempt Village Corporations may experience benefits associated with less public disclosure and less regulation. But at the same time, less public disclosure carries trade-offs. Benchmarking will become harder Publicly-filed proxy statements and annual reports have long served as a reference set. Shareholders, corporations, advisors, and counsel use them to compare governance practices, compensation, and financial results across similarly-situated ANCs. Since fewer of these materials will be filed publicly, there will be fewer comparable documents available, which will make benchmarking and market-checking more difficult for like-sized ANCs over time. Executive compensation transparency may be reduced The Division’s proxy rules require disclosure of the compensation of ANC’s top five most highly compensated individuals (3 AAC 08.345(b)(2)), related-party transactions above $20,000 (3 AAC 08.345(b)(3)), and audited financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis (3 AAC 08.365). When a corporation is no longer required to file these disclosures publicly, it becomes harder for shareholders and others to obtain the information, to understand how compensation is set for their corporate leadership, and how it compares across corporations of similar size and complexity. Transparency may matter more as ANCs grow Some ANCs have grown into large, complex enterprises with substantial revenue and many subsidiaries, even with fewer than 500 shareholders. For an ANC with a broad and dispersed shareholder base, public materials can be an important way for shareholders and other stakeholders to understand governance, compensation, and performance across ANCs. Reduced disclosure may carry more practical weight in those settings than for a small corporation whose shareholders are closely connected to the business. The ANCSA annual report obligation continues It is important not to overstate what HB 126 does. HB 126 changes the state filing proxy requirements. It does not remove the separate obligation under ANCSA itself. That obligation comes from ANCSA at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c), which requires a Native Corporation that would otherwise be subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prepare and transmit to its shareholders an annual report containing substantially the information a company subject to that Act would include. Similarly, ANCs that solicit proxies for an annual meeting are still required to furnish shareholders with those proxy materials under general Alaska corporate law. However, ANCs are now no longer required to transmit proxy statements to the State. ANCs’ reporting obligations to their shareholders are unaffected by HB 126. Any corporation newly exempt from state filing still owes its shareholders a detailed annual report and a proxy statement, even though that report is no longer routed through the State and made public. Reinstatement of dissolved Village Corporations Separately, HB 126 amends AS 10.06.960(k) to remove the prior deadline (previously December 31, 2020) for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. A dissolved Village Corporation may now apply to be reinstated under AS 10.06.633(e) at any time. Reinstatement still runs through the commissioner under AS 10.06.633(e). In general, that means the ANC must apply, cure the neglect or delinquency that led to dissolution, and pay the amounts owed, and the corporation’s name must be available or be changed to one that is. Once reinstated, the corporation and its shareholders are restored to the rights, privileges, liabilities, and obligations they would have had as if the dissolution had never occurred, and corporate and shareholder actions taken during the dissolution are treated as valid. If the previously-used corporate name is no longer available, the board alone may amend the articles to adopt a new name (without the necessity for shareholder approval). 3. Frequently Asked Questions What does HB 126 do? It changes how Alaska measures the 500-shareholder test that decides which ANCs must file proxy and annual report materials with the state. It removes the asset test, and it counts shareholders based on original enrollment rather than the current rolls. It also removes the deadline for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. Which ANCs are affected? Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders, because they may no longer need to file with the Division. Regional Corporations and Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders must continue to file as before. Does HB 126 eliminate all reporting obligations? No. It changes the state filing requirement under AS 45.55.139, but it does not remove the separate ANCSA obligation (43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c)) to provide shareholders with an annual report, and general corporate law still calls for a proxy statement when the ANC solicits proxies. Corporations that remain subject to state filing requirements must also continue to comply with the Division's rules. We think we are now exempt. What should our ANC board and management consider? Confirm your ANC’s original enrollment number and whether your corporation falls below the new threshold. Watch for communications from the State on this topic as they proceed with their research. If your ANC is now exempt, decide how your corporation will meet its continuing ANCSA obligation to shareholders, review proxy and annual meeting materials and timelines, and consider what to communicate to shareholders about any change in how they will receive information. It is worth documenting the basis for any exemption. What should ANC shareholders watch for? Shareholders should watch for how and when they will continue to receive annual report and proxy statement information directly from their ANC, since some material that used to be available through the State’s online website will no longer be publicly filed. If something is unclear, shareholders can ask their ANC how it intends to meet its ANCSA reporting obligations. How Dorsey Can Help HB 126 lightens the State filing load for smaller Village Corporations, but it also raises practical questions: confirming who is exempt, meeting continuing ANCSA obligations to shareholders, keeping proxy and annual meeting processes on track, and maintaining benchmarking when public materials become less available. These are exactly the kinds of judgment calls that benefit from early planning. Dorsey’s attorneys work closely with Alaska Native Corporations and related stakeholders. If you have questions about HB 126, ANC governance, proxy filings, annual reports, disclosure obligations, or shareholder communications, please contact your Dorsey attorney, including the authors of this eUpdate.

News

Dorsey Partner Melissa Raphan Elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers

International law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP is pleased to announce that Partner Melissa Raphan has been elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers (CLEL) as part of its 2026 class. “Melissa’s election to this prestigious fellowship comes as no surprise to those of us who have had the privilege of working with her,” says Peter Nelson, Dorsey’s Managing Partner.  “She is an exceptional employment lawyer, a trusted advisor, and a leader whose impact extends far beyond her matters. Clients rely on her deep knowledge, strategic counsel, and ability to navigate complex workplace disputes and sensitive employment matters with both confidence and compassion. She has helped shape our firm, strengthen our profession, and opened doors for countless others through her commitment to mentorship and diversity. We are incredibly proud of her accomplishments and delighted to see her receive this recognition.” CLEL is a nonprofit professional association that honors the nation’s leading attorneys in the field of labor and employment law. Originally established to recognize excellence in the profession, CLEL has evolved into a respected intellectual and practical resource for the legal community and its many audiences. Its mission centers on recognizing individuals who have made significant contributions to the field, fostering the exchange of knowledge and delivering value to academia, government, the judiciary, and the broader public. Election as a fellow represents the highest level of peer acknowledgment, reflecting sustained achievement, integrity, and a commitment to advancing the profession. Melissa’s career reflects CLEL’s mission. She has been recognized both regionally and nationally for her advocacy, leadership, and achievements both inside and outside of the courtroom. Her employment litigation experience spans class actions, collective actions, and high-stakes individual disputes in state and federal courts, as well as arbitration forums including the American Arbitration Association and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). She is also a trusted advisor on a full range of workplace issues, from hiring and performance management to sensitive terminations and organizational change. She brings decades of experience representing clients across the financial services, healthcare, food and agriculture, and energy sectors. Melissa will be formally inducted during CLEL’s installation ceremony held in conjunction with the American Bar Association’s Labor & Employment Law Conference in Washington, D.C., on November 7.

Insights

Proposed CMS Rule Ramps Up Potential Medicare Fraud Administrative Remedies

On July 6, 2026, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a rule that would expand its administrative remedies to combat potential fraud. The proposed rule is the latest in a round of administrative actions that signal CMS’s intent to aggressively pursue allegations of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and heighten the risk of fraud enforcement against even well-intentioned Medicare and Medicaid providers and suppliers. The proposed rule includes several changes to regulations that govern Medicare billing privileges. Providers and suppliers should be aware that these changes dramatically expand the flexibility afforded to CMS in enrollment and revocation actions, potentially leading to harsh consequences for ministerial and administrative errors. If finalized, moreover, the proposed rule could have material implications for providers and suppliers facing threatened revocation, including heightened risk of overpayment liability and increased hurdles to challenging revocations and denials of enrollment. Added Flexibility to Existing Revocation Grounds CMS has proposed to remove a number of factors that the regulations list as relevant to a determination of whether a provider has engaged in “abuse of billing privileges.” While acknowledging that the inclusion of these factors in the regulations was permissive (requiring consideration only where “as appropriate or applicable”), CMS stated that it must be afforded “the maximum flexibility to address all possible . . . scenarios without the rigid constraints of our existing factors.” CMS provided little guidance as to the outer bounds of what conduct could constitute an “abuse of privileges” that merits revocation of Medicare billing privileges. Instead, CMS noted that a “pattern of practice” of abuse of billing privileges might be established “by a simple finding that several of a provider’s claims do not meet Medicare requirements.” Similarly, CMS has proposed to expand the regulatory provision that permits revocation of enrollment if a provider certifies as “true” false or misleading information in Medicare enrollment application or renewal forms to include any scenario in which a provider submits “false or misleading information on or associated with any CMS Medicare enrollment-related form,” including materials submitted to Medicare contractors. CMS stated that it interprets this expanded rule to include anything related to Medicare enrollment, and not only those submissions that are “intended to gain or maintain Medicare enrollment.” If finalized, the proposed rule would add significant flexibility to CMS’s ability to pursue revocation of a provider’s enrollment. While CMS has assured providers that it would “invoke [the revised regulations]. . . only when legitimately warranted under the facts and circumstances and not as a matter of course,” such expanded flexibility threatens unpredictability in the event of even administrative or ministerial errors in submissions and claims. These changes would, moreover, make it more difficult for providers to challenge a revocation action. Expanded Revocation Grounds In addition to adding flexibility to existing grounds for revocation, CMS’s proposed rule adds to and expands CMS’s already broad authority to revoke provider and supplier enrollment. Such proposed changes include adding the following grounds for revocation: Denial of Enrollment Application. Where CMS could previously revoke a provider’s other enrollments if one enrollment is revoked, CMS would also be able to revoke a provider’s existing enrollments if an application for enrollment submitted by the provider is denied. High-Risk Enrollments. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if it determines the provider or supplier (including owning/managing employees or organizations) poses a high risk of fraud, waste, or abuse due to “. . . an affiliation under [42 C.F.R.] § 424.519” or “the provider’s or supplier’s location within a limited geographic area that has an excessive number of providers and suppliers.” Certain Misdemeanor Convictions. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if a provider or supplier—or its owners, managing employees, managing organizations, officers, or directors—are convicted of a “misdemeanor related to sexual assault or financial misconduct within the past 10 years that CMS deems detrimental to the best interests of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries.” Ownership Changes (HHA, Hospice, DMEPOS). CMS would have broad authority to revoke enrollment of home health agencies, hospices, and DMEPOS suppliers who do not comply with the regulations governing provider changes of ownership. These proposed, expanded grounds for revocation are notably broad, and CMS provides only limited guidance as to what conduct might result in revocation under these grounds. As with the proposed expansion of existing grounds for revocation, the open-ended nature of these proposed grounds for revocation may make it more difficult for providers and suppliers to challenge revocation actions. Expanded Grounds to Deny Medicare Enrollment As with revocations, CMS proposes to expand the grounds under which a provider’s application to enroll in Medicare can be denied. These expanded and additional grounds include many of the grounds added for revocations, but also include: Medicare Debt or Payment Suspension. CMS proposes expanding the ground to deny enrollment based on Medicare debt or payment suspension to include a provider or supplier’s “managing employee, managing organization, or individual or entity with any other form of business or financial relationship with the provider or supplier[.]” Significantly, this expansive definition (called an “associated party” under the proposed regulation) currently contains no material limitations, meaning almost any person or entity with whom an applicant does business could create denial liability. Sharing Locations with Denied/Revoked Providers or Suppliers. CMS would have authority to deny applications where a “provider’s or supplier’s practice location is in the same suite or office as another provider or supplier whose Medicare enrollment has been revoked or denied.” Hospices with Distant Medical Directors or Administrators. CMS would have discretion to deny hospice applications if the hospice’s medical director or administrator serves “multiple other hospices” or practices/is located “at such a distance (for example, in a different state) from the enrolling hospice that the medical director cannot realistically perform all medical director functions,” with a similar provision for administrators. In addition, CMS proposes applications denied for “other program termination or suspension,” may be applied to the provider or supplier in its own name or NPI or that of its owners, managing employees, or managing organization regardless of whether any appeals are pending. Retroactive Revocation CMS proposed to restructure and expand the regulatory grounds for retroactive revocation of billing privileges. Currently, Medicare regulations provide that revocations are, by default, prospective in nature: effective 30 days after CMS or the CMS contractor mails notice to the provider. Under certain circumstances, the regulations provide for revocations to be retroactive, such as when a provider is convicted of a felony, the date a professional license is suspended, revoked, or surrendered, or when a provider submits a false certification in their enrollment application. CMS has proposed to reframe the rule so as to default to retroactive revocation of billing privileges. CMS expressed concern that providers may collect payment from Medicare while remaining so non-compliant with enrollment requirements as to merit revocation. To address this concern, CMS proposed that all revocations be retroactive to the date of determined non-compliance.[1] As a result, providers suspected of misconduct or non-compliance are likely to face claims of retroactive overpayments in addition to the immediate concern no longer receiving Medicare payments while their enrollment is revoked. Reapplication Bar CMS’s proposed rule expands the grounds from which a provider may be prohibited from seeking reapplication as a Medicare provider. Under current regulations, CMS may prohibit prospective providers from enrolling in Medicare for up to 10 years if its enrollment application is denied because the applicant submitted false or misleading information in its application. Under the proposed rule, CMS will have the discretion to prohibit a provider from enrolling in Medicare if their enrollment application is denied for any reason. Conclusion As a part of the federal government’s increasingly aggressive push to combat real or perceived healthcare fraud, the proposed rule both broadens CMS’s authority to revoke and deny Medicare enrollment and raises the stakes for revocation and denial. What the proposed rule does not share is how CMS plans to exercise this expanded discretion: as a result, the proposed rule, if enacted, increases the unpredictability and potential ramifications of even technical noncompliance with CMS rules. As a result, Medicare providers should keep a close eye on potential revisions to these rules and their potential implementation and consider proactively evaluating their compliance under CMS standards. [1] In the proposed rule, CMS identifies, with respect to each ground for revocation, what it will consider to be the effective date of revocation.