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Tendering Claims to Insurers and Addressing Coverage Disputes

June 9, 2023

by Kent J. Schmidt

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In the litigation process, addressing and managing insurance coverage issues can be critical. In many cases, the complexity of litigation increases as a result of a side-contest over coverage. Insurers either deny coverage or agree that there is coverage subject to a reservation of rights. More issues emerge as the insurer seeks to control the costs and dictate the defense of the claim. In this episode, Dorsey Partners Kent Schmidt and Skip Durocher explore insurance coverage issues, from tendering a claim to insurers, dealing with an adverse coverage decision, and working with insurance adjusters in managing claims to a successful completion.

This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

Transcript

Voiceover
Welcome to another episode of the SharkCast on litigation risks management where we explore why businesses are so frequently sued, and how to mitigate and navigate the dangers lurking in the risky waters. Join us now as we welcome our host Kent Schmidt, Litigation Partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.

Schmidt
Thank you for joining us today for what I trust will be an informative discussion on the issues companies routinely face when evaluating insurance coverage for certain types of commercial litigation. And then if there is insurance coverage, working with the insurer to manage the litigation to a successful conclusion. As I encounter these issues with clients and in my practice over the last two plus decades, I’ve routinely reached out to my partner, longtime friend and mentor, Skip Durocher. So I thought it would be a great idea to have Skip join us on an episode of this podcast to talk about insurance coverage litigation. So welcome Skip. So great to have you as a guest on the podcast.

Durocher
Hey, thank you Kent. I’m looking forward to talking with you today.

Schmidt
As long as we’ve work together on various matters, including insurance, I don’t think I’ve ever heard you explain how you initially got into insurance coverage. Is there a story that some particular case or something that peaked your interest on insurance coverage and has resulted in this storied career and extensive expertise?

Durocher
Sure, I actually started out doing reinsurance work. And for those whose haven’t heard of it, reinsurance is basically insurance for insurance companies. And on my very first day of practice, I started out with a large national firm in Chicago back in 1987, first day in the office I walked into my mentor’s office to get my first assignment and he asked me if I knew anything about reinsurance. And I said no. And he said have you ever heard of reinsurance? And I said, no. And he said, do you think you can spell it? And I gave it a good shot. I’m not sure if I got it spelled correctly or not, but in any event he said congratulations, you’re now a reinsurance lawyer. And so we had a lot of very interesting reinsurance issues for a client at the time, and that reinsurance work then sort of just evolved into insurance coverage work. Generally at that firm, and then when I joined Dorsey in 1990 there were just a few people here, couple of partners who were doing insurance coverage work, and really no associates. So, I jumped right in and started doing that work and now I’m one of the more senior guys here that handles coverage work.

Schmidt
So I think to sort of frame our conversation, and be helpful to walk through in a somewhat chronological fashion how these insurance issues arise and the beginning issue that we face is examining the policy and tendering the claims. What are some of the issues that you need to work with clients on in grappling with those threshold matters of evaluating coverage and tendering the claim.

Durocher
Well the very first thing is to remember that you have insurance. I’ve learned now in my practice over the years, the first two questions I ask as a litigator when I’m contacted by a client whose been sued is, one, have you notified your carriers, looked at your policy and notified your carriers? And two, have you issued a litigation hold? We won’t talk about litigation hold today, but that’s a another essential question, but the other question that you have to ask is, have you looked at your policy and tendered a claim or given notice? And so that’s the first thing you have to think about is do you have a possible coverage situation here? If you do, the next step is figuring out the right policy. There may be multiple policies that could possibly provide coverage.

So you got to sort through them perhaps with the help of your broker, if you have a sophisticated broker, or outside counsel. Or maybe you have a risk manager inside that can assist with that. And then another thing you got to keep in mind is identifying the right policies to notify. And I don’t mean just different types of coverage, but which policy for a particular kind of coverage because you can have, there’s two basic kinds of coverage. Claims-made coverage and occurrence coverage or occurrence policies. And claims-made is just what it sounds like. The policy that is triggered that you’d put notice on is the policy that’s in place, that’s in effect at the time the claim is made. But there’s also occurrence policies. In an occurrence policy, if a claim comes in and it triggers an occurrence policy, it would be covered by an occurrence policy. What you would do is you’d be putting notice on the policy that was in place at the time the occurrence took place that gives rise to a claim that could be years later. For example, like a pollution or environmental claim, so you got to figure out not just what coverages you might have but then which policies might be triggered.

Schmidt
And then in those instances where you have layers of policies, that can, we probably don’t have time to get into this, but the insurers end up having indemnity claims against one another often over who goes first in terms of stepping up to the plate and providing coverage.

Durocher
Absolutely. There’s a, most policies will have something called another insurance clause which says, in certain instances somebody else’s policy may take precedence over my policy. So if you have two or three different policies all that could potentially provide coverage. There may be a fight amongst the insurance companies as to who has to go first, and who has got to provide the defense. So, yeah that would be something that we could spend a whole podcast on. I know we’re just going to touch the surface on some of these issues, but the key is identifying all of those possible coverages and then putting out a notice to the various carriers. There’s different schools of thought on who should provide that notice.

Schmidt
That was going to be my next question.

 Durocher
Oh, there you go. Yes, so my own personal view is if you got a decent broker, I prefer to let the broker send out the notice. They are the most familiar with your schedule of insurance and the types of coverage, and there can be consultation amongst the insured. In particular if that insured has a risk manager or somebody in the finance group who’s knowledgeable about insurance, they may have their own ideas as of which policies are triggered. But there should definitely be a conversation with the broker who set up the program, and then in addition if you have trusted outside counsel that does insurance work you can bring them into the equation too. Anyone of those entities or persons can be the one to provide the notice. Could be the insured itself can send out the notice, the broker can, or the outside counsel could.

Typically you would look to the policy itself as to what information is needed. It will usually spell out what kind of information you’re supposed to provide when you provide notice of a claim or of a possible claim. My own personal preference is let’s have the broker send it out, and send out that notice. Again, because they probably are the most knowledgeable, part of their job often times is to provide claims assistance. And just on a little bit of a selfish note, I would rather the broker do it because they have coverage for exactly the kind of mistake they might make if they didn’t provide notice to all the right entities. So, they will be very careful and hopefully they’ll get everybody right, and if they get the right folks to contact. But if there is a failing then you can always look to the broker to make that right.

Schmidt
So I think it’s implied in our conversation about the importance of tendering a claim early.

Durocher
Yeah.

Schmidt
But can you just touch on the consequences if, we’ll go ahead and blame the broker since you opened the door there. If the broker tendered one, a claim to one insurer but forgot that there’s another policy that was in place that may provide coverage and just failed to deliver the claim or to tender the claim to that insurer. Then the insurer were a year into the litigation, the insurer gets the claim, what’s typical response of the insurer in that situation on insurance policy number two?

 Durocher
Yeah, they usually have an argument that they should not have, provide any defense costs for anything that’s incurred prior to notice, and that’s pretty much across the board. Insurance law is generally covered by each different state. Each state has its own bulk statutory and common law that applies to the insurance issues that come up within that state. And different states deal with late notice differently, but one thing that’s pretty consistent is that insurers will not compensate you or reimburse you for defense costs or other costs that you incur prior to the time you send notice.

Durocher
Now if you get a notice in and then you start, you have to go out and defend yourself while you’re waiting to hear from the insurance company, you should be okay. If it takes them a month to get back to you, two months to get back to you, you got to take steps to protect yourself in the meantime. But until you send out that notice, carriers will end policies, usually state that they will not be obligated to pay any defense costs or certainly any settlement that you’d enter into without their prior knowledge and consent.

So, and then some states will also have some laws that will say in the event that you provide too late of notice, it causes prejudice to the insurance company, that that may end up being a breach of the policy and give the insurance company an opportunity to not have any, to provide any coverage under the policy. So that’s really more state by state as to how that’ll happen, but it’s certainly a risk that you could, by failing to timely notify the insurance company, that they may have a basis for denying coverage all together.

Schmidt
Alright. Well that’s a very timely and important recommendation on promptly entering the policy to the insurers. Now let’s step forward and the next phase of the process, which is getting a response from the insurer, and the response is going to fall either in good news, there’s coverage, or bad news, we’re denying coverage, but perhaps some in-between as well. So what are the typical issues that arise in getting that initial response from the insurer?

Durocher
Sure. So notice goes about you’re waiting for the insurance company to get back to you. Like I said, you should protect yourself in the meantime if you have to retain counsel, file an answer to a complaint, take other steps to protect yourself, issue that litigation hold. But at some point you hopefully will hear back from the insurance company, and as you said it’s probably going to be one of three things. Rarely, but once in a while you’ll get a confirmation that they are going to provide coverage with no reservation, they're going to, and maybe if they have a duty to defend they’ll appoint counsel themselves, and counsel will defend the claim, and if there’s a judgment against you or if there’s going to be a settlement, the insurance company just steps up and pays. That’s fantastic.

In those instances I usually don’t have to get involved. On the other end of the spectrum an insurance company can, it would just deny coverage outright, and if that happens they’ll typically do that in writing. Sometimes they’ll hire counsel to write that letter, sometimes they’ll write it in-house, and they will typically lay out the facts as they understand the claim. They’ll, a lot of times the way they do these letters is they’ll list the various parts of the policy that justifies, in their mind, the denial, and then at the end of the letter say after all the foregoing reasons we don’t believe there’s any coverage and therefore we must deny coverage.

Durocher
And then the middle ground, as you say, the in-between is there’s a letter with a reservation of rights. And typically those types of letters will say we’ve reviewed the coverage, the facts and the coverage, and while there may not be coverage at the end of the day either for defense and/or indemnity, based upon what we know right now we’re not going to say no. We are going to go ahead and defend you, but we are reserving our rights to either withdraw that defense or to not indemnify you in the event there’s a judgment or a settlement down the road.

 Schmidt
How often, I’ve had it happen in my practice where an insurer would just sort of change their mind about halfway through the litigation. It’s not some bad fact that came out that re-characterized the claim that moved it over into an excluding category. Maybe it’s just a change of personnel. In fact I think that was the situation in that case where they just stepped in and said you know, so-and-so’s taken over the file, we looked at it and we’re not providing coverage anymore.

Durocher
Right.

Schmidt
How often does that happen?

Durocher
Not terribly often. I would say, either way it doesn’t happen terribly often that either they start out by saying we are going to cover and then change their mind halfway through, or vice versa, where they start out saying we’re not going to cover and then at some point you perhaps provide them with additional information and you get them to change their mind and provide coverage, either defense or indemnity coverage. But it doesn’t mean it never happens, and I’ve had both situations happen. And that’s, it can be a welcome surprise or an awful disappointment for the client depending on which way they change their mind.

And then you’re forced with, to make some hard decisions if they kind of pull out their defense on you in the middle of the case and leave you hanging. That’s a dangerous way to handle that from the insurance company’s standpoint because they are leaving you hanging oftentimes and perhaps you’re even, are in a situation where you can’t afford to continue the defense yourself. A lot of times, if they are going to take that step, to deny either right off the blocks or sometime during the litigation. A lot of times that’ll be accompanied with a declaratory judgment action that they’ll file a DJ asking a court to confirm that they no longer have a duty to defend and/or indemnify.

Durocher
If they don’t bring that action then you, and they change their mind midway through like they did with you and say they’re no longer going to provide coverage for whatever reason, and they don’t file a DJ action that gives you the option to file a DJ action right away, in a breach of contract action actually, to try to get coverage established again. Or if you’re in the position to do so I supposed you could also just continue to defend the case yourself, wait to see how it all plays out, and then sue them after the fact.

You got to keep in mind of course the statute of limitations which typically will start running when they tell you they no longer have a duty to defend or indemnify ‘cause that would be the breach that would cause the statute to start running.

 Schmidt
So as we follow this flow chart of possible scenarios, if there’s a denial of coverage and we believe there’s strong evidence and very good argument that there is coverage, denial is improper, then there’s a coverage lawsuit and, or we think they’re actually right and we think we don’t have a good argument, in which case we just say no surprise, nothing gained, nothing lost.

Durocher
If you get that denial letter and you read it, then maybe you have outside counsel read it, or your broker. A lot of times people turn to their broke and the one caution I’d give there is don’t assume that your conversations with your broker are going to be privileged because they likely will not be. The broker is not your counsel. And so you just have to be careful about what you put in writing, getting their coverage analysis where they look at the denial letter and say yeah, there’s no coverage here. That can be discoverable down the road. So you got to keep that in mind.

But in any event you can look at that denial letter and perhaps you decide yeah, they’re right. So at that point, you know, why throw good money after bad. You just figure out another way to defend the lawsuit or do what you need to do to protect yourself. But you can also look through that letter and perhaps push back. So even before you file a coverage action, typically the denial letter will say if we got any facts wrong or if you otherwise believe there’s a basis for coverage please let us know right away, and taken them up on that because I’ve done that on occasion and I’ve actually gotten insurance companies to change their mind from a denial to at least a reservation of rights.

So that’s another option. And then the third option is, as you say, is at some point you may have to file an action to affirm coverage and it’s a declaratory judgment but also an alleged breach of contract, then perhaps if the law allows for it, a bad faith claim that you’ve been treated by the insurance company in bad faith.

Schmidt
Alright, great, great reminders. Well, let’s follow the other branch of the tree, which is there’s coverage, and let’s assume it’s the typical positive response which is a coverage but with a reservation of rights. What are some of the issues that we’re going to deal with right off the bat now that there’s coverage, the fine print so to speak is there’s coverage, but.

Durocher
Sure, yeah. And there’s a whole host of issues that can come up. One is does the insurance company have a duty to defend or is it a policy that only requires them to reimburse you for the expenditure of defense costs. So you need to look at the policy and figure out what kind of policy it is in that regard, because that may impact other things like who gets to select counsel. In a typical duty to defend policy the insurance company has the contractual right to select counsel, then of course to pay for that counsel, and that can be a great thing because there’s no dispute about you don’t have to get involved in the dispute about whether counsel’s rates are appropriate, whether they spend too much time on a matter, those sorts of things.

But the downside is that oftentimes the lawyers who are select by the insurance company, you have no relationship with them, they may not be familiar with your company, you may not have the highest trust in that law firm. You may be worried that are their allegiances or loyalties more to the insurance company who may be hiring them for time and time again versus the loyalty and acting in your best interest now. You want to believe that all lawyers act in the best interest of their clients, and I think most do, but that is a concern that comes up.

So but if it’s a duty to reimburse policy, and you have the right to select counsel, maybe it’s counsel, sometimes they have a panel counsel, they have a list of counsel from whom you can pick. Sometimes it’s, you can pick whoever you want, but it’s subject to their approval, and subject to approval on rates. You and I, I think have gotten into fights with insurance companies when our clients want to use Dorsey or some other firm but with whom they have a long relationship, and we go back to the insurance company and say okay, we have the right to select counsel, here’s our counsel of choice.

And a lot of times the insurance company will come back and say hey, that’s fine, we’re happy to let you pick your own counsel. But the bad news is that we’re only willing to pay half of that hourly rate, or a third or, pick your number. We will not pay the full hourly rate because that’s more than what we typically pay. And therein, you know, is another problem that you have to deal with. I’ve been involved in lots of negotiations with insurance companies trying to get them to pay the full hourly rate of the lawyer of choice.

Sometimes I’m successful, sometimes the insurance, sometimes the law firm of choice will agree to reduce their rate to the amount that’s paid by the insurance company. And sometimes it’s important enough for the insured to have that lawyer of choice that they will say okay, we’ll accept the amount that the insurance company is willing to pay for the hourly rate, and then we, the client, the insured will make up the difference between what the insurance company will pay and the hourly rate that the attorney charges.

Durocher
So that’s something that is, becomes an issue and can be dealt with in ways I’ve just suggested. Other issues that come up, kind of right out of the blocks there, when you have outside counsel, regardless of who’s selected them, who controls the process, who controls the defense, who controls settlement. Again, you have to look at the policy. A lot of times they spell out some of these things, but many times the insurance company has the right to control the defense, they have the right to decide if and when to settle and for how much. So those are issues that you got to be familiar with, look at the policy, and figure out who’s in charge in each of these cases.

And a couple of other things that come up: billing guidelines. For those listening who aren’t familiar with insurance company billing guidelines, you’ll be pleasantly surprised. I’m being facetious there. Billing guidelines can be very frustrating. Most insurance companies now when you select the counsel, your counsel, and they’re going to be defending you, the insurance company’s going to be paying some or all of their rate. They will say okay, but, and here’s our billing guidelines that your lawyer has to follow. And it’s usually a fairly thick document, and it talks about all the things the insurance companies will pay for and those things they won’t pay for.

And they’ll set up other rules and guidelines along the way. And it’s important to review those right up front and, because there is some pushback in negotiation that can take place with respect to billing guidelines. I think the law is now pretty clear that insurance companies typically have the right to issue billing guidelines as long as they don’t interfere with the professional judgment of the lawyer defending you. They can’t say, the billing guidelines can’t say you only get to take three depositions in any case, because of a lawyer says wait a minute, I need to take 10 depositions here, courts would find that those billing guidelines and the insurance company are interfering with the proper defense.

And so there have been court cases about this and courts have said that’s inappropriate. But there’s other instances where you can review those billing guidelines and perhaps they say we do not pay for any conferences among the lawyers within a firm. And maybe you can push back and say look, in a small dog-bite case maybe you don’t need to have conferences among lawyers. But in a very difficult, sophisticated, complex class action lawsuit where we’re going to have a team of lawyers, obviously there’s got to be conferences amongst those lawyers and insurance company, you should pay for that.

Durocher
So you should, identify the issues within the billing guidelines, see what you can negotiate with the insurance company, and then also make sure if you’re the client that your lawyers are familiar with the guidelines and comply with those that they have to comply with.

Schmidt
Well very good. We often also deal with some conflicts when we’re trying to settle the case, where the insurer has one view of settlement and the insured has a different view. And then in some of those instances the coverage issues can sort of become part of the discussion on settlement if there’s a reservation of rights. Have you experienced that in your practice?

Durocher
Yes. Actually various conflicts can come up, and the other one we should talk about briefly in a minute is the Cumis counsel issue that I know you and I have talked about in the past. But let me address your other question first. Yeah, I mean, I’ve seen it come at kind of both ways here where there’s conflicts that come up with respect to settlement. Perhaps it’s a case where the insured desperately wants to settle early on because maybe because of publicity, maybe because it’s, they have good relationship with whoever sued them, and it’s a vendor/owner relationship or something where you want to preserve the relationship, and so you want to make them whole with, using the insurance company’s money.

And the insurance company may say no, we don’t care about publicity, bad publicity you might face here. We don’t care whether this may ruin the relationship with whoever’s suing you. We think we got a good defense, we’re going to fight this out, and regardless of the consequences. And so that’s a situation where you, you know, each one is unique, but you got to look to, again, one, the policy to see what the policy says about who controls settlement, and there can be all sorts of different terms within the policy that could affect that control.

But you can also look at the law of the state that would be applying to this insurance relationship, and this might be a situation where you have a bad faith claim where you have an opportunity to settle and the insurance company says no, we’re going to fight this to the death. And even if, at the end of the day, if we lose your judgment could be, are higher than the limits of our policy. Well that may be a classic bad faith claim that you’d have against the insurance company, and what you can do there to try to get some leverage is to assert that bad faith, perhaps not in a lawsuit right out of the blocks, but in a demand letter or what we call a hammer letter to the insurance company that says look, we have the opportunity to settle. Defense counsel says we should settle, there’s liability here, and if we don’t settle we could get hit with a judgment above verdict.

And so, and if that happens and you refuse to settle, we’re going to be looking to you to make us whole for that amount that would be above the policy limits. So just a, that’s not unusual for that kind of issue to come up Cumis counsel, Dorsey lawyers and clients all the time on how to deal with that, that conflict issue.

Schmidt
Anytime you have triangulation you have interesting issues, whether it’s just a three-party case or it’s a two-party case with insure, you really have three parties that are participating and they each have their own economic interest and it creates some interesting dynamics, doesn’t it?

Durocher
Exactly, yep. And in fact that sort of leads me to the Cumis counsel issues I mentioned a minute ago because that’s also created, the issue there is created by what they call the tri-part type relationship amongst the insured, the insurance company, and the lawyer or law firm that’s being asked to defend the insured. And so as I mentioned on occasion, in many occasions the insurance policy allows the insurance company to, gives them the duty to defend, and they have the right and duty to select counsel and to defend the case.

And so they may do that under a reservation of rights, and that reservation of rights may outline all sorts of different scenarios where the insurance company, if certain facts or certain legal things happen the insurance company’s no longer going to have a duty to defend or to indemnify. But they, at the same time, say we’re going to pick the lawyer who’s going to defend you. And the concern, as I mentioned earlier, is that the insured says geez, is this law firm going to be really looking out for my interest, or will they perhaps guide the case in a way that could result in the insurance company getting out of coverage here?

So as I mentioned this is a, this tri-part type relationship, different states treat it differently again. So you got to look at the law of your state for some guidance. But certain states will say where there is a conflict of interest between the insurance company and the insured on a third-party claim that the insured gets to select its own counsel, regardless of what the insurance policy says about selection of counsel. In those instances the insured gets to select counsel and the insurance company has to pay.

Schmidt
That’s a nice win for the insured.

Durocher
That’s a nice win for the insured. It’s, there’s always issues that come up, even when you have this situation. I think when it, this first, this issue was first sort of fleshed out was in California and the case was called Cumis, part of the name of the case. And so a lot of times people shorthand this situation when you have to, when the insured gets to hire its own counsel on the insurance company’s nickel, they shorthand it and call it Cumis counsel. But other states have adopted a similar approach now. But you do have to look to each state to determine what does it mean to have a conflict of interest?

Durocher
That might get you to the point where the insured can retain its own counsel. Some states say hey, if the insurance company, if it issues a reservation of rights letter, unless it just agrees completely that it’s going to cover no matter what, if it issues a reservation of rights letter then that’s enough of a conflict to give you the right to go out and select your own counsel on the insurance company’s nickel.

Other states, such as Minnesota where I do some of my practice, say that it’s, a reservation of rights letter alone is not enough, and what you have to demonstrate is an actual conflict between the insurance company and the insured, and only when you can demonstrate an actual conflict do you have the right to go out and select your own counsel. So you got to, do that analysis, what’s the state law say, and then what does an actual conflict mean, and then, even then you’re really not out of the woods because I think, as you and I know, you still may come back to that rate negotiation issue.

Schmidt
Right.

Durocher
Because, you know, this whole idea about the tri-part type relationship and the ability to go out and select independent counsel, the insurance company still can come back and say well yeah, but you can’t pick whoever you want and we have to pay whatever hourly rate they claim. It’s got to be a reasonable rate. And so then again starts this fight about what’s a reasonable rate, and that whole negotiation dance.

 Schmidt
Well, as you can tell from this conversation, listeners, I could chat with Skip for a long time about insurance coverage issue and we could continue to talk shop about commercial litigation and the type of work we do. But at this point in our podcast we like to turn to a segment we call The Deeper Dive and learn a little bit more about Skip, your background, your, what makes you tick, so to speak, and I have a couple questions for you. I guess maybe the first that our listeners might like to hear is what’s a good way over the years that you’ve learned to strike a good work/life balance?

Durocher
Yeah, yeah, that’s a good question, and I’m not sure I’ve ever mastered that yet, and I’ve been practicing for however many years, it’s been maybe close to 40, 35. But one thing that’s helped me a lot in the last, since 2014, my wife and I used to live in a suburb here in the Minneapolis area, and I have a drive, about half hour drive to work each day. And then in 2014 we moved much closer to the city of Minneapolis, so I’m not two miles, I’m within the city, and I’ve taken to walking to work each day.

And that is a complete de-stressor for me because no matter what kind of day I’ve got, I’ve got that 30-minute walk over the Mississippi River, to downtown Minneapolis. And then at the end of the day the walk back. Even in the middle of winter I really enjoy that. I try not to think about work, I try to enjoy the scenery and the city sites and think about things that aren’t work-related, and that has been a tremendous benefit for me to have that exercise and that mind clearing.

Schmidt

Do you listen to music while you walk, or is the sound of the cities you like to take that in?

Durocher
Yep. The sound of the cities. For many years I used to stop and pick up a cup of coffee, but the coffee shop closed and I haven’t found another one that’s open as early as I usually like to come in. So nope, it’s just walk in and got to have the time to clear your mind.

Schmidt
Now is there a temperature tolerance that if it drops below a certain degree you’re out on the walk, or no matter what?

Durocher
Pretty much no matter what. It just, mostly in the winter the question is whether I put on long underwear first.

Schmidt
Excellent. Well, and also great health, great investment in your longevity and health. Well, one of the things I also wanted to ask you about in the time that remains, as long as I’ve known you, you and your wife, Ann, have taken some of the most interesting vacations. Not the typical vacations to the standard places that most of us go. First of all, do you have any vacations on the horizon to one of those exotic locations? And if I could as a compound question, which I’m sure lawyers aren’t supposed to ask at the same time, what’s one of the more interesting experiences you’ve had in these very unusual vacations you take?

Durocher
Sure. I’ll pick your, the question about upcoming trips. The one that I’m waiting to finalize is one that we were supposed to take a couple of years go. I’m on the board of Twin City’s Habitat for Humanity, and I’ve done international build. My wife and I went to Guatemala a few years ago and build houses there with a group from Minneapolis. Then the next trip we were supposed to take for Habitat was to Nepal to build houses there. And then COVID came and interrupted that plan. So we’re now, Habitat’s just getting back to international builds, and I’m hoping that we can reignite interest in the Nepal trip because that’s the one that I really, I’d love to do because I’d like to maybe do a little trekking while I’m in Nepal.

So that’s the, what I’m hoping will be a good up-coming trip. And you’re right, we’ve had some great trips in the past, Russia, Morocco, China. And I would say amongst, the one that I’ll say is probably my fondest memory is our trip to Africa where we started in Uganda/Rwanda and did a gorilla trek up into the mountains and got to see gorillas in, within 50 yards away. And then from there we went down to South Africa and did a walking and driving safari in Kruger National Park. The memories of that trip are just phenomenal, and my wife, It was very meaningful for my wife who grew up in a small farm in southern Wisconsin ready National Geographic magazines and always sort of thinking that someday she’d get to see some of those things she saw pictures of in the magazines. I think she, when we left South Africa, there were tears in her eyes.

Schmidt
Amazing.

Durocher
Yeah.

Schmidt
What an amazing experience that must be. Well, it looks like our time is about up, and I just wanted to return once more to our topic of insurance coverage and give you the last word, Skip. What’s the one takeaway that you’d like to leave our listeners with on the issue of managing insurance coverage issues in commercial litigation?

 Durocher
Sure. I think that the, what I would want to impress upon people is the notion that insurance is an asset of your company, and you should treat it like that. Just like your, your computers, your people, your bank account, this is an asset that you own and you want to use it to its fullest. And so even before a claim comes in be aware of what coverages you have, look for holes, have someone look for holes for you, gaps. Educate your people because even going beyond just your risk management and finance people, education the people who will be the ones who may be able to be on the front lines when a claim comes in.

Make sure they understand what kinds of coverages are out there that could respond to one of those claims. Make sure they understand what the reporting duties are, who they need to talk to. We’ve done, as I mentioned earlier, policy analysis for clients, and then gone out and actually done, sort of like insurance 101 to anybody who’s on the front lines and I think it’s really important to educate the employees of clients on those issues so that you can use your asset to the fullest.

Schmidt
Well, that’s a great word to leave our listeners with. Well, Skip, thank you for your friendship and your partnership over these many years, and thank you for taking the time to be a guest on our podcast, and really appreciate you stopping by.

Durocher
My absolute pleasure, Kent. Good talking to you.

Schmidt
That’s all the time we have for today. Thank you for listening. I’m indebted to the extraordinary team at Dorsey for making this podcast and episode possible. For resources on this and other litigation risk, go to litigationrisk.com where more information can be found, including a book on managing litigation risk, written by yours truly. Until next time my friends, this is yet another reminder that there are a lot of sharks swimming out there in the murky waters. So swim safely.

Voiceover
This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

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Litigation Privilege Does Not Automatically Protect Communications with Funders: The Commercial Court Clarifies the Limits of Privilege in the Context of Litigation Funding

In Uber London Ltd & Ors v Garry White & Ors; Mishcon de Reya LLP [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that documents created to help a funder decide whether to invest in a claim will not ordinarily attract litigation privilege. This means that information a firm gathers while acting for a funder can later fall within the control of the claimants it goes on to represent in the same matter. Background The Claimants (a claim group of over 10,000 individual London black cab drivers and the assignee of two former minicab operators) alleged that the Defendants (three companies in the Uber group) obtained and retained their private hire operator's licence through an unlawful means conspiracy alleged to involve fraud. Because the claims were issued outside the ordinary six-year limitation period, the Claimants relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, contending they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud before June 2018. A preliminary issue trial was listed to determine the question of whether the Claimants discovered, or could have discovered with reasonable diligence, the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment only after June 2018. The Claimants were represented by Mishcon de Reya ("MdR"). However, before MdR’s engagement with the individual drivers had begun, in late 2017 it was engaged by the litigation funder Harbour to investigate the merits and value of the potential claim. During that stage, MdR corresponded extensively with Harbour and with the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association ("LTDA"), a black cab drivers' trade association. MdR was not formally engaged by the Claimants until October 2018 onwards. Once the proceedings had started, the Defendants sought disclosure of communications exchanged between MdR and Harbour before the engagement of MdR by the Claimants (the "Harbour Communications"). This included correspondence between MdR and Harbour, communications with the LTDA, and documents held on MdR's file opened in Harbour's name in connection with the potential claim. The Claimants resisted disclosure on four grounds: (i) that the documents were not relevant; (ii) on the grounds of litigation privilege; (iii) that the documents were outside their control; and (iv) that disclosure occurring so close to trial would be disproportionate. Judgment (i) Were the Harbour Communications relevant to the preliminary issue? The Court held that the Harbour Communications were likely to contain relevant material, on two bases. First, where the Claimants or the LTDA had communicated directly with MdR, that material could shed light on individual Claimants' actual knowledge of the alleged facts. Secondly, what MdR and Harbour had discovered during their investigation could inform the question of what a Claimant could reasonably have discovered at the time (even though the Defendants accepted that MdR's knowledge could not simply be imputed to the Claimants). (ii) Were the Harbour Communications protected by litigation privilege? As set out in the classic cases of Three Rivers (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 and WH Holding Ltd v E20 Stadium LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2652, communications between parties or their solicitors and third parties for the purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation are privileged when the following conditions are satisfied: Litigation must be in progress or in reasonable contemplation. The communications must have been made for the sole or dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The litigation must be adversarial, not investigative or inquisitorial. The Court rejected the Claimant’s claim to be able to withhold the Harbour Communications on the basis of litigation privilege. The Court confirmed that litigation privilege protects only communications created for the dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The Court found that Harbour had instructed MdR so that Harbour could decide whether to fund the proceedings. As such, the dominant purpose of the communications was in relation to funding, not the conduct of litigation. This was distinguished from the situation where an individual litigant who takes its own funding decision. In that situation, the decision whether to fund and the decision whether to litigate are one and the same, made by the person who will actually be the claimant, and so it forms a part of that person's conduct of their own litigation. In contrast, a third-party funder's commercial decision whether to fund someone else's claim is not necessarily part of conducting that litigation. The fact that litigation privilege can, in principle, be claimed by a non-party funder (as recognised in the case of Al Sadeq v Dechert [2024] EWCA 28) did not assist Harbour, since there was no evidence it intended to play any role in the litigation itself beyond funding it. Communications between Harbour and MdR did remain capable of attracting another kind of privilege: legal advice privilege, because of the solicitor-client relationship between Harbour and MdR. But communications with third parties such as the LTDA were not automatically protected in the same way. (iii) Were the Harbour Communications within the Claimants' control? The Court also rejected the argument that the Harbour Communications sat outside the Claimants' control because they belonged to Harbour and not the Claimants. The Court’s reasoning was that once the individual Claimant drivers became MdR's clients, MdR also owed them a duty to disclose material information. That included information that MdR had originally acquired while acting for Harbour. As held in the case of Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood (a firm) [2005] 1 WLR 567, a solicitor owing duties to two clients cannot simply prefer one over the other, and it was unrealistic to suppose MdR would investigate the same claims for Harbour, then represent the Claimants, while disregarding everything it had already learned. The obvious commercial expectation was that this earlier work would be used to advance the Claimants' case. MdR sought to rely on a confidentiality clause in a 2024 retainer agreement between it and RGL Management Ltd (a claims management company acting on behalf of the Claimants) to argue that it was relieved of any duty to disclose information obtained while acting for other clients. The provision stated that MdR may "have acted for persons in the same or similar sector as yours and by agreeing to the terms of this letter you agree that will have no duty to disclose to you any confidential information that we have obtained, or might in the future obtain, from acting for such persons or which is derived from any other source". The Court rejected this on several grounds. Claimants who had already become MdR's clients had an existing right to information in the Harbour Communications where it was relevant to their claims before the 2024 retainer agreement. If they were to surrender that right, it would have required their informed consent (also required under the SRA Code of Conduct). The Court found no evidence that such informed consent had been given. The terms had simply been made available to the Claimants through a portal, with no indication that Claimants understood they were giving up existing rights to relevant information. The Court found that even if the terms had been contractually binding, that would not have amounted to informed consent. In addition, the wording of the clause was not sufficiently clear to show that the Claimants had agreed to waive access to this information. (iv) Was disclosure reasonable, proportionate, and necessary at this stage? The Claimants argued that it was neither reasonable nor proportionate for disclosure to be given at such a late stage (approximately two weeks before the start of the preliminary issue trial) and that it was not necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings. The Court rejected this, but it drew a distinction between two categories of documents within the Harbour Communications: Documents bearing on the actual knowledge of the individual drivers, including communications with the LTDA, were not privileged, likely straightforward to review, and directly relevant to the preliminary issue. Their disclosure was ordered as reasonable, proportionate, and necessary. Documents reflecting only MdR's or Harbour's own assessment of the merits were of more marginal, indirect relevance and largely likely to fall under legal advice privilege. A review to isolate the smaller pool of non-privileged material in this category would be time-consuming for limited benefit, so this was excluded from the order. Key Points to Note The judgment is an important reminder of several practical points: However closely a funder is involved in evaluating a claim's merits, litigation privilege will only apply to communications where the sole or dominant purpose of the communication is the conduct of litigation, not the funder's own decision on whether to finance it. Unless that communication separately attracts legal advice privilege, it may need to be disclosed. The same considerations apply to other communications. For example, in RBS Rights Litigation [2017] 1 WLR 3539 the argument that an After the Event (ATE) policy was subject to litigation privilege was rejected on a similar basis. Whilst in this case, there was no dispute as to whether litigation was in contemplation, it is important to note that litigation privilege will not automatically apply to the investigative stages of a claim, i.e. before litigation is in contemplation. Even where litigation is reasonably contemplated, the dominant purpose test must still be satisfied. Material created primarily for fact-finding, risk assessment, or other investigative purposes will not attract litigation privilege unless those activities are actually undertaken for the dominant purpose of conducting the litigation. (See The Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2017] EWHC 1017 (QB)). When engaging a law firm, clients should ensure that they understand whether the firm has previously obtained information about their claim while acting for another party (for example, a funder or another interested party) and how that information will be handled. Any restrictions on the firm’s ability to share relevant information with the client should be explained clearly at the outset, including what information may be withheld and why. If this decision raises questions about your own funding arrangements, disclosure strategy, or privilege position, please get in touch with our Commercial Litigation team.

Insights

State Affordability Infrastructure Districts (SAIDs) — A Financing Tool for Taiwanese Investment in Arizona Science and Technology Parks

If you have developed a facility inside one of Taiwan's science or technology parks, you are accustomed to the one-stop-shop of government planning the park and delivering the roads, water, power, and other infrastructure before your building is even constructed. In the United States, including Arizona, land development generally does not work that way. In Arizona, the cost of infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, power, and the digital backbone, typically falls on the private landowner and is incurred up front before operations generate revenue to offset that cost. For a company entering the Arizona market, this is often the largest and earliest capital burden of the entire project. Arizona recently created a tool that provides a more cost-effective way for landowners and developer to finance some of that infrastructure. House Bill 2999, signed into law June 2026 and codified at Chapter 40 of Title 48 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, establishes the creation of a State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID). How a SAID Works Landowners are now able to use a SAID to finance public infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, parking, lighting, communications, rail sidings and signalization, and similar improvements, through tax-exempt bonds. The bonds are repaid over up to 30 years and secured solely by the property within the SAID. No city, county, or state credit is pledged, and no obligation falls on other taxpayers, and therefore no city, county, or state approval other than from the Arizona Finance Authority (AFA). In effect, a SAID lets you spread the cost of horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of funding it entirely at the outset. And tax-exempt bonds often offer a lower interest rate than taxable or other types of financing. How a SAID is Formed A SAID is formed upon the filing of a petition with the AFA. The petition must include the finance plan, general plan, estimated costs, maximum tax rate, appraisal, bond counsel certificate, consultant list, petitioner experience, legal description, title report, and other materials. While the landowner is required to provide notice to the local governing jurisdiction, local governing jurisdiction does not have the right to approve or deny. The petition is reviewed administratively by the AFA through a standards-based process. For an inbound investor without long-standing local relationships, an objective, criteria-driven process is a meaningful advantage to the overt political process associated with other financing districts in Arizona. Formation requirements. A SAID requires consent from 100% of landowners within the proposed district; public infrastructure costs must exceed $5 million (easily met at any real scale); the district property must all be in the same county and need not be contiguous provided that noncontiguous property is located within five miles of the district's other property; and the board is initially appointed by the forming owners of the SAID district, later transitioning to election as ownership diversifies. Actual bond issuance requires an election of the SAID property owners. Ownership and corporate structure. Consent rights and board seats run with title. If you hold the Arizona land through a U.S. blocker beneath your Taiwan parent, the standard model for Taiwanese/Arizona real estate and operating investment, the U.S. property-holding entity, rather than it’s corporate parent, is the landowner of record for the district. Before formation, our Dorsey team will confirm that you have the proper corporate structure and board mechanics to be compliant.  Board composition has no citizenship or residency requirement. This is a common concern for foreign investors, and the statute answers it cleanly. Under A.R.S. § 48-7004, a director must either hold fee title to real property in the district or be an individual designated or appointed by a fee-title owner. Corporations, partnerships, and other business entities are expressly permitted to be those owners, to vote as owners, and to designate an individual to serve. There is no requirement that a director be a U.S. citizen or resident. So your U.S. property-holding entity, as landowner of record, can appoint whichever of your principals you choose, including a Taiwan-based individual, as the three-member board.  Power infrastructure limitation. The enacted definition of "public infrastructure" in A.R.S. § 48-7001 does not include electrical power generation or transmission. The reference to electrical facilities appears only as components of lighting and traffic-control systems, and the Legislature removed broader energy infrastructure from the definition during the Senate amendments. A SAID will likely not finance the high-load power infrastructure required for semiconductor fabrication, data storage, or heavy manufacturing.  Water infrastructure within a current utility CC&N. Where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the SAID cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility on completion. Entitlements and zoning: The determination of entitlements, zoning, and other land use permitting, as well as construction permitting for a technology or manufacturing facilities remain with the local jurisdiction and run on a separate track. Our Dorsey team will help you coordinate the financing and entitlement timelines together. Our Dorsey team works regularly with Taiwanese and other Asia-Pacific companies entering the Arizona market. If a SAID fits your project, we can structure it for your cross-border ownership.

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Proposed CMS Rule Ramps Up Potential Medicare Fraud Administrative Remedies

On July 6, 2026, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a rule that would expand its administrative remedies to combat potential fraud. The proposed rule is the latest in a round of administrative actions that signal CMS’s intent to aggressively pursue allegations of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and heighten the risk of fraud enforcement against even well-intentioned Medicare and Medicaid providers and suppliers. The proposed rule includes several changes to regulations that govern Medicare billing privileges. Providers and suppliers should be aware that these changes dramatically expand the flexibility afforded to CMS in enrollment and revocation actions, potentially leading to harsh consequences for ministerial and administrative errors. If finalized, moreover, the proposed rule could have material implications for providers and suppliers facing threatened revocation, including heightened risk of overpayment liability and increased hurdles to challenging revocations and denials of enrollment. Added Flexibility to Existing Revocation Grounds CMS has proposed to remove a number of factors that the regulations list as relevant to a determination of whether a provider has engaged in “abuse of billing privileges.” While acknowledging that the inclusion of these factors in the regulations was permissive (requiring consideration only where “as appropriate or applicable”), CMS stated that it must be afforded “the maximum flexibility to address all possible . . . scenarios without the rigid constraints of our existing factors.” CMS provided little guidance as to the outer bounds of what conduct could constitute an “abuse of privileges” that merits revocation of Medicare billing privileges. Instead, CMS noted that a “pattern of practice” of abuse of billing privileges might be established “by a simple finding that several of a provider’s claims do not meet Medicare requirements.” Similarly, CMS has proposed to expand the regulatory provision that permits revocation of enrollment if a provider certifies as “true” false or misleading information in Medicare enrollment application or renewal forms to include any scenario in which a provider submits “false or misleading information on or associated with any CMS Medicare enrollment-related form,” including materials submitted to Medicare contractors. CMS stated that it interprets this expanded rule to include anything related to Medicare enrollment, and not only those submissions that are “intended to gain or maintain Medicare enrollment.” If finalized, the proposed rule would add significant flexibility to CMS’s ability to pursue revocation of a provider’s enrollment. While CMS has assured providers that it would “invoke [the revised regulations]. . . only when legitimately warranted under the facts and circumstances and not as a matter of course,” such expanded flexibility threatens unpredictability in the event of even administrative or ministerial errors in submissions and claims. These changes would, moreover, make it more difficult for providers to challenge a revocation action. Expanded Revocation Grounds In addition to adding flexibility to existing grounds for revocation, CMS’s proposed rule adds to and expands CMS’s already broad authority to revoke provider and supplier enrollment. Such proposed changes include adding the following grounds for revocation: Denial of Enrollment Application. Where CMS could previously revoke a provider’s other enrollments if one enrollment is revoked, CMS would also be able to revoke a provider’s existing enrollments if an application for enrollment submitted by the provider is denied. High-Risk Enrollments. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if it determines the provider or supplier (including owning/managing employees or organizations) poses a high risk of fraud, waste, or abuse due to “. . . an affiliation under [42 C.F.R.] § 424.519” or “the provider’s or supplier’s location within a limited geographic area that has an excessive number of providers and suppliers.” Certain Misdemeanor Convictions. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if a provider or supplier—or its owners, managing employees, managing organizations, officers, or directors—are convicted of a “misdemeanor related to sexual assault or financial misconduct within the past 10 years that CMS deems detrimental to the best interests of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries.” Ownership Changes (HHA, Hospice, DMEPOS). CMS would have broad authority to revoke enrollment of home health agencies, hospices, and DMEPOS suppliers who do not comply with the regulations governing provider changes of ownership. These proposed, expanded grounds for revocation are notably broad, and CMS provides only limited guidance as to what conduct might result in revocation under these grounds. As with the proposed expansion of existing grounds for revocation, the open-ended nature of these proposed grounds for revocation may make it more difficult for providers and suppliers to challenge revocation actions. Expanded Grounds to Deny Medicare Enrollment As with revocations, CMS proposes to expand the grounds under which a provider’s application to enroll in Medicare can be denied. These expanded and additional grounds include many of the grounds added for revocations, but also include: Medicare Debt or Payment Suspension. CMS proposes expanding the ground to deny enrollment based on Medicare debt or payment suspension to include a provider or supplier’s “managing employee, managing organization, or individual or entity with any other form of business or financial relationship with the provider or supplier[.]” Significantly, this expansive definition (called an “associated party” under the proposed regulation) currently contains no material limitations, meaning almost any person or entity with whom an applicant does business could create denial liability. Sharing Locations with Denied/Revoked Providers or Suppliers. CMS would have authority to deny applications where a “provider’s or supplier’s practice location is in the same suite or office as another provider or supplier whose Medicare enrollment has been revoked or denied.” Hospices with Distant Medical Directors or Administrators. CMS would have discretion to deny hospice applications if the hospice’s medical director or administrator serves “multiple other hospices” or practices/is located “at such a distance (for example, in a different state) from the enrolling hospice that the medical director cannot realistically perform all medical director functions,” with a similar provision for administrators. In addition, CMS proposes applications denied for “other program termination or suspension,” may be applied to the provider or supplier in its own name or NPI or that of its owners, managing employees, or managing organization regardless of whether any appeals are pending. Retroactive Revocation CMS proposed to restructure and expand the regulatory grounds for retroactive revocation of billing privileges. Currently, Medicare regulations provide that revocations are, by default, prospective in nature: effective 30 days after CMS or the CMS contractor mails notice to the provider. Under certain circumstances, the regulations provide for revocations to be retroactive, such as when a provider is convicted of a felony, the date a professional license is suspended, revoked, or surrendered, or when a provider submits a false certification in their enrollment application. CMS has proposed to reframe the rule so as to default to retroactive revocation of billing privileges. CMS expressed concern that providers may collect payment from Medicare while remaining so non-compliant with enrollment requirements as to merit revocation. To address this concern, CMS proposed that all revocations be retroactive to the date of determined non-compliance.[1] As a result, providers suspected of misconduct or non-compliance are likely to face claims of retroactive overpayments in addition to the immediate concern no longer receiving Medicare payments while their enrollment is revoked. Reapplication Bar CMS’s proposed rule expands the grounds from which a provider may be prohibited from seeking reapplication as a Medicare provider. Under current regulations, CMS may prohibit prospective providers from enrolling in Medicare for up to 10 years if its enrollment application is denied because the applicant submitted false or misleading information in its application. Under the proposed rule, CMS will have the discretion to prohibit a provider from enrolling in Medicare if their enrollment application is denied for any reason. Conclusion As a part of the federal government’s increasingly aggressive push to combat real or perceived healthcare fraud, the proposed rule both broadens CMS’s authority to revoke and deny Medicare enrollment and raises the stakes for revocation and denial. What the proposed rule does not share is how CMS plans to exercise this expanded discretion: as a result, the proposed rule, if enacted, increases the unpredictability and potential ramifications of even technical noncompliance with CMS rules. As a result, Medicare providers should keep a close eye on potential revisions to these rules and their potential implementation and consider proactively evaluating their compliance under CMS standards. [1] In the proposed rule, CMS identifies, with respect to each ground for revocation, what it will consider to be the effective date of revocation.

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Dorsey Partner Melissa Raphan Elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers

International law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP is pleased to announce that Partner Melissa Raphan has been elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers (CLEL) as part of its 2026 class. “Melissa’s election to this prestigious fellowship comes as no surprise to those of us who have had the privilege of working with her,” says Peter Nelson, Dorsey’s Managing Partner.  “She is an exceptional employment lawyer, a trusted advisor, and a leader whose impact extends far beyond her matters. Clients rely on her deep knowledge, strategic counsel, and ability to navigate complex workplace disputes and sensitive employment matters with both confidence and compassion. She has helped shape our firm, strengthen our profession, and opened doors for countless others through her commitment to mentorship and diversity. We are incredibly proud of her accomplishments and delighted to see her receive this recognition.” CLEL is a nonprofit professional association that honors the nation’s leading attorneys in the field of labor and employment law. Originally established to recognize excellence in the profession, CLEL has evolved into a respected intellectual and practical resource for the legal community and its many audiences. Its mission centers on recognizing individuals who have made significant contributions to the field, fostering the exchange of knowledge and delivering value to academia, government, the judiciary, and the broader public. Election as a fellow represents the highest level of peer acknowledgment, reflecting sustained achievement, integrity, and a commitment to advancing the profession. Melissa’s career reflects CLEL’s mission. She has been recognized both regionally and nationally for her advocacy, leadership, and achievements both inside and outside of the courtroom. Her employment litigation experience spans class actions, collective actions, and high-stakes individual disputes in state and federal courts, as well as arbitration forums including the American Arbitration Association and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). She is also a trusted advisor on a full range of workplace issues, from hiring and performance management to sensitive terminations and organizational change. She brings decades of experience representing clients across the financial services, healthcare, food and agriculture, and energy sectors. Melissa will be formally inducted during CLEL’s installation ceremony held in conjunction with the American Bar Association’s Labor & Employment Law Conference in Washington, D.C., on November 7.

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37 Dorsey Attorneys Named 2026 Top Lawyers by Minnesota Monthly

Minnesota Monthly has recognized 37 Dorsey attorneys across 27 practice areas as 2026 Top Lawyers in Minnesota. Honorees are selected through a peer nomination process and a curated survey of practicing attorneys in Minnesota, who identify leading lawyers across a range of practice areas. Administrative / Regulatory Law Jennifer Coates Antitrust Law Michael Lindsay Banking & Financial Service Law Peter Nelson Copyright Law  Jeffrey Cadwell Corporate Law  Robert Hensley Robert Rosenbaum Criminal Defense: White-Collar  Beth Forsythe Edward Magarian RJ Zayed Health Care Law  Claire Topp Immigration Law  J. Mike Sevilla Insurance Law  Daniel Brown Intellectual Property and Patent Law  Stuart Hemphill International Trade Law  Jonathan Van Horn Labor and Employment Law  Edward Magarian Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Land Use & Zoning  Jay Lindgren Marcus Mollison Litigation – Antitrust  Michael Lindsay F. Matthew Ralph Jaime Stilson Litigation – Commercial  Michael Lindsay Litigation – Construction  Eric Ruzicka Litigation – Intellectual Property  Peter Lancaster RJ Zayed Litigation – Labor Employment Benefits  Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Litigation – Trusts and Estates  William J. Berens Theresa Bevilacqua Bridget Logstrom Koci Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions  James K. Langdon Mergers & Acquisitions Law  Keith Ahlgren Rachel Benedict Brian Burke Morgan Helme John Jorgenson Brian Moore Robert Rosenbaum Jonathan Van Horn Bri Whiting Municipal Law Jay Lindgren Nonprofit/Charities Law Claire Topp Securities / Capital Markets Law Cam Hoang Robert Rosenbaum Securities Regulation Theresa Bevilacqua James K. Langdon Tax Law William J. Berens Trusts and Estates Jennifer Ede Bridget Logstrom Koci Sonny Miller Kiley Petty Henry

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The Long-Awaited Public Infrastructure Financing Solution for Development in Arizona

Every developer who has taken raw Arizona ground to a finished project knows the largest upfront cost other than the land price is almost always the cost to install the public infrastructure. Water, sewer, stormwater, streets, dry utilities, and the fiber backbone all have to be in the ground before a single lot closes or a building opens. That capital is deployed early and generates no return for years. For decades the standard workaround has been the Community Facilities District (CFD). That tool has grown materially harder to use, for reasons cited below, and House Bill 2999, signed in June 2026 and now codified as Chapter 40 of Title 48, is Arizona's response. Some Background I have spent a good part of my career on the other side of this problem. In the 1990s and early 2000s I served as general counsel of SunCor Development Company, one of Arizona's most active master-planned community developers, where we used Community Facilities Districts to finance hundreds of millions of dollars of major infrastructure across Arizona in cities such as Goodyear, Phoenix, Tempe, Litchfield Park, and Prescott Valley. For its time the CFD was an effective structure, and a great deal of what is now on the ground in those communities was financed with this tool. Unfortunately, CFDs have over time become considerably harder to use. Successive legislative amendments have layered on tax-rate ceilings, homebuyer disclosure obligations, and added procedural steps. Another drag on the use of CFDs is that formation of them runs through the municipality, where approval can turn as much on local politics as on the merits of a project. Developers now routinely are asked to absorb delay and uncertainty that a project's economics cannot support, which is a large part of why Arizona has fallen behind Colorado, Texas, and Utah in getting infrastructure financed. A better tool was needed, and Chapter 40 is it. How a SAID Improves on a CFD A State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID) keeps what worked about the CFD: tax-exempt, property-secured, non-recourse infrastructure financing — while shedding much of what made the CFD cumbersome. Its principal advantages over a traditional CFD: Administrative formation. A SAID is formed by the Arizona Finance Authority against fixed statutory criteria, through a yes-or-no compliance review on a sixty-day clock, rather than through the discretionary approval of a city council or a board of supervisors. Insulation from municipal politics. Because formation is a state-level compliance determination, a meritorious project is far less exposed to local political headwinds than it is under the CFD process. Landowner control of the board. A SAID is governed by a board of the landowners — appointed at formation, then elected on an acreage basis. In a typical municipal CFD, the city council sits as the district board; here, the developer controls governance. Advance funding of impact fees. A SAID can use bond proceeds to advance-pay municipal development impact fees, unlike CFDs, removing one of the largest upfront cash burdens in a project. A uniform, statewide process. The criteria are the same regardless of jurisdiction, replacing the municipality-by-municipality variation that has made CFD outcomes hard to predict. Flexible boundaries. A district may include noncontiguous parcels in the same county within five miles of one another, which fits phased and multi-tract development. Capped cost and a fixed timeline. Authority fees to form a district are capped at $15,000, and a complete petition must be acted on within sixty days. The full range of bonds. A SAID may issue general obligation, special assessment, revenue, and refunding bonds, secured solely by district property and creating no obligation for any other taxpayer. What is a SAID A SAID is a special taxing district that the owners of a development form to finance public infrastructure with tax-exempt bonds: general obligation bonds, special assessment bonds, and revenue bonds. The bonds are secured only by the property inside the district and are repaid over the long term, with terms up to 30 years. They do not affect the credit of the city, the county, or the State, and they create no obligation for any taxpayer outside the district. In practical terms, a SAID lets you finance horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of writing the check at the front end. The maximum ad valorem rate securing general obligation bonds is capped by statute at $5.00 per $100 of net assessed limited property valuation, with a limited step-up to cover a debt-service shortfall. SAIDs Work for Commercial as Well as Residential Development The SAID bill drew most of its press as a housing-affordability measure, and it appears to be a strong one. It is the first Arizona district statute to let bond proceeds advance-fund municipal development impact fees, which pulls one of the largest upfront cash burdens off a homebuilder's pro forma. But the statute's eligible infrastructure categories apply with equal force to commercial, industrial, and mixed-use projects. An industrial or logistics project can finance roads, rail crossings, sidings, and grade separations. A life-sciences or technology campus can finance its water, sewer, roads, and broadband the same way a subdivision can. Read Chapter 40 as a general-purpose infrastructure finance platform, not a subdivision-only device. How Formation Works A SAID is formed administratively by the Arizona Finance Authority. The Authority reviews the petition for compliance with the statute; it is a yes-or-no review against fixed criteria, not a discretionary negotiation with a city council or a board of supervisors, and it runs on a sixty-day clock once a complete petition is filed. Formation requires the written consent of 100% of the landowners in the proposed district and an engineer's certification that public infrastructure costs will exceed $5 million. The district may include noncontiguous parcels so long as they lie in the same county and within five miles of the district's other property, which accommodates phased and multi-tract development; if any part of the district sits inside a municipality, the whole district must stay within that municipality's limits or planning area. The Authority's fees to form a district are capped at $15,000. Issuing bonds requires a district election. Governance Simplified A SAID is run by a three-member board. The initial directors are named in the petition; after that, directors are elected by the landowners on an acreage basis as ownership diversifies. Board service runs with ownership; a director must either hold fee title inside the district or be an individual designated by a fee-title owner; and corporations, partnerships, and other entities may hold that ownership, vote as owners, and designate the individual who serves. A district has no power of eminent domain and no zoning authority, and directors may not be officials or employees of the municipality in which the district sits. What a SAID Does Not Do It finances; it does not entitle. Zoning, platting, rezonings, use permits, and the specialized approvals a manufacturing or life-sciences facility may need all remain with the local jurisdiction and proceed on their own track. The financing and entitlement timelines should be coordinated with formation of the SAID, but they are separate processes. Two substantive limits are worth flagging at the planning stage. First, electric power is largely outside the tool: the statutory definition of public infrastructure does not reach power generation or transmission, and broader energy infrastructure was removed from the bill during the Senate amendments. A power-intensive user should not assume a SAID will carry its electrical load. Second, where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the district cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility upon completion. Our Take For most master-planned residential work, and for a wide range of commercial and industrial development, a SAID will be the most efficient infrastructure-financing structure Arizona has offered. The right time to evaluate it is early in the acquisition and pre-development process, while the capital stack, the development agreement, and the entitlement strategy are still being set. Once the district's boundaries, general plan, and financing parameters are set, it is cumbersome at best to bring those into conformance later. Our Dorsey team has begun advising our developer clients on SAID formation on residential, commercial, and industrial projects statewide. If you would like us to assess whether a SAID fits a project you are working on, please reach out.

News

Real Estate Attorney Alexis Olsen Joins Dorsey in Phoenix

Attorney Alexis Olsen has joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP as Of Counsel in the Real Estate group in Phoenix, the law firm announced today. Alexis focuses her practice on large-scale residential, mixed-use, and multi-asset development projects as well as multi-state commercial leasing transactions. She guides clients through sophisticated acquisitions, dispositions, leasing, entity structuring, investment strategies, and due diligence matters. She has structured co-investment arrangements that drive capital deployment into housing subdivisions nationwide and has represented both landlords and tenants in commercial leasing transactions involving office, retail, industrial, and specialty-use properties, including cannabis dispensaries. Alexis received her J.D. from Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law and her B.A. from the University of Arizona. Alexis comes to Dorsey from Squire Patton Boggs. “Alexis strengthens Dorsey’s real estate capabilities at a time when Phoenix remains one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic real estate markets in the country,” said Scott Jenkins, Dorsey’s Phoenix office head. “Her addition further enhances our deep bench of 12 real estate attorneys in Phoenix and reflects our continued investment in serving clients throughout Arizona and supporting their real estate transactions and objectives across the country. We are thrilled to welcome Alexis to Dorsey.” “Joining a firm with such a deep bench of experienced attorneys in the Phoenix office, especially in the Real Estate group, presents an exciting opportunity not just for my own professional growth, but for the clients we service,” said Alexis Olsen. “I look forward to building on this strong foundation, growing our national practice, and delivering top-tier service to our clients.”

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Patent Partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic Join Dorsey in Palo Alto

Patent partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic have joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Palo Alto, the international law firm announced today. Al Araiza works with clients to develop and implement patent strategies that align with corporate objectives, supporting growth initiatives, financing efforts, and successful exits, including initial public offerings and acquisitions. He advises on building, managing, and optimizing patent portfolios across a broad range of emerging and frontier technologies, with depth in wireless communications, artificial intelligence, and energy innovation. Before practicing law, Al gained engineering experience in the defense industry, working on energy system modeling and communications circuitry design. He also conducted biomedical research, with findings published in peer-reviewed journals. He has been recognized in the IAM Patent 1000 for his work advising clients on patent strategy and portfolio development. Al received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law, his M.E. in Biomedical Engineering from Tulane University, and his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from UCLA. Lena Petrovic works across the software and hardware industries to develop clear, well-supported patent applications. She guides clients through the prosecution process and advises on global trademark and copyright matters, including licensing and portfolio management. Lena regularly supports clients developing technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, fintech, cryptography, interactive and immersive experiences, and digital media, and works with companies in entertainment, gaming, and sports. Before practicing law, Lena spent a decade at Pixar, where she contributed to major films including The Incredibles, Ratatouille, WALL‑E, and Brave. Lena received her J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law, her M.S. in Computer Science from Princeton University, and her B.S. from California Institute of Technology. “Al and Lena bring a practical, technical, and business-focused approach informed by extensive experience working with technology companies, startups, and investors,” said Gina Cornelio, Patent Practice Group Co-Leader. “We are thrilled to welcome them to the Patent team and our growing Palo Alto office.” “Dorsey’s Patent practice is dedicated to understanding each client's business deeply, tailoring patent strategies that directly advance their goals,” said Al Araiza. “We are proud to join this outstanding team and look forward to driving success for our clients.”

Insights

Alaska HB 126: What Changes for Alaska Native Corporations, Proxy Filings, and Annual Reports

Alaska House Bill 126 (HB 126), sponsored by Representative Neal Foster and passed by the 34th Alaska Legislature, is now law. The bill changes which Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) must file proxy and annual report materials with the State of Alaska, and makes it easier to reinstate certain dissolved Village Corporations. For many smaller Village Corporations, the practical result is less public disclosure. For shareholders, advisors, and the public, it means some financial information that used to be available through the State will no longer be readily obtained. This eUpdate explains what HB 126 does in plain terms, walks through the practical trade-offs, and answers common questions. 1. What HB 126 Changes The old rule Under prior law (Alaska Statutes Sec. 45.55.139), an Alaska Native Corporation had to file its annual report, proxies, and proxy statements with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities (the Division) if it had more than $1 million in assets and 500 or more shareholders on its current rolls. A filing ANC was also required to follow the Division’s proxy rules (3 AAC 08.305 through .365), which require specific disclosures such as top 5 executive compensation, and related-party transactions. Because these filings are treated as public records, they gave non-shareholders, including the public and the press, visibility into ANC financial information that is not filed with the SEC. The new rule HB 126 changes how the 500-shareholder test is measured. Now, the asset test is removed, and the shareholder count is based on how many shareholders the corporation originally enrolled when it was formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), not how many it has today. As shares have passed down through families over the decades, some Village Corporations that started with fewer than 500 shareholders now have more than 500 recordholders. Under the old current-count test, when those corporations had crossed the threshold, they had to file. Under the new original-enrollment test, they do not. Who is affected Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders are the main beneficiaries. They no longer have to file proxy and annual report materials with the Division or follow the Division’s proxy regulations at 3 AAC 08.305 through .365. Two groups must continue to file as before: all twelve ANCSA Regional Corporations, each of which enrolled more than 500 shareholders at creation, and all Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders. As reported by the Alaska Beacon, when the bill was under consideration, the Division identified 59 corporations then filing, expected at least seven village corporations to become exempt, and was reviewing roughly 30 more. 2. Practical Analysis HB 126 reduces a real compliance burden for smaller Village Corporations, which now need not spend time and money on State filings. In coming years, the exempt Village Corporations may experience benefits associated with less public disclosure and less regulation. But at the same time, less public disclosure carries trade-offs. Benchmarking will become harder Publicly-filed proxy statements and annual reports have long served as a reference set. Shareholders, corporations, advisors, and counsel use them to compare governance practices, compensation, and financial results across similarly-situated ANCs. Since fewer of these materials will be filed publicly, there will be fewer comparable documents available, which will make benchmarking and market-checking more difficult for like-sized ANCs over time. Executive compensation transparency may be reduced The Division’s proxy rules require disclosure of the compensation of ANC’s top five most highly compensated individuals (3 AAC 08.345(b)(2)), related-party transactions above $20,000 (3 AAC 08.345(b)(3)), and audited financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis (3 AAC 08.365). When a corporation is no longer required to file these disclosures publicly, it becomes harder for shareholders and others to obtain the information, to understand how compensation is set for their corporate leadership, and how it compares across corporations of similar size and complexity. Transparency may matter more as ANCs grow Some ANCs have grown into large, complex enterprises with substantial revenue and many subsidiaries, even with fewer than 500 shareholders. For an ANC with a broad and dispersed shareholder base, public materials can be an important way for shareholders and other stakeholders to understand governance, compensation, and performance across ANCs. Reduced disclosure may carry more practical weight in those settings than for a small corporation whose shareholders are closely connected to the business. The ANCSA annual report obligation continues It is important not to overstate what HB 126 does. HB 126 changes the state filing proxy requirements. It does not remove the separate obligation under ANCSA itself. That obligation comes from ANCSA at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c), which requires a Native Corporation that would otherwise be subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prepare and transmit to its shareholders an annual report containing substantially the information a company subject to that Act would include. Similarly, ANCs that solicit proxies for an annual meeting are still required to furnish shareholders with those proxy materials under general Alaska corporate law. However, ANCs are now no longer required to transmit proxy statements to the State. ANCs’ reporting obligations to their shareholders are unaffected by HB 126. Any corporation newly exempt from state filing still owes its shareholders a detailed annual report and a proxy statement, even though that report is no longer routed through the State and made public. Reinstatement of dissolved Village Corporations Separately, HB 126 amends AS 10.06.960(k) to remove the prior deadline (previously December 31, 2020) for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. A dissolved Village Corporation may now apply to be reinstated under AS 10.06.633(e) at any time. Reinstatement still runs through the commissioner under AS 10.06.633(e). In general, that means the ANC must apply, cure the neglect or delinquency that led to dissolution, and pay the amounts owed, and the corporation’s name must be available or be changed to one that is. Once reinstated, the corporation and its shareholders are restored to the rights, privileges, liabilities, and obligations they would have had as if the dissolution had never occurred, and corporate and shareholder actions taken during the dissolution are treated as valid. If the previously-used corporate name is no longer available, the board alone may amend the articles to adopt a new name (without the necessity for shareholder approval). 3. Frequently Asked Questions What does HB 126 do? It changes how Alaska measures the 500-shareholder test that decides which ANCs must file proxy and annual report materials with the state. It removes the asset test, and it counts shareholders based on original enrollment rather than the current rolls. It also removes the deadline for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. Which ANCs are affected? Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders, because they may no longer need to file with the Division. Regional Corporations and Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders must continue to file as before. Does HB 126 eliminate all reporting obligations? No. It changes the state filing requirement under AS 45.55.139, but it does not remove the separate ANCSA obligation (43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c)) to provide shareholders with an annual report, and general corporate law still calls for a proxy statement when the ANC solicits proxies. Corporations that remain subject to state filing requirements must also continue to comply with the Division's rules. We think we are now exempt. What should our ANC board and management consider? Confirm your ANC’s original enrollment number and whether your corporation falls below the new threshold. Watch for communications from the State on this topic as they proceed with their research. If your ANC is now exempt, decide how your corporation will meet its continuing ANCSA obligation to shareholders, review proxy and annual meeting materials and timelines, and consider what to communicate to shareholders about any change in how they will receive information. It is worth documenting the basis for any exemption. What should ANC shareholders watch for? Shareholders should watch for how and when they will continue to receive annual report and proxy statement information directly from their ANC, since some material that used to be available through the State’s online website will no longer be publicly filed. If something is unclear, shareholders can ask their ANC how it intends to meet its ANCSA reporting obligations. How Dorsey Can Help HB 126 lightens the State filing load for smaller Village Corporations, but it also raises practical questions: confirming who is exempt, meeting continuing ANCSA obligations to shareholders, keeping proxy and annual meeting processes on track, and maintaining benchmarking when public materials become less available. These are exactly the kinds of judgment calls that benefit from early planning. Dorsey’s attorneys work closely with Alaska Native Corporations and related stakeholders. If you have questions about HB 126, ANC governance, proxy filings, annual reports, disclosure obligations, or shareholder communications, please contact your Dorsey attorney, including the authors of this eUpdate.