.

The Tidal Wave of Website Privacy Class Actions and Mass Arbitration Claims

June 20, 2024

by Kent J. Schmidt

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We often hear of litigation trends described in dramatic terms: “the floodgates will open” or “a tidal wave of claims is coming.” Often the predictions end up being off the mark. But with respect to website privacy claims, companies being deluged in litigation claims and the metaphors are apt.  A number of law firms in California and elsewhere are bringing large number of individual lawsuits, class actions and mass arbitrations.  Any company with a website that seeks to capitalize on gathering data on website activities is vulnerable. These cases present unique substantive and procedural challenges. In this episode, Deb Howitt, Austin Chambers and Jessica Leano explain the merits of these claims, how courts and arbitrators are reacting to these trends and what companies should do to be prepared for the tidal wave.

This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

Transcript

Voiceover

Welcome to another episode of the SharkCast on litigation risks management where we explore why businesses are so frequently sued, and how to mitigate and navigate the dangers lurking in these risky waters. Join us now as we welcome our host Kent Schmidt, Litigation Partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.

Schmidt

Thanks for joining us for another episode of Shark Cast. I’m happy to welcome today three guests to the show. Deb Howitt is a partner in our Denver office as well as Austin Chambers, also a partner in the Denver office, and Jessica Leano practices litigation with me here in Southern California. Deb and Austin are both privacy specialists. They advise clients on privacy regulations, which are constantly changing and continue to grow and create significant compliance obligations for clients, and as I indicated, Jessica is a commercial litigator who along with me has been doing a fair amount of privacy related litigation. There’s been an absolute tidal wave of consumer privacy litigation over the past eighteen months or so focused on the privacy claims that are filed when a consumer goes to a website and watches a video, or does some browsing and then discovers that that browsing history or that video watching activity is somehow transferred to other platforms, whether Facebook or Google or some other platform, and they start being targeted with ads. These claims are being filed in federal court, state court and an arbitration. They have a number of different statutory bases, a number of different strategies that the lawyers are employing, and so I thought would be a great idea to tackle some of these issues with the lawyers that I work with the most on these claims. So with that as a brief introduction, let me welcome Deb and Austin and Jessica. Thank you for being here on SharkCast.

Howitt

Thanks, Kent. Really glad to be here.

Chambers

Yeah, thanks Kent.

Schmidt

Well, thank you for joining us and for your time. Deb, I think you’ve probably been in the privacy space longer than all of us and so you have perhaps greater contacts for assessing this new tidal wave of claims. Can you give us sort of your perspective about what you’ve seen over the last, say ten or fifteen years in privacy, and how that informs you with respect to this new subset of privacy claims?

Howitt

Sure. In the past, privacy litigation was much less prevalent and more focused on proving the elements and showing harm, such as that the behavior of the defendant was deceptive or unfair or breach of contract, or perhaps an invasion of privacy tort claim where the plaintiff had to show emotional distress. Or often in a data breach scenario where they’d have to show that the defendant was negligent and the plaintiff suffered some harm, but these latest cases are just about the numbers. They’re being filed under laws that have statutory damages available per violation. The violations rack up extremely quickly with website visitors and the plaintiffs’ attorneys are filing as many suits and arbitration claims as possible, even if there’s no harm whatsoever, and even when it’s truly not clear whether the statute is even applicable to the circumstances. Just because they know that many of these defendants will settle and that different courts will have different approaches, the judges are not always sophisticated in their knowledge of the technology and may not fully comprehend what’s being discussed in some of these claims, and they have different opinions. So these plaintiffs’ attorneys are just throwing everything against the wall and seeing what sticks, and they repeat that hundreds and hundreds of times against other defendants and, you know, they’re successful in many of these cases. People thought that the CCPA would result in a significant amount of litigation. That’s the California Consumer Privacy Act, if anybody’s not aware of that, and there were certainly cases filed, but the only private right of action under this CCPA is if there was a data breach and the defendant failed to have reasonable security measures in place. Plaintiffs did try to bring CPA claims under other theories, but these are typically not successful, and frankly, these other statutes that are being used now more heavily are just easier and so this is where the plaintiffs are focused at this time.

Schmidt

Well, it’s a great overview, Deb and I think it helps us sort of set the table for where we’d like to go in this conversation and we’re going to hear from each of our guests shortly. What I would propose is that we sort of divide the discussion into a number of segments, and first, I’d like to tackle a little bit of the technology that’s at issue in these cases and then secondly, we’ll tackle some of the substantive theories, and as I said earlier, there are variations on the legal theories. And then we would want to delve into some of the procedural issues and the litigation tactics of the firms that are bringing these claims, and what we’re seeing come down the line and what we’ll probably be seeing for the foreseeable future. So let’s begin with a discussion of the technology, and as I often do, when I work with Austin on these cases, I asked him to explain this in a way that makes sense to those of us that sit at the back of the classroom, at least on the technology side of things. So without getting too technical, because he has a wealth of background, can you tell us, Austin, what the technology is in general terms that triggers these claims?

Chambers

Of course, yeah, happy to and as an adamant back of the class person coming up through law school, I’m happy to do that. So you know, these technologies are pretty ubiquitous. What they are, it’s really common marketing technology. I mean frankly kind of to set the stage here. If you’re in marketing, this is sort of it would be malpractice, almost not to use some of these technologies like they’re just sort of considered run-of-the-mill regular things that you’re doing. So like the scale is enormous like so many websites use these types of technologies, and really what they are, are relatively simple. We hear a lot about pixels and really all that is, is just a pixel that’s on a page. It’s loaded when the web page loads and you work with other companies like Google or Facebook or all the social media companies. All these advertisers, all your website operators, brands, what have you, what they want to do ultimately, they want to reach a broader audience, right? Their goal is to, you know, get eyeballs on their marketing, get their brand out there, get people to click on ads and buy stuff, right? So these pixels, these marketing technologies, what they do is if you go to a brand’s website, they will pull a little bit of information about your browser, about who you are and it’ll send it to either Google or Meta. Any of these types of companies and it’ll let them know that you’ve been to this website and these brands, they’ll go on social media and they’ll run ad campaigns on Facebook or Instagram and they’ll say we want to reach people who’ve been to our website before. We want to remind them who we are, and the pixels really are just this sort of very simple technical tool that allows for marketers to figure out who’s been to their website before, and then find them on other properties. And different ways to go about that and they count all work in slightly different ways, whether that’s advertising on specific social media platform or it can be again Google where they are, you know, sort of in the business of finding you elsewhere or pretty much on any other media site for example, that shows display ads, they might just find you there. But fundamentally the technology that these plaintiffs have seized on is this ubiquitous pixel technology that just allows for retargeting and remarketing and ultimately kind of profiling. But in order to pull this off, ultimately the technology that underlies this retargeting creates a huge database. They frankly can track people pretty effectively in their activities across the Internet, so I think this is kind of driving a little bit of the plaintiffs theories here that this is kind of an invasive technology, and, and as the public has picked up on this some more and realized what these systems that have sort of grown up around it. What profiles they build about people, and what you do on the Internet, what have you creates a little bit of sensitivity. I think getting a little bit of sympathy from judges as well. Who are learning a little bit about what this technology does.

Schmidt

Yeah, well, in very broad strokes, as I understand it from doing some work in this area, there’s no express legislation, state or federal, that speaks to this precise practice. It’s not directly regulated and therefore, and we’ll talk about the legal theories in a moment. There’s a vacuum that’s created and lawyers come up with creative legal theories to attack this type of conduct. Do you see anything on the horizon of Congress or state legislatures that specifically address pixel sharing and this related technology?

Chambers

Yeah, so there has been some legislation, I think CCPA is one of those laws and some of these other state consumer privacy laws do mention retargeting or cross context behavioral advertising, and that’s what these pixels are able to do fundamentally. But the interesting thing about those laws is that they’re all on an opt out basis. Basically, each of these laws, for the most part, only would require that a website provide a means by which an individual could come and say, don’t track me, don’t engage in retargeting. I want to opt out. It doesn’t mean that you’re going to get advertising. You might instead just get sort of less targeted or less relevant to ads. But again, fundamentally, the regime is opt out, and it’s been enforced only by regulators. So again, as Deb mentioned, CCPA has no private right of action. You can’t sue for these things. So what we’ve kind of seen is these new claims are kind of an end around of what was carefully crafted statutes around this sort of technology, and this was never meant to be opt in. That’s not what this was and we’ve seen people sort of, I think, kind of resisting their inability to take more action or maybe the inaction by regulators so far.

Schmidt

Well, let’s talk for a moment about what users can do before we get to the legal theories. If they do not want their browsing history shared. Obviously you’ve talked about opt out, but apart from those opt out features, or if those opt out features are not present on a website, what can users do?

Chambers

Sure, so for many years there have been ad blockers. I think a lot of people are familiar with ad blocker plus or uBlock or Ghostery. Each of these technologies and these have been sort of a ham fisted way of approaching the issue, perhaps, but basically what these tools do is they live in your browser and they have a small database of all of these different trackers. How the pixels work and they will pretty much just strip out the little bits of code that make the pixels work, so they will basically just modify the site. So for a lot of people, sort of, I guess the absence of user choice has led them to take relatively drastic measures, which is these ad blockers.

Howitt

Yeah, and it’s interesting that the major browsers have announced that they’re phasing out some technologies, third party cookies, I think from they’ve announced just recently as part of their settlement with regard to the Incognito browsing that if anyone uses the Incognito browser tabs, the third party tracking technologies are disabled by default, and I think Google and Edge and you know others are in the process of phasing them out generally. I mean they will be replaced with something else, but they’re starting to go away generally.

Schmidt

Well, I think the take away is, as I used to say on the Evening News, this is an evolving story or a developing story. So as the browsers phase out, there’s AI that’s coming on. So this area is going to continue to evolve with the technology, even if the picture a year from now is not quite the same as what we see today.

Howitt

Yeah. One thing. I’m sorry. One thing I think we should mention also with what they can do is that many websites are now starting to have Cookie banner functionality in their websites. The little banner that you see pop up when you visit a website and there are cookie settings in there and many users, don’t bother to do that. They’ll just click sort of accept all or reject all, but they can actually go in and change their settings if they wish to through those modules as well.

Schmidt

Okay, that’s interesting options that technology presents. Let’s turn now to some of the legal theories, and Jessica I’ll turn to you as my fellow litigator on the call here and ask you to sort of unpack some of these legal theories that we’re seeing, again as indicated earlier, these are not necessarily statutes that had the Internet or browsing history in mind, but are being adapted and expanded by courts to apply here. So can you give us what you’re seeing as the most often invoked statutory basis here in California?

Leano

Sure. So in California, we’ve seen a mix of claims runs the gamut from you know, your typical law school intrusion upon seclusion, invasion of privacy, constitutional violation claim. In terms of statutes, we’re seeing quite a bit of claims under CIPA, the California Invasion of Privacy Act and as you mentioned Kent, the legislature, when enacting CIPA, likely wasn’t thinking about megapixels or beacons, or various technologies that are on a website in today’s times. This was a law that was enacted in the 60s. So CIPA was enacted, contemplating that there would be advances in science and technology that would result in new devices that would have eavesdropping capability, and that there would be invasions of privacy resulting from such eavesdropping. But I don’t think the legislator thought about cookies and megapixels and the things we’re dealing with today. So as of today, what we’re seeing is a lot of claims under CIPA for wiretapping, but it’s not wiretapping in the sense that you stick a device onto a phone line and you can listen to what the person is saying. As Austin and Deb mentioned a lot of these claims have to do with websites and what consumer attorneys and consumers are claiming are, listening to surreptitious conversations through the technology. So kind of as a primer we have the Federal Wiretap Act, which requires that a violator, so the website, the company intentionally intercept or endeavor to intercept the contents of an electronic communication to be liable for a wiretapping violation. And then we have the California wiretapping law, which is part of CIPA that similarly requires that the violator to be liable under the statute obtain contents of a communication. So to boil it down, we have a lot of claims coming up that are saying a pixel or some other communication on a website is the equivalent of someone basically listening into your phone conversations and involving a third party. The third party in this case usually being Facebook, Google, TikTok, a social media platform. So the claim is that the eavesdropper is listening and getting your information by the website having software installed, usually for advertising purposes, but we’re seeing a lot of claimants analogize these website technologies to someone listening to your phone conversations.

Schmidt

And let’s just clarify on this. This technology doesn’t actually listen to conversations. It just picks up browsing history, and that’s a major disconnect between CIPA, which was focused on the actual content of the conversation, as opposed to just the fact that some communication of some sort occurred. Is that?

Leano

Yeah, that that’s correct then. Yeah, I’d say that’s fair. The statutes say contents of a communication. They don’t say, you know, there’s liability just for observing the fact that someone is having a conversation or that some kind of transmittals going back and forth. They do say contents, but we end up in a battle over what constitutes contents, of course, and whether getting some information about websites you visited is a content of a communication. Is that any substance? Is that the equivalent of listening to a conversation? So there’s definitely a split there between the plaintiffs and defense bar on whether what these websites are doing in terms of advertising even fits within the scheme of the Federal Wiretap Act or CIPA.

Schmidt

Deb, let’s cover one more statutory claim before we move to some other topics and that is something that for once doesn’t come from California, but comes from another state, Illinois, and that’s the biometric privacy regulation in Illinois. We’ve had some experience, both you on compliance, and Jessica and me on litigation in BIPA. Can you explain what BIPA is and what companies be aware of on that privacy claim?

Howitt

Sure. Yeah, so BIPA regulates the collection and processing of biometric data. So you know this is data collected for the purpose of identifying a person. So this is often collected in the employment context. Maybe, you know, employee has to scan their fingerprint to enter a certain secured area, or there might be a retina scan, or scan of facial geometry for purposes of facial recognition. So under this statute, it requires notice with very specific elements in the notice and consent for the collection, as well as requiring that companies have a specific policy describing the retention and the destruction of the data when it’s no longer needed and so this statute really catches a lot of companies off guard. They’re just not aware of it. There’s private right of action, and there have been numerous class actions, significant litigation under this statute and more recently there has been a case indicating that the statutory damages occur per violation. So in the employment context, when you have an employee who’s worked for the company for five years and scans their fingerprint or their face or whatever, every single day, that adds up extremely quickly. So this is a big one to watch out for.

Schmidt

Jessica, can I ask you to just add on to the BIPA discussion from the litigation experience perspective relating to websites that are the target of some of these claims, even if they don’t fall within the more traditional biometric applications that Deb just talked about?

Leano

Yes, this is an interesting area Kent, because the companies we’re seeing are not companies you would expect to be doing quote un quote, biometric matching and identification. The defendants we’re seeing in a lot of the BIPA cases are companies that provide makeup, glasses, hair extensions, any kind of try on clothes, features like that that as a consumer, you think, oh, this is helpful I’d like to see what I look like with this color lipstick on before I buy the product. But because these websites are using a photograph feature where it’s, you know, upload your picture or take a picture through your webcam and then try on a certain product, we’re seeing plaintiffs analogize this, too. This is biometric screening because you’re taking a picture of my face, you’re doing something behind the scenes digitally, and, you know, we assume you’re saving this picture somewhere, so you have a database. So it is an interesting situation to see companies that are not in the security or medical field getting hit with these types of BIPA claims. As Doug mentioned, one important aspect of the statute is that liability is imposed when there is matching. This is, as Deb mentioned, I walk up to my office, it scans my picture, it scans my face and then it matches my face to know that I’m an employee of the building and it lets me in. That’s a different scenario from me trying on a hat virtually. So we’re seeing a different evolution of claims. It’s different from the megapixel or the trap and trace claims, but it is another situation where you know the statute says biometric data and we’re seeing that, that definition gets stretched into new technologies and new features that are really meant to provide the customer service, you know, increased sales. As now leading to biometric data related claims, it’s a very interesting area and something that’s a bit surprising.

Schmidt

Well, and the correlation between everything we’ve talked about is the legislature says X and the plaintiffs’ bar comes along and says Oh it’s X, but it’s also Y&Z and courts take a look at it and some say yeah, I think it’s Y but not Z, and other courts say no, it is Y&Z, and next thing you know you have litigation risks that go far beyond X, what the legislature originally envisioned, but are real and are significant for companies to be aware of. Let’s turn to another statute, this one of federal statute, the Video Privacy Protection Act, and Deb, I’m gonna ask you to address this legal theory and how it’s being adapted and asserted in a wide variety of contexts to address certain consumer privacy concerns.

Howitt

Of course. The VPPA is a federal law that was enacted back in 1988, and it came about following Robert Bork’s confirmation hearing and publication of his video rental history. So as a result of that, Congress passed the VPPA with the goal to prevent video rental stores such as Blockbuster back in the day from disclosing information regarding what their customers had rented unless there was, you know, prior express consent by that customer. So the VPPA was more recently amended to make it clear that it does apply to video content delivered online through newer technologies. So the online applicability is not the issue here. However, the statute specifically applies to what they call video service providers, which is defined as an entity engaged in the business of rental, sale or delivery of videos. So not just to any site that happens to have a video or two on their site, or some video ads on their site and the consumers to whom the statute applies are, to quote the statute, a renter, purchaser or subscriber. So not just a casual visitor who happens to go to a site once and click on a video. But the plaintiffs’ attorneys are now stretching these definitions and bringing claims against any company just because it has even, you know, a short video clip or ad on its site featuring video, even though it’s not truly in the business of being a video service provider as the statute intended. If that site happens to be using the megapixel or Google Analytics or some of these other technologies that Austin discussed which shares the data about a user or visiting a page that has a video, or maybe clicking on a particular video with those third parties. The VPPA requires consent to share video viewing data in the situations where it does apply, and in these new cases, we have circumstances where sites are just using these third party tools as Austin mentioned, they’re extremely common. Virtually every site has some of these tools in place to help them track what’s popular on their site, you know what’s being viewed for how long, you know where users come from, where they go to, you know, just common data that companies need to operate their sites and their business to target ads to their visitors. So in order to do all of this, they need to share certain data with those third parties to accomplish these goals, and that’s perfectly legal as we were just discussing in the US at this time. So the vast majority of sites in the US don’t obtain prior consent to share data with Google or Meta or others just because it’s not required at this time as it is in certain other countries. So some of the major issues or whether it applies to companies merely using video for advertising or providing short video clips to casual users which seems to not have been the intent of the statute based on the way it’s drafted, but the claims are being brought anyway.

Schmidt

Most courts by the way, and Deb, wouldn’t you agree that most courts are coming down on that issue in favor of the companies and against lawyers?

Howitt

Yes.

Schmidt

Jessica and I had a win in federal court a couple months ago on that very issue on the under the…

Howitt

Mm-hmm.

Schmidt

Yay, that seems to be a growing body of case law. Is that your experience?

Howitt

Yes, absolutely. Yep, I’m glad that the courts are starting to see the light in that regard, and I think it may potentially start to reduce the number of cases and I think these attorneys are moving on, you know, as we’ve seen to some of these other theories that Jessica mentioned under CIPA.

Schmidt

Well, we don’t have time to unpack every single variation on the legal theory, but before we move from the legal theories to discuss some other concept, I wanted to ask Jessica about a trap and trace variation on some of these claims. Jessica, what is that legal theory?

Leano

Under a different provision of CIPA Kent, this would be section 638.51, we have a statute that says a person may not install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order. So here we’re thinking about, technologies that are known to be used by law enforcement to observe ingoing calls, outgoing calls really have a register of who someone may be communicating with and we’re seeing this statute evolving to the basis of claims for metapixels or TikTok pixels, very similar claims. So it appears that, you know, with some difficulties or with some unfavorable decisions about the wiretapping theory we’re seeing that claimants, attorneys and plaintiffs bars using the trap and trace statute as a basis to similarly allege a privacy violation based on software on a website. At this point, there’s not much case law on what constitutes a pen register or what constitutes a trap and trace device. We’re seeing quite a bit of uncertainty at this point without any case law either way saying you know a metapixel is a trap and trace device, or metapixel is not a trap and trace device and it is a little odd to think about, you know, needing a court order or equivalent of a warrant to be able to have advertising software. But at this point, we’re waiting for a court to weigh in and give us guidance on whether the statutes are even implicated by this type of technology. As I mentioned, we’ve seen a lot of cases be filed in the last few months, but the cases are generally early, so I predict that we’ll see quite a bit of battle over whether a metapixel is a trap and trace device, or whether a metapixel is a pen register. At this point, it’s really an open question and I think there’s uncertainties on both sides about whether this statute is meant to criminalize or penalize standard website software as Austin and Deb have mentioned. So that’s the summary of the trap and trace legal theory at this point.

Schmidt

You know, some common threads in all of these variations, and even legal theories we haven’t been able to tackle in this conversation. One of which is there’s so much of a square peg in a round hole to use and perhaps an overuse phrase. You know, so many of these statutes were drafted before the advent of the Internet and so we’re trying to analogize or extend concepts of technology in the 60s or even earlier to modern technology, and it’s a I guess you have to say the plaintiffs’ lawyers are very creative and to some extent they’ve had some success. I’d like to turn back to you, Austin on another common thread in all of these legal theories, and that is the concept of consent. The users’ affirmative consent to the activity that the website is engaged in. Can you talk to us from a compliance perspective, but also I suppose from a defense perspective, when a company is actually facing these types of issues? How this concept of consumer consent plays out, and how that informs how a company should proactively avoid this litigation risk altogether?

Chambers

Sure. So consent is an interesting thing. It’s evolved a lot in sort of the privacy compliance space over the years. And historically there was this old notion of notice and consent, right, which basically meant the company puts up a privacy policy as long as you talk about what you’re doing, you know, that’s deemed consent as long as you continue to use it, and you were transparent about these practices. This is kind of separate and apart from what we see in modern privacy laws, which is the notion of, you know, opt in consent or prior specific informed consent and there’s this sort of spectrum of what consent really is, and I think as we’ve seen these cases involving what sort of consent is required and you know, consent is of course is going to be a bar for most of these cases. You know, you can install a wiretap as long as you have consent. The question really is becoming what sort of consent is that, and it’s been an interesting thing to watch, whereas you know, obviously we’ve seen many clients and many companies have privacy policies that talk about retargeting pixels, and all of this stuff, but this has not been persuasive necessarily to the plaintiffs’ bar. They’re sort of alleging almost that we have to have prior specific informed opt in consent before you can install any of these technologies. In practice, what that would mean is, as Deb mentioned, those cookie banners you see on all the websites you know, do we need to have that? Do you have to click, yes, I agree, before you can install a tracking pixel. That certainly seems to be the direction that a lot of these plaintiffs are going for with this, which is a dramatic departure from sort of traditional practice with respect to a website. I think a lot of marketers and you know, website operators of course would take the position that you know, there has certainly been consent, but maybe not to that degree.

Schmidt

Jessica, do you want to add anything to this concept of consent? The perspective of one and the litigation, briefing and arguing over whether or not there’s been effective and valid consent.

Leano

Sure. As you know Austin has mentioned, the consent is really key. A lot of the decisions we’ve seen, motions to dismiss, we’ll turn on consent and whether the court believes that there is consent for exactly what the claimant or plaintiff is claiming the defendant did. In theory, under both the Federal Wiretapping Act and CIPA, as well as, you know, common law, privacy claims, consent is a complete bar to the claim. If you said ahead of time, you can do what I’m now complaining that you’re doing, you have no claim. When it comes to consent, we’re seeing arguments about what’s the consent informed? Did you give me proper notice and proper detail of what you were doing? Did you just tell me that Facebook might get some information versus the specific pages you’re visiting on our website will be communicated to Facebook. So once we get into the consent phase, we’re seeing a lot of arbiters look at what the claimant contends the defendant or the company is doing and what the defendant says that they told the claim that they were going to do. You know, in theory, a pop up banner that tells a consumer that information may be shared with third parties should be sufficient for the claimant to know that, okay, by using this website my information is going to be sent to a third party and I’m agreeing to that. The courts are also dissecting and arbiters are dissecting, you know, the method of information. Was there a cookie banner that popped up? At what point did the cookie banner pop up before information was supposedly sent? Did the cookie banner have very small writing that someone would not look at and would just click past? Does the cookie banner hyperlink to a policy that is more specific? Is there a cookie banner at all? Courts are really looking at how conspicuous did you make the disclosure? How many places did you make the disclosure? Was the person who visited the website really able to give their consent and really understand what you were going to do with their information? So in theory, consent can be a complete bar to these privacy claims. Then we get into the nitty gritty of what’s consent effective and courts are looking at all kinds of factors going forth, you know, from the method of the pop up to what color was the text. You know things that allow us to consider what the person saw and we’ll come down to the Court’s judgment of, oh, someone would have seen that and they should have known versus oh, no one would have seen that. So we’re seeing some interesting arguments there similar to, you know, shrink wrap or other cases where we’re kind of imputing knowledge on what someone would have known and what they agreed to.

Schmidt

Very good, and in many of these cases, it’s very difficult to get past motion to dismiss because consent itself involves very factually intensive questions as to whether consent was effective and whether the disclosure that is on the privacy policy is understandable and things of that nature. So this presents issues for litigation. Keeping with our focus on litigation, let’s discuss how these claims are being brought, beginning with the forum in which some of these lawsuits and arbitration claims are being filed. Often in consumer cases, the preferred process for bringing those claims as a consumer class action, and we certainly see state and federal consumer class actions in this area, but we’re also seeing a very unique type of claim, AAA, American Arbitration Association arbitration claims that are brought as a mass arbitration. Who would like to tackle the advent of mass arbitration claims brought in the consumer privacy context?

Leano

I suppose I can. So we are seeing very much an influx of mass arbitrations, and what that entails is we’ll see some repeat names in the plaintiffs’ bar who, you know, will file 10, 15, 20 demands for arbitration with an arbitration association like the AAA or JAMS, and it’s a very simple process to initiate a lawsuit there. You just fill out a form. You can give a short summary of the claims. So we’ll see a violation of CIPA, a violation of the Federal Wiretap Act, and the claimant can file the claim with the AAA, and it eventually makes its way to the defendant. In theory, the consumer arbitration process is meant to be a cost effective, and you know, streamlined way to litigate disputes. But we’re seeing the companies who have arbitration provisions incurring significant fees with the AAA or JAMS, the company will end up footing the bill for an arbitrator’s fee, administration fees, and it can be very difficult to manage a lot of these claims and it can be very expensive. It’s very difficult to get arbitrations consolidated or combined, so you may end up with a company that has, you know, as many from 5 to 20 to 30 identical actions pending against them brought by the same firm with different claimants and they’re all on different tracks and they’re all incurring fees for arbitrators, for administration. So it can be a very expensive process. Certainly there’s benefits to arbitration, moving faster, you know you are not going through the court system where there can be delays. But the downside is also dealing with mass arbitrations where you’re incurring a significant amount of fees just to administer the disputes, and it tends to be very costly for the companies. Whereas for the consumers it’s very simple, they don’t incur as many fees to process the dispute, and so that’s what we’ve been seeing Kent.

Schmidt

Deb or Austin, anything you want to add on mass arbitrations dealing with clients that are facing these types of claims being filed?

Howitt

Yes, so many companies have had class action waivers in their website terms of use, but it’s also important to think about the possibility of mass arbitrations, and extend the waiver and the language in the terms of use or other applicable notices and agreements to cover mass arbitrations as well. This wasn’t as much of an issue in the past as it is now and many of our clients are seeing multiple claims and mass arbitration claims from these plaintiffs’ firms, and so we definitely recommend addressing those as well to the extent possible.

Schmidt

And there are ways to address this risk relating to mass arbitration claims in website terms and conditions, so that’s something to think about, not just making sure that the consumer class action waiver will meet the standards and be enforceable. So this is again a very dynamic and evolving area. Well, with that, I’d like to turn to the segment of our show that we call the deeper dive, and learn a little bit more about each of you. And today, we’d like to talk about travel. We’ll begin with you, Deb, because I know from some of our prior interactions that you recently took a very interesting trip to Italy. One of my favorite locations. But you didn’t do just the typical sightseeing that most people do in Italy. Tell us what you did and saw in Italy.

Howitt

Yes, so it was an incredible trip. My family and I went on a hut to hut hiking trip in the Dolomites in northern Italy. And I love hiking, I love being out in nature, it’s truly my passion. And on this trip, there’s a well-marked trail called the Alta Via 1, there’s actually a series of these Alta Via trails and these huts you can reserve in advance, and it’s sort of like an extremely rustic B&B, hostel type of arrangement where you show up and you can have a hot meal and a glass of wine or a beer and sleep in an actual bed. And it’s a really nice way to travel. The scenery is incredible. Met so many interesting people. You get to know people who are on sort of the same schedule as you, you know, going down the trail for 10 days. And even when it’s really challenging, it’s nice because, you know, you have to get to your destination. That’s where you’re sleeping, so you just keep going.

Schmidt

And I’m sure after however many miles you traverse, no matter how primitive or rustic the bed is, you sleep really well at night?

Howitt

Oh yes, absolutely.

Schmidt

And how was the food? It’s somewhat rustic, as you say, I’m sure the food was phenomenal, huh?

Howitt

Oh, the food was great. I mean, anywhere in Italy, the food is incredible. But yeah, it’s unexpected to be sort of out in the middle of nowhere, and you show up in this very remote location and get your, you know, pumpkin gnocchi and some delightful red wine.

Schmidt

Well, yeah, I think it’s hard to have a bad meal in Italy.

Howitt

Yes.

Schmidt

You have to work at it. Austin, let’s turn to you going to a different hemisphere. I understand that you have recently gone to Mexico, and tell us about those journeys.

Chambers

Yeah, sure. So we just took the family down for a quick couple week trip after Christmas this year. We went down to Merida, Mexico. It’s out in the Yucatan, but on the other side of the peninsula, so a lot of people, you know, fly into Cancun and you know, do the Riviera Maya down there kind of on the eastern side of the peninsula. So Merida is the old colonial city on the west side. Really interesting place honestly, a ton of history. Was kind of one of the very rich trading cities during the Spanish colonial period in Mexico, so it’s kind of got this interesting mix of the colonial history, but it’s also alongside a lot of the old, obviously there was a lot of Maya in the area previously, so a lot of interesting Mayan ruins, Chichén Itzá is near there, but aside from Chichén Itzá there’s also a handful of other smaller, maybe lesser well known Mayan ruins and temples and pyramids and what have you. So we spent a couple weeks down there. Kind of traveling around, going to the beach, going to some ruins. Obviously eating the food and if you’ve never had food from the Yucatan, it’s a little bit different from you know sort of your traditional Mexican food and red enchiladas and what you might know from the northern Mexican type cuisine. Really interesting sort of Caribbean vibe to the food, and like a lot of interesting new different dishes, and it was fantastic.

Schmidt

Well, indicating where my priorities are when I travel. I’m always interested in what the food is. So Jessica, let’s conclude with you, travels either where you’ve been or your bucket list of where you feel like you have to get to.

Leano

Bucket list, definitely. So I guess a fun fact about me is I’m one of those oddballs who likes homework and likes going to class and misses law school. So for the past two years I’ve been taking Korean classes trying to learn Korean language. It’s a lot of fun. It’s an adult class, once a week. I will not speak any right now, but I would love to go to Korea and, you know, go with some of my classmates and just experience a lot of different places, and see if my language skills can take me far enough to not get too lost. So I’d love to go to Seoul and see a lot of the famous landmarks, and then there’s one particular place called Jeju Island. You would say Jeju-Do, which is an island about a couple hours away from Seoul. It’s just this beautiful green island that’s on its own. Has hot springs, and then if we’re looking at, you know, the foodie aspect of it, they have this pork there that’s really interesting, kind of a funny famous pork dish which I would love to try. And it’s just an island, so there’s all kinds of fresh seafood and I see on my Food Network shows there’s just all kinds of things to eat and try. So hopefully one day I can get there.

Schmidt

Well, that’s fantastic. I didn’t know you were working on adding that language to your impressive list of skills and accomplishments, so congratulations to that and hope you can get there in the not too distant future. Well, with that, I’d like to thank each of you for being here. I think it’s been a great discussion on these emerging litigation risk and website browsing consumer activities. Is there anything that one of you would like to summarize in terms of the main take away from all of this?

Howitt

Companies need to pay attention to any new features or technologies they’re putting on their websites, such as chat bots, adding video, anything new, new pixels, or tracking or cookies, and speak with your attorneys to find out what you can do to mitigate the risks of litigation associated with these technologies. Because the plaintiffs’ firms are coming at these fast and furiously and they’re very creative in their arguments.

Schmidt

Well, thanks each of you for being here. It’s been a very interesting discussion and I would think this will be a great benefit to our listeners of SharkCast. As always, I’m indebted to the extraordinary team at Dorsey for making this podcast and episode possible. For more resources on this and other litigation risk, go to litigationrisk.com, where more information can be found, including a book on managing litigation risk written by yours truly. Until next time, my friends, this is yet another reminder that there are a lot of sharks swimming out there in the murky waters, so swim safely.

Voiceover

This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship, or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP for those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only, and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

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Insights

Proposed CMS Rule Ramps Up Potential Medicare Fraud Administrative Remedies

On July 6, 2026, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a rule that would expand its administrative remedies to combat potential fraud. The proposed rule is the latest in a round of administrative actions that signal CMS’s intent to aggressively pursue allegations of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and heighten the risk of fraud enforcement against even well-intentioned Medicare and Medicaid providers and suppliers. The proposed rule includes several changes to regulations that govern Medicare billing privileges. Providers and suppliers should be aware that these changes dramatically expand the flexibility afforded to CMS in enrollment and revocation actions, potentially leading to harsh consequences for ministerial and administrative errors. If finalized, moreover, the proposed rule could have material implications for providers and suppliers facing threatened revocation, including heightened risk of overpayment liability and increased hurdles to challenging revocations and denials of enrollment. Added Flexibility to Existing Revocation Grounds CMS has proposed to remove a number of factors that the regulations list as relevant to a determination of whether a provider has engaged in “abuse of billing privileges.” While acknowledging that the inclusion of these factors in the regulations was permissive (requiring consideration only where “as appropriate or applicable”), CMS stated that it must be afforded “the maximum flexibility to address all possible . . . scenarios without the rigid constraints of our existing factors.” CMS provided little guidance as to the outer bounds of what conduct could constitute an “abuse of privileges” that merits revocation of Medicare billing privileges. Instead, CMS noted that a “pattern of practice” of abuse of billing privileges might be established “by a simple finding that several of a provider’s claims do not meet Medicare requirements.” Similarly, CMS has proposed to expand the regulatory provision that permits revocation of enrollment if a provider certifies as “true” false or misleading information in Medicare enrollment application or renewal forms to include any scenario in which a provider submits “false or misleading information on or associated with any CMS Medicare enrollment-related form,” including materials submitted to Medicare contractors. CMS stated that it interprets this expanded rule to include anything related to Medicare enrollment, and not only those submissions that are “intended to gain or maintain Medicare enrollment.” If finalized, the proposed rule would add significant flexibility to CMS’s ability to pursue revocation of a provider’s enrollment. While CMS has assured providers that it would “invoke [the revised regulations]. . . only when legitimately warranted under the facts and circumstances and not as a matter of course,” such expanded flexibility threatens unpredictability in the event of even administrative or ministerial errors in submissions and claims. These changes would, moreover, make it more difficult for providers to challenge a revocation action. Expanded Revocation Grounds In addition to adding flexibility to existing grounds for revocation, CMS’s proposed rule adds to and expands CMS’s already broad authority to revoke provider and supplier enrollment. Such proposed changes include adding the following grounds for revocation: Denial of Enrollment Application. Where CMS could previously revoke a provider’s other enrollments if one enrollment is revoked, CMS would also be able to revoke a provider’s existing enrollments if an application for enrollment submitted by the provider is denied. High-Risk Enrollments. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if it determines the provider or supplier (including owning/managing employees or organizations) poses a high risk of fraud, waste, or abuse due to “. . . an affiliation under [42 C.F.R.] § 424.519” or “the provider’s or supplier’s location within a limited geographic area that has an excessive number of providers and suppliers.” Certain Misdemeanor Convictions. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if a provider or supplier—or its owners, managing employees, managing organizations, officers, or directors—are convicted of a “misdemeanor related to sexual assault or financial misconduct within the past 10 years that CMS deems detrimental to the best interests of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries.” Ownership Changes (HHA, Hospice, DMEPOS). CMS would have broad authority to revoke enrollment of home health agencies, hospices, and DMEPOS suppliers who do not comply with the regulations governing provider changes of ownership. These proposed, expanded grounds for revocation are notably broad, and CMS provides only limited guidance as to what conduct might result in revocation under these grounds. As with the proposed expansion of existing grounds for revocation, the open-ended nature of these proposed grounds for revocation may make it more difficult for providers and suppliers to challenge revocation actions. Expanded Grounds to Deny Medicare Enrollment As with revocations, CMS proposes to expand the grounds under which a provider’s application to enroll in Medicare can be denied. These expanded and additional grounds include many of the grounds added for revocations, but also include: Medicare Debt or Payment Suspension. CMS proposes expanding the ground to deny enrollment based on Medicare debt or payment suspension to include a provider or supplier’s “managing employee, managing organization, or individual or entity with any other form of business or financial relationship with the provider or supplier[.]” Significantly, this expansive definition (called an “associated party” under the proposed regulation) currently contains no material limitations, meaning almost any person or entity with whom an applicant does business could create denial liability. Sharing Locations with Denied/Revoked Providers or Suppliers. CMS would have authority to deny applications where a “provider’s or supplier’s practice location is in the same suite or office as another provider or supplier whose Medicare enrollment has been revoked or denied.” Hospices with Distant Medical Directors or Administrators. CMS would have discretion to deny hospice applications if the hospice’s medical director or administrator serves “multiple other hospices” or practices/is located “at such a distance (for example, in a different state) from the enrolling hospice that the medical director cannot realistically perform all medical director functions,” with a similar provision for administrators. In addition, CMS proposes applications denied for “other program termination or suspension,” may be applied to the provider or supplier in its own name or NPI or that of its owners, managing employees, or managing organization regardless of whether any appeals are pending. Retroactive Revocation CMS proposed to restructure and expand the regulatory grounds for retroactive revocation of billing privileges. Currently, Medicare regulations provide that revocations are, by default, prospective in nature: effective 30 days after CMS or the CMS contractor mails notice to the provider. Under certain circumstances, the regulations provide for revocations to be retroactive, such as when a provider is convicted of a felony, the date a professional license is suspended, revoked, or surrendered, or when a provider submits a false certification in their enrollment application. CMS has proposed to reframe the rule so as to default to retroactive revocation of billing privileges. CMS expressed concern that providers may collect payment from Medicare while remaining so non-compliant with enrollment requirements as to merit revocation. To address this concern, CMS proposed that all revocations be retroactive to the date of determined non-compliance.[1] As a result, providers suspected of misconduct or non-compliance are likely to face claims of retroactive overpayments in addition to the immediate concern no longer receiving Medicare payments while their enrollment is revoked. Reapplication Bar CMS’s proposed rule expands the grounds from which a provider may be prohibited from seeking reapplication as a Medicare provider. Under current regulations, CMS may prohibit prospective providers from enrolling in Medicare for up to 10 years if its enrollment application is denied because the applicant submitted false or misleading information in its application. Under the proposed rule, CMS will have the discretion to prohibit a provider from enrolling in Medicare if their enrollment application is denied for any reason. Conclusion As a part of the federal government’s increasingly aggressive push to combat real or perceived healthcare fraud, the proposed rule both broadens CMS’s authority to revoke and deny Medicare enrollment and raises the stakes for revocation and denial. What the proposed rule does not share is how CMS plans to exercise this expanded discretion: as a result, the proposed rule, if enacted, increases the unpredictability and potential ramifications of even technical noncompliance with CMS rules. As a result, Medicare providers should keep a close eye on potential revisions to these rules and their potential implementation and consider proactively evaluating their compliance under CMS standards. [1] In the proposed rule, CMS identifies, with respect to each ground for revocation, what it will consider to be the effective date of revocation.

Insights

State Affordability Infrastructure Districts (SAIDs) — A Financing Tool for Taiwanese Investment in Arizona Science and Technology Parks

If you have developed a facility inside one of Taiwan's science or technology parks, you are accustomed to the one-stop-shop of government planning the park and delivering the roads, water, power, and other infrastructure before your building is even constructed. In the United States, including Arizona, land development generally does not work that way. In Arizona, the cost of infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, power, and the digital backbone, typically falls on the private landowner and is incurred up front before operations generate revenue to offset that cost. For a company entering the Arizona market, this is often the largest and earliest capital burden of the entire project. Arizona recently created a tool that provides a more cost-effective way for landowners and developer to finance some of that infrastructure. House Bill 2999, signed into law June 2026 and codified at Chapter 40 of Title 48 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, establishes the creation of a State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID). How a SAID Works Landowners are now able to use a SAID to finance public infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, parking, lighting, communications, rail sidings and signalization, and similar improvements, through tax-exempt bonds. The bonds are repaid over up to 30 years and secured solely by the property within the SAID. No city, county, or state credit is pledged, and no obligation falls on other taxpayers, and therefore no city, county, or state approval other than from the Arizona Finance Authority (AFA). In effect, a SAID lets you spread the cost of horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of funding it entirely at the outset. And tax-exempt bonds often offer a lower interest rate than taxable or other types of financing. How a SAID is Formed A SAID is formed upon the filing of a petition with the AFA. The petition must include the finance plan, general plan, estimated costs, maximum tax rate, appraisal, bond counsel certificate, consultant list, petitioner experience, legal description, title report, and other materials. While the landowner is required to provide notice to the local governing jurisdiction, local governing jurisdiction does not have the right to approve or deny. The petition is reviewed administratively by the AFA through a standards-based process. For an inbound investor without long-standing local relationships, an objective, criteria-driven process is a meaningful advantage to the overt political process associated with other financing districts in Arizona. Formation requirements. A SAID requires consent from 100% of landowners within the proposed district; public infrastructure costs must exceed $5 million (easily met at any real scale); the district property must all be in the same county and need not be contiguous provided that noncontiguous property is located within five miles of the district's other property; and the board is initially appointed by the forming owners of the SAID district, later transitioning to election as ownership diversifies. Actual bond issuance requires an election of the SAID property owners. Ownership and corporate structure. Consent rights and board seats run with title. If you hold the Arizona land through a U.S. blocker beneath your Taiwan parent, the standard model for Taiwanese/Arizona real estate and operating investment, the U.S. property-holding entity, rather than it’s corporate parent, is the landowner of record for the district. Before formation, our Dorsey team will confirm that you have the proper corporate structure and board mechanics to be compliant.  Board composition has no citizenship or residency requirement. This is a common concern for foreign investors, and the statute answers it cleanly. Under A.R.S. § 48-7004, a director must either hold fee title to real property in the district or be an individual designated or appointed by a fee-title owner. Corporations, partnerships, and other business entities are expressly permitted to be those owners, to vote as owners, and to designate an individual to serve. There is no requirement that a director be a U.S. citizen or resident. So your U.S. property-holding entity, as landowner of record, can appoint whichever of your principals you choose, including a Taiwan-based individual, as the three-member board.  Power infrastructure limitation. The enacted definition of "public infrastructure" in A.R.S. § 48-7001 does not include electrical power generation or transmission. The reference to electrical facilities appears only as components of lighting and traffic-control systems, and the Legislature removed broader energy infrastructure from the definition during the Senate amendments. A SAID will likely not finance the high-load power infrastructure required for semiconductor fabrication, data storage, or heavy manufacturing.  Water infrastructure within a current utility CC&N. Where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the SAID cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility on completion. Entitlements and zoning: The determination of entitlements, zoning, and other land use permitting, as well as construction permitting for a technology or manufacturing facilities remain with the local jurisdiction and run on a separate track. Our Dorsey team will help you coordinate the financing and entitlement timelines together. Our Dorsey team works regularly with Taiwanese and other Asia-Pacific companies entering the Arizona market. If a SAID fits your project, we can structure it for your cross-border ownership.

News

37 Dorsey Attorneys Named 2026 Top Lawyers by Minnesota Monthly

Minnesota Monthly has recognized 37 Dorsey attorneys across 27 practice areas as 2026 Top Lawyers in Minnesota. Honorees are selected through a peer nomination process and a curated survey of practicing attorneys in Minnesota, who identify leading lawyers across a range of practice areas. Administrative / Regulatory Law Jennifer Coates Antitrust Law Michael Lindsay Banking & Financial Service Law Peter Nelson Copyright Law  Jeffrey Cadwell Corporate Law  Robert Hensley Robert Rosenbaum Criminal Defense: White-Collar  Beth Forsythe Edward Magarian RJ Zayed Health Care Law  Claire Topp Immigration Law  J. Mike Sevilla Insurance Law  Daniel Brown Intellectual Property and Patent Law  Stuart Hemphill International Trade Law  Jonathan Van Horn Labor and Employment Law  Edward Magarian Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Land Use & Zoning  Jay Lindgren Marcus Mollison Litigation – Antitrust  Michael Lindsay F. Matthew Ralph Jaime Stilson Litigation – Commercial  Michael Lindsay Litigation – Construction  Eric Ruzicka Litigation – Intellectual Property  Peter Lancaster RJ Zayed Litigation – Labor Employment Benefits  Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Litigation – Trusts and Estates  William J. Berens Theresa Bevilacqua Bridget Logstrom Koci Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions  James K. Langdon Mergers & Acquisitions Law  Keith Ahlgren Rachel Benedict Brian Burke Morgan Helme John Jorgenson Brian Moore Robert Rosenbaum Jonathan Van Horn Bri Whiting Municipal Law Jay Lindgren Nonprofit/Charities Law Claire Topp Securities / Capital Markets Law Cam Hoang Robert Rosenbaum Securities Regulation Theresa Bevilacqua James K. Langdon Tax Law William J. Berens Trusts and Estates Jennifer Ede Bridget Logstrom Koci Sonny Miller Kiley Petty Henry

Insights

Alaska HB 126: What Changes for Alaska Native Corporations, Proxy Filings, and Annual Reports

Alaska House Bill 126 (HB 126), sponsored by Representative Neal Foster and passed by the 34th Alaska Legislature, is now law. The bill changes which Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) must file proxy and annual report materials with the State of Alaska, and makes it easier to reinstate certain dissolved Village Corporations. For many smaller Village Corporations, the practical result is less public disclosure. For shareholders, advisors, and the public, it means some financial information that used to be available through the State will no longer be readily obtained. This eUpdate explains what HB 126 does in plain terms, walks through the practical trade-offs, and answers common questions. 1. What HB 126 Changes The old rule Under prior law (Alaska Statutes Sec. 45.55.139), an Alaska Native Corporation had to file its annual report, proxies, and proxy statements with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities (the Division) if it had more than $1 million in assets and 500 or more shareholders on its current rolls. A filing ANC was also required to follow the Division’s proxy rules (3 AAC 08.305 through .365), which require specific disclosures such as top 5 executive compensation, and related-party transactions. Because these filings are treated as public records, they gave non-shareholders, including the public and the press, visibility into ANC financial information that is not filed with the SEC. The new rule HB 126 changes how the 500-shareholder test is measured. Now, the asset test is removed, and the shareholder count is based on how many shareholders the corporation originally enrolled when it was formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), not how many it has today. As shares have passed down through families over the decades, some Village Corporations that started with fewer than 500 shareholders now have more than 500 recordholders. Under the old current-count test, when those corporations had crossed the threshold, they had to file. Under the new original-enrollment test, they do not. Who is affected Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders are the main beneficiaries. They no longer have to file proxy and annual report materials with the Division or follow the Division’s proxy regulations at 3 AAC 08.305 through .365. Two groups must continue to file as before: all twelve ANCSA Regional Corporations, each of which enrolled more than 500 shareholders at creation, and all Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders. As reported by the Alaska Beacon, when the bill was under consideration, the Division identified 59 corporations then filing, expected at least seven village corporations to become exempt, and was reviewing roughly 30 more. 2. Practical Analysis HB 126 reduces a real compliance burden for smaller Village Corporations, which now need not spend time and money on State filings. In coming years, the exempt Village Corporations may experience benefits associated with less public disclosure and less regulation. But at the same time, less public disclosure carries trade-offs. Benchmarking will become harder Publicly-filed proxy statements and annual reports have long served as a reference set. Shareholders, corporations, advisors, and counsel use them to compare governance practices, compensation, and financial results across similarly-situated ANCs. Since fewer of these materials will be filed publicly, there will be fewer comparable documents available, which will make benchmarking and market-checking more difficult for like-sized ANCs over time. Executive compensation transparency may be reduced The Division’s proxy rules require disclosure of the compensation of ANC’s top five most highly compensated individuals (3 AAC 08.345(b)(2)), related-party transactions above $20,000 (3 AAC 08.345(b)(3)), and audited financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis (3 AAC 08.365). When a corporation is no longer required to file these disclosures publicly, it becomes harder for shareholders and others to obtain the information, to understand how compensation is set for their corporate leadership, and how it compares across corporations of similar size and complexity. Transparency may matter more as ANCs grow Some ANCs have grown into large, complex enterprises with substantial revenue and many subsidiaries, even with fewer than 500 shareholders. For an ANC with a broad and dispersed shareholder base, public materials can be an important way for shareholders and other stakeholders to understand governance, compensation, and performance across ANCs. Reduced disclosure may carry more practical weight in those settings than for a small corporation whose shareholders are closely connected to the business. The ANCSA annual report obligation continues It is important not to overstate what HB 126 does. HB 126 changes the state filing proxy requirements. It does not remove the separate obligation under ANCSA itself. That obligation comes from ANCSA at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c), which requires a Native Corporation that would otherwise be subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prepare and transmit to its shareholders an annual report containing substantially the information a company subject to that Act would include. Similarly, ANCs that solicit proxies for an annual meeting are still required to furnish shareholders with those proxy materials under general Alaska corporate law. However, ANCs are now no longer required to transmit proxy statements to the State. ANCs’ reporting obligations to their shareholders are unaffected by HB 126. Any corporation newly exempt from state filing still owes its shareholders a detailed annual report and a proxy statement, even though that report is no longer routed through the State and made public. Reinstatement of dissolved Village Corporations Separately, HB 126 amends AS 10.06.960(k) to remove the prior deadline (previously December 31, 2020) for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. A dissolved Village Corporation may now apply to be reinstated under AS 10.06.633(e) at any time. Reinstatement still runs through the commissioner under AS 10.06.633(e). In general, that means the ANC must apply, cure the neglect or delinquency that led to dissolution, and pay the amounts owed, and the corporation’s name must be available or be changed to one that is. Once reinstated, the corporation and its shareholders are restored to the rights, privileges, liabilities, and obligations they would have had as if the dissolution had never occurred, and corporate and shareholder actions taken during the dissolution are treated as valid. If the previously-used corporate name is no longer available, the board alone may amend the articles to adopt a new name (without the necessity for shareholder approval). 3. Frequently Asked Questions What does HB 126 do? It changes how Alaska measures the 500-shareholder test that decides which ANCs must file proxy and annual report materials with the state. It removes the asset test, and it counts shareholders based on original enrollment rather than the current rolls. It also removes the deadline for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. Which ANCs are affected? Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders, because they may no longer need to file with the Division. Regional Corporations and Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders must continue to file as before. Does HB 126 eliminate all reporting obligations? No. It changes the state filing requirement under AS 45.55.139, but it does not remove the separate ANCSA obligation (43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c)) to provide shareholders with an annual report, and general corporate law still calls for a proxy statement when the ANC solicits proxies. Corporations that remain subject to state filing requirements must also continue to comply with the Division's rules. We think we are now exempt. What should our ANC board and management consider? Confirm your ANC’s original enrollment number and whether your corporation falls below the new threshold. Watch for communications from the State on this topic as they proceed with their research. If your ANC is now exempt, decide how your corporation will meet its continuing ANCSA obligation to shareholders, review proxy and annual meeting materials and timelines, and consider what to communicate to shareholders about any change in how they will receive information. It is worth documenting the basis for any exemption. What should ANC shareholders watch for? Shareholders should watch for how and when they will continue to receive annual report and proxy statement information directly from their ANC, since some material that used to be available through the State’s online website will no longer be publicly filed. If something is unclear, shareholders can ask their ANC how it intends to meet its ANCSA reporting obligations. How Dorsey Can Help HB 126 lightens the State filing load for smaller Village Corporations, but it also raises practical questions: confirming who is exempt, meeting continuing ANCSA obligations to shareholders, keeping proxy and annual meeting processes on track, and maintaining benchmarking when public materials become less available. These are exactly the kinds of judgment calls that benefit from early planning. Dorsey’s attorneys work closely with Alaska Native Corporations and related stakeholders. If you have questions about HB 126, ANC governance, proxy filings, annual reports, disclosure obligations, or shareholder communications, please contact your Dorsey attorney, including the authors of this eUpdate.

Insights

The Long-Awaited Public Infrastructure Financing Solution for Development in Arizona

Every developer who has taken raw Arizona ground to a finished project knows the largest upfront cost other than the land price is almost always the cost to install the public infrastructure. Water, sewer, stormwater, streets, dry utilities, and the fiber backbone all have to be in the ground before a single lot closes or a building opens. That capital is deployed early and generates no return for years. For decades the standard workaround has been the Community Facilities District (CFD). That tool has grown materially harder to use, for reasons cited below, and House Bill 2999, signed in June 2026 and now codified as Chapter 40 of Title 48, is Arizona's response. Some Background I have spent a good part of my career on the other side of this problem. In the 1990s and early 2000s I served as general counsel of SunCor Development Company, one of Arizona's most active master-planned community developers, where we used Community Facilities Districts to finance hundreds of millions of dollars of major infrastructure across Arizona in cities such as Goodyear, Phoenix, Tempe, Litchfield Park, and Prescott Valley. For its time the CFD was an effective structure, and a great deal of what is now on the ground in those communities was financed with this tool. Unfortunately, CFDs have over time become considerably harder to use. Successive legislative amendments have layered on tax-rate ceilings, homebuyer disclosure obligations, and added procedural steps. Another drag on the use of CFDs is that formation of them runs through the municipality, where approval can turn as much on local politics as on the merits of a project. Developers now routinely are asked to absorb delay and uncertainty that a project's economics cannot support, which is a large part of why Arizona has fallen behind Colorado, Texas, and Utah in getting infrastructure financed. A better tool was needed, and Chapter 40 is it. How a SAID Improves on a CFD A State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID) keeps what worked about the CFD: tax-exempt, property-secured, non-recourse infrastructure financing — while shedding much of what made the CFD cumbersome. Its principal advantages over a traditional CFD: Administrative formation. A SAID is formed by the Arizona Finance Authority against fixed statutory criteria, through a yes-or-no compliance review on a sixty-day clock, rather than through the discretionary approval of a city council or a board of supervisors. Insulation from municipal politics. Because formation is a state-level compliance determination, a meritorious project is far less exposed to local political headwinds than it is under the CFD process. Landowner control of the board. A SAID is governed by a board of the landowners — appointed at formation, then elected on an acreage basis. In a typical municipal CFD, the city council sits as the district board; here, the developer controls governance. Advance funding of impact fees. A SAID can use bond proceeds to advance-pay municipal development impact fees, unlike CFDs, removing one of the largest upfront cash burdens in a project. A uniform, statewide process. The criteria are the same regardless of jurisdiction, replacing the municipality-by-municipality variation that has made CFD outcomes hard to predict. Flexible boundaries. A district may include noncontiguous parcels in the same county within five miles of one another, which fits phased and multi-tract development. Capped cost and a fixed timeline. Authority fees to form a district are capped at $15,000, and a complete petition must be acted on within sixty days. The full range of bonds. A SAID may issue general obligation, special assessment, revenue, and refunding bonds, secured solely by district property and creating no obligation for any other taxpayer. What is a SAID A SAID is a special taxing district that the owners of a development form to finance public infrastructure with tax-exempt bonds: general obligation bonds, special assessment bonds, and revenue bonds. The bonds are secured only by the property inside the district and are repaid over the long term, with terms up to 30 years. They do not affect the credit of the city, the county, or the State, and they create no obligation for any taxpayer outside the district. In practical terms, a SAID lets you finance horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of writing the check at the front end. The maximum ad valorem rate securing general obligation bonds is capped by statute at $5.00 per $100 of net assessed limited property valuation, with a limited step-up to cover a debt-service shortfall. SAIDs Work for Commercial as Well as Residential Development The SAID bill drew most of its press as a housing-affordability measure, and it appears to be a strong one. It is the first Arizona district statute to let bond proceeds advance-fund municipal development impact fees, which pulls one of the largest upfront cash burdens off a homebuilder's pro forma. But the statute's eligible infrastructure categories apply with equal force to commercial, industrial, and mixed-use projects. An industrial or logistics project can finance roads, rail crossings, sidings, and grade separations. A life-sciences or technology campus can finance its water, sewer, roads, and broadband the same way a subdivision can. Read Chapter 40 as a general-purpose infrastructure finance platform, not a subdivision-only device. How Formation Works A SAID is formed administratively by the Arizona Finance Authority. The Authority reviews the petition for compliance with the statute; it is a yes-or-no review against fixed criteria, not a discretionary negotiation with a city council or a board of supervisors, and it runs on a sixty-day clock once a complete petition is filed. Formation requires the written consent of 100% of the landowners in the proposed district and an engineer's certification that public infrastructure costs will exceed $5 million. The district may include noncontiguous parcels so long as they lie in the same county and within five miles of the district's other property, which accommodates phased and multi-tract development; if any part of the district sits inside a municipality, the whole district must stay within that municipality's limits or planning area. The Authority's fees to form a district are capped at $15,000. Issuing bonds requires a district election. Governance Simplified A SAID is run by a three-member board. The initial directors are named in the petition; after that, directors are elected by the landowners on an acreage basis as ownership diversifies. Board service runs with ownership; a director must either hold fee title inside the district or be an individual designated by a fee-title owner; and corporations, partnerships, and other entities may hold that ownership, vote as owners, and designate the individual who serves. A district has no power of eminent domain and no zoning authority, and directors may not be officials or employees of the municipality in which the district sits. What a SAID Does Not Do It finances; it does not entitle. Zoning, platting, rezonings, use permits, and the specialized approvals a manufacturing or life-sciences facility may need all remain with the local jurisdiction and proceed on their own track. The financing and entitlement timelines should be coordinated with formation of the SAID, but they are separate processes. Two substantive limits are worth flagging at the planning stage. First, electric power is largely outside the tool: the statutory definition of public infrastructure does not reach power generation or transmission, and broader energy infrastructure was removed from the bill during the Senate amendments. A power-intensive user should not assume a SAID will carry its electrical load. Second, where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the district cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility upon completion. Our Take For most master-planned residential work, and for a wide range of commercial and industrial development, a SAID will be the most efficient infrastructure-financing structure Arizona has offered. The right time to evaluate it is early in the acquisition and pre-development process, while the capital stack, the development agreement, and the entitlement strategy are still being set. Once the district's boundaries, general plan, and financing parameters are set, it is cumbersome at best to bring those into conformance later. Our Dorsey team has begun advising our developer clients on SAID formation on residential, commercial, and industrial projects statewide. If you would like us to assess whether a SAID fits a project you are working on, please reach out.

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Real Estate Attorney Alexis Olsen Joins Dorsey in Phoenix

Attorney Alexis Olsen has joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP as Of Counsel in the Real Estate group in Phoenix, the law firm announced today. Alexis focuses her practice on large-scale residential, mixed-use, and multi-asset development projects as well as multi-state commercial leasing transactions. She guides clients through sophisticated acquisitions, dispositions, leasing, entity structuring, investment strategies, and due diligence matters. She has structured co-investment arrangements that drive capital deployment into housing subdivisions nationwide and has represented both landlords and tenants in commercial leasing transactions involving office, retail, industrial, and specialty-use properties, including cannabis dispensaries. Alexis received her J.D. from Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law and her B.A. from the University of Arizona. Alexis comes to Dorsey from Squire Patton Boggs. “Alexis strengthens Dorsey’s real estate capabilities at a time when Phoenix remains one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic real estate markets in the country,” said Scott Jenkins, Dorsey’s Phoenix office head. “Her addition further enhances our deep bench of 12 real estate attorneys in Phoenix and reflects our continued investment in serving clients throughout Arizona and supporting their real estate transactions and objectives across the country. We are thrilled to welcome Alexis to Dorsey.” “Joining a firm with such a deep bench of experienced attorneys in the Phoenix office, especially in the Real Estate group, presents an exciting opportunity not just for my own professional growth, but for the clients we service,” said Alexis Olsen. “I look forward to building on this strong foundation, growing our national practice, and delivering top-tier service to our clients.”

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Litigation Privilege Does Not Automatically Protect Communications with Funders: The Commercial Court Clarifies the Limits of Privilege in the Context of Litigation Funding

In Uber London Ltd & Ors v Garry White & Ors; Mishcon de Reya LLP [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that documents created to help a funder decide whether to invest in a claim will not ordinarily attract litigation privilege. This means that information a firm gathers while acting for a funder can later fall within the control of the claimants it goes on to represent in the same matter. Background The Claimants (a claim group of over 10,000 individual London black cab drivers and the assignee of two former minicab operators) alleged that the Defendants (three companies in the Uber group) obtained and retained their private hire operator's licence through an unlawful means conspiracy alleged to involve fraud. Because the claims were issued outside the ordinary six-year limitation period, the Claimants relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, contending they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud before June 2018. A preliminary issue trial was listed to determine the question of whether the Claimants discovered, or could have discovered with reasonable diligence, the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment only after June 2018. The Claimants were represented by Mishcon de Reya ("MdR"). However, before MdR’s engagement with the individual drivers had begun, in late 2017 it was engaged by the litigation funder Harbour to investigate the merits and value of the potential claim. During that stage, MdR corresponded extensively with Harbour and with the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association ("LTDA"), a black cab drivers' trade association. MdR was not formally engaged by the Claimants until October 2018 onwards. Once the proceedings had started, the Defendants sought disclosure of communications exchanged between MdR and Harbour before the engagement of MdR by the Claimants (the "Harbour Communications"). This included correspondence between MdR and Harbour, communications with the LTDA, and documents held on MdR's file opened in Harbour's name in connection with the potential claim. The Claimants resisted disclosure on four grounds: (i) that the documents were not relevant; (ii) on the grounds of litigation privilege; (iii) that the documents were outside their control; and (iv) that disclosure occurring so close to trial would be disproportionate. Judgment (i) Were the Harbour Communications relevant to the preliminary issue? The Court held that the Harbour Communications were likely to contain relevant material, on two bases. First, where the Claimants or the LTDA had communicated directly with MdR, that material could shed light on individual Claimants' actual knowledge of the alleged facts. Secondly, what MdR and Harbour had discovered during their investigation could inform the question of what a Claimant could reasonably have discovered at the time (even though the Defendants accepted that MdR's knowledge could not simply be imputed to the Claimants). (ii) Were the Harbour Communications protected by litigation privilege? As set out in the classic cases of Three Rivers (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 and WH Holding Ltd v E20 Stadium LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2652, communications between parties or their solicitors and third parties for the purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation are privileged when the following conditions are satisfied: Litigation must be in progress or in reasonable contemplation. The communications must have been made for the sole or dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The litigation must be adversarial, not investigative or inquisitorial. The Court rejected the Claimant’s claim to be able to withhold the Harbour Communications on the basis of litigation privilege. The Court confirmed that litigation privilege protects only communications created for the dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The Court found that Harbour had instructed MdR so that Harbour could decide whether to fund the proceedings. As such, the dominant purpose of the communications was in relation to funding, not the conduct of litigation. This was distinguished from the situation where an individual litigant who takes its own funding decision. In that situation, the decision whether to fund and the decision whether to litigate are one and the same, made by the person who will actually be the claimant, and so it forms a part of that person's conduct of their own litigation. In contrast, a third-party funder's commercial decision whether to fund someone else's claim is not necessarily part of conducting that litigation. The fact that litigation privilege can, in principle, be claimed by a non-party funder (as recognised in the case of Al Sadeq v Dechert [2024] EWCA 28) did not assist Harbour, since there was no evidence it intended to play any role in the litigation itself beyond funding it. Communications between Harbour and MdR did remain capable of attracting another kind of privilege: legal advice privilege, because of the solicitor-client relationship between Harbour and MdR. But communications with third parties such as the LTDA were not automatically protected in the same way. (iii) Were the Harbour Communications within the Claimants' control? The Court also rejected the argument that the Harbour Communications sat outside the Claimants' control because they belonged to Harbour and not the Claimants. The Court’s reasoning was that once the individual Claimant drivers became MdR's clients, MdR also owed them a duty to disclose material information. That included information that MdR had originally acquired while acting for Harbour. As held in the case of Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood (a firm) [2005] 1 WLR 567, a solicitor owing duties to two clients cannot simply prefer one over the other, and it was unrealistic to suppose MdR would investigate the same claims for Harbour, then represent the Claimants, while disregarding everything it had already learned. The obvious commercial expectation was that this earlier work would be used to advance the Claimants' case. MdR sought to rely on a confidentiality clause in a 2024 retainer agreement between it and RGL Management Ltd (a claims management company acting on behalf of the Claimants) to argue that it was relieved of any duty to disclose information obtained while acting for other clients. The provision stated that MdR may "have acted for persons in the same or similar sector as yours and by agreeing to the terms of this letter you agree that will have no duty to disclose to you any confidential information that we have obtained, or might in the future obtain, from acting for such persons or which is derived from any other source". The Court rejected this on several grounds. Claimants who had already become MdR's clients had an existing right to information in the Harbour Communications where it was relevant to their claims before the 2024 retainer agreement. If they were to surrender that right, it would have required their informed consent (also required under the SRA Code of Conduct). The Court found no evidence that such informed consent had been given. The terms had simply been made available to the Claimants through a portal, with no indication that Claimants understood they were giving up existing rights to relevant information. The Court found that even if the terms had been contractually binding, that would not have amounted to informed consent. In addition, the wording of the clause was not sufficiently clear to show that the Claimants had agreed to waive access to this information. (iv) Was disclosure reasonable, proportionate, and necessary at this stage? The Claimants argued that it was neither reasonable nor proportionate for disclosure to be given at such a late stage (approximately two weeks before the start of the preliminary issue trial) and that it was not necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings. The Court rejected this, but it drew a distinction between two categories of documents within the Harbour Communications: Documents bearing on the actual knowledge of the individual drivers, including communications with the LTDA, were not privileged, likely straightforward to review, and directly relevant to the preliminary issue. Their disclosure was ordered as reasonable, proportionate, and necessary. Documents reflecting only MdR's or Harbour's own assessment of the merits were of more marginal, indirect relevance and largely likely to fall under legal advice privilege. A review to isolate the smaller pool of non-privileged material in this category would be time-consuming for limited benefit, so this was excluded from the order. Key Points to Note The judgment is an important reminder of several practical points: However closely a funder is involved in evaluating a claim's merits, litigation privilege will only apply to communications where the sole or dominant purpose of the communication is the conduct of litigation, not the funder's own decision on whether to finance it. Unless that communication separately attracts legal advice privilege, it may need to be disclosed. The same considerations apply to other communications. For example, in RBS Rights Litigation [2017] 1 WLR 3539 the argument that an After the Event (ATE) policy was subject to litigation privilege was rejected on a similar basis. Whilst in this case, there was no dispute as to whether litigation was in contemplation, it is important to note that litigation privilege will not automatically apply to the investigative stages of a claim, i.e. before litigation is in contemplation. Even where litigation is reasonably contemplated, the dominant purpose test must still be satisfied. Material created primarily for fact-finding, risk assessment, or other investigative purposes will not attract litigation privilege unless those activities are actually undertaken for the dominant purpose of conducting the litigation. (See The Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2017] EWHC 1017 (QB)). When engaging a law firm, clients should ensure that they understand whether the firm has previously obtained information about their claim while acting for another party (for example, a funder or another interested party) and how that information will be handled. Any restrictions on the firm’s ability to share relevant information with the client should be explained clearly at the outset, including what information may be withheld and why. If this decision raises questions about your own funding arrangements, disclosure strategy, or privilege position, please get in touch with our Commercial Litigation team.

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Dorsey Partner Melissa Raphan Elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers

International law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP is pleased to announce that Partner Melissa Raphan has been elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers (CLEL) as part of its 2026 class. “Melissa’s election to this prestigious fellowship comes as no surprise to those of us who have had the privilege of working with her,” says Peter Nelson, Dorsey’s Managing Partner.  “She is an exceptional employment lawyer, a trusted advisor, and a leader whose impact extends far beyond her matters. Clients rely on her deep knowledge, strategic counsel, and ability to navigate complex workplace disputes and sensitive employment matters with both confidence and compassion. She has helped shape our firm, strengthen our profession, and opened doors for countless others through her commitment to mentorship and diversity. We are incredibly proud of her accomplishments and delighted to see her receive this recognition.” CLEL is a nonprofit professional association that honors the nation’s leading attorneys in the field of labor and employment law. Originally established to recognize excellence in the profession, CLEL has evolved into a respected intellectual and practical resource for the legal community and its many audiences. Its mission centers on recognizing individuals who have made significant contributions to the field, fostering the exchange of knowledge and delivering value to academia, government, the judiciary, and the broader public. Election as a fellow represents the highest level of peer acknowledgment, reflecting sustained achievement, integrity, and a commitment to advancing the profession. Melissa’s career reflects CLEL’s mission. She has been recognized both regionally and nationally for her advocacy, leadership, and achievements both inside and outside of the courtroom. Her employment litigation experience spans class actions, collective actions, and high-stakes individual disputes in state and federal courts, as well as arbitration forums including the American Arbitration Association and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). She is also a trusted advisor on a full range of workplace issues, from hiring and performance management to sensitive terminations and organizational change. She brings decades of experience representing clients across the financial services, healthcare, food and agriculture, and energy sectors. Melissa will be formally inducted during CLEL’s installation ceremony held in conjunction with the American Bar Association’s Labor & Employment Law Conference in Washington, D.C., on November 7.

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Patent Partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic Join Dorsey in Palo Alto

Patent partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic have joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Palo Alto, the international law firm announced today. Al Araiza works with clients to develop and implement patent strategies that align with corporate objectives, supporting growth initiatives, financing efforts, and successful exits, including initial public offerings and acquisitions. He advises on building, managing, and optimizing patent portfolios across a broad range of emerging and frontier technologies, with depth in wireless communications, artificial intelligence, and energy innovation. Before practicing law, Al gained engineering experience in the defense industry, working on energy system modeling and communications circuitry design. He also conducted biomedical research, with findings published in peer-reviewed journals. He has been recognized in the IAM Patent 1000 for his work advising clients on patent strategy and portfolio development. Al received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law, his M.E. in Biomedical Engineering from Tulane University, and his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from UCLA. Lena Petrovic works across the software and hardware industries to develop clear, well-supported patent applications. She guides clients through the prosecution process and advises on global trademark and copyright matters, including licensing and portfolio management. Lena regularly supports clients developing technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, fintech, cryptography, interactive and immersive experiences, and digital media, and works with companies in entertainment, gaming, and sports. Before practicing law, Lena spent a decade at Pixar, where she contributed to major films including The Incredibles, Ratatouille, WALL‑E, and Brave. Lena received her J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law, her M.S. in Computer Science from Princeton University, and her B.S. from California Institute of Technology. “Al and Lena bring a practical, technical, and business-focused approach informed by extensive experience working with technology companies, startups, and investors,” said Gina Cornelio, Patent Practice Group Co-Leader. “We are thrilled to welcome them to the Patent team and our growing Palo Alto office.” “Dorsey’s Patent practice is dedicated to understanding each client's business deeply, tailoring patent strategies that directly advance their goals,” said Al Araiza. “We are proud to join this outstanding team and look forward to driving success for our clients.”