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Supreme Court Update: Three Decisions From the Last Term that Impact Litigation Risks

July 27, 2023

by Kent J. Schmidt, Brock Huebner, Nick Bullard, and Steve Wells

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The end of June marked the conclusion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent term. In addition to cases that grab headlines dealing with social, political, or public policy issues, the Court also decides issues that impact business litigation. Its decision will now play out in courts around the country as judges apply the new cases. In this episode, we hear from three Dorsey appellate lawyers, Steve WellsNick Bullard and Brock Huebner, who have been tracking the Court’s decisions, along with Partner and Podcast Host, Kent Schmidt. We focus on three decisions from this term that in-house counsel should consider in managing and assessing litigation risks.

This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

Transcript

Voiceover
Welcome to another episode of the SharkCast on Litigation Risks Management, where we explore why businesses are so frequently sued and how to mitigate and navigate the dangers lurking in these risky waters.  Join us now as we welcome our host, Kent Schmidt, Litigation Partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.

Schmidt
I am pleased to be joined in the palatial SharkCast studios by Steve Wells, Nick Bullard and Brock Huebner.  Each one of these lawyers is a member of Dorsey’s Appellate Practice group.  This group of lawyers reviews and summarizes US Supreme Court decisions throughout the term and sends e-updates on each decisions as well as orders granting.  So it’s a very helpful update for staying on top of cases coming down from the High Court, and I recommend signing up for this e-update if it would be of any interest to you.  In the time we have on the podcast today, we’re gonna ask each of these three guests to highlight a decision from this last Supreme Court term.  I’ve asked them to select a case that pertains in some way to commercial litigation risk and to address the practical takeaways that in-house counsel might consider going forward.  We will leave for the law school professors and commentators the more esoteric and philosophical debates about what’s going on at the Court and try to make this presentation as pragmatic and practical as possible for those in the trenches dealing with litigation risk management.  So it’s a pleasure to welcome each of you to the SharkCast Podcast.  We have a great deal of ground to cover in a very short amount of time, so let’s get started.  The first of the three cases that we’re going to discuss today is National Pork Producers Council versus Ross.  Which of you three is gonna tackle this interesting new case?

Wells
Hey, this is Steve Wells and I’ll be weighing in on this one.

Schmidt
Let’s begin by hearing what this case is about, including the California law that was challenged in Pork Producers Council.

Wells
Several years ago, the California voters approved Proposition 12, which prohibited, in California, the sale of any whole pork products that were the result of raising pigs in a manner that was cruel, and cruel actually had a statutory definition.  I won’t go into it in great detail, but it essentially proscribed raising pigs in a manner that would prevent them from standing up, prevent them from turning around and raising them in various ways that were contrary to the views of, in all rights, proponents of Prop. 12.

Schmidt
Okay, so here in California we have propositions on the ballot on a regular basis.  We understand a little bit about what Prop. 12 is about.  What was the basis for the constitutional attack on Prop. 12?

Wells
The plaintiffs in this case were industry organizations that raised or sold pork products, so the name plaintiff was National Pork Producers Council.  And the claim here was that this law violated what’s called the Dormant Commerce Clause.  That is a somewhat arcane legal doctrine that results from a provision of the Constitution.  So the US Constitution expressly says that Congress has the right to regulate commerce among the states.  The Supreme Court has decided that the flip side of that is that states don’t have that right.  And so when states try to regulate interstate commerce, either by discriminating against out-of-state economic interests, or by, for example, trying to legislate in a way that would regulate matters outside of the state.  Those cases have been held by the Supreme Court to violate what’s called the Dormant Commerce Clause.

Schmidt
Ultimately, how did the US Supreme Court come down on the Dormant Commerce Clause issue with respect to Prop 12?

Wells
So the issue in this case wasn’t outright discrimination.  The kind of classic example of a Dormant Commerce Clause violation is where a state enacts a regulation that prefers in-state economic interest to out-of-state economic interest.  The State of Michigan, for example, several years ago wanted to protect in-state wine producers.  These are Michigan vineyard owners and Michigan enacted a regulation which allowed in-state wine producers to mail their products to homeowners in Michigan, but prohibited out-of-state vineyard owners from doing the same thing.  And the court said that was purposeful discrimination, you’re obviously protecting an in-state interest at the expense of out-of-state interests.  So the Court in this case was clear to say that’s not what’s going on right here.  What’s going on in this case is that there is no outright, what’s called facial discrimination, because in-state pork producers were treated the same as out-of-state pork producers.  The argument in this case, though, was that because only five percent of the pork that’s eaten in California comes from California, this was really a regulation, a law, that burdened out-of-state pork producers almost exclusively.  And the court had to deal with whether that violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.  The holding was that it does not.  In this case, Justice Gorsuch, who wrote the opinion for the majority, found that what the court really will look to is this purposeful discrimination, is there some way in which the statute or regulation that’s being challenged openly prefers in-state interests over out-of-state interests.  And the Court found this one did not.  The Court recognized that there was a substantial burden, if you will, on other states, because that’s where all the pork producers raised the pigs that yielded pork that ended up in California.  But the Court said that’s not enough, and it went through a sort of lengthy and somewhat arcane explanation of why that’s so, and many of the Justices signed on to the first point, saying yeah, there’s no, there’s no open discrimination here.  But the opinion was fractured about whether you could still make a claim that the Dormant Commerce Clause was violated as a result of a very substantial impact on out-of-state commerce, even if that wasn’t the intent of the statute.

Schmidt
Steve, what would you say is the major take away or the result of this decision from a legal perspective, an industry perspective going forward, particularly as it relates to large states like California and New York that wield the significance of power from the virtue of their population and their markets and their ability to legislate conduct that has an impact nationwide?

Wells
This case was being very closely watched because if the Court had found that laws in California or Texas or New York, states that have a lot of economic heft, if laws there could be challenged under Dormant Commerce Clause because it had a significant effect outside the state, that would have been a very dramatic expansion of the Dormant Commerce Clause.  And what the Court pretty clearly here said is we’re not going to expand the Dormant Commerce Clause that way.  The mere fact that there’s a burden outside of a state, as long as there’s no purposeful discrimination, we’re going to allow that to stand.  And what I would suggest is that the Justices were keenly aware the goose and gander problem here.  If they said that a California regulation that imposed essentially substantial burdens outside the state invalidated a California law, one could imagine the same argument being used to curtail a legislation in Texas, for example, that might relate to abortion that has substantial economic effects outside the state.  And I think the Court did what it should have done here, which is to say we’re not going to take sides on this and we’re not going to expand the law in a way which dramatically gives the Court the power to eliminate state regulation.  So what I think we can expect to see out of this is states with a significant economic power like California, like Texas, like New York, like Florida, enact regulations that the legislatures think is appropriate in those jurisdictions without regard to the impact it may have outside of the boundaries of their state.

Schmidt
Well, that will make compliance with the patchwork of regulations that continue to emerge all the more challenging.  So thank you for that update and for those observations on our first case.  And before we move on to our second case, it seems like when I’m talking about Supreme Court cases involving pork and pigs, you are the one whose name comes to mind.  So this is not your first time to have some involvement at least on a case before the Supreme Court involving pigs.  Can you tell us about your prior experience on that?

Wells
Well, Kent, as it turns out, I know something about pigs and the federal government and the US Supreme Court.  About 10 years ago, I was counsel of record for the National Meat Association, which challenged a California regulation of animal handling, particularly in the pork area, on a different ground.  It was a ground of federal preemption.  So states are constricted from making regulations relating to animal welfare and animal handling and food safety in a number of different ways, other than the Dormant Commerce Clause.  And one way is whether there, if there’s a federal statute that regulates this area, and Congress has decided that it will be the statute that governs, states are not allowed to intrude on federal authority.  So states do not always have a free hand to regulate in this area, and in that case we were successful in arguing that California had gone too far and the Supreme Court invalidated the California animal handling law.

Schmidt
And as I recall, that was a nine – zero decision.

Wells
Happily, yes.

Schmidt
Alright.  Well, let’s turn to our next Supreme Court decision from this last term.  It’s Mallory versus Norfolk Southern Railway Company.  Who’s going to tackle this case?

Bullard
Kent, this is Nick Bullard.  I’m going to tackle this one.

Schmidt
All right, Nick, why don’t you tell us what this case is about?

Bullard
Kent, I think this is the most significant jurisdictional case the Court has decided in the last five to ten years, and it addresses the circumstance under which states can exercise personal jurisdiction over corporate defendants, and Civ. Pro. refresher, personal jurisdiction is basically the power that a court has to call you to come into court, and there’s three general types of personal jurisdiction.  There’s general jurisdiction, which means you can be sued in a state for any reason, even if the lawsuit has no connection to that particular state, and for most corporate entities, that’s the place where the corporation is incorporated and the state where it has its principal place of business.  That’s general jurisdiction.  Then there’s specific jurisdiction, which is the state in which wherever the conduct that gave rise to the suit occurred.  So if I get a car, in a car accident with you, Kent, in California, California courts can call me into California courts to answer for that car accident, that’s specific jurisdiction.  And then there’s a less known and frankly less developed area of jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction by consent.  And that’s actually the particular type of jurisdiction that was at issue in this case.  And the particular issue is okay, well, what happens if you’re a corporate entity and you register to do business in a state like California?  Are you consenting to jurisdiction in California courts?  That’s the important issue that the Supreme Court took up in this Mallory case, and the facts of the case are really simple.  We have a plaintiff, Mr. Mallory, who is a Virginia resident, who sued Norfolk Southern, a Virginia corporation with its headquarters in Virginia, and he was suing about conduct that occurred in Virginia and Ohio.  And so you might think, well, Mr. Mallory probably sued in Virginia, maybe Ohio, but no.  He sued in the state of Pennsylvania.  Why?  Because Norfolk Southern had registered to business in Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania has a particular statute which is a little bit unique and we can talk about this later, saying if you’re gonna register to do business in our state, Mr. Corporation, you must consent to all suits in front of, in front of Pennsylvania courts.  So the court took up that issue.  Does that type of state statute violate the due process clause of the US Constitution?

Schmidt
What was the decision of the lower courts below, and ultimately was that affirmed by the US Supreme Court?

Bullard
Yeah.  So this bought us way through the Pennsylvania State courts and the, actually the High Court, the High Pennsylvania Court said this was not consistent with the due process clause and invalidated its own state statute and said this is not allowed.  The US Supreme Court, which was surprising to many observers, reversed and said to that, in a highly fractured decision, and I know you said to avoid this sort of philosophical issues, but the fracturing of the Court is really important in this case.  But the short story is, the Court said Pennsylvania may call Norfolk Southern into its courts because Norfolk Southern registered to do business.  And the case was highly fractured.  Four Justices said this is consistent with the Constitution, four said it’s not consistent with the Constitution, and one Justice, Justice Alito, said well, we have this really old case which says this is okay, but I kind of think it’s not, but there’s this case on point so I’m going to say that it’s okay.  So the really narrow holding of the Court is there’s a case from 1916 from the US Supreme Court, which said that if you’re a corporation and you register to do business, you could be called into that state court for any reason.  And so the narrow holding of the case is simply that state statute is consistent with the Constitution, and corporations can be called into their courts.

Schmidt
So if you’re a plaintiff, you now have much greater latitude and opportunities to engage in a little forum shopping and deciding where to sue than you had before, at least with respect to companies that are registered in multiple states, right?

Bullard
Absolutely, and particularly in the state of Pennsylvania, really this case is focused on the particular language of this particular Pennsylvania statute and how broad it was, and my understanding is this statute is actually pretty unique in how broad and saying, hey, if you want to come to do register business here, you will consent to any suit in Pennsylvania State Court.  That’s a little bit unique.  Now other states may copy it, but, you know, my first take away for our listeners is check to see if your business is registered in Pennsylvania, because you’re about to get a ton of lawsuits, particularly personal injury lawsuits in Pennsylvania, because that state has a reputation for being plaintiff friendly, particularly in the personal injury suits, and now if you’re registered to do business there, you can be sued there for any lawsuit.

Schmidt
Well, I’ll just observe also it’s also a pretty significant state for consumer class actions as well.  I mean, obviously, New York and California are the co-leaders of consumer class actions, but we get a lot of claims from Pittsburgh courts and Philadelphia courts as well.  So Pennsylvania does deserve a particular scrutiny.  Well, do you expect that most legislatures will perhaps reexamine their statute and determine that perhaps they now have the green light, and maybe should amend their statutes to allow their courts to have more cases brought in, ostensibly for the benefit of individuals living there?

Bullard
I do expect that’s gonna happen and that’s, you know, the point the dissent drives home is basically the majority has carved a way for states to get around the constitutional constraints.  And why wouldn’t the state, right?  I mean, it brings in, it brings in business in the form of lawsuits, makes your, it gets your courts busy and you, you know, like you said, you arguably protecting your citizens.  So yeah, I would expect there will be, states will amend their statutes to look a lot more like Pennsylvania’s in the years to come.

Schmidt
Any other takeaways that you have that in-house counsel might consider in terms of concrete actions to take in response to this decision, other than checking their Pennsylvania registration?

Bullard
Two other points, one is just more generally, I would check to see where your particular company is registered to do business.  You know, I know sometimes these things can sort of pile up over time, and you could be registered in states, or maybe you no longer need to be registered there.  As this dynamic is changing as states begin amending their laws, check to make sure, do you really need to be registered in the state and if you don’t, maybe it’s a good time to let those registrations expire so you’re not exposed to this risk, that’s point one.  Point two is, you know, make sure that you have feelers out for the legislative activity in these states.  Like I said, the dissent specifically calls out that states are likely to start amending to, you know, to get in line with what Pennsylvania’s doing.  So make sure you’re keeping up with the states that you are registered to do business, what the statute says.  And then third, just more generally, stay tuned to this area of law.  I think what this decision revealed is there is really deep disagreement for the first time in a long time at the Supreme Court about the nature of personal jurisdiction and the constitutional limits.  Many of the Justices indicated what Pennsylvania did may have run into a problem on the Dormant Commerce Clause, actually to off of what Steve was talking about.  I expect there’s gonna be a lot of litigation in this area in the years to come and I’m sure it’ll wind its way up to the Supreme Court, so stay tuned.

Schmidt
Very good summary.  Well, I’m gathering that the last of our three cases is going to be highlighted by Brock.  This case has received quite a bit of press in recent days.  It is called 303 Creative LLC versus Elenis.  For those who haven’t followed the news and the new headlines on this case, Brock, can you tell what this case is about?

Huebner
Thanks, Kent.  On the last day of this Court’s term, the Court announced this decision in 303 Creative v. Elenis.  In this case, Laurie Smith is the owner of a graphic design firm, 303 Creative, and she wanted to expand her business into making custom wedding websites.  However, she had a religious objection to same-sex marriage and didn’t want to design websites for any of those weddings, and she planned to put a notice on her own company website saying that she would not provide those services.  Now she worried that Colorado, because it has a state law prohibiting any discrimination based on protective status, including LGBTQ status, from businesses open to the public.  And Smith worried that if she put this notice on her website and refused to provide her services for same-sex weddings that she would be prosecuted under Colorado’s public accommodations law.  So she affirmatively filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction against any potential use of the law against her business and arguing that her sincere religious beliefs against same-sex marriages meant that any enforcement of the law would violate her First Amendment freedom of speech rights.  Now the 10th Circuit considered her lawsuit and agreed that her custom websites are expressive conduct, even though it’s a business, even though it is written down and not spoken aloud, it is protected by the First amendment.  However, the court ruled that Colorado’s law here was constitutional because it was narrowly tailored to advance Colorado’s interest in avoiding LGBTQ discrimination.  Now, the Supreme Court took up this issue, and Justice Gorsuch authored a six to three opinion reversing the 10th Circuit.  Justice Gorsuch framed the question as an issue of whether the state can force someone who provides expressive services to abandon their conscience and speak the states preferred message instead, and Justice Gorsuch focusing on the importance of a marketplace of ideas in our First Amendment context ruled for the Court that that would violate the First Amendment.  And even speech where society or the Justices themselves may consider unattractive or misguided, is still protected by the First Amendment clause.  Justice Sotomayor, writing for herself, Justice Kagan and Justice Jackson wrote a dissent, criticizing the majority for focusing on the speech issues here at all and saying that public accommodations laws like in Colorado and many other states focus on conduct and not speech.  They’re there to ensure that any business that is open to the public is required to serve all comers.  And to the extent that they regulate speech at all, that is ancillary to their main purpose.  And so the fact that this enforcement was limited on free speech grounds, the dissent found misguided.

Schmidt
So this is a case that doesn’t necessarily, or in any respect, really involve employee rights.  This is a sole proprietor that is operating a business.  But most observers I think would say that 303 Creative will impact employment and non-discrimination issues, Title VII and so forth, particularly in light of another Supreme Court decision this last term, which we don’t have time to go into, Groff versus DeJoy, from a Title VII case handed down recently.  What’s your take on the impact of 303 Creative in the employment context?

Huebner
I think that’s been one of the major questions coming out of this decision is just how broad this holding reaches.  Justice Gorsuch was careful in his majority opinion to write that the Court’s reasoning was limited to the stipulated facts at issue in this case.  However, there’s no apparent limit in the reasoning to say that this is only for sole proprietors of their own businesses.  Rather, the reasoning and protections of free exercise or freedom of speech rights for expressive conduct and expressive businesses could very well extend to those rights when exercised by the employees themselves.  There isn’t necessarily a limit in the Court’s reasoning to say that an employee providing the same expressive conduct as Ms. Smith as a sole proprietor would not find similar protections from enforcement of public accommodations laws in these contexts.

Schmidt
Do you think there are implications for this decision outside of the LGBTQ context, and even outside the employment context?

Huebner
That’s been another focus of the commentaries around this opinion in the weeks since it was issued.  And even in the oral arguments itself, the Justices focused on the broader implications of any ruling in this decision, questioning whether the Court’s holding was limited to LGBTQ rights, or as in a hypothetical provided by Justice Jackson, whether it could extend to racial discrimination.  In the hypothetical, she provided whether a holiday photographer in a mall could prohibit black children from sitting on the lap of Santa because they wanted to project a certain 1950s era imagery in their business.  Others have questioned whether other expressive businesses could find protection under this opinion, whether it be florists or photographers or even headstone makers, whether they could limit their business based on either freedom of speech or freedom of religious-based objections.

Schmidt
Well it will certainly be interesting to follow these cases and the decisions that seek to apply 303 Creative as well as the other cases that we’ve talked about today.  Thanks for your summary on that, Brock.  Now we’d like to turn to a segment of the podcast that we call the Deeper Dive, and would like to learn a little bit more about each one of you in aspects of your life not devoted to following Supreme Court decisions and activity at the High Court and other legal work.  Since we have three guests, we’re gonna be particularly efficient in this aspect of our show.  But here’s the question I’d like to ask each of you, and why don’t we go in order of seniority?  So, Steve, that means you’ll be first.  Here’s the question, what movie or book would you recommend to our listeners, particularly those that may be early in their practice of law or their legal education, or other education for that matter, that you believe has the greatest capacity to inspire us to be better lawyers and/or members of our community, regardless of whether or not the book or movie is about the law or litigation?

Wells
Ken, I’m going to recommend a book that I’m not sure others would find inspirational, but I’m pretty confident they would find hugely insightful.  It’s a book that was written about 10 years ago, maybe 11 years ago, by Jonathan Haidt, and it’s called The Righteous Mind, and it is as insightful today as it was when it was written 10 years ago.  It’s written by a professor who is a social psychologist and who sets out to figure out whether the literature supports a notion that we are hardwired to be Democrats, we’re hardwired to be Republicans.  In other words, is there an evolutionary reason why some people tend to be liberal and Democratic in their outlook or more conservative and Republican in their outlook.  It’s an incredibly useful and insightful book.  It is distinctly nonpartisan, and in fact openly nonpartisan about this, there’s no judgment at all involved.  But it does talk about the psychology of why people lean certain ways when they talk about equality or when they talk about authority, for example, and why evolution has contributed to man’s predilections for certain political philosophies.  It’s just a wonderful book, and I think it tends to diffuse, in my mind, a lot of what causes outrage and sparks division among Americans today.  So I highly recommend it.  The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt.

Schmidt
Well, you’ve certainly piqued my interest.  That sounds like a fascinating topic.  Nick, you’re next.  What’s your recommendation on the book or movie?

Bullard
I’m gonna cheat into a series, a Netflix series.  Hopefully that’s okay.  But by my count, it’s the most entertaining on-screen depiction of what it’s like to be a lawyer.  And that’s Netflix’s Lincoln Lawyer.  So this is, you know, based on the novel similar like the Matthew McConaughey movie, but a series, and season one is out, and there’s Season 2 is coming.  As I said, I think it’s the best on-screen portrayal of what it’s like to be a lawyer, hits on themes of your obligations to be an officer of court and due justice, how to balance work, life and family, mental health issues that lawyers face.  There’s also, it sprinkles in practical tips for the law, which I think is outstanding, and it’s just flat entertaining.  So I highly recommend Lincoln Lawyer on Netflix.  And just to clarify, Kent, I’m not being paid by Netflix in any way to endorse their shows.  But it is a great show and I recommend it to your listeners.

Schmidt
Well, that is encouraging because I usually veer away from any on-screen depiction of lawyers or the legal process, because it’s usually so far removed from reality.  But with that encouragement I’ll have to check that out.  All right, Brock, last but not least, what’s your recommendation for inspiring movie or book?

Huebner
I’ve got another book to recommend.  It’s called Mine! How the Hidden Rules of Ownership Control Our Lives by Michael A. Heller and James Salzman.  This book starts from the conceit that most people’s intuitive understanding of property law is based on concepts that they first encounter on the playground.  Whether that’s first come, first served, possession is 9/10th’s of the law, finders-keepers, and it really breaks down on a lot of those common stories and understandings and shows how they often come into conflict in our day-to-day lives.  And I just found the book fascinating in the real world examples that they provide to really challenge the stories that we tell and are long held assumptions about kind of the basic foundations of legal practice, whether that’s the ambiguity around whether you can recline your seat on an airplane, and how that allows airlines to essentially sell the same space twice.  Or why Netflix password sharing we don’t look at inherently as theft.  We’re more okay with that, or at least many of us are, and Netflix is no longer okay with that.  And then just the control of our own property and the limits of that and how our rights come into conflict with others rights in that respect, and many others.

Schmidt
Again, sounds like a fascinating recommendation, so I hope to check that out, and I’m sure our listeners will give that consideration as well.  Well, that’s all the time we have for today.  Thank you for listening to Shark Cast.  I’m indebted to the extraordinary team at Dorsey for making this podcast and episode possible.  For more resources on this and other litigation risk, go to litigationrisks.com, where more information can be found, including a book on managing litigation risk written by yours truly.  Until next time, my friends, this is yet another reminder that there are a lot of sharks swimming out there in the murky waters, so swim safely.

Voiceover
This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone.  Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things.  The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only, and not those of Dorsey & Whitney.  This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

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The Long-Awaited Public Infrastructure Financing Solution for Development in Arizona

Every developer who has taken raw Arizona ground to a finished project knows the largest upfront cost other than the land price is almost always the cost to install the public infrastructure. Water, sewer, stormwater, streets, dry utilities, and the fiber backbone all have to be in the ground before a single lot closes or a building opens. That capital is deployed early and generates no return for years. For decades the standard workaround has been the Community Facilities District (CFD). That tool has grown materially harder to use, for reasons cited below, and House Bill 2999, signed in June 2026 and now codified as Chapter 40 of Title 48, is Arizona's response. Some Background I have spent a good part of my career on the other side of this problem. In the 1990s and early 2000s I served as general counsel of SunCor Development Company, one of Arizona's most active master-planned community developers, where we used Community Facilities Districts to finance hundreds of millions of dollars of major infrastructure across Arizona in cities such as Goodyear, Phoenix, Tempe, Litchfield Park, and Prescott Valley. For its time the CFD was an effective structure, and a great deal of what is now on the ground in those communities was financed with this tool. Unfortunately, CFDs have over time become considerably harder to use. Successive legislative amendments have layered on tax-rate ceilings, homebuyer disclosure obligations, and added procedural steps. Another drag on the use of CFDs is that formation of them runs through the municipality, where approval can turn as much on local politics as on the merits of a project. Developers now routinely are asked to absorb delay and uncertainty that a project's economics cannot support, which is a large part of why Arizona has fallen behind Colorado, Texas, and Utah in getting infrastructure financed. A better tool was needed, and Chapter 40 is it. How a SAID Improves on a CFD A State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID) keeps what worked about the CFD: tax-exempt, property-secured, non-recourse infrastructure financing — while shedding much of what made the CFD cumbersome. Its principal advantages over a traditional CFD: Administrative formation. A SAID is formed by the Arizona Finance Authority against fixed statutory criteria, through a yes-or-no compliance review on a sixty-day clock, rather than through the discretionary approval of a city council or a board of supervisors. Insulation from municipal politics. Because formation is a state-level compliance determination, a meritorious project is far less exposed to local political headwinds than it is under the CFD process. Landowner control of the board. A SAID is governed by a board of the landowners — appointed at formation, then elected on an acreage basis. In a typical municipal CFD, the city council sits as the district board; here, the developer controls governance. Advance funding of impact fees. A SAID can use bond proceeds to advance-pay municipal development impact fees, unlike CFDs, removing one of the largest upfront cash burdens in a project. A uniform, statewide process. The criteria are the same regardless of jurisdiction, replacing the municipality-by-municipality variation that has made CFD outcomes hard to predict. Flexible boundaries. A district may include noncontiguous parcels in the same county within five miles of one another, which fits phased and multi-tract development. Capped cost and a fixed timeline. Authority fees to form a district are capped at $15,000, and a complete petition must be acted on within sixty days. The full range of bonds. A SAID may issue general obligation, special assessment, revenue, and refunding bonds, secured solely by district property and creating no obligation for any other taxpayer. What is a SAID A SAID is a special taxing district that the owners of a development form to finance public infrastructure with tax-exempt bonds: general obligation bonds, special assessment bonds, and revenue bonds. The bonds are secured only by the property inside the district and are repaid over the long term, with terms up to 30 years. They do not affect the credit of the city, the county, or the State, and they create no obligation for any taxpayer outside the district. In practical terms, a SAID lets you finance horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of writing the check at the front end. The maximum ad valorem rate securing general obligation bonds is capped by statute at $5.00 per $100 of net assessed limited property valuation, with a limited step-up to cover a debt-service shortfall. SAIDs Work for Commercial as Well as Residential Development The SAID bill drew most of its press as a housing-affordability measure, and it appears to be a strong one. It is the first Arizona district statute to let bond proceeds advance-fund municipal development impact fees, which pulls one of the largest upfront cash burdens off a homebuilder's pro forma. But the statute's eligible infrastructure categories apply with equal force to commercial, industrial, and mixed-use projects. An industrial or logistics project can finance roads, rail crossings, sidings, and grade separations. A life-sciences or technology campus can finance its water, sewer, roads, and broadband the same way a subdivision can. Read Chapter 40 as a general-purpose infrastructure finance platform, not a subdivision-only device. How Formation Works A SAID is formed administratively by the Arizona Finance Authority. The Authority reviews the petition for compliance with the statute; it is a yes-or-no review against fixed criteria, not a discretionary negotiation with a city council or a board of supervisors, and it runs on a sixty-day clock once a complete petition is filed. Formation requires the written consent of 100% of the landowners in the proposed district and an engineer's certification that public infrastructure costs will exceed $5 million. The district may include noncontiguous parcels so long as they lie in the same county and within five miles of the district's other property, which accommodates phased and multi-tract development; if any part of the district sits inside a municipality, the whole district must stay within that municipality's limits or planning area. The Authority's fees to form a district are capped at $15,000. Issuing bonds requires a district election. Governance Simplified A SAID is run by a three-member board. The initial directors are named in the petition; after that, directors are elected by the landowners on an acreage basis as ownership diversifies. Board service runs with ownership; a director must either hold fee title inside the district or be an individual designated by a fee-title owner; and corporations, partnerships, and other entities may hold that ownership, vote as owners, and designate the individual who serves. A district has no power of eminent domain and no zoning authority, and directors may not be officials or employees of the municipality in which the district sits. What a SAID Does Not Do It finances; it does not entitle. Zoning, platting, rezonings, use permits, and the specialized approvals a manufacturing or life-sciences facility may need all remain with the local jurisdiction and proceed on their own track. The financing and entitlement timelines should be coordinated with formation of the SAID, but they are separate processes. Two substantive limits are worth flagging at the planning stage. First, electric power is largely outside the tool: the statutory definition of public infrastructure does not reach power generation or transmission, and broader energy infrastructure was removed from the bill during the Senate amendments. A power-intensive user should not assume a SAID will carry its electrical load. Second, where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the district cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility upon completion. Our Take For most master-planned residential work, and for a wide range of commercial and industrial development, a SAID will be the most efficient infrastructure-financing structure Arizona has offered. The right time to evaluate it is early in the acquisition and pre-development process, while the capital stack, the development agreement, and the entitlement strategy are still being set. Once the district's boundaries, general plan, and financing parameters are set, it is cumbersome at best to bring those into conformance later. Our Dorsey team has begun advising our developer clients on SAID formation on residential, commercial, and industrial projects statewide. If you would like us to assess whether a SAID fits a project you are working on, please reach out.

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Patent Partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic Join Dorsey in Palo Alto

Patent partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic have joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Palo Alto, the international law firm announced today. Al Araiza works with clients to develop and implement patent strategies that align with corporate objectives, supporting growth initiatives, financing efforts, and successful exits, including initial public offerings and acquisitions. He advises on building, managing, and optimizing patent portfolios across a broad range of emerging and frontier technologies, with depth in wireless communications, artificial intelligence, and energy innovation. Before practicing law, Al gained engineering experience in the defense industry, working on energy system modeling and communications circuitry design. He also conducted biomedical research, with findings published in peer-reviewed journals. He has been recognized in the IAM Patent 1000 for his work advising clients on patent strategy and portfolio development. Al received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law, his M.E. in Biomedical Engineering from Tulane University, and his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from UCLA. Lena Petrovic works across the software and hardware industries to develop clear, well-supported patent applications. She guides clients through the prosecution process and advises on global trademark and copyright matters, including licensing and portfolio management. Lena regularly supports clients developing technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, fintech, cryptography, interactive and immersive experiences, and digital media, and works with companies in entertainment, gaming, and sports. Before practicing law, Lena spent a decade at Pixar, where she contributed to major films including The Incredibles, Ratatouille, WALL‑E, and Brave. Lena received her J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law, her M.S. in Computer Science from Princeton University, and her B.S. from California Institute of Technology. “Al and Lena bring a practical, technical, and business-focused approach informed by extensive experience working with technology companies, startups, and investors,” said Gina Cornelio, Patent Practice Group Co-Leader. “We are thrilled to welcome them to the Patent team and our growing Palo Alto office.” “Dorsey’s Patent practice is dedicated to understanding each client's business deeply, tailoring patent strategies that directly advance their goals,” said Al Araiza. “We are proud to join this outstanding team and look forward to driving success for our clients.”

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37 Dorsey Attorneys Named 2026 Top Lawyers by Minnesota Monthly

Minnesota Monthly has recognized 37 Dorsey attorneys across 27 practice areas as 2026 Top Lawyers in Minnesota. Honorees are selected through a peer nomination process and a curated survey of practicing attorneys in Minnesota, who identify leading lawyers across a range of practice areas. Administrative / Regulatory Law Jennifer Coates Antitrust Law Michael Lindsay Banking & Financial Service Law Peter Nelson Copyright Law  Jeffrey Cadwell Corporate Law  Robert Hensley Robert Rosenbaum Criminal Defense: White-Collar  Beth Forsythe Edward Magarian RJ Zayed Health Care Law  Claire Topp Immigration Law  J. Mike Sevilla Insurance Law  Daniel Brown Intellectual Property and Patent Law  Stuart Hemphill International Trade Law  Jonathan Van Horn Labor and Employment Law  Edward Magarian Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Land Use & Zoning  Jay Lindgren Marcus Mollison Litigation – Antitrust  Michael Lindsay F. Matthew Ralph Jaime Stilson Litigation – Commercial  Michael Lindsay Litigation – Construction  Eric Ruzicka Litigation – Intellectual Property  Peter Lancaster RJ Zayed Litigation – Labor Employment Benefits  Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Litigation – Trusts and Estates  William J. Berens Theresa Bevilacqua Bridget Logstrom Koci Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions  James K. Langdon Mergers & Acquisitions Law  Keith Ahlgren Rachel Benedict Brian Burke Morgan Helme John Jorgenson Brian Moore Robert Rosenbaum Jonathan Van Horn Bri Whiting Municipal Law Jay Lindgren Nonprofit/Charities Law Claire Topp Securities / Capital Markets Law Cam Hoang Robert Rosenbaum Securities Regulation Theresa Bevilacqua James K. Langdon Tax Law William J. Berens Trusts and Estates Jennifer Ede Bridget Logstrom Koci Sonny Miller Kiley Petty Henry

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Proposed CMS Rule Ramps Up Potential Medicare Fraud Administrative Remedies

On July 6, 2026, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a rule that would expand its administrative remedies to combat potential fraud. The proposed rule is the latest in a round of administrative actions that signal CMS’s intent to aggressively pursue allegations of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and heighten the risk of fraud enforcement against even well-intentioned Medicare and Medicaid providers and suppliers. The proposed rule includes several changes to regulations that govern Medicare billing privileges. Providers and suppliers should be aware that these changes dramatically expand the flexibility afforded to CMS in enrollment and revocation actions, potentially leading to harsh consequences for ministerial and administrative errors. If finalized, moreover, the proposed rule could have material implications for providers and suppliers facing threatened revocation, including heightened risk of overpayment liability and increased hurdles to challenging revocations and denials of enrollment. Added Flexibility to Existing Revocation Grounds CMS has proposed to remove a number of factors that the regulations list as relevant to a determination of whether a provider has engaged in “abuse of billing privileges.” While acknowledging that the inclusion of these factors in the regulations was permissive (requiring consideration only where “as appropriate or applicable”), CMS stated that it must be afforded “the maximum flexibility to address all possible . . . scenarios without the rigid constraints of our existing factors.” CMS provided little guidance as to the outer bounds of what conduct could constitute an “abuse of privileges” that merits revocation of Medicare billing privileges. Instead, CMS noted that a “pattern of practice” of abuse of billing privileges might be established “by a simple finding that several of a provider’s claims do not meet Medicare requirements.” Similarly, CMS has proposed to expand the regulatory provision that permits revocation of enrollment if a provider certifies as “true” false or misleading information in Medicare enrollment application or renewal forms to include any scenario in which a provider submits “false or misleading information on or associated with any CMS Medicare enrollment-related form,” including materials submitted to Medicare contractors. CMS stated that it interprets this expanded rule to include anything related to Medicare enrollment, and not only those submissions that are “intended to gain or maintain Medicare enrollment.” If finalized, the proposed rule would add significant flexibility to CMS’s ability to pursue revocation of a provider’s enrollment. While CMS has assured providers that it would “invoke [the revised regulations]. . . only when legitimately warranted under the facts and circumstances and not as a matter of course,” such expanded flexibility threatens unpredictability in the event of even administrative or ministerial errors in submissions and claims. These changes would, moreover, make it more difficult for providers to challenge a revocation action. Expanded Revocation Grounds In addition to adding flexibility to existing grounds for revocation, CMS’s proposed rule adds to and expands CMS’s already broad authority to revoke provider and supplier enrollment. Such proposed changes include adding the following grounds for revocation: Denial of Enrollment Application. Where CMS could previously revoke a provider’s other enrollments if one enrollment is revoked, CMS would also be able to revoke a provider’s existing enrollments if an application for enrollment submitted by the provider is denied. High-Risk Enrollments. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if it determines the provider or supplier (including owning/managing employees or organizations) poses a high risk of fraud, waste, or abuse due to “. . . an affiliation under [42 C.F.R.] § 424.519” or “the provider’s or supplier’s location within a limited geographic area that has an excessive number of providers and suppliers.” Certain Misdemeanor Convictions. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if a provider or supplier—or its owners, managing employees, managing organizations, officers, or directors—are convicted of a “misdemeanor related to sexual assault or financial misconduct within the past 10 years that CMS deems detrimental to the best interests of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries.” Ownership Changes (HHA, Hospice, DMEPOS). CMS would have broad authority to revoke enrollment of home health agencies, hospices, and DMEPOS suppliers who do not comply with the regulations governing provider changes of ownership. These proposed, expanded grounds for revocation are notably broad, and CMS provides only limited guidance as to what conduct might result in revocation under these grounds. As with the proposed expansion of existing grounds for revocation, the open-ended nature of these proposed grounds for revocation may make it more difficult for providers and suppliers to challenge revocation actions. Expanded Grounds to Deny Medicare Enrollment As with revocations, CMS proposes to expand the grounds under which a provider’s application to enroll in Medicare can be denied. These expanded and additional grounds include many of the grounds added for revocations, but also include: Medicare Debt or Payment Suspension. CMS proposes expanding the ground to deny enrollment based on Medicare debt or payment suspension to include a provider or supplier’s “managing employee, managing organization, or individual or entity with any other form of business or financial relationship with the provider or supplier[.]” Significantly, this expansive definition (called an “associated party” under the proposed regulation) currently contains no material limitations, meaning almost any person or entity with whom an applicant does business could create denial liability. Sharing Locations with Denied/Revoked Providers or Suppliers. CMS would have authority to deny applications where a “provider’s or supplier’s practice location is in the same suite or office as another provider or supplier whose Medicare enrollment has been revoked or denied.” Hospices with Distant Medical Directors or Administrators. CMS would have discretion to deny hospice applications if the hospice’s medical director or administrator serves “multiple other hospices” or practices/is located “at such a distance (for example, in a different state) from the enrolling hospice that the medical director cannot realistically perform all medical director functions,” with a similar provision for administrators. In addition, CMS proposes applications denied for “other program termination or suspension,” may be applied to the provider or supplier in its own name or NPI or that of its owners, managing employees, or managing organization regardless of whether any appeals are pending. Retroactive Revocation CMS proposed to restructure and expand the regulatory grounds for retroactive revocation of billing privileges. Currently, Medicare regulations provide that revocations are, by default, prospective in nature: effective 30 days after CMS or the CMS contractor mails notice to the provider. Under certain circumstances, the regulations provide for revocations to be retroactive, such as when a provider is convicted of a felony, the date a professional license is suspended, revoked, or surrendered, or when a provider submits a false certification in their enrollment application. CMS has proposed to reframe the rule so as to default to retroactive revocation of billing privileges. CMS expressed concern that providers may collect payment from Medicare while remaining so non-compliant with enrollment requirements as to merit revocation. To address this concern, CMS proposed that all revocations be retroactive to the date of determined non-compliance.[1] As a result, providers suspected of misconduct or non-compliance are likely to face claims of retroactive overpayments in addition to the immediate concern no longer receiving Medicare payments while their enrollment is revoked. Reapplication Bar CMS’s proposed rule expands the grounds from which a provider may be prohibited from seeking reapplication as a Medicare provider. Under current regulations, CMS may prohibit prospective providers from enrolling in Medicare for up to 10 years if its enrollment application is denied because the applicant submitted false or misleading information in its application. Under the proposed rule, CMS will have the discretion to prohibit a provider from enrolling in Medicare if their enrollment application is denied for any reason. Conclusion As a part of the federal government’s increasingly aggressive push to combat real or perceived healthcare fraud, the proposed rule both broadens CMS’s authority to revoke and deny Medicare enrollment and raises the stakes for revocation and denial. What the proposed rule does not share is how CMS plans to exercise this expanded discretion: as a result, the proposed rule, if enacted, increases the unpredictability and potential ramifications of even technical noncompliance with CMS rules. As a result, Medicare providers should keep a close eye on potential revisions to these rules and their potential implementation and consider proactively evaluating their compliance under CMS standards. [1] In the proposed rule, CMS identifies, with respect to each ground for revocation, what it will consider to be the effective date of revocation.

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Real Estate Attorney Alexis Olsen Joins Dorsey in Phoenix

Attorney Alexis Olsen has joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP as Of Counsel in the Real Estate group in Phoenix, the law firm announced today. Alexis focuses her practice on large-scale residential, mixed-use, and multi-asset development projects as well as multi-state commercial leasing transactions. She guides clients through sophisticated acquisitions, dispositions, leasing, entity structuring, investment strategies, and due diligence matters. She has structured co-investment arrangements that drive capital deployment into housing subdivisions nationwide and has represented both landlords and tenants in commercial leasing transactions involving office, retail, industrial, and specialty-use properties, including cannabis dispensaries. Alexis received her J.D. from Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law and her B.A. from the University of Arizona. Alexis comes to Dorsey from Squire Patton Boggs. “Alexis strengthens Dorsey’s real estate capabilities at a time when Phoenix remains one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic real estate markets in the country,” said Scott Jenkins, Dorsey’s Phoenix office head. “Her addition further enhances our deep bench of 12 real estate attorneys in Phoenix and reflects our continued investment in serving clients throughout Arizona and supporting their real estate transactions and objectives across the country. We are thrilled to welcome Alexis to Dorsey.” “Joining a firm with such a deep bench of experienced attorneys in the Phoenix office, especially in the Real Estate group, presents an exciting opportunity not just for my own professional growth, but for the clients we service,” said Alexis Olsen. “I look forward to building on this strong foundation, growing our national practice, and delivering top-tier service to our clients.”

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State Affordability Infrastructure Districts (SAIDs) — A Financing Tool for Taiwanese Investment in Arizona Science and Technology Parks

If you have developed a facility inside one of Taiwan's science or technology parks, you are accustomed to the one-stop-shop of government planning the park and delivering the roads, water, power, and other infrastructure before your building is even constructed. In the United States, including Arizona, land development generally does not work that way. In Arizona, the cost of infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, power, and the digital backbone, typically falls on the private landowner and is incurred up front before operations generate revenue to offset that cost. For a company entering the Arizona market, this is often the largest and earliest capital burden of the entire project. Arizona recently created a tool that provides a more cost-effective way for landowners and developer to finance some of that infrastructure. House Bill 2999, signed into law June 2026 and codified at Chapter 40 of Title 48 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, establishes the creation of a State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID). How a SAID Works Landowners are now able to use a SAID to finance public infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, parking, lighting, communications, rail sidings and signalization, and similar improvements, through tax-exempt bonds. The bonds are repaid over up to 30 years and secured solely by the property within the SAID. No city, county, or state credit is pledged, and no obligation falls on other taxpayers, and therefore no city, county, or state approval other than from the Arizona Finance Authority (AFA). In effect, a SAID lets you spread the cost of horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of funding it entirely at the outset. And tax-exempt bonds often offer a lower interest rate than taxable or other types of financing. How a SAID is Formed A SAID is formed upon the filing of a petition with the AFA. The petition must include the finance plan, general plan, estimated costs, maximum tax rate, appraisal, bond counsel certificate, consultant list, petitioner experience, legal description, title report, and other materials. While the landowner is required to provide notice to the local governing jurisdiction, local governing jurisdiction does not have the right to approve or deny. The petition is reviewed administratively by the AFA through a standards-based process. For an inbound investor without long-standing local relationships, an objective, criteria-driven process is a meaningful advantage to the overt political process associated with other financing districts in Arizona. Formation requirements. A SAID requires consent from 100% of landowners within the proposed district; public infrastructure costs must exceed $5 million (easily met at any real scale); the district property must all be in the same county and need not be contiguous provided that noncontiguous property is located within five miles of the district's other property; and the board is initially appointed by the forming owners of the SAID district, later transitioning to election as ownership diversifies. Actual bond issuance requires an election of the SAID property owners. Ownership and corporate structure. Consent rights and board seats run with title. If you hold the Arizona land through a U.S. blocker beneath your Taiwan parent, the standard model for Taiwanese/Arizona real estate and operating investment, the U.S. property-holding entity, rather than it’s corporate parent, is the landowner of record for the district. Before formation, our Dorsey team will confirm that you have the proper corporate structure and board mechanics to be compliant.  Board composition has no citizenship or residency requirement. This is a common concern for foreign investors, and the statute answers it cleanly. Under A.R.S. § 48-7004, a director must either hold fee title to real property in the district or be an individual designated or appointed by a fee-title owner. Corporations, partnerships, and other business entities are expressly permitted to be those owners, to vote as owners, and to designate an individual to serve. There is no requirement that a director be a U.S. citizen or resident. So your U.S. property-holding entity, as landowner of record, can appoint whichever of your principals you choose, including a Taiwan-based individual, as the three-member board.  Power infrastructure limitation. The enacted definition of "public infrastructure" in A.R.S. § 48-7001 does not include electrical power generation or transmission. The reference to electrical facilities appears only as components of lighting and traffic-control systems, and the Legislature removed broader energy infrastructure from the definition during the Senate amendments. A SAID will likely not finance the high-load power infrastructure required for semiconductor fabrication, data storage, or heavy manufacturing.  Water infrastructure within a current utility CC&N. Where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the SAID cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility on completion. Entitlements and zoning: The determination of entitlements, zoning, and other land use permitting, as well as construction permitting for a technology or manufacturing facilities remain with the local jurisdiction and run on a separate track. Our Dorsey team will help you coordinate the financing and entitlement timelines together. Our Dorsey team works regularly with Taiwanese and other Asia-Pacific companies entering the Arizona market. If a SAID fits your project, we can structure it for your cross-border ownership.

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Alaska HB 126: What Changes for Alaska Native Corporations, Proxy Filings, and Annual Reports

Alaska House Bill 126 (HB 126), sponsored by Representative Neal Foster and passed by the 34th Alaska Legislature, is now law. The bill changes which Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) must file proxy and annual report materials with the State of Alaska, and makes it easier to reinstate certain dissolved Village Corporations. For many smaller Village Corporations, the practical result is less public disclosure. For shareholders, advisors, and the public, it means some financial information that used to be available through the State will no longer be readily obtained. This eUpdate explains what HB 126 does in plain terms, walks through the practical trade-offs, and answers common questions. 1. What HB 126 Changes The old rule Under prior law (Alaska Statutes Sec. 45.55.139), an Alaska Native Corporation had to file its annual report, proxies, and proxy statements with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities (the Division) if it had more than $1 million in assets and 500 or more shareholders on its current rolls. A filing ANC was also required to follow the Division’s proxy rules (3 AAC 08.305 through .365), which require specific disclosures such as top 5 executive compensation, and related-party transactions. Because these filings are treated as public records, they gave non-shareholders, including the public and the press, visibility into ANC financial information that is not filed with the SEC. The new rule HB 126 changes how the 500-shareholder test is measured. Now, the asset test is removed, and the shareholder count is based on how many shareholders the corporation originally enrolled when it was formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), not how many it has today. As shares have passed down through families over the decades, some Village Corporations that started with fewer than 500 shareholders now have more than 500 recordholders. Under the old current-count test, when those corporations had crossed the threshold, they had to file. Under the new original-enrollment test, they do not. Who is affected Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders are the main beneficiaries. They no longer have to file proxy and annual report materials with the Division or follow the Division’s proxy regulations at 3 AAC 08.305 through .365. Two groups must continue to file as before: all twelve ANCSA Regional Corporations, each of which enrolled more than 500 shareholders at creation, and all Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders. As reported by the Alaska Beacon, when the bill was under consideration, the Division identified 59 corporations then filing, expected at least seven village corporations to become exempt, and was reviewing roughly 30 more. 2. Practical Analysis HB 126 reduces a real compliance burden for smaller Village Corporations, which now need not spend time and money on State filings. In coming years, the exempt Village Corporations may experience benefits associated with less public disclosure and less regulation. But at the same time, less public disclosure carries trade-offs. Benchmarking will become harder Publicly-filed proxy statements and annual reports have long served as a reference set. Shareholders, corporations, advisors, and counsel use them to compare governance practices, compensation, and financial results across similarly-situated ANCs. Since fewer of these materials will be filed publicly, there will be fewer comparable documents available, which will make benchmarking and market-checking more difficult for like-sized ANCs over time. Executive compensation transparency may be reduced The Division’s proxy rules require disclosure of the compensation of ANC’s top five most highly compensated individuals (3 AAC 08.345(b)(2)), related-party transactions above $20,000 (3 AAC 08.345(b)(3)), and audited financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis (3 AAC 08.365). When a corporation is no longer required to file these disclosures publicly, it becomes harder for shareholders and others to obtain the information, to understand how compensation is set for their corporate leadership, and how it compares across corporations of similar size and complexity. Transparency may matter more as ANCs grow Some ANCs have grown into large, complex enterprises with substantial revenue and many subsidiaries, even with fewer than 500 shareholders. For an ANC with a broad and dispersed shareholder base, public materials can be an important way for shareholders and other stakeholders to understand governance, compensation, and performance across ANCs. Reduced disclosure may carry more practical weight in those settings than for a small corporation whose shareholders are closely connected to the business. The ANCSA annual report obligation continues It is important not to overstate what HB 126 does. HB 126 changes the state filing proxy requirements. It does not remove the separate obligation under ANCSA itself. That obligation comes from ANCSA at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c), which requires a Native Corporation that would otherwise be subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prepare and transmit to its shareholders an annual report containing substantially the information a company subject to that Act would include. Similarly, ANCs that solicit proxies for an annual meeting are still required to furnish shareholders with those proxy materials under general Alaska corporate law. However, ANCs are now no longer required to transmit proxy statements to the State. ANCs’ reporting obligations to their shareholders are unaffected by HB 126. Any corporation newly exempt from state filing still owes its shareholders a detailed annual report and a proxy statement, even though that report is no longer routed through the State and made public. Reinstatement of dissolved Village Corporations Separately, HB 126 amends AS 10.06.960(k) to remove the prior deadline (previously December 31, 2020) for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. A dissolved Village Corporation may now apply to be reinstated under AS 10.06.633(e) at any time. Reinstatement still runs through the commissioner under AS 10.06.633(e). In general, that means the ANC must apply, cure the neglect or delinquency that led to dissolution, and pay the amounts owed, and the corporation’s name must be available or be changed to one that is. Once reinstated, the corporation and its shareholders are restored to the rights, privileges, liabilities, and obligations they would have had as if the dissolution had never occurred, and corporate and shareholder actions taken during the dissolution are treated as valid. If the previously-used corporate name is no longer available, the board alone may amend the articles to adopt a new name (without the necessity for shareholder approval). 3. Frequently Asked Questions What does HB 126 do? It changes how Alaska measures the 500-shareholder test that decides which ANCs must file proxy and annual report materials with the state. It removes the asset test, and it counts shareholders based on original enrollment rather than the current rolls. It also removes the deadline for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. Which ANCs are affected? Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders, because they may no longer need to file with the Division. Regional Corporations and Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders must continue to file as before. Does HB 126 eliminate all reporting obligations? No. It changes the state filing requirement under AS 45.55.139, but it does not remove the separate ANCSA obligation (43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c)) to provide shareholders with an annual report, and general corporate law still calls for a proxy statement when the ANC solicits proxies. Corporations that remain subject to state filing requirements must also continue to comply with the Division's rules. We think we are now exempt. What should our ANC board and management consider? Confirm your ANC’s original enrollment number and whether your corporation falls below the new threshold. Watch for communications from the State on this topic as they proceed with their research. If your ANC is now exempt, decide how your corporation will meet its continuing ANCSA obligation to shareholders, review proxy and annual meeting materials and timelines, and consider what to communicate to shareholders about any change in how they will receive information. It is worth documenting the basis for any exemption. What should ANC shareholders watch for? Shareholders should watch for how and when they will continue to receive annual report and proxy statement information directly from their ANC, since some material that used to be available through the State’s online website will no longer be publicly filed. If something is unclear, shareholders can ask their ANC how it intends to meet its ANCSA reporting obligations. How Dorsey Can Help HB 126 lightens the State filing load for smaller Village Corporations, but it also raises practical questions: confirming who is exempt, meeting continuing ANCSA obligations to shareholders, keeping proxy and annual meeting processes on track, and maintaining benchmarking when public materials become less available. These are exactly the kinds of judgment calls that benefit from early planning. Dorsey’s attorneys work closely with Alaska Native Corporations and related stakeholders. If you have questions about HB 126, ANC governance, proxy filings, annual reports, disclosure obligations, or shareholder communications, please contact your Dorsey attorney, including the authors of this eUpdate.

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Dorsey Partner Melissa Raphan Elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers

International law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP is pleased to announce that Partner Melissa Raphan has been elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers (CLEL) as part of its 2026 class. “Melissa’s election to this prestigious fellowship comes as no surprise to those of us who have had the privilege of working with her,” says Peter Nelson, Dorsey’s Managing Partner.  “She is an exceptional employment lawyer, a trusted advisor, and a leader whose impact extends far beyond her matters. Clients rely on her deep knowledge, strategic counsel, and ability to navigate complex workplace disputes and sensitive employment matters with both confidence and compassion. She has helped shape our firm, strengthen our profession, and opened doors for countless others through her commitment to mentorship and diversity. We are incredibly proud of her accomplishments and delighted to see her receive this recognition.” CLEL is a nonprofit professional association that honors the nation’s leading attorneys in the field of labor and employment law. Originally established to recognize excellence in the profession, CLEL has evolved into a respected intellectual and practical resource for the legal community and its many audiences. Its mission centers on recognizing individuals who have made significant contributions to the field, fostering the exchange of knowledge and delivering value to academia, government, the judiciary, and the broader public. Election as a fellow represents the highest level of peer acknowledgment, reflecting sustained achievement, integrity, and a commitment to advancing the profession. Melissa’s career reflects CLEL’s mission. She has been recognized both regionally and nationally for her advocacy, leadership, and achievements both inside and outside of the courtroom. Her employment litigation experience spans class actions, collective actions, and high-stakes individual disputes in state and federal courts, as well as arbitration forums including the American Arbitration Association and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). She is also a trusted advisor on a full range of workplace issues, from hiring and performance management to sensitive terminations and organizational change. She brings decades of experience representing clients across the financial services, healthcare, food and agriculture, and energy sectors. Melissa will be formally inducted during CLEL’s installation ceremony held in conjunction with the American Bar Association’s Labor & Employment Law Conference in Washington, D.C., on November 7.

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Litigation Privilege Does Not Automatically Protect Communications with Funders: The Commercial Court Clarifies the Limits of Privilege in the Context of Litigation Funding

In Uber London Ltd & Ors v Garry White & Ors; Mishcon de Reya LLP [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that documents created to help a funder decide whether to invest in a claim will not ordinarily attract litigation privilege. This means that information a firm gathers while acting for a funder can later fall within the control of the claimants it goes on to represent in the same matter. Background The Claimants (a claim group of over 10,000 individual London black cab drivers and the assignee of two former minicab operators) alleged that the Defendants (three companies in the Uber group) obtained and retained their private hire operator's licence through an unlawful means conspiracy alleged to involve fraud. Because the claims were issued outside the ordinary six-year limitation period, the Claimants relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, contending they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud before June 2018. A preliminary issue trial was listed to determine the question of whether the Claimants discovered, or could have discovered with reasonable diligence, the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment only after June 2018. The Claimants were represented by Mishcon de Reya ("MdR"). However, before MdR’s engagement with the individual drivers had begun, in late 2017 it was engaged by the litigation funder Harbour to investigate the merits and value of the potential claim. During that stage, MdR corresponded extensively with Harbour and with the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association ("LTDA"), a black cab drivers' trade association. MdR was not formally engaged by the Claimants until October 2018 onwards. Once the proceedings had started, the Defendants sought disclosure of communications exchanged between MdR and Harbour before the engagement of MdR by the Claimants (the "Harbour Communications"). This included correspondence between MdR and Harbour, communications with the LTDA, and documents held on MdR's file opened in Harbour's name in connection with the potential claim. The Claimants resisted disclosure on four grounds: (i) that the documents were not relevant; (ii) on the grounds of litigation privilege; (iii) that the documents were outside their control; and (iv) that disclosure occurring so close to trial would be disproportionate. Judgment (i) Were the Harbour Communications relevant to the preliminary issue? The Court held that the Harbour Communications were likely to contain relevant material, on two bases. First, where the Claimants or the LTDA had communicated directly with MdR, that material could shed light on individual Claimants' actual knowledge of the alleged facts. Secondly, what MdR and Harbour had discovered during their investigation could inform the question of what a Claimant could reasonably have discovered at the time (even though the Defendants accepted that MdR's knowledge could not simply be imputed to the Claimants). (ii) Were the Harbour Communications protected by litigation privilege? As set out in the classic cases of Three Rivers (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 and WH Holding Ltd v E20 Stadium LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2652, communications between parties or their solicitors and third parties for the purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation are privileged when the following conditions are satisfied: Litigation must be in progress or in reasonable contemplation. The communications must have been made for the sole or dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The litigation must be adversarial, not investigative or inquisitorial. The Court rejected the Claimant’s claim to be able to withhold the Harbour Communications on the basis of litigation privilege. The Court confirmed that litigation privilege protects only communications created for the dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The Court found that Harbour had instructed MdR so that Harbour could decide whether to fund the proceedings. As such, the dominant purpose of the communications was in relation to funding, not the conduct of litigation. This was distinguished from the situation where an individual litigant who takes its own funding decision. In that situation, the decision whether to fund and the decision whether to litigate are one and the same, made by the person who will actually be the claimant, and so it forms a part of that person's conduct of their own litigation. In contrast, a third-party funder's commercial decision whether to fund someone else's claim is not necessarily part of conducting that litigation. The fact that litigation privilege can, in principle, be claimed by a non-party funder (as recognised in the case of Al Sadeq v Dechert [2024] EWCA 28) did not assist Harbour, since there was no evidence it intended to play any role in the litigation itself beyond funding it. Communications between Harbour and MdR did remain capable of attracting another kind of privilege: legal advice privilege, because of the solicitor-client relationship between Harbour and MdR. But communications with third parties such as the LTDA were not automatically protected in the same way. (iii) Were the Harbour Communications within the Claimants' control? The Court also rejected the argument that the Harbour Communications sat outside the Claimants' control because they belonged to Harbour and not the Claimants. The Court’s reasoning was that once the individual Claimant drivers became MdR's clients, MdR also owed them a duty to disclose material information. That included information that MdR had originally acquired while acting for Harbour. As held in the case of Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood (a firm) [2005] 1 WLR 567, a solicitor owing duties to two clients cannot simply prefer one over the other, and it was unrealistic to suppose MdR would investigate the same claims for Harbour, then represent the Claimants, while disregarding everything it had already learned. The obvious commercial expectation was that this earlier work would be used to advance the Claimants' case. MdR sought to rely on a confidentiality clause in a 2024 retainer agreement between it and RGL Management Ltd (a claims management company acting on behalf of the Claimants) to argue that it was relieved of any duty to disclose information obtained while acting for other clients. The provision stated that MdR may "have acted for persons in the same or similar sector as yours and by agreeing to the terms of this letter you agree that will have no duty to disclose to you any confidential information that we have obtained, or might in the future obtain, from acting for such persons or which is derived from any other source". The Court rejected this on several grounds. Claimants who had already become MdR's clients had an existing right to information in the Harbour Communications where it was relevant to their claims before the 2024 retainer agreement. If they were to surrender that right, it would have required their informed consent (also required under the SRA Code of Conduct). The Court found no evidence that such informed consent had been given. The terms had simply been made available to the Claimants through a portal, with no indication that Claimants understood they were giving up existing rights to relevant information. The Court found that even if the terms had been contractually binding, that would not have amounted to informed consent. In addition, the wording of the clause was not sufficiently clear to show that the Claimants had agreed to waive access to this information. (iv) Was disclosure reasonable, proportionate, and necessary at this stage? The Claimants argued that it was neither reasonable nor proportionate for disclosure to be given at such a late stage (approximately two weeks before the start of the preliminary issue trial) and that it was not necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings. The Court rejected this, but it drew a distinction between two categories of documents within the Harbour Communications: Documents bearing on the actual knowledge of the individual drivers, including communications with the LTDA, were not privileged, likely straightforward to review, and directly relevant to the preliminary issue. Their disclosure was ordered as reasonable, proportionate, and necessary. Documents reflecting only MdR's or Harbour's own assessment of the merits were of more marginal, indirect relevance and largely likely to fall under legal advice privilege. A review to isolate the smaller pool of non-privileged material in this category would be time-consuming for limited benefit, so this was excluded from the order. Key Points to Note The judgment is an important reminder of several practical points: However closely a funder is involved in evaluating a claim's merits, litigation privilege will only apply to communications where the sole or dominant purpose of the communication is the conduct of litigation, not the funder's own decision on whether to finance it. Unless that communication separately attracts legal advice privilege, it may need to be disclosed. The same considerations apply to other communications. For example, in RBS Rights Litigation [2017] 1 WLR 3539 the argument that an After the Event (ATE) policy was subject to litigation privilege was rejected on a similar basis. Whilst in this case, there was no dispute as to whether litigation was in contemplation, it is important to note that litigation privilege will not automatically apply to the investigative stages of a claim, i.e. before litigation is in contemplation. Even where litigation is reasonably contemplated, the dominant purpose test must still be satisfied. Material created primarily for fact-finding, risk assessment, or other investigative purposes will not attract litigation privilege unless those activities are actually undertaken for the dominant purpose of conducting the litigation. (See The Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2017] EWHC 1017 (QB)). When engaging a law firm, clients should ensure that they understand whether the firm has previously obtained information about their claim while acting for another party (for example, a funder or another interested party) and how that information will be handled. Any restrictions on the firm’s ability to share relevant information with the client should be explained clearly at the outset, including what information may be withheld and why. If this decision raises questions about your own funding arrangements, disclosure strategy, or privilege position, please get in touch with our Commercial Litigation team.