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The Nuances of Antitrust Law

September 5, 2024

by Kent J. Schmidt and Anthony P. Badaracco

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Antitrust law is complex, demanding a clear grasp of its nuances, especially in identifying permitted versus prohibited conduct. In this episode, SharkCast host Kent Schmidt interviews fellow Dorsey Partner Tony Badaracco about the evolving landscape of antitrust law. With new decisions and emerging trends, staying informed is crucial.

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Transcript

Voiceover

Welcome to another episode of the SharkCast on litigation risks management where we explore why businesses are so frequently sued, and how to mitigate and navigate the dangers lurking in these risky waters. Join us now as we welcome our host Kent Schmidt, Litigation Partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.

Schmidt

Welcome to another episode of SharkCast. Today we’re going to tackle the challenging and somewhat daunting topic of antitrust law. US antitrust law is one of the more complicated areas of the law. It can be a challenge for in-house counsel, and others tasked with keeping a client out of trouble, to understand the nuances of antitrust law, specifically, what is permitted and what is prohibited conduct. Even for a seasoned practitioner, the details and specific types of agreements and business practices can present a challenge. It’s a recurring, evolving area of the law, with new decisions coming out, new trends developing, and so staying abreast on the recent changes is also a significant task. To help us understand some of these big pictures and start to tackle some of the subject matter, I’m pleased to welcome to SharkCast, Tony Badaracco. Tony is a partner in our New York office and a significant part of his practice deals in this area of law. So welcome to SharkCast, Tony. It’s a pleasure to have you here to help us understand US antitrust law.

Badaracco

Well, thank you, Kent. I find antitrust to be fascinating and I’m happy to speak with you about it today and hopefully we can unpack some of those issues you’ve identified.

Schmidt

Excellent. You know, why don’t we begin with some broad observations. You and I have discussed antitrust law in broad strokes before and I think we agree that part of what makes this such a challenging area is that it’s controlled by very broadly worded statutes that were enacted well over a hundred years ago in most instances, and the legislature, congress or state legislatures, make these broad statements and then they leave it to the courts to try to figure out the details later on of what’s prohibited, what’s permitted, essentially what they meant, and that makes it very much a decisional driven area of the law as opposed to other areas of law where you can go and find the very precise answer by digging deep into the regulation. You can find the very specific answer in a very definitive manner to the question you’re asking. It becomes more challenging to try to figure out what’s analogous to the situation you’re dealing with by applying US decisions. Can you begin our discussion here by talking about that topic as well as the unifying theme or objective of antitrust law when you’re first approaching an antitrust problem?

Badaracco

Yeah, happy to. I think that’s a fair characterization. So antitrust is sometimes referred to as an example of statutory common law. Now statutes and common law are two different things. So what does that mean? You know, some areas of law are kind of Rules based or Code based. I mean, my understanding of the way that our tax lawyer colleagues work is that as you suggest, they look to the Code and a lot of the time there’s an answer, a kind of specific answer to address what’s supposed to happen in a specific area.

Schmidt

As well as some of our European Civil Code jurisdictions as well that aren’t based on the common law.

Badaracco

That’s also absolutely right. Other areas are driven really entirely by the common law. You and I, Kent, both spend some time litigating breach of contract matters, and that’s something where you really just have to look at what the courts have said over the years to figure out what the law is. Antitrust is a little bit of both. So, the Sherman Act, which is kind of the foundational law in the United States in the antitrust world, really says two things. One, contracts combinations and conspiracies and restraint of trade are unlawful, and two, monopolization or attempted monopolization is unlawful. There are a couple of other odds and ends in other parts of the law, but those are really the two kinds of foundational statutes. And if you’re a business trying to figure out how to comply with the law and avoid investigations and costly lawsuits in 2024, there’s a lot of work to do to go from that basic language to figuring out whatever complicated distribution structure or pricing plan or competitor collaboration or whatever else you’re considering doing is lawful or not. And I guess, I think what I would say is what it really comes down to, that kind of the lodestar, the guiding light in antitrust is always the notion of competition. So, kind of the philosophy behind antitrust law is that competition is good for consumers and it’s good for the economy overall because when businesses have to react to what other companies who are trying to eat their lunch do, the result is you get more competitive pricing offers, you get better service, you get more innovation. And so, the basic idea underlying antitrust laws is that competition is good and anything that deprives consumers and the economy of competition is bad. Now again, what that means in practice? Well, there are a whole lot of details to be worked out, but that’s a lodestar.

Schmidt

And before we get into some of those details, I want to talk about sources of litigation. You know, in my book on litigation risk, we talk about the five C’s of litigation and we do touch on antitrust law, although not in great detail, and we put it under the C, which is competitor claims, which I think is a fair place to stick antitrust law because as you say, competition is the guiding principle and so your competitor can bring a claim against you for violating antitrust law. In fact, that’s probably where most of these civil litigation claims come from, but you can also have lawsuits brought by consumers who claim that they do not have the choices that they’re entitled to under antitrust law, so that’s another of the C’s, and then another of the five C’s is contract claims. Contract provisions can be invalidated as illegal, unlawful, because they’re in violation of antitrust laws. So, you start covering a number of different C’s of the sources of litigation. On top of that, you have state antitrust statutes as well as federal. They don’t always align perfectly, and then of course you have the additional challenge of government enforcement. It doesn’t have to be civil litigation. The public prosecutor, whether it’s the US attorney or the justice department or state enforcers, can bring these claims. It is a widely varied area of the law where you have to have your eye on a number of different sources of litigation, sources of the law, both decisional and statutory, and then on top of all that you have treble damages and significant penalties that can attach. So, that’s probably a pretty good beginning compelling case for why understanding antitrust law is important. Can you talk to us now about a general framework for approaching a discussion of antitrust law and putting these various theories into the various buckets of antitrust violation?

Badaracco

Sure. Let me just pick up on what you just said a little bit and say that I agree with everything you’ve just said. There are a lot of different sources of antitrust complaints and issues, and I’ll just add one more, which is international enforcement authorities. If you’re a company that manufacturers domestically and distributes domestically and that’s it, then you probably don’t have to worry too much about what happens outside of the United States. But if you’re a tech company that offers an app or a software product or something else to people all over the world, you’ve got to pay a lot of attention to what the European Commission’s doing and the CMA and the UK and several jurisdictions in Asia and Latin America that are very active these days. And by the way, they communicate with each other, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission are in the habit of speaking regularly with their counterparts around the world. So, in terms of how to think about this, there is a framework that the courts in the United States have used for a long time in providing guidance on what’s lawful and what isn’t. So, I started off by saying that the two basic statutory provisions, Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, say nothing other than that contracts combination and conspiracies and restraint of trade are unlawful and that monopolization and attempted monopolization is unlawful. Any contract between one company and another company is a contract combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade because if you decide to do business with someone else in the marketplace under specific pricing terms and under a specific time term and under other terms you’ve restrained trade in some sense. I don’t think there’s any doubt about that. Really for more than 100 years since the beginnings of US antitrust law, the courts in the United States have put kind of a judicial gloss on the language that doesn’t actually appear in the statute, and that’s the word reasonable. Since the very beginning, courts have found that the antitrust laws in the United States only prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade, and over time we’ve kind of evolved to have two pathways that you can go down in trying to figure out whether something is lawful or not. One is that there are certain types of conduct that regardless of the structure of the market, regardless of the party’s intent, regardless of almost anything else, where you see these types of conduct, there’s an antitrust violation. So, we use the term per se in the antitrust world. There are certain things that are per se unlawful. The most obvious, most famous one that I think a lot of business people are familiar with is the notion of price fixing. So, if you call up your direct competitor and agree that you’re going to sell prices, sell your products rather at exactly the same price that your competitor is selling at, that is an antitrust violation no matter what, and the court doesn’t need to know anything else about how you got there or what the conversations look like or what the impact of those conversations are. If you agree to fix prices with a competitor, it’s an easy case, put it that way. And then there are certain other things that kind of look a lot like price fixing and maybe have the same ultimate impact. If you agree not to compete for certain categories of customers, if you agree to fix or rig bids that you make for a certain type of business in the marketplace, and then certain other things that just kind of look a lot like an agreement on price or the terms of sale. Those things are per se unlawful.

Schmidt

And is the per se rule the same whether it’s a civil claim or it’s a claim brought by the government?

Badaracco

Well, the government brings both civil cases and criminal cases. The Department of Justice Antitrust Division has criminal antitrust authority, and it also has civil antitrust authority alongside the Federal Trade Commission. And historically, the Department of Justice only brings criminal cases that are aimed at matters that are within the boundaries of what courts have found to be per se unlawful. So in that sense, yes, there’s a lot of overlap between the two concepts. The things that are prosecuted criminally are the same categories of conduct that we just talked about, it’s price fixing, bid rigging, customer allocation, things like that. When you get outside of the per se world, there’s just a whole universe of types of conduct that courts think about under what’s called the rule of reason. And when you’re in that world, that’s where you start to see questions about what the parties intended to do, what the likely impact of a certain type of conduct is, how many competitors or customers are going to be impacted by this conduct, how much competition is foreclosed, and those are complicated questions. Those are the kinds of questions when they come up in litigation, where both sides have to hire an economic expert, probably have to hire an industry expert, litigation tends to be long, drawn out, complicated and expensive, and so these are more difficult cases to win and much more complicated cases.

Schmidt

So the rule of reason is applicable to price fixing as well as other areas of antitrust law?

Badaracco

Generally no, but with one caveat. So, price fixing between competitors or between companies that are in what’s known as a horizontal relationship with each other because they’re kind of in the same segment of the market. They’re either selling directly to customers or they’re manufacturers that compete with each other. That’s per se unlawful no matter what. What’s sometimes called vertical price fixing or agreements on price between manufacturers and distributors or distributors and resellers is a little bit different. There, at least as a matter of federal law, it’s a rule of reason question, because as the courts have found over the course of the last couple of decades, sometimes there are good reasons for companies that are in a vertical arrangement with each other to talk about price with each other. Sometimes when they do that it makes it easier for a reseller to be comfortable making investments and selling more effectively. Sometimes it allows for more effective inter-brand competition, so competition between one manufacturer and then the various companies that are helping sell its products and manufacturers and resellers of competing products. Sometimes there are intellectual property reasons why it makes sense to allow for these kinds of conversations. In a vertical relationship, you have a lot more leeway, or at least sometimes there are good reasons to have conversations, than there are horizontally. When you talk with the direct competitor about price it’s really, really, really dangerous.

Schmidt

Can you give me some examples of a conversation or communication with a direct competitor about price that a company may feel instinctively is permitted because we’re not price fixing but getting awful close to the line and would potentially expose you to very significant antitrust violations.

Badaracco

Yeah, that’s a great question. So, and I’m going to answer that directly. But first let me make kind of a slightly different point. I think everybody knows, I think any savvy lawyer, and I think just about any business person, knows that if you have a conversation explicitly with your direct competitor about fixing prices or not competing for each other’s customers, that that’s wrong. And you might think they’re classic examples when this happens. I don’t know if you’ve seen the movie The Informant, it’s probably about 20 years old now at this point, with Matt Damon about the lysine cartel from a few decades ago now, and there was video of people in literally a dark smoke-filled room agreeing with each other on what prices they were going to charge. And at one point, one of them says oh, what if the FBI hears us, and then everybody in the room laughs. You know, because they know that they’re breaking the law when they have a conversation like that. I don’t think that’s what usually happens, though. That’s not the most common fact then. I think what’s much more common is kind of an informal conversation that’s kind of on the margins that where maybe people don’t necessarily realize that they’re talking about something that would be per se unlawful. Let me tell you how this might play out. A lot of companies are members of trade associations. Trade associations, by the way, are perfectly lawful, and they do all sorts of good work that’s critical for our economy. I have some trade associations that are my clients, and I’m happy to work with them. But there’s always danger when you get together with people from competing companies, and what can happen is that maybe you have a formal agenda of topics that are perfectly lawful and reasonable and pro-competitive, but then there’s a there’s a coffee break in between sessions, and during that coffee break, maybe outside of the room, maybe you have sales people or CEOs or senior executives from two companies that compete with each other, and you know, they have a social conversation about something that doesn’t have anything to do directly with work, and then maybe they get into a conversation or one of them says, oh boy, I’m really, I’m seeing a lot of pressure in, you know, this region of the country, I’m really having a lot of trouble there, I’m getting some more, you know, new competitors are entering, business is hard. And maybe the other one says, yeah, you know, I’m actually kind of seeing something similar in this other part of the country where I’ve, you know, my company’s kind of focused historically. And then, maybe they say, well, what if we just sort of back off of each other a little bit and I’ll kind of focus on this segment and you kind of focus on that segment and it’ll be better for both of us.

Schmidt

So they’re not discuss, to be clear, they’re not discussing price, they’re discussing markets and competition with one another.

Badaracco

That’s exactly right. And what I can tell you with great confidence is that if there were a lawyer from the Department of Justice Antitrust Division or, you know, an enterprising creative plaintiff’s lawyer who happened to be, you know, right around the corner and overhear that conversation, that person would take the position that what just happened was a conversation that restricts competition and that gets into the nature of the terms of marketing and sales that the two companies are entering into. So, if Company A agrees not to go after customers and Company B’s kind of best territory, and vice versa, well, then you know, competition is a little bit less intense for both of them and they’re just not going to have quite as much incentive to innovate and to offer promotions and to, you know, respond to customers concerns and things like that. And that’s the kind of thing that absolutely does happen. And by the way, it doesn’t just impact the two companies that were involved in that conversation. The trade association that put on the event and, you know, that may very well have hired counsel, but maybe somebody wasn’t listening to that conversation out in the hallway, could be named as a defendant in the case, or if not that could at least get a subpoena and have to produce documents and make somebody available for a deposition and get involved in something that it doesn’t want to have anything to do with.

Schmidt

For facilitating this anti-competitive agreement?

Badaracco

Exactly. And so, it seems to me that everybody has an interest in making sure that conversations like that don’t happen.

Schmidt

Well, it’s very interesting because I’ve had so many cases over the years where a significant part of the facts relating to the case occurred at a trade show. I mean, we’ve had, you know, cases involving, you know, NDA violations and people starting to get together to engage in some sort of joint venture and then it falls apart and they, but they had a sneak peek at the others and now they’re competing against them, you know, obviously a lot of other types of discussions and agreement occur at these trade, a lot of business is done at these trade associations and so I suppose the word to the wise for in-house counsel is be aware of who’s going off to trade associations, particularly those that are in senior management, have knowledge of strategic plans, but even those that are just far less aware of some of these issues. Trade association conventions are fraught with all sorts of risk.

Badaracco

Yeah, I really don’t want to bad mouth trade associations or trade shows because there’s a whole lot of good and reasonable and entirely proper business that gets done there too, from standards development to joint lobbying to just all sorts of things that the law is very clear are completely legitimate and healthy and not unlawful in any way, but I agree with you. Every company ought to be keeping track of which trade associations the company and its employees interact with. Particularly those where they’re C-Suite or senior salespeople attending and anybody who goes to trade show meetings should probably be meeting beforehand with in-house counsel to talk about how to take a relatively small number of, I think fairly easy steps to significantly reduce the risks associated with this sort of thing.

Schmidt

Before we move away from price fixing and allocation of markets, can you talk a little bit more about what you referred to earlier as this vertical situation of a manufacturer, for example, setting the price or minimum price for the resale and what the current state and federal law is on that, which is something that’s pretty common.

Badaracco

Sure. So, manufacturers might have any number of different reasons to want to set minimum prices for the sale of their products. Some companies are in a kind of a luxury brand space, and just for customer perception reasons, it can actually be helpful for prices to remain relatively high. Some companies want their distributors and retailers to really feel like kind of partners in the relationship, and to be sufficiently incentivized to invest time and resources in promoting the sale of the manufacturer’s products. There may be other reasons too. Historically until 2007, as a matter of federal law, it was per se unlawful for a manufacturer and its reseller or distributor to agree on the price for resale of the manufacturer’s products, but the law has changed. Since 2007, as a matter of federal law, those sorts of conversations about price are now subject to the rule of reason. They’re not automatically lawful, but they’re no longer automatically unlawful. And so, if a manufacturer has got good reasons for talking about these sorts of things, it’s often fine as a matter of federal law. But to go back to the very first thing that we talked about today, Kent, in addition to federal law, not all 50, but 40-some of our states have their own antitrust laws, and under the laws of a few states, including the one in which you said, in California, the states continue to take the position that conversations about price, even when they’re vertical in nature, between a manufacturer and its reseller are per se unlawful. But that’s not the end of the story, because in the price fixing regime under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, you have to have an agreement. If there’s no agreement, there’s no violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act or it’s state law corpus. So, for at least 100 years now, the Supreme Court of the United States has been clear that there’s a way to have conversations about price. You just can’t do it through an agreement. If you’re a manufacturer and you have a valid reason to want to keep minimum prices at a certain level, you can unilaterally announce to your resellers and distributors that here’s our list of minimum prices. It’s up to you because this is our unilateral policy, it’s up to you to decide whether you’re going to comply or not, but if you don’t, we’re going to terminate you and you’re not going to be able to sell our products anymore.

Schmidt

That’s not an agreement.

Badaracco

It’s not an agreement. So, even though it might feel like you’re getting to the same place, the point is, the other party still has a choice whether or not to comply, and as long as that’s true, as long as there’s no agreement, that sort of unilateral policy is perfectly legal under federal law and under the law of every state.

Schmidt

This is a great example of what I was talking about at the beginning, that antitrust can seem counterintuitive because if you can’t have an express agreement, but you can have the arrangement you just discussed, it seems six in one hand, half a dozen in another.

Badaracco

Well, Kent, let me push back on you very slightly on that, and you use the word arrangement. So, an agreement is an agreement, but there’s some case law including from California making pretty clear that even where you have a unilateral policy, as I described that would be lawful, if the reseller and the manufacturer then engage in back and forth communications, maybe the reseller tries to negotiate the prices a little bit, and then there are emails back and forth about where parties are gonna land, or maybe the reseller takes that unilateral policy, signs it, and says okay, I hereby agree and sends it back to the manufacturer. Then you have something that looks a whole lot more like an agreement. So, part of why this is an interesting area for an antitrust lawyer to work on is the implementation is just as important as the starting point. So, I can help a client write up a perfectly lawful unilateral pricing policy, but if the client then gets into conversations with its resellers and distributors about it that look a little too much like an agreement, well, we haven’t accomplished anything and there might be a problem.

Schmidt

I appreciate what you just said because I keep running into this concept in not just antitrust, but in many, many areas where I just want to use this to emphasize this. Policies are great. Policies are important. You got to have the policy, but policies are not self-executing and having the best policy in the world, whether it’s sexual harassment, you know, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, antibribery, you know, your ethics, your antitrust policy, they’re never enough. Vigilance, understanding, engagement, cultural implementation, all of that’s so important, and certainly antitrust law is no exception.

Badaracco

Yeah, and just briefly to kind of put sort of two points on top of what you’ve just said, which I agree completely with. You know, if there’s an announcement of a policy that comes out of an antitrust compliance policy, but it’s not clear that the CEO of the company cares about making sure that everybody complies with this, it’s not gonna work. Compliance has to start at the top, that’s point one. And then point two, you have to think about incentives and kind of the logistics of how people do their jobs. So when I’ve worked with clients to put in place pricing policies like what I’ve described, one thing that I always do is encourage them to set up an e-mail address that’s something like pricingpolicy@companyname.com, and make clear that any communication from a reseller or distributor that has anything to do with this policy, has to go to that e-mail address alone and it goes automatically to whichever lawyer at the company that’s responsible for ensuring compliance. So that the sales director, somebody who’s incentivized to just increase sales as much as possible, can’t unilaterally have conversations about something that might get the company in trouble, so that it has to go through a lawyer who has responsibility to make sure that the company is compliant. And I think that’s critically important.

Schmidt

Absolutely, couldn’t agree more. So can we just touch on maybe a few other areas that you’re seeing where a company can go down a path, whether it’s a policy, a practice or just an isolated transaction that at first blush wouldn’t seem like perhaps it deserves antitrust scrutiny, but they would be well advised to think about this practice policy or business endeavor from an antitrust standpoint.

Badaracco

Sure. So, so let me highlight one that’s been in the news lately, and that is noncompetes and nonsolicits. For a long time, I think companies particularly with senior executives and with people who work a lot with trade secrets and other kind of highly sensitive company information, companies have relied on noncompete agreements in the employment contracts that those people sign. As I think a lot of our listeners will have heard just by sort of reading the newspaper lately, the federal antitrust enforcement agencies have really started to crack down on noncompetes and nonsolicits in a significant way. So, for several years now, the Department of Justice has announced that it views noncompetes, nonpoach, nonsolicit agreements between competitors, as per se unlawful. That’s a relatively new development, and the Department of Justice has actually been bringing criminal cases directed to companies who’ve been reaching those agreements. More recently, the Federal Trade Commission announced the rule that would ban essentially all noncompetes nationwide going forward, and that would invalidate existing noncompetes. So that’s interesting for a couple of reasons. One, I think if you’re a company, you need to go back and look at your existing noncompetes that you’ve been relying on. Maybe years ago now at this point, you signed an employment agreement with someone who’s now your CEO, your COO, your CTO, and you’re relying on that to make sure that if that person leaves the company, that you’re most sensitive company information and secrets aren’t gonna leave along with that person and go to your competitor. Well, the FTC is saying that it doesn’t think you can do that. So, first of all, I think there’s a risk that companies entering into noncompetes are gonna see lawsuits where employees are taking the position that their advancement opportunities have been limited by these things and that they’ve been damaged, but I also think companies need to think about enforceability risk. The idea that you just can’t count on being able to enforce a noncompete or nonsolicit going forward the way that you used to, and you really ought to be thinking about other tools that you can use to get to the same place. Maybe you need to strengthen your nondisclosure agreements, maybe you should be thinking about retention bonuses and policies and other things that you can do to prevent your highly sensitive company information from going out the door to your competitor.

Schmidt

That’s a very important area. Anything else relating to lawsuits that we’re seeing brought under antitrust laws that are brought by consumers relating to impact on their consumer choice, their options, the pricing, that you think represents a wave of litigation or trends in litigation?

Badaracco

So customers for longer than I can remember have been bringing antitrust lawsuits alleging that they’ve been overcharged, and this happened specifically when the government brings a big antitrust case, you’re guaranteed to see treble damages, consumer class action cases get filed shortly thereafter. So just last week the Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against Live Nation related to its acquisition of Ticketmaster years ago. Well, very shortly afterward, we saw a class action filed on behalf of consume, actually a number of class actions filed on behalf of consumers alleging that they’ve had to pay too much, essentially, because of the collaboration between Live Nation and Ticketmaster, and I think we’re gonna continue seeing cases like that. If you’re a plaintiff’s lawyer, this sort of case is pretty appealing, because if you win, your client gets threefold its actual damages, and you get back your costs and attorney’s fees as well. So even a rule of reason case that might take 10 years to litigate can lead to significant damages awards that get trebled and that also involve the plaintiff getting its fees reimbursed, and because those incentives are so strong, defendants who get hit with rule of reason antitrust cases have to think pretty seriously about whether to settle early, even for significant amounts, rather than deal with the case that could take many, many years, potentially tens of millions of dollars of fees and an unknown outcome.

Schmidt

So as we start to wrap up this conversation about antitrust law, if you were to encapsulate your entire message on antitrust vigilance in a couple of sentences, what’s the main take away for in-house counsel grappling with potential antitrust liability?

Badaracco

Anytime that you’re thinking about some sort of a collaboration or an agreement with your direct competitor, it’s just fraught with peril and you have to think really seriously about that, but even outside of those sorts of agreements, anytime that somebody wants to talk about price or terms of sale or anything that tends to implicate the antitrust laws, speak with your in-house counsel about it, because an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

Schmidt

Well, Tony, we’ve reached the end of our allocated time to talk about these interesting antitrust concepts and advice relating to antitrust compliance. At this point in our show, we like to do what we call the deeper dive and learn a little bit more about you as a person outside of your practice. So why don’t I ask you a couple of questions, beginning with what you do to manage stress as a busy lawyer with an expanding practice? How do you manage stress with various activities and things in the evenings, and weekends or the mornings, early mornings to keep your head above water?

Badaracco

Well, for a long time now I’ve been a runner, so I love just going outside. I never bring music with me. I never put any headphones in or anything else. I love to just go out and run because it burns calories, but I also just find that it clears my head out and I tend to do some pretty good thinking after I do that.

Schmidt

You like to hear the sound of your feet on the pavement.

Badaracco

Well, I live in New York City, so it’s that along with you know, taxi horns and people yelling at each other and who knows what else, but that’s right. You know, another thing I’ve actually started doing in the last year or two is a very brief daily meditation. So, I actually, there’s an app that I use and it’s just five minutes a day. It’s nothing too intense and I tend to do it at night after dinner, and I just find that it helps to kind of calm my mind down and help me refocus a little bit and get in a good space before trying to go to sleep. I’ve really gotten a lot of value on that, and I think it’s probably going to be a lifelong habit.

Schmidt

And I recall year and a half or so ago, I might be off, you being on paternity leave, so you have a family and that adds to the joys, but also adds to the stress as well. How many children do you have?

Badaracco

Yeah, just one and as far as I’m concerned that’s plenty to keep me busy. My son is 18 months old. Sometimes just being able to take advantage of a little nap here and there is worth about as much as anything else too.

Schmidt

Yeah, for sure. Let me ask you another question I’ve asked other guests on SharkCast before. If you weren’t a lawyer today, where could you conceivably see yourself career-wise?

Badaracco

Well, when I was a kid, I always wanted to play first base for the New York Yankees, and it didn’t take me too long to figure out that I just wasn’t good enough for that to be an option. The other thing that I love doing, really for much of my life, is playing music. I played saxophone and clarinet and bass clarinet, and you know, I really pursued that for quite a while and then similarly sort of realized it just wasn’t quite good enough to really hack it professionally, and so I was gonna be either a lawyer or an engineer. I started off in college studying mechanical engineering. I always kind of liked putting things together and taking them apart again and I think if I weren’t practicing law, I would probably be doing something in that field.

Schmidt

Interesting. What’s interesting with that background and interest that you end up being an antitrust lawyer and not a, you know, patent lawyer so, but a lot of those people that have those interesting gifts end up in that area of the law. All right, last deep dive question, is there any hobby or skill that if you had time, perhaps over the next decade or so or beyond, you would like to tackle and learn and make part of your life that as of right now, you just haven’t had time to tackle?

Badaracco

Well, there are two things that I’d like to be doing more of. One, I do some and I love playing tennis and I play whenever I can. The other thing that I’ve always wanted to do and thought that I would do if I had a little space and maybe someday if we get a place outside the city, I’ll take up, is woodworking. I just love tables, chairs, other stuff made out of pieces of wood, and I’ve always thought, boy, it would be fun to be able to, you know, set up shop in a garage and just try building things and see how good I can get at it. You know, I live in an apartment in the city right now and so it’s just not something that I’ve that I’ve really taken on, but it’s always kind of been there in the back of my head and I think someday I will.

Schmidt

That sounds like a nice change of pace from antitrust analysis and antitrust litigation. So couldn’t, I suppose it couldn’t be more in contrast to the work you do day in and day out each day. So that’s probably key.

Badaracco

I think that might be part of what’s appealing.

Schmidt

All right. Well, thank you so much, Tony, for being our guest here today. I know I’ve enjoyed this conversation from beginning to end. It’s always fascinating to think about these areas of law that are continuing to change and evolve with each passing week and month, as new decisions are released by the courts, nuances of antitrust law continue to emerge. So, thank you for being here, and I really enjoyed our conversation.

Badaracco

Very good. Well, thank you, Kent. My pleasure.

Schmidt

With that, I’d like to thank you, our listener, for being a part of SharkCast today. As always, I’m indebted at the extraordinary team at Dorsey for making this podcast and episode possible. For more resources on this and other litigation risk, go to litigationrisks.com, where more information can be found, including a book on managing litigation risk written by yours truly. Until next time my friends, this is yet another reminder that there are a lot of sharks swimming out there in the murky waters, so please swim safely.

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This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP for those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

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37 Dorsey Attorneys Named 2026 Top Lawyers by Minnesota Monthly

Minnesota Monthly has recognized 37 Dorsey attorneys across 27 practice areas as 2026 Top Lawyers in Minnesota. Honorees are selected through a peer nomination process and a curated survey of practicing attorneys in Minnesota, who identify leading lawyers across a range of practice areas. Administrative / Regulatory Law Jennifer Coates Antitrust Law Michael Lindsay Banking & Financial Service Law Peter Nelson Copyright Law  Jeffrey Cadwell Corporate Law  Robert Hensley Robert Rosenbaum Criminal Defense: White-Collar  Beth Forsythe Edward Magarian RJ Zayed Health Care Law  Claire Topp Immigration Law  J. Mike Sevilla Insurance Law  Daniel Brown Intellectual Property and Patent Law  Stuart Hemphill International Trade Law  Jonathan Van Horn Labor and Employment Law  Edward Magarian Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Land Use & Zoning  Jay Lindgren Marcus Mollison Litigation – Antitrust  Michael Lindsay F. Matthew Ralph Jaime Stilson Litigation – Commercial  Michael Lindsay Litigation – Construction  Eric Ruzicka Litigation – Intellectual Property  Peter Lancaster RJ Zayed Litigation – Labor Employment Benefits  Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Litigation – Trusts and Estates  William J. Berens Theresa Bevilacqua Bridget Logstrom Koci Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions  James K. Langdon Mergers & Acquisitions Law  Keith Ahlgren Rachel Benedict Brian Burke Morgan Helme John Jorgenson Brian Moore Robert Rosenbaum Jonathan Van Horn Bri Whiting Municipal Law Jay Lindgren Nonprofit/Charities Law Claire Topp Securities / Capital Markets Law Cam Hoang Robert Rosenbaum Securities Regulation Theresa Bevilacqua James K. Langdon Tax Law William J. Berens Trusts and Estates Jennifer Ede Bridget Logstrom Koci Sonny Miller Kiley Petty Henry

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Alaska HB 126: What Changes for Alaska Native Corporations, Proxy Filings, and Annual Reports

Alaska House Bill 126 (HB 126), sponsored by Representative Neal Foster and passed by the 34th Alaska Legislature, is now law. The bill changes which Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) must file proxy and annual report materials with the State of Alaska, and makes it easier to reinstate certain dissolved Village Corporations. For many smaller Village Corporations, the practical result is less public disclosure. For shareholders, advisors, and the public, it means some financial information that used to be available through the State will no longer be readily obtained. This eUpdate explains what HB 126 does in plain terms, walks through the practical trade-offs, and answers common questions. 1. What HB 126 Changes The old rule Under prior law (Alaska Statutes Sec. 45.55.139), an Alaska Native Corporation had to file its annual report, proxies, and proxy statements with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities (the Division) if it had more than $1 million in assets and 500 or more shareholders on its current rolls. A filing ANC was also required to follow the Division’s proxy rules (3 AAC 08.305 through .365), which require specific disclosures such as top 5 executive compensation, and related-party transactions. Because these filings are treated as public records, they gave non-shareholders, including the public and the press, visibility into ANC financial information that is not filed with the SEC. The new rule HB 126 changes how the 500-shareholder test is measured. Now, the asset test is removed, and the shareholder count is based on how many shareholders the corporation originally enrolled when it was formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), not how many it has today. As shares have passed down through families over the decades, some Village Corporations that started with fewer than 500 shareholders now have more than 500 recordholders. Under the old current-count test, when those corporations had crossed the threshold, they had to file. Under the new original-enrollment test, they do not. Who is affected Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders are the main beneficiaries. They no longer have to file proxy and annual report materials with the Division or follow the Division’s proxy regulations at 3 AAC 08.305 through .365. Two groups must continue to file as before: all twelve ANCSA Regional Corporations, each of which enrolled more than 500 shareholders at creation, and all Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders. As reported by the Alaska Beacon, when the bill was under consideration, the Division identified 59 corporations then filing, expected at least seven village corporations to become exempt, and was reviewing roughly 30 more. 2. Practical Analysis HB 126 reduces a real compliance burden for smaller Village Corporations, which now need not spend time and money on State filings. In coming years, the exempt Village Corporations may experience benefits associated with less public disclosure and less regulation. But at the same time, less public disclosure carries trade-offs. Benchmarking will become harder Publicly-filed proxy statements and annual reports have long served as a reference set. Shareholders, corporations, advisors, and counsel use them to compare governance practices, compensation, and financial results across similarly-situated ANCs. Since fewer of these materials will be filed publicly, there will be fewer comparable documents available, which will make benchmarking and market-checking more difficult for like-sized ANCs over time. Executive compensation transparency may be reduced The Division’s proxy rules require disclosure of the compensation of ANC’s top five most highly compensated individuals (3 AAC 08.345(b)(2)), related-party transactions above $20,000 (3 AAC 08.345(b)(3)), and audited financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis (3 AAC 08.365). When a corporation is no longer required to file these disclosures publicly, it becomes harder for shareholders and others to obtain the information, to understand how compensation is set for their corporate leadership, and how it compares across corporations of similar size and complexity. Transparency may matter more as ANCs grow Some ANCs have grown into large, complex enterprises with substantial revenue and many subsidiaries, even with fewer than 500 shareholders. For an ANC with a broad and dispersed shareholder base, public materials can be an important way for shareholders and other stakeholders to understand governance, compensation, and performance across ANCs. Reduced disclosure may carry more practical weight in those settings than for a small corporation whose shareholders are closely connected to the business. The ANCSA annual report obligation continues It is important not to overstate what HB 126 does. HB 126 changes the state filing proxy requirements. It does not remove the separate obligation under ANCSA itself. That obligation comes from ANCSA at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c), which requires a Native Corporation that would otherwise be subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prepare and transmit to its shareholders an annual report containing substantially the information a company subject to that Act would include. Similarly, ANCs that solicit proxies for an annual meeting are still required to furnish shareholders with those proxy materials under general Alaska corporate law. However, ANCs are now no longer required to transmit proxy statements to the State. ANCs’ reporting obligations to their shareholders are unaffected by HB 126. Any corporation newly exempt from state filing still owes its shareholders a detailed annual report and a proxy statement, even though that report is no longer routed through the State and made public. Reinstatement of dissolved Village Corporations Separately, HB 126 amends AS 10.06.960(k) to remove the prior deadline (previously December 31, 2020) for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. A dissolved Village Corporation may now apply to be reinstated under AS 10.06.633(e) at any time. Reinstatement still runs through the commissioner under AS 10.06.633(e). In general, that means the ANC must apply, cure the neglect or delinquency that led to dissolution, and pay the amounts owed, and the corporation’s name must be available or be changed to one that is. Once reinstated, the corporation and its shareholders are restored to the rights, privileges, liabilities, and obligations they would have had as if the dissolution had never occurred, and corporate and shareholder actions taken during the dissolution are treated as valid. If the previously-used corporate name is no longer available, the board alone may amend the articles to adopt a new name (without the necessity for shareholder approval). 3. Frequently Asked Questions What does HB 126 do? It changes how Alaska measures the 500-shareholder test that decides which ANCs must file proxy and annual report materials with the state. It removes the asset test, and it counts shareholders based on original enrollment rather than the current rolls. It also removes the deadline for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. Which ANCs are affected? Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders, because they may no longer need to file with the Division. Regional Corporations and Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders must continue to file as before. Does HB 126 eliminate all reporting obligations? No. It changes the state filing requirement under AS 45.55.139, but it does not remove the separate ANCSA obligation (43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c)) to provide shareholders with an annual report, and general corporate law still calls for a proxy statement when the ANC solicits proxies. Corporations that remain subject to state filing requirements must also continue to comply with the Division's rules. We think we are now exempt. What should our ANC board and management consider? Confirm your ANC’s original enrollment number and whether your corporation falls below the new threshold. Watch for communications from the State on this topic as they proceed with their research. If your ANC is now exempt, decide how your corporation will meet its continuing ANCSA obligation to shareholders, review proxy and annual meeting materials and timelines, and consider what to communicate to shareholders about any change in how they will receive information. It is worth documenting the basis for any exemption. What should ANC shareholders watch for? Shareholders should watch for how and when they will continue to receive annual report and proxy statement information directly from their ANC, since some material that used to be available through the State’s online website will no longer be publicly filed. If something is unclear, shareholders can ask their ANC how it intends to meet its ANCSA reporting obligations. How Dorsey Can Help HB 126 lightens the State filing load for smaller Village Corporations, but it also raises practical questions: confirming who is exempt, meeting continuing ANCSA obligations to shareholders, keeping proxy and annual meeting processes on track, and maintaining benchmarking when public materials become less available. These are exactly the kinds of judgment calls that benefit from early planning. Dorsey’s attorneys work closely with Alaska Native Corporations and related stakeholders. If you have questions about HB 126, ANC governance, proxy filings, annual reports, disclosure obligations, or shareholder communications, please contact your Dorsey attorney, including the authors of this eUpdate.

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Litigation Privilege Does Not Automatically Protect Communications with Funders: The Commercial Court Clarifies the Limits of Privilege in the Context of Litigation Funding

In Uber London Ltd & Ors v Garry White & Ors; Mishcon de Reya LLP [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that documents created to help a funder decide whether to invest in a claim will not ordinarily attract litigation privilege. This means that information a firm gathers while acting for a funder can later fall within the control of the claimants it goes on to represent in the same matter. Background The Claimants (a claim group of over 10,000 individual London black cab drivers and the assignee of two former minicab operators) alleged that the Defendants (three companies in the Uber group) obtained and retained their private hire operator's licence through an unlawful means conspiracy alleged to involve fraud. Because the claims were issued outside the ordinary six-year limitation period, the Claimants relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, contending they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud before June 2018. A preliminary issue trial was listed to determine the question of whether the Claimants discovered, or could have discovered with reasonable diligence, the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment only after June 2018. The Claimants were represented by Mishcon de Reya ("MdR"). However, before MdR’s engagement with the individual drivers had begun, in late 2017 it was engaged by the litigation funder Harbour to investigate the merits and value of the potential claim. During that stage, MdR corresponded extensively with Harbour and with the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association ("LTDA"), a black cab drivers' trade association. MdR was not formally engaged by the Claimants until October 2018 onwards. Once the proceedings had started, the Defendants sought disclosure of communications exchanged between MdR and Harbour before the engagement of MdR by the Claimants (the "Harbour Communications"). This included correspondence between MdR and Harbour, communications with the LTDA, and documents held on MdR's file opened in Harbour's name in connection with the potential claim. The Claimants resisted disclosure on four grounds: (i) that the documents were not relevant; (ii) on the grounds of litigation privilege; (iii) that the documents were outside their control; and (iv) that disclosure occurring so close to trial would be disproportionate. Judgment (i) Were the Harbour Communications relevant to the preliminary issue? The Court held that the Harbour Communications were likely to contain relevant material, on two bases. First, where the Claimants or the LTDA had communicated directly with MdR, that material could shed light on individual Claimants' actual knowledge of the alleged facts. Secondly, what MdR and Harbour had discovered during their investigation could inform the question of what a Claimant could reasonably have discovered at the time (even though the Defendants accepted that MdR's knowledge could not simply be imputed to the Claimants). (ii) Were the Harbour Communications protected by litigation privilege? As set out in the classic cases of Three Rivers (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 and WH Holding Ltd v E20 Stadium LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2652, communications between parties or their solicitors and third parties for the purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation are privileged when the following conditions are satisfied: Litigation must be in progress or in reasonable contemplation. The communications must have been made for the sole or dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The litigation must be adversarial, not investigative or inquisitorial. The Court rejected the Claimant’s claim to be able to withhold the Harbour Communications on the basis of litigation privilege. The Court confirmed that litigation privilege protects only communications created for the dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The Court found that Harbour had instructed MdR so that Harbour could decide whether to fund the proceedings. As such, the dominant purpose of the communications was in relation to funding, not the conduct of litigation. This was distinguished from the situation where an individual litigant who takes its own funding decision. In that situation, the decision whether to fund and the decision whether to litigate are one and the same, made by the person who will actually be the claimant, and so it forms a part of that person's conduct of their own litigation. In contrast, a third-party funder's commercial decision whether to fund someone else's claim is not necessarily part of conducting that litigation. The fact that litigation privilege can, in principle, be claimed by a non-party funder (as recognised in the case of Al Sadeq v Dechert [2024] EWCA 28) did not assist Harbour, since there was no evidence it intended to play any role in the litigation itself beyond funding it. Communications between Harbour and MdR did remain capable of attracting another kind of privilege: legal advice privilege, because of the solicitor-client relationship between Harbour and MdR. But communications with third parties such as the LTDA were not automatically protected in the same way. (iii) Were the Harbour Communications within the Claimants' control? The Court also rejected the argument that the Harbour Communications sat outside the Claimants' control because they belonged to Harbour and not the Claimants. The Court’s reasoning was that once the individual Claimant drivers became MdR's clients, MdR also owed them a duty to disclose material information. That included information that MdR had originally acquired while acting for Harbour. As held in the case of Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood (a firm) [2005] 1 WLR 567, a solicitor owing duties to two clients cannot simply prefer one over the other, and it was unrealistic to suppose MdR would investigate the same claims for Harbour, then represent the Claimants, while disregarding everything it had already learned. The obvious commercial expectation was that this earlier work would be used to advance the Claimants' case. MdR sought to rely on a confidentiality clause in a 2024 retainer agreement between it and RGL Management Ltd (a claims management company acting on behalf of the Claimants) to argue that it was relieved of any duty to disclose information obtained while acting for other clients. The provision stated that MdR may "have acted for persons in the same or similar sector as yours and by agreeing to the terms of this letter you agree that will have no duty to disclose to you any confidential information that we have obtained, or might in the future obtain, from acting for such persons or which is derived from any other source". The Court rejected this on several grounds. Claimants who had already become MdR's clients had an existing right to information in the Harbour Communications where it was relevant to their claims before the 2024 retainer agreement. If they were to surrender that right, it would have required their informed consent (also required under the SRA Code of Conduct). The Court found no evidence that such informed consent had been given. The terms had simply been made available to the Claimants through a portal, with no indication that Claimants understood they were giving up existing rights to relevant information. The Court found that even if the terms had been contractually binding, that would not have amounted to informed consent. In addition, the wording of the clause was not sufficiently clear to show that the Claimants had agreed to waive access to this information. (iv) Was disclosure reasonable, proportionate, and necessary at this stage? The Claimants argued that it was neither reasonable nor proportionate for disclosure to be given at such a late stage (approximately two weeks before the start of the preliminary issue trial) and that it was not necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings. The Court rejected this, but it drew a distinction between two categories of documents within the Harbour Communications: Documents bearing on the actual knowledge of the individual drivers, including communications with the LTDA, were not privileged, likely straightforward to review, and directly relevant to the preliminary issue. Their disclosure was ordered as reasonable, proportionate, and necessary. Documents reflecting only MdR's or Harbour's own assessment of the merits were of more marginal, indirect relevance and largely likely to fall under legal advice privilege. A review to isolate the smaller pool of non-privileged material in this category would be time-consuming for limited benefit, so this was excluded from the order. Key Points to Note The judgment is an important reminder of several practical points: However closely a funder is involved in evaluating a claim's merits, litigation privilege will only apply to communications where the sole or dominant purpose of the communication is the conduct of litigation, not the funder's own decision on whether to finance it. Unless that communication separately attracts legal advice privilege, it may need to be disclosed. The same considerations apply to other communications. For example, in RBS Rights Litigation [2017] 1 WLR 3539 the argument that an After the Event (ATE) policy was subject to litigation privilege was rejected on a similar basis. Whilst in this case, there was no dispute as to whether litigation was in contemplation, it is important to note that litigation privilege will not automatically apply to the investigative stages of a claim, i.e. before litigation is in contemplation. Even where litigation is reasonably contemplated, the dominant purpose test must still be satisfied. Material created primarily for fact-finding, risk assessment, or other investigative purposes will not attract litigation privilege unless those activities are actually undertaken for the dominant purpose of conducting the litigation. (See The Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2017] EWHC 1017 (QB)). When engaging a law firm, clients should ensure that they understand whether the firm has previously obtained information about their claim while acting for another party (for example, a funder or another interested party) and how that information will be handled. Any restrictions on the firm’s ability to share relevant information with the client should be explained clearly at the outset, including what information may be withheld and why. If this decision raises questions about your own funding arrangements, disclosure strategy, or privilege position, please get in touch with our Commercial Litigation team.

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Real Estate Attorney Alexis Olsen Joins Dorsey in Phoenix

Attorney Alexis Olsen has joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP as Of Counsel in the Real Estate group in Phoenix, the law firm announced today. Alexis focuses her practice on large-scale residential, mixed-use, and multi-asset development projects as well as multi-state commercial leasing transactions. She guides clients through sophisticated acquisitions, dispositions, leasing, entity structuring, investment strategies, and due diligence matters. She has structured co-investment arrangements that drive capital deployment into housing subdivisions nationwide and has represented both landlords and tenants in commercial leasing transactions involving office, retail, industrial, and specialty-use properties, including cannabis dispensaries. Alexis received her J.D. from Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law and her B.A. from the University of Arizona. Alexis comes to Dorsey from Squire Patton Boggs. “Alexis strengthens Dorsey’s real estate capabilities at a time when Phoenix remains one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic real estate markets in the country,” said Scott Jenkins, Dorsey’s Phoenix office head. “Her addition further enhances our deep bench of 12 real estate attorneys in Phoenix and reflects our continued investment in serving clients throughout Arizona and supporting their real estate transactions and objectives across the country. We are thrilled to welcome Alexis to Dorsey.” “Joining a firm with such a deep bench of experienced attorneys in the Phoenix office, especially in the Real Estate group, presents an exciting opportunity not just for my own professional growth, but for the clients we service,” said Alexis Olsen. “I look forward to building on this strong foundation, growing our national practice, and delivering top-tier service to our clients.”

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State Affordability Infrastructure Districts (SAIDs) — A Financing Tool for Taiwanese Investment in Arizona Science and Technology Parks

If you have developed a facility inside one of Taiwan's science or technology parks, you are accustomed to the one-stop-shop of government planning the park and delivering the roads, water, power, and other infrastructure before your building is even constructed. In the United States, including Arizona, land development generally does not work that way. In Arizona, the cost of infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, power, and the digital backbone, typically falls on the private landowner and is incurred up front before operations generate revenue to offset that cost. For a company entering the Arizona market, this is often the largest and earliest capital burden of the entire project. Arizona recently created a tool that provides a more cost-effective way for landowners and developer to finance some of that infrastructure. House Bill 2999, signed into law June 2026 and codified at Chapter 40 of Title 48 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, establishes the creation of a State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID). How a SAID Works Landowners are now able to use a SAID to finance public infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, parking, lighting, communications, rail sidings and signalization, and similar improvements, through tax-exempt bonds. The bonds are repaid over up to 30 years and secured solely by the property within the SAID. No city, county, or state credit is pledged, and no obligation falls on other taxpayers, and therefore no city, county, or state approval other than from the Arizona Finance Authority (AFA). In effect, a SAID lets you spread the cost of horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of funding it entirely at the outset. And tax-exempt bonds often offer a lower interest rate than taxable or other types of financing. How a SAID is Formed A SAID is formed upon the filing of a petition with the AFA. The petition must include the finance plan, general plan, estimated costs, maximum tax rate, appraisal, bond counsel certificate, consultant list, petitioner experience, legal description, title report, and other materials. While the landowner is required to provide notice to the local governing jurisdiction, local governing jurisdiction does not have the right to approve or deny. The petition is reviewed administratively by the AFA through a standards-based process. For an inbound investor without long-standing local relationships, an objective, criteria-driven process is a meaningful advantage to the overt political process associated with other financing districts in Arizona. Formation requirements. A SAID requires consent from 100% of landowners within the proposed district; public infrastructure costs must exceed $5 million (easily met at any real scale); the district property must all be in the same county and need not be contiguous provided that noncontiguous property is located within five miles of the district's other property; and the board is initially appointed by the forming owners of the SAID district, later transitioning to election as ownership diversifies. Actual bond issuance requires an election of the SAID property owners. Ownership and corporate structure. Consent rights and board seats run with title. If you hold the Arizona land through a U.S. blocker beneath your Taiwan parent, the standard model for Taiwanese/Arizona real estate and operating investment, the U.S. property-holding entity, rather than it’s corporate parent, is the landowner of record for the district. Before formation, our Dorsey team will confirm that you have the proper corporate structure and board mechanics to be compliant.  Board composition has no citizenship or residency requirement. This is a common concern for foreign investors, and the statute answers it cleanly. Under A.R.S. § 48-7004, a director must either hold fee title to real property in the district or be an individual designated or appointed by a fee-title owner. Corporations, partnerships, and other business entities are expressly permitted to be those owners, to vote as owners, and to designate an individual to serve. There is no requirement that a director be a U.S. citizen or resident. So your U.S. property-holding entity, as landowner of record, can appoint whichever of your principals you choose, including a Taiwan-based individual, as the three-member board.  Power infrastructure limitation. The enacted definition of "public infrastructure" in A.R.S. § 48-7001 does not include electrical power generation or transmission. The reference to electrical facilities appears only as components of lighting and traffic-control systems, and the Legislature removed broader energy infrastructure from the definition during the Senate amendments. A SAID will likely not finance the high-load power infrastructure required for semiconductor fabrication, data storage, or heavy manufacturing.  Water infrastructure within a current utility CC&N. Where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the SAID cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility on completion. Entitlements and zoning: The determination of entitlements, zoning, and other land use permitting, as well as construction permitting for a technology or manufacturing facilities remain with the local jurisdiction and run on a separate track. Our Dorsey team will help you coordinate the financing and entitlement timelines together. Our Dorsey team works regularly with Taiwanese and other Asia-Pacific companies entering the Arizona market. If a SAID fits your project, we can structure it for your cross-border ownership.

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Proposed CMS Rule Ramps Up Potential Medicare Fraud Administrative Remedies

On July 6, 2026, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a rule that would expand its administrative remedies to combat potential fraud. The proposed rule is the latest in a round of administrative actions that signal CMS’s intent to aggressively pursue allegations of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and heighten the risk of fraud enforcement against even well-intentioned Medicare and Medicaid providers and suppliers. The proposed rule includes several changes to regulations that govern Medicare billing privileges. Providers and suppliers should be aware that these changes dramatically expand the flexibility afforded to CMS in enrollment and revocation actions, potentially leading to harsh consequences for ministerial and administrative errors. If finalized, moreover, the proposed rule could have material implications for providers and suppliers facing threatened revocation, including heightened risk of overpayment liability and increased hurdles to challenging revocations and denials of enrollment. Added Flexibility to Existing Revocation Grounds CMS has proposed to remove a number of factors that the regulations list as relevant to a determination of whether a provider has engaged in “abuse of billing privileges.” While acknowledging that the inclusion of these factors in the regulations was permissive (requiring consideration only where “as appropriate or applicable”), CMS stated that it must be afforded “the maximum flexibility to address all possible . . . scenarios without the rigid constraints of our existing factors.” CMS provided little guidance as to the outer bounds of what conduct could constitute an “abuse of privileges” that merits revocation of Medicare billing privileges. Instead, CMS noted that a “pattern of practice” of abuse of billing privileges might be established “by a simple finding that several of a provider’s claims do not meet Medicare requirements.” Similarly, CMS has proposed to expand the regulatory provision that permits revocation of enrollment if a provider certifies as “true” false or misleading information in Medicare enrollment application or renewal forms to include any scenario in which a provider submits “false or misleading information on or associated with any CMS Medicare enrollment-related form,” including materials submitted to Medicare contractors. CMS stated that it interprets this expanded rule to include anything related to Medicare enrollment, and not only those submissions that are “intended to gain or maintain Medicare enrollment.” If finalized, the proposed rule would add significant flexibility to CMS’s ability to pursue revocation of a provider’s enrollment. While CMS has assured providers that it would “invoke [the revised regulations]. . . only when legitimately warranted under the facts and circumstances and not as a matter of course,” such expanded flexibility threatens unpredictability in the event of even administrative or ministerial errors in submissions and claims. These changes would, moreover, make it more difficult for providers to challenge a revocation action. Expanded Revocation Grounds In addition to adding flexibility to existing grounds for revocation, CMS’s proposed rule adds to and expands CMS’s already broad authority to revoke provider and supplier enrollment. Such proposed changes include adding the following grounds for revocation: Denial of Enrollment Application. Where CMS could previously revoke a provider’s other enrollments if one enrollment is revoked, CMS would also be able to revoke a provider’s existing enrollments if an application for enrollment submitted by the provider is denied. High-Risk Enrollments. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if it determines the provider or supplier (including owning/managing employees or organizations) poses a high risk of fraud, waste, or abuse due to “. . . an affiliation under [42 C.F.R.] § 424.519” or “the provider’s or supplier’s location within a limited geographic area that has an excessive number of providers and suppliers.” Certain Misdemeanor Convictions. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if a provider or supplier—or its owners, managing employees, managing organizations, officers, or directors—are convicted of a “misdemeanor related to sexual assault or financial misconduct within the past 10 years that CMS deems detrimental to the best interests of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries.” Ownership Changes (HHA, Hospice, DMEPOS). CMS would have broad authority to revoke enrollment of home health agencies, hospices, and DMEPOS suppliers who do not comply with the regulations governing provider changes of ownership. These proposed, expanded grounds for revocation are notably broad, and CMS provides only limited guidance as to what conduct might result in revocation under these grounds. As with the proposed expansion of existing grounds for revocation, the open-ended nature of these proposed grounds for revocation may make it more difficult for providers and suppliers to challenge revocation actions. Expanded Grounds to Deny Medicare Enrollment As with revocations, CMS proposes to expand the grounds under which a provider’s application to enroll in Medicare can be denied. These expanded and additional grounds include many of the grounds added for revocations, but also include: Medicare Debt or Payment Suspension. CMS proposes expanding the ground to deny enrollment based on Medicare debt or payment suspension to include a provider or supplier’s “managing employee, managing organization, or individual or entity with any other form of business or financial relationship with the provider or supplier[.]” Significantly, this expansive definition (called an “associated party” under the proposed regulation) currently contains no material limitations, meaning almost any person or entity with whom an applicant does business could create denial liability. Sharing Locations with Denied/Revoked Providers or Suppliers. CMS would have authority to deny applications where a “provider’s or supplier’s practice location is in the same suite or office as another provider or supplier whose Medicare enrollment has been revoked or denied.” Hospices with Distant Medical Directors or Administrators. CMS would have discretion to deny hospice applications if the hospice’s medical director or administrator serves “multiple other hospices” or practices/is located “at such a distance (for example, in a different state) from the enrolling hospice that the medical director cannot realistically perform all medical director functions,” with a similar provision for administrators. In addition, CMS proposes applications denied for “other program termination or suspension,” may be applied to the provider or supplier in its own name or NPI or that of its owners, managing employees, or managing organization regardless of whether any appeals are pending. Retroactive Revocation CMS proposed to restructure and expand the regulatory grounds for retroactive revocation of billing privileges. Currently, Medicare regulations provide that revocations are, by default, prospective in nature: effective 30 days after CMS or the CMS contractor mails notice to the provider. Under certain circumstances, the regulations provide for revocations to be retroactive, such as when a provider is convicted of a felony, the date a professional license is suspended, revoked, or surrendered, or when a provider submits a false certification in their enrollment application. CMS has proposed to reframe the rule so as to default to retroactive revocation of billing privileges. CMS expressed concern that providers may collect payment from Medicare while remaining so non-compliant with enrollment requirements as to merit revocation. To address this concern, CMS proposed that all revocations be retroactive to the date of determined non-compliance.[1] As a result, providers suspected of misconduct or non-compliance are likely to face claims of retroactive overpayments in addition to the immediate concern no longer receiving Medicare payments while their enrollment is revoked. Reapplication Bar CMS’s proposed rule expands the grounds from which a provider may be prohibited from seeking reapplication as a Medicare provider. Under current regulations, CMS may prohibit prospective providers from enrolling in Medicare for up to 10 years if its enrollment application is denied because the applicant submitted false or misleading information in its application. Under the proposed rule, CMS will have the discretion to prohibit a provider from enrolling in Medicare if their enrollment application is denied for any reason. Conclusion As a part of the federal government’s increasingly aggressive push to combat real or perceived healthcare fraud, the proposed rule both broadens CMS’s authority to revoke and deny Medicare enrollment and raises the stakes for revocation and denial. What the proposed rule does not share is how CMS plans to exercise this expanded discretion: as a result, the proposed rule, if enacted, increases the unpredictability and potential ramifications of even technical noncompliance with CMS rules. As a result, Medicare providers should keep a close eye on potential revisions to these rules and their potential implementation and consider proactively evaluating their compliance under CMS standards. [1] In the proposed rule, CMS identifies, with respect to each ground for revocation, what it will consider to be the effective date of revocation.

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Dorsey Partner Melissa Raphan Elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers

International law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP is pleased to announce that Partner Melissa Raphan has been elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers (CLEL) as part of its 2026 class. “Melissa’s election to this prestigious fellowship comes as no surprise to those of us who have had the privilege of working with her,” says Peter Nelson, Dorsey’s Managing Partner.  “She is an exceptional employment lawyer, a trusted advisor, and a leader whose impact extends far beyond her matters. Clients rely on her deep knowledge, strategic counsel, and ability to navigate complex workplace disputes and sensitive employment matters with both confidence and compassion. She has helped shape our firm, strengthen our profession, and opened doors for countless others through her commitment to mentorship and diversity. We are incredibly proud of her accomplishments and delighted to see her receive this recognition.” CLEL is a nonprofit professional association that honors the nation’s leading attorneys in the field of labor and employment law. Originally established to recognize excellence in the profession, CLEL has evolved into a respected intellectual and practical resource for the legal community and its many audiences. Its mission centers on recognizing individuals who have made significant contributions to the field, fostering the exchange of knowledge and delivering value to academia, government, the judiciary, and the broader public. Election as a fellow represents the highest level of peer acknowledgment, reflecting sustained achievement, integrity, and a commitment to advancing the profession. Melissa’s career reflects CLEL’s mission. She has been recognized both regionally and nationally for her advocacy, leadership, and achievements both inside and outside of the courtroom. Her employment litigation experience spans class actions, collective actions, and high-stakes individual disputes in state and federal courts, as well as arbitration forums including the American Arbitration Association and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). She is also a trusted advisor on a full range of workplace issues, from hiring and performance management to sensitive terminations and organizational change. She brings decades of experience representing clients across the financial services, healthcare, food and agriculture, and energy sectors. Melissa will be formally inducted during CLEL’s installation ceremony held in conjunction with the American Bar Association’s Labor & Employment Law Conference in Washington, D.C., on November 7.

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The Long-Awaited Public Infrastructure Financing Solution for Development in Arizona

Every developer who has taken raw Arizona ground to a finished project knows the largest upfront cost other than the land price is almost always the cost to install the public infrastructure. Water, sewer, stormwater, streets, dry utilities, and the fiber backbone all have to be in the ground before a single lot closes or a building opens. That capital is deployed early and generates no return for years. For decades the standard workaround has been the Community Facilities District (CFD). That tool has grown materially harder to use, for reasons cited below, and House Bill 2999, signed in June 2026 and now codified as Chapter 40 of Title 48, is Arizona's response. Some Background I have spent a good part of my career on the other side of this problem. In the 1990s and early 2000s I served as general counsel of SunCor Development Company, one of Arizona's most active master-planned community developers, where we used Community Facilities Districts to finance hundreds of millions of dollars of major infrastructure across Arizona in cities such as Goodyear, Phoenix, Tempe, Litchfield Park, and Prescott Valley. For its time the CFD was an effective structure, and a great deal of what is now on the ground in those communities was financed with this tool. Unfortunately, CFDs have over time become considerably harder to use. Successive legislative amendments have layered on tax-rate ceilings, homebuyer disclosure obligations, and added procedural steps. Another drag on the use of CFDs is that formation of them runs through the municipality, where approval can turn as much on local politics as on the merits of a project. Developers now routinely are asked to absorb delay and uncertainty that a project's economics cannot support, which is a large part of why Arizona has fallen behind Colorado, Texas, and Utah in getting infrastructure financed. A better tool was needed, and Chapter 40 is it. How a SAID Improves on a CFD A State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID) keeps what worked about the CFD: tax-exempt, property-secured, non-recourse infrastructure financing — while shedding much of what made the CFD cumbersome. Its principal advantages over a traditional CFD: Administrative formation. A SAID is formed by the Arizona Finance Authority against fixed statutory criteria, through a yes-or-no compliance review on a sixty-day clock, rather than through the discretionary approval of a city council or a board of supervisors. Insulation from municipal politics. Because formation is a state-level compliance determination, a meritorious project is far less exposed to local political headwinds than it is under the CFD process. Landowner control of the board. A SAID is governed by a board of the landowners — appointed at formation, then elected on an acreage basis. In a typical municipal CFD, the city council sits as the district board; here, the developer controls governance. Advance funding of impact fees. A SAID can use bond proceeds to advance-pay municipal development impact fees, unlike CFDs, removing one of the largest upfront cash burdens in a project. A uniform, statewide process. The criteria are the same regardless of jurisdiction, replacing the municipality-by-municipality variation that has made CFD outcomes hard to predict. Flexible boundaries. A district may include noncontiguous parcels in the same county within five miles of one another, which fits phased and multi-tract development. Capped cost and a fixed timeline. Authority fees to form a district are capped at $15,000, and a complete petition must be acted on within sixty days. The full range of bonds. A SAID may issue general obligation, special assessment, revenue, and refunding bonds, secured solely by district property and creating no obligation for any other taxpayer. What is a SAID A SAID is a special taxing district that the owners of a development form to finance public infrastructure with tax-exempt bonds: general obligation bonds, special assessment bonds, and revenue bonds. The bonds are secured only by the property inside the district and are repaid over the long term, with terms up to 30 years. They do not affect the credit of the city, the county, or the State, and they create no obligation for any taxpayer outside the district. In practical terms, a SAID lets you finance horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of writing the check at the front end. The maximum ad valorem rate securing general obligation bonds is capped by statute at $5.00 per $100 of net assessed limited property valuation, with a limited step-up to cover a debt-service shortfall. SAIDs Work for Commercial as Well as Residential Development The SAID bill drew most of its press as a housing-affordability measure, and it appears to be a strong one. It is the first Arizona district statute to let bond proceeds advance-fund municipal development impact fees, which pulls one of the largest upfront cash burdens off a homebuilder's pro forma. But the statute's eligible infrastructure categories apply with equal force to commercial, industrial, and mixed-use projects. An industrial or logistics project can finance roads, rail crossings, sidings, and grade separations. A life-sciences or technology campus can finance its water, sewer, roads, and broadband the same way a subdivision can. Read Chapter 40 as a general-purpose infrastructure finance platform, not a subdivision-only device. How Formation Works A SAID is formed administratively by the Arizona Finance Authority. The Authority reviews the petition for compliance with the statute; it is a yes-or-no review against fixed criteria, not a discretionary negotiation with a city council or a board of supervisors, and it runs on a sixty-day clock once a complete petition is filed. Formation requires the written consent of 100% of the landowners in the proposed district and an engineer's certification that public infrastructure costs will exceed $5 million. The district may include noncontiguous parcels so long as they lie in the same county and within five miles of the district's other property, which accommodates phased and multi-tract development; if any part of the district sits inside a municipality, the whole district must stay within that municipality's limits or planning area. The Authority's fees to form a district are capped at $15,000. Issuing bonds requires a district election. Governance Simplified A SAID is run by a three-member board. The initial directors are named in the petition; after that, directors are elected by the landowners on an acreage basis as ownership diversifies. Board service runs with ownership; a director must either hold fee title inside the district or be an individual designated by a fee-title owner; and corporations, partnerships, and other entities may hold that ownership, vote as owners, and designate the individual who serves. A district has no power of eminent domain and no zoning authority, and directors may not be officials or employees of the municipality in which the district sits. What a SAID Does Not Do It finances; it does not entitle. Zoning, platting, rezonings, use permits, and the specialized approvals a manufacturing or life-sciences facility may need all remain with the local jurisdiction and proceed on their own track. The financing and entitlement timelines should be coordinated with formation of the SAID, but they are separate processes. Two substantive limits are worth flagging at the planning stage. First, electric power is largely outside the tool: the statutory definition of public infrastructure does not reach power generation or transmission, and broader energy infrastructure was removed from the bill during the Senate amendments. A power-intensive user should not assume a SAID will carry its electrical load. Second, where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the district cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility upon completion. Our Take For most master-planned residential work, and for a wide range of commercial and industrial development, a SAID will be the most efficient infrastructure-financing structure Arizona has offered. The right time to evaluate it is early in the acquisition and pre-development process, while the capital stack, the development agreement, and the entitlement strategy are still being set. Once the district's boundaries, general plan, and financing parameters are set, it is cumbersome at best to bring those into conformance later. Our Dorsey team has begun advising our developer clients on SAID formation on residential, commercial, and industrial projects statewide. If you would like us to assess whether a SAID fits a project you are working on, please reach out.

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Patent Partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic Join Dorsey in Palo Alto

Patent partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic have joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Palo Alto, the international law firm announced today. Al Araiza works with clients to develop and implement patent strategies that align with corporate objectives, supporting growth initiatives, financing efforts, and successful exits, including initial public offerings and acquisitions. He advises on building, managing, and optimizing patent portfolios across a broad range of emerging and frontier technologies, with depth in wireless communications, artificial intelligence, and energy innovation. Before practicing law, Al gained engineering experience in the defense industry, working on energy system modeling and communications circuitry design. He also conducted biomedical research, with findings published in peer-reviewed journals. He has been recognized in the IAM Patent 1000 for his work advising clients on patent strategy and portfolio development. Al received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law, his M.E. in Biomedical Engineering from Tulane University, and his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from UCLA. Lena Petrovic works across the software and hardware industries to develop clear, well-supported patent applications. She guides clients through the prosecution process and advises on global trademark and copyright matters, including licensing and portfolio management. Lena regularly supports clients developing technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, fintech, cryptography, interactive and immersive experiences, and digital media, and works with companies in entertainment, gaming, and sports. Before practicing law, Lena spent a decade at Pixar, where she contributed to major films including The Incredibles, Ratatouille, WALL‑E, and Brave. Lena received her J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law, her M.S. in Computer Science from Princeton University, and her B.S. from California Institute of Technology. “Al and Lena bring a practical, technical, and business-focused approach informed by extensive experience working with technology companies, startups, and investors,” said Gina Cornelio, Patent Practice Group Co-Leader. “We are thrilled to welcome them to the Patent team and our growing Palo Alto office.” “Dorsey’s Patent practice is dedicated to understanding each client's business deeply, tailoring patent strategies that directly advance their goals,” said Al Araiza. “We are proud to join this outstanding team and look forward to driving success for our clients.”