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New AI Lawsuits Relating to the Use of Allegedly Stolen Data

September 14, 2023

by Kent J. Schmidt and Melonie S. Jordan

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Litigation risks associated with consumer privacy are well-known. Until this year, almost all of the consumer privacy litigation was aimed at companies releasing individuals’ personal information to others. But with the advent of AI, we are seeing new permutation of privacy claims — liability for companies that receive data scraped from the internet including de-anonymizing data of website visitors.  In this episode, Dorsey Associate Melonie Jordan and Dorsey Partner and Podcast Host Kent Schmidt discuss what some recent court filings, providing a preview of the road ahead for AI-related litigation relating to consumer privacy including two new California lawsuits.

This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

Transcript

Voiceover
Welcome to another episode of the SharkCast on Litigation Risks Management, where we explore why businesses are so frequently sued and how to mitigate and navigate the dangers lurking in these risky waters.  Join us now as we welcome our host, Kent Schmidt, Litigation Partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.

 Schmidt
Welcome SharkCast listeners.  I am thrilled that you’ve joined us today for an episode to talk about and issue that is cutting edge, right off the press, lawyers, print machines and newly filed lawsuits that are discussing some very current topics I think will be of interest to each of you.  Most people know consume privacy is one of the fastest growing areas of evolving litigation risk for companies.  What makes this area of law so challenging is that the technologies are constantly changing.  The regulations and legal theories continue to merge and it makes it very difficult to understand what companies can and cannot do with the data they receive from their consumers.  Of course, over the last couple months in particular there has been great emphasis in the news on artificial intelligence.  Today we’re going to discuss two newly filed lawsuits, both in California that illustrates some of the emerging legal theories relative to consumer privacy and artificial intelligence.  To tackle these challenging topics, I am very pleased to welcome to the podcast studio, Melonie Jordan.

Melonie is an attorney in our Labor and Employment group here with me in Southern California.  She focuses on all aspects of employment law, litigation, and compliance.  Particularly as an emphasis in the area of privacy and all of the privacy regulations that apply to employers.  As well as more generalized privacy practice.  Welcome to SharkCast.  I’m very pleased that you’ve joined us today for an in person interview to talk about consumer privacy.  How are you doing today?

Jordan
I’m doing great.  Thank you so much for having me.  I’m very excited about today’s topic.

Schmidt
Well you’ve had to do a little bit of homework to prepare for today’s topic.  We’re going to get into this because these lawsuits that we’re going to talk about are hot off the presses, as I’ve indicated.  Both lawsuits involve a concept of data scraping with of course we’re familiar with in the concept of AI.  Can you sort of explain to us before we get into the details of these lawsuits.  What is data scraping and what does it have to do consumer privacy?

Jordan
Sure.  So, I think it’s important for us to step back and frame the conversation as it relates to web scraping.  Because these lawsuits relates on the use of AI and its employment to web scraping.  AI is essentially the means by which you’re teaching and using technology to perform cognitive tasks that essentially have been relegated to humans, but now we’re employing it for a different kind of machines.  So there are different kinds of AI.  AI has been around for several decades, but more recently we’ve seen this shift into generative AI and natural language processing.  Which is at issue with a lot of these lawsuits, particularly these two, or mainly one that was filed here.  The other one kind of mentions it in passing.  When we’re talking about data scraping.  AI is allegedly being used to scour the entire internet and pretty much scrape information from each webpage that is on there, and essentially taking that information, condensing it down, and then using it to train the AI to generate responses, generate content, generate images, generate audio, and I guess there’s been a lot of lawsuits surrounding that issue.

Schmidt
So let’s talk about the first big lawsuit in the Northern District of California.  On June 28, the plaintiff is PM v. OpenAI LP, and there are a number of other affiliated entities, including Microsoft Corporation, that are named in this class action complaint.  And by the way it’s filed by the Clarkson law firm.  I’ve litigated against them before.  They’ve very good lawyers.  This is quite a complaint.  Can you unpack it for us?

Jordan
Sure.  So this complaint spans 151 pages, and it read like a cross between an Orwellian novel and a law review article.  But it could be condensed down I think most succinctly to two paragraphs within the complaint, paragraphs 146 and 147.  It says despite established protocols for the purchase and use of personal information, Defendant’s, meaning Open IA and its entities and Microsoft Corporation, took a different approach, theft.  They systematically scraped 300 billion words from the internet, books, articles, websites and posts, including personal information obtained without consent.  OpenAI did so in secret, and without registering as a data broker as it was required to do under applicable law.  Scraping involves the use of bots, or robot applications, deployed for automated tasks, which scan and copy the information on web pages, then store and index the information.

So this lawsuit then focuses on two different kinds of theft as it relates to the World Wide Web, if you will.  First would be web scraping, and they’re using that term to refer to non-users is what they call them.  Individuals who’ve never used OpenAI products, but they are, have used the Internet in some shape or form essentially.  So they’re saying you scraped the web of their information.  And then you have the second kind of information that was allegedly stolen, and that is what they’re calling user data, which is individuals who’ve actually used the OpenAI products and now they’re taking information that they’re inputting into the products and using it to train the models and generate content as well.

Schmidt
So let’s break down the web scraping component of this.

Jordan
Sure.

Schmidt
So if I am in the AI business, I’m one of these defendants, and I’m going out and scraping, to use their word, of the entire universe of data that’s out there.  Much of that data is presumptively legally obtained.  It’s out there because people put it out there, they don’t care that it’s out there.  How can there be liability at least with respect to that?

Jordan
I think that’s, so it raises a ton of different issues.  Right?  One would be, well, when you as a consumer engage with one website, are you of the understanding that that engagement could then be used for potentially another business relationship such that another company’s AI or Microsoft as this complaint alleges, could use the information.  So that’s where this web scraping, I guess theory is arising, which is giving rise to 15 different causes of action alleged in this complaint.  Another cause of action that we’re seeing is whether there’s an invasion of privacy that’s associated with that use.  Did you have an expectation of your personal information being used in this way?  Another cause of action or liability could be, well, was this information obtained lawfully in the first place?  A lot of these statutes that they’re alleging within this complaint focus on unauthorized access of personal information.

Schmidt
So what is the significance of the fact that much of this data is anonymous?  It’s data that doesn’t really relate to an individual person, it has no value on individualized basis, but the aggregate of the data, the statistics as to who is doing what and what the trends are is the real value.  Does this complaint draw in the distinction between anonymized data or aggregated data that really doesn’t carry with it a reasonable expectation of privacy?

Jordan
No, and I think that’s an interesting point.  It doesn’t seem that the complaint really focuses on whether the data was anonymized or I guess accessed in a way that it couldn’t be traced to an identifiable individual.  I think the complaint really focuses on the fact that the information was accessed at all.  That’s in contrast to the next lawsuit that we’ll talk about, which does focus on whether the information was de-anonymized or not.  In this circumstance it’s really about the fact that this information was used in the first place, both by people who never use OpenAI products, and by people who have used OpenAI as they allege.

Schmidt
Well, let me turn the discussion to what the plaintiff here are seeking to accomplish.  What is their objective?  And before we talk about the relief that’s sought, one observation I have is as you read this entire complaint, there is a good case to be made that there should be some sort of government regulation of AI.  The question is are you gonna issue, are you gonna obtain that regulation through an injunction from a district court as opposed to a process by which state and federal lawmakers can start getting a handle on this AI and regulate it in a more thoughtful manner.  What are your thoughts on seeking to accomplish AI regulation via an injunction?

Jordan
You know, I don’t know if that’s necessarily effective in the long run.  We’ll have to see.  Certainly the complaint alleges two different actions taken by the FTC and spend a considerable amount of time focusing on the FTCs and force of action as it relates to other companies.  But when seeking an injunction from I guess a district court in a northern, the Northern District of California.  I’m not quite sure if it will be as long lasting as I guess the complaint alleges that it seeks, right.

Schmidt
I could just imagine a district court judge saying I understand there’s a lot that needs to be done here, but how can I accomplish this with an injunction?  Maybe that should go to Sacramento or Washington D.C., but not my desk ‘cause it’s overwhelming to try to figure and balance all of these interest, and essentially start governing AI in the collection of this data.

Jordan
Sure, and I, I honestly, I think that that might be the response of the court, both in terms of them, the means or the remedies that are being sought, but also the mechanism in which the plaintiffs are using.  Is a class action of this size that helpful?  Essentially this complaint admits that this lawsuit, or this punitive class action would include virtually everyone who’s used the internet in some shape or form.  The complaint goes to great lengths to make a distinction between those who use the products and those who didn’t.  And it talks about how OpenAI before was just using information for academic purposes largely, and so it looked at the entire internet essentially before 2023.  That’s decades and decades of information, and that’s billions of people.  And so how is a court going to manage a class focusing on this amount of people spanning several different states?  They’re pulling states, individuals from California, Illinois, Florida, they even alleged a cause of action under New York law as well.  This is unwieldly as a mechanism, and I think that it will probably be viewed as unwieldly in terms of the remedy sought.

Schmidt
There’s a component of this complaint, recurring theme as I read it, where there’s a contention that, as you mentioned, it started out as a non-profit, and now it’s making billions of dollars because AI is such a lucrative emerging area.  But what relevance does that really have to these causes of action that the company started off as non-profit and now is for profit?

Jordan
Honestly that’s a great question.  I think the, it really just, I guess gets more a, maybe a public policy argument, more of a publicity issue.  There is no relevance in terms of the actually 15 causes of actions themselves.  Interestingly they make references throughout this complaint to the California Consumer Privacy Act, but they don’t actually bring a cause of action under it.

Schmidt
And why is that?  Why would you not, comprehensive data privacy, why would the plaintiffs not bring a CCPA claim here?

Jordan
Well, one, I think as it relates to your earlier question, the CCPA doesn’t apply to non-profits.  Right?  And so, but they could bring it now because this company is now a for profit enterprise.  That said, I believe that they didn’t allege CCPA because the CCPA has a cure provision within it.  Right?  So these plaintiffs would have the duty to send a notice to the defendants that there’s been a violation of the CCPA, and then the defendants have 30 days to secure the alleged violation.  Should they cure the alleged violation then that eliminates the statutory damages.  And so a great swath of the recovery then is it’s cut from under them.  And it’s interesting too that they, again, they mention the California Consumer Privacy Act right out of the gate in at least one paragraph, and then there’s a couple footnotes that cite to the data broker registration provision that incorporates and references the CCPA as well.  So it’s, they’re kind of dancing around it, and I even know it in paragraph 141 that they’re, when describing the personal information that the allege was taken, they’re using I guess what a lot of privacy practitioners would understand as a sensitive personal information definition.  And so they’re kind of dancing around the periphery of it, but they’re not actually evoking a cause of action under it.  So it’s a pretty interesting approach that this complaint has taken.

Schmidt
You mentioned the data broker requirements in the CCPA.  In general, without getting into too far into the weeds, what are those requirements that accompany that’s engaged in some activity with data should check into to ensure whether or not they need to be registered as a data broker in California?

Jordan
Yeah, sure.  So I wanna say as back in 2020 actually under the CCPA, or under the data broker registration law I should say, all data brokers must register with the California attorney general’s office.  And a data broker is defined as a business that knowingly collects and sells to third parties the personal information of a consumer with whom the business does not have a direct relationship, and this law refers back to the CCPA for the definitions of business, sale, and third party.  But interestingly it doesn’t define what a direct relationship is.  At least in my understanding at this point.  So again, dancing around that CCPA provision, but not jumping into the waters.

Schmidt

A lot of interesting coins and interesting concepts and challenges for the plaintiffs here.  But if you boil it down to its essence, what’s the take away, word to the wise that a company should consider in reading this lawsuit?

Jordan
Well think about the risk with AI.  It’s very exciting area, it’s, promises a lot of benefits for companies, for individuals, and then the employment aspect, certainly for the employment relationship.  But this lawsuit says to me that if you are incorporating AI into your business, whether it’s through managing employment relationship or just providing goods to consumers, perhaps think about whether you would fall under the definition of data broker, or the other pitfalls that are involved, such as invasion of privacy.  Can I even think about it from, again, the employment aspect.  Say you type in someone’s name, tell me about Kent Schmidt, and ChatGPT4, if you paid for the subscription, gives you, or gives me information about you.  And then I use that as a basis to determine whether I want to interview your or extend a job offer to you.  Does that search constitute a background search such that certain ban the box ordinances would be triggered, like in L.A. or in San Francisco.

So thinking about whether those constitute background searches, whether the information is accurate or correct, it brings up a plethora of issues.  So just be cautious about it, and words to the wise.  Open AI in Microsoft, their facing a class action that’s alleging $3 billion are at issue here.  And so whether that’s obtained or not time will tell.  Right?  But again, think about the CCPA and think about these other fate laws that are out there that may be applicable in this circumstance.

Schmidt
That’s a good word of advice, Melanie.  Let’s now turn to the second of the two lawsuits.  Hernandez v. MRI Software, LLC.  This is a lawsuit filed by my long-time litigation advisory, Scott Fare.  We’ve probably had 20 lawsuits against one another, and Scott mentioned this lawsuit to me when we were talking on the phone on one of our cases a couple of weeks ago.  He’s jazzed about these lawsuits.  If anyone knows Pacific trial attorneys, and Scott Fare, he tends to file the same type of lawsuit again and again and again.  He’s a plaintiff’s consumer class action lawyer.  So I’ve asked Melanie to take a look at this lawsuit.  Thankfully it’s much shorter than the first lawsuit we talked about.  And give us a summary of what’s alleged here and what the takeaways are for companies focused on litigation risk.

Jordan
Sure.  So this lawsuit was very interesting, or is very interesting.  Pretty much the plaintiffs allege that MRI software, they’ve installed software on its own website that allows MRI to de-anonymize and quote dox every visitor to its site.  I think the two paragraphs aptly sum up the point of the lawsuit, which is they’re saying that lead forensics describes itselves as the world’s number one website visitor identification software, lead forensics being the software that’s being employed by MRI.  So software reveals the identity of your anonymous website visitors, turning them into actionable sales ready leads in real time.  And then the plaintiff alleges that MRI installed spyware because the spyware reveals the identity of your anonymous website traffic and turned them into actual sale leads in real time and gives you access to that power by revealing the identity of your previously unknown website visitors.

So essentially this website, or this plaintiff’s complaint, is saying that you’re installing this software that can tell you who I am and you’re not properly informed me or given me notice that this was occurring, and that my information would be used in this way, such that now I’m personally identifiable.

Schmidt
So let me make sure I’m tracking this.  If I go to the defendant’s website, as of right now if the defendant didn’t have the software all they would have is my IP address and they couldn’t really do anything with that.  But what lead forensics does is to combine my IP address with an innumerable amount of data that they have, and to let that company know hey, it was Kent Schmidt that went to that website.

Jordan

Kent Schmidt, or that it was likely Kent or someone, you know…

Schmidt
Someone using Kent’s computer.

Jordan
Yeah, right.  And so they’re then bringing two causes of action under California state law.  And I think it is important to note that this lawsuit was filed in state court as opposed to federal.  Obviously because of and whatnot for the Northern District of California case.  But this one just alleges violations of California’s penal code, the California Unauthorize to Computer Data Act, and then two sections 630 through 638 as it relates to aiding and abetting allegedly the software company.  So I think that they’re saying then that this information is able to be used from your IP and address, but also information that’s generally out on the web, to then pool together a profile to figure out who you are, and then now we’re able to effectively market to you.  That’s what this complaint is alleging.

Schmidt
It’s interesting to me that the plaintiff analogizes this lawsuit to stolen property, a concept that we’re all familiar with.  Do you think that’s a fair metaphor for what’s going on here?

Jordan
I don’t, I don’t think it’s fair.  I think that receiving stolen property, it evokes like imagery of like a seedy pawn shop somewhere.  And I don’t that that’s, I think it’s an oversimplification of what may actually occur, and probably a little inaccurate.  I think what, the real question is, for at least the these lawsuits is, is the information that we put onto the web, is that now publically available information such that anyone can access it and use it to train their software?

Schmidt
Well, for one thing, the stolen property is far from clear because sure, this data is out there and no one knows necessarily how it got there.

Jordan
Right.

Schmidt
And it may not have been stolen.

Jordan
Right.  So it, I guess, yeah, we don’t know what stolen means in this context.  Right?  And to be fair information is on the internet it doesn’t necessarily mean, you willingly and voluntarily put it there.  Right?  We don’t know if, at least I don’t know if some of the software is utilizing information from the dark web or other aspects of the World Wide Web here.  But I think if it’s utilizing or filtering out irreputable sources and focusing on reputable web pages at least, is that improper, ‘cause what would separate that from a general Google search or other search engine result?

Schmidt
There’s a phrase that’s used throughout this lawsuit, de-anonymize.  And the concept is if you put all this information out there, then on its own you remain anonymous.  But once you put the pieces of the puzzle back together the picture emerges as to who it is.  Is this a concept that’s ever been recognized in the law, a claim or someone’s violation of a right to privacy due to de-anonymized data?

Jordan
Oh sure, I think that the different laws that, at least are in play in the state level are seeking to address this issue point blank.  I mean California was the first here, of course modeling the GDPR in Europe.  But last I checked, there’s at least 10 other states who have privacy legislation that’s been enacted now, and all of them are focusing on our ability, or a company’s ability to understand and identify you, and making sure that you’re aware that they can identify you, and then understanding what they’re doing with the data that they have about you.

Schmidt
Melonie, in addition to the work that you do as a lawyer, you serve a vital function at Dorsey by sitting on Dorsey’s newly formed AI Task Force.  Discussing how AI is going to impact the practice of law what things are you learning that you’re at liberty to share with us and with our listeners on some of the ways we’re going to be seeing AI impact the practice of law going forward.

Jordan
It’s a real honor, first of all, to serve on the AI Task Force for Dorsey.  The task force represents a slice of practitioners from across our platform that are figuring out how we can employ AI potentially and the further ends of our practice, but then also a subset of us are kind of looking at ways that AI are impacting different areas of law.  In particular as it relates to employment issues, I have been building a workplace privacy practice which focuses on the unique point in time that we’re in right now.  With the add event of remote work over the last several years combined with the general acceptance now of AI and society and now in the workplace.  I’ve been tasked within advising employers about the risk that are presented by employing AI both as it relates to managing the employment relationship and as it relates to the employees actually performing the work involved.  So it’s an exciting time, an exciting area, different changes every day, and I’m really excited about the workplace privacy work that we’re doing.

Schmidt
It must be a real challenge because what you understand about AI in July becomes obsolete by October, or maybe that’s a slight exaggeration, or maybe or maybe not, or maybe it’s an understatement.

Jordan
I think it’s more of an understatement, right?  I mean GPT was released to the public in March, I think, of 2023, and we’re in July now and my goodness, it’s changed so much.  So, it’s continuously moving.  You have those issues.  You also have the proliferation of many states and acting privacy legislation as is.  And to my understanding now, you have California who’s kind of standing as the Lone Ranger and applying privacy law to the employment relationship and so my practice really focuses on that overlap between the two and managing the risk associated with the employment of the technology.  But also, you know, facing off any issues such that if litigation were to arise then, you know, defend it and get after it.

Schmidt
Well that’s very good.  I must say that I’m still a nascent user, or early adopter of a lot of AI and the only way I was able to get through this 150 page complaint that was filed by the Clarkson Law Firm that we discussed earlier was to use some AI.  I used Speechify which is great app that you can put a PDF into the program and have it essentially read any text to you through your IPhone.  So that’s how I was able to get through that complaint.  So we’re all enjoying different aspects of AI, but it’s also important to think about some of the litigation risks that are emerging as well.  Well we’ve come to the part of our episode in which we do what we call the deeper dive to learn a little bit more about you as a person in addition to your legal practice and.  Melonie, I understand that you are the mother of a ten year old, a three year old and a nine month old, so congratulations.

Jordan
Thank you.

Schmidt
And hats off to you for all the responsibilities that go with that.  What’s your secret to managing your busy and very evolving practice and all the responsibilities that you have at home as well?

Jordan
Well I think it’s just understanding where the priorities lie.  Making those first things first and being unapologetic about those priorities and about my time.  So I’ve noticed as I’ve had more children, three girls now, I’m a lot more protective of my time, and I seem to accomplish more than I did when I was, you know single and you know with no responsibilities.  It’s funny because you think that you won’t.  You may feel that children slow you down, but they’ve only, you know empowered me.  So I guess my secret is, you know, this is the time that I have to accomplish this task.  This is the time that I have to do it, and I do it.  And then the time that I have with my children, then I’m very, very protective of that.  My husband and I really prioritize spending time with each other and spending time with our three girls.

Schmidt
What are some of the things you do as a family here in Sothern California to enjoy time away from the office and time with those three girls?

Jordan
We love going on hikes together.  Hiking in California is very different then hiking in the east coast where I’m from.  We’re not trekking through mountains and other rugged terrain.  Really its nice hills with lovely ocean views, on top of the world hike, Laguna Beach.  We love doing that with our girls.  We love heading down to San Diego and spending time on Coronado Island.  That’s our favorite spot.  We just really, really enjoy spending time at the beach.  I meant there’s a plethora of options here, right?  So it’s good.

Schmidt
What are the challenges of hiking in Southern California?  It’s pretty hilly.

Jordan
Yes!

Schmidt
So you’re heading uphill and then your downhill and then back uphill again and so those kids are learning some good fitness skills early on to be able to tackle the hikes that you just mentioned.

Jordan
Sure.

Schmidt
What about the balance of practicing in really two practice areas, which is privacy and labor and employment?  Some of which intersect of course with employee privacy, but how do you manage really two practices that are in many ways distinct?

Jordan
Sure.  So I really try to focus on that overlap.  I think that if I was just a core privacy attorney I wouldn’t be as affective, but my first love has been employment law since coming out of law school.  I really enjoy the work quite a bit and I find that a subset of employment issues focus on employee data and privacy, and you know not just those two areas, but thinking more so about employees in the workplace and protecting their interests there more broadly.  So, looking at surveillance issues, looking at, you know, workplace monitoring issues looking at, I guess, background checks, and drug testing and all those other aspects of what people would term as your private life.  And so I balance it by making sure that I stay within that overlap of the diagram, if you will.

Schmidt
I imagine the times that you’re able to be by yourself and pursue some hobby or other leisure activity are few and far between with all these responsibilities at work and at home, but to the extent that you do get those rare occasions, what are some things that you like to do to unwind and engage in a little self-care?

Jordan
Yes.  So one is I, I actually am a morning person.  Interesting fact, but there’s 80% of the human population are morning people apparently, so I’m one of them.  And I like to get up before my kids get up, before my husband is up and I like to go to the gym and listen to podcasts, listen to my YouTube videos.  It’s just my time to zone out and tend to myself in that way and then I’m pretty regimented about my weeks in terms of, you know, Thursday night is date night with my husband.  Friday night is Friday family fun night, and then Saturday is self-care for myself.  So Saturday night I’m enjoying a bubble bath, some sparkling cider and watching some Netflix.

Schmidt
Good for you.  Well you know this is a marathon not a sprint.  The practice of life and law in general.  So it’s good to pace yourself and to take care of yourself along the way.  That’s very important.  So, thank you so much for being here.  We appreciate your incites and your thoughts, and we’ll have to have you back some time because we know AI is quickly evolving and things we talk about are going to be developing quickly over the next several months and years.  That’s all the time we have for today.  Thank you for listening.  I’m indebted to the extraordinary team at Dorsey for making this podcast and episode possible.  For more resources on this and other litigation risk go to litigationrisks.com where more information can be found including a book on managing litigation risk written my yours truly.  Until next time my friends this is another reminder that there are a lot of sharks swimming out there in the murky waters, so swim safely.

Voiceover
This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone.  Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things.  The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only, and not those of Dorsey & Whitney.  This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

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Patent Partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic Join Dorsey in Palo Alto

Patent partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic have joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Palo Alto, the international law firm announced today. Al Araiza works with clients to develop and implement patent strategies that align with corporate objectives, supporting growth initiatives, financing efforts, and successful exits, including initial public offerings and acquisitions. He advises on building, managing, and optimizing patent portfolios across a broad range of emerging and frontier technologies, with depth in wireless communications, artificial intelligence, and energy innovation. Before practicing law, Al gained engineering experience in the defense industry, working on energy system modeling and communications circuitry design. He also conducted biomedical research, with findings published in peer-reviewed journals. He has been recognized in the IAM Patent 1000 for his work advising clients on patent strategy and portfolio development. Al received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law, his M.E. in Biomedical Engineering from Tulane University, and his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from UCLA. Lena Petrovic works across the software and hardware industries to develop clear, well-supported patent applications. She guides clients through the prosecution process and advises on global trademark and copyright matters, including licensing and portfolio management. Lena regularly supports clients developing technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, fintech, cryptography, interactive and immersive experiences, and digital media, and works with companies in entertainment, gaming, and sports. Before practicing law, Lena spent a decade at Pixar, where she contributed to major films including The Incredibles, Ratatouille, WALL‑E, and Brave. Lena received her J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law, her M.S. in Computer Science from Princeton University, and her B.S. from California Institute of Technology. “Al and Lena bring a practical, technical, and business-focused approach informed by extensive experience working with technology companies, startups, and investors,” said Gina Cornelio, Patent Practice Group Co-Leader. “We are thrilled to welcome them to the Patent team and our growing Palo Alto office.” “Dorsey’s Patent practice is dedicated to understanding each client's business deeply, tailoring patent strategies that directly advance their goals,” said Al Araiza. “We are proud to join this outstanding team and look forward to driving success for our clients.”

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State Affordability Infrastructure Districts (SAIDs) — A Financing Tool for Taiwanese Investment in Arizona Science and Technology Parks

If you have developed a facility inside one of Taiwan's science or technology parks, you are accustomed to the one-stop-shop of government planning the park and delivering the roads, water, power, and other infrastructure before your building is even constructed. In the United States, including Arizona, land development generally does not work that way. In Arizona, the cost of infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, power, and the digital backbone, typically falls on the private landowner and is incurred up front before operations generate revenue to offset that cost. For a company entering the Arizona market, this is often the largest and earliest capital burden of the entire project. Arizona recently created a tool that provides a more cost-effective way for landowners and developer to finance some of that infrastructure. House Bill 2999, signed into law June 2026 and codified at Chapter 40 of Title 48 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, establishes the creation of a State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID). How a SAID Works Landowners are now able to use a SAID to finance public infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, parking, lighting, communications, rail sidings and signalization, and similar improvements, through tax-exempt bonds. The bonds are repaid over up to 30 years and secured solely by the property within the SAID. No city, county, or state credit is pledged, and no obligation falls on other taxpayers, and therefore no city, county, or state approval other than from the Arizona Finance Authority (AFA). In effect, a SAID lets you spread the cost of horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of funding it entirely at the outset. And tax-exempt bonds often offer a lower interest rate than taxable or other types of financing. How a SAID is Formed A SAID is formed upon the filing of a petition with the AFA. The petition must include the finance plan, general plan, estimated costs, maximum tax rate, appraisal, bond counsel certificate, consultant list, petitioner experience, legal description, title report, and other materials. While the landowner is required to provide notice to the local governing jurisdiction, local governing jurisdiction does not have the right to approve or deny. The petition is reviewed administratively by the AFA through a standards-based process. For an inbound investor without long-standing local relationships, an objective, criteria-driven process is a meaningful advantage to the overt political process associated with other financing districts in Arizona. Formation requirements. A SAID requires consent from 100% of landowners within the proposed district; public infrastructure costs must exceed $5 million (easily met at any real scale); the district property must all be in the same county and need not be contiguous provided that noncontiguous property is located within five miles of the district's other property; and the board is initially appointed by the forming owners of the SAID district, later transitioning to election as ownership diversifies. Actual bond issuance requires an election of the SAID property owners. Ownership and corporate structure. Consent rights and board seats run with title. If you hold the Arizona land through a U.S. blocker beneath your Taiwan parent, the standard model for Taiwanese/Arizona real estate and operating investment, the U.S. property-holding entity, rather than it’s corporate parent, is the landowner of record for the district. Before formation, our Dorsey team will confirm that you have the proper corporate structure and board mechanics to be compliant.  Board composition has no citizenship or residency requirement. This is a common concern for foreign investors, and the statute answers it cleanly. Under A.R.S. § 48-7004, a director must either hold fee title to real property in the district or be an individual designated or appointed by a fee-title owner. Corporations, partnerships, and other business entities are expressly permitted to be those owners, to vote as owners, and to designate an individual to serve. There is no requirement that a director be a U.S. citizen or resident. So your U.S. property-holding entity, as landowner of record, can appoint whichever of your principals you choose, including a Taiwan-based individual, as the three-member board.  Power infrastructure limitation. The enacted definition of "public infrastructure" in A.R.S. § 48-7001 does not include electrical power generation or transmission. The reference to electrical facilities appears only as components of lighting and traffic-control systems, and the Legislature removed broader energy infrastructure from the definition during the Senate amendments. A SAID will likely not finance the high-load power infrastructure required for semiconductor fabrication, data storage, or heavy manufacturing.  Water infrastructure within a current utility CC&N. Where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the SAID cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility on completion. Entitlements and zoning: The determination of entitlements, zoning, and other land use permitting, as well as construction permitting for a technology or manufacturing facilities remain with the local jurisdiction and run on a separate track. Our Dorsey team will help you coordinate the financing and entitlement timelines together. Our Dorsey team works regularly with Taiwanese and other Asia-Pacific companies entering the Arizona market. If a SAID fits your project, we can structure it for your cross-border ownership.

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Proposed CMS Rule Ramps Up Potential Medicare Fraud Administrative Remedies

On July 6, 2026, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a rule that would expand its administrative remedies to combat potential fraud. The proposed rule is the latest in a round of administrative actions that signal CMS’s intent to aggressively pursue allegations of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and heighten the risk of fraud enforcement against even well-intentioned Medicare and Medicaid providers and suppliers. The proposed rule includes several changes to regulations that govern Medicare billing privileges. Providers and suppliers should be aware that these changes dramatically expand the flexibility afforded to CMS in enrollment and revocation actions, potentially leading to harsh consequences for ministerial and administrative errors. If finalized, moreover, the proposed rule could have material implications for providers and suppliers facing threatened revocation, including heightened risk of overpayment liability and increased hurdles to challenging revocations and denials of enrollment. Added Flexibility to Existing Revocation Grounds CMS has proposed to remove a number of factors that the regulations list as relevant to a determination of whether a provider has engaged in “abuse of billing privileges.” While acknowledging that the inclusion of these factors in the regulations was permissive (requiring consideration only where “as appropriate or applicable”), CMS stated that it must be afforded “the maximum flexibility to address all possible . . . scenarios without the rigid constraints of our existing factors.” CMS provided little guidance as to the outer bounds of what conduct could constitute an “abuse of privileges” that merits revocation of Medicare billing privileges. Instead, CMS noted that a “pattern of practice” of abuse of billing privileges might be established “by a simple finding that several of a provider’s claims do not meet Medicare requirements.” Similarly, CMS has proposed to expand the regulatory provision that permits revocation of enrollment if a provider certifies as “true” false or misleading information in Medicare enrollment application or renewal forms to include any scenario in which a provider submits “false or misleading information on or associated with any CMS Medicare enrollment-related form,” including materials submitted to Medicare contractors. CMS stated that it interprets this expanded rule to include anything related to Medicare enrollment, and not only those submissions that are “intended to gain or maintain Medicare enrollment.” If finalized, the proposed rule would add significant flexibility to CMS’s ability to pursue revocation of a provider’s enrollment. While CMS has assured providers that it would “invoke [the revised regulations]. . . only when legitimately warranted under the facts and circumstances and not as a matter of course,” such expanded flexibility threatens unpredictability in the event of even administrative or ministerial errors in submissions and claims. These changes would, moreover, make it more difficult for providers to challenge a revocation action. Expanded Revocation Grounds In addition to adding flexibility to existing grounds for revocation, CMS’s proposed rule adds to and expands CMS’s already broad authority to revoke provider and supplier enrollment. Such proposed changes include adding the following grounds for revocation: Denial of Enrollment Application. Where CMS could previously revoke a provider’s other enrollments if one enrollment is revoked, CMS would also be able to revoke a provider’s existing enrollments if an application for enrollment submitted by the provider is denied. High-Risk Enrollments. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if it determines the provider or supplier (including owning/managing employees or organizations) poses a high risk of fraud, waste, or abuse due to “. . . an affiliation under [42 C.F.R.] § 424.519” or “the provider’s or supplier’s location within a limited geographic area that has an excessive number of providers and suppliers.” Certain Misdemeanor Convictions. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if a provider or supplier—or its owners, managing employees, managing organizations, officers, or directors—are convicted of a “misdemeanor related to sexual assault or financial misconduct within the past 10 years that CMS deems detrimental to the best interests of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries.” Ownership Changes (HHA, Hospice, DMEPOS). CMS would have broad authority to revoke enrollment of home health agencies, hospices, and DMEPOS suppliers who do not comply with the regulations governing provider changes of ownership. These proposed, expanded grounds for revocation are notably broad, and CMS provides only limited guidance as to what conduct might result in revocation under these grounds. As with the proposed expansion of existing grounds for revocation, the open-ended nature of these proposed grounds for revocation may make it more difficult for providers and suppliers to challenge revocation actions. Expanded Grounds to Deny Medicare Enrollment As with revocations, CMS proposes to expand the grounds under which a provider’s application to enroll in Medicare can be denied. These expanded and additional grounds include many of the grounds added for revocations, but also include: Medicare Debt or Payment Suspension. CMS proposes expanding the ground to deny enrollment based on Medicare debt or payment suspension to include a provider or supplier’s “managing employee, managing organization, or individual or entity with any other form of business or financial relationship with the provider or supplier[.]” Significantly, this expansive definition (called an “associated party” under the proposed regulation) currently contains no material limitations, meaning almost any person or entity with whom an applicant does business could create denial liability. Sharing Locations with Denied/Revoked Providers or Suppliers. CMS would have authority to deny applications where a “provider’s or supplier’s practice location is in the same suite or office as another provider or supplier whose Medicare enrollment has been revoked or denied.” Hospices with Distant Medical Directors or Administrators. CMS would have discretion to deny hospice applications if the hospice’s medical director or administrator serves “multiple other hospices” or practices/is located “at such a distance (for example, in a different state) from the enrolling hospice that the medical director cannot realistically perform all medical director functions,” with a similar provision for administrators. In addition, CMS proposes applications denied for “other program termination or suspension,” may be applied to the provider or supplier in its own name or NPI or that of its owners, managing employees, or managing organization regardless of whether any appeals are pending. Retroactive Revocation CMS proposed to restructure and expand the regulatory grounds for retroactive revocation of billing privileges. Currently, Medicare regulations provide that revocations are, by default, prospective in nature: effective 30 days after CMS or the CMS contractor mails notice to the provider. Under certain circumstances, the regulations provide for revocations to be retroactive, such as when a provider is convicted of a felony, the date a professional license is suspended, revoked, or surrendered, or when a provider submits a false certification in their enrollment application. CMS has proposed to reframe the rule so as to default to retroactive revocation of billing privileges. CMS expressed concern that providers may collect payment from Medicare while remaining so non-compliant with enrollment requirements as to merit revocation. To address this concern, CMS proposed that all revocations be retroactive to the date of determined non-compliance.[1] As a result, providers suspected of misconduct or non-compliance are likely to face claims of retroactive overpayments in addition to the immediate concern no longer receiving Medicare payments while their enrollment is revoked. Reapplication Bar CMS’s proposed rule expands the grounds from which a provider may be prohibited from seeking reapplication as a Medicare provider. Under current regulations, CMS may prohibit prospective providers from enrolling in Medicare for up to 10 years if its enrollment application is denied because the applicant submitted false or misleading information in its application. Under the proposed rule, CMS will have the discretion to prohibit a provider from enrolling in Medicare if their enrollment application is denied for any reason. Conclusion As a part of the federal government’s increasingly aggressive push to combat real or perceived healthcare fraud, the proposed rule both broadens CMS’s authority to revoke and deny Medicare enrollment and raises the stakes for revocation and denial. What the proposed rule does not share is how CMS plans to exercise this expanded discretion: as a result, the proposed rule, if enacted, increases the unpredictability and potential ramifications of even technical noncompliance with CMS rules. As a result, Medicare providers should keep a close eye on potential revisions to these rules and their potential implementation and consider proactively evaluating their compliance under CMS standards. [1] In the proposed rule, CMS identifies, with respect to each ground for revocation, what it will consider to be the effective date of revocation.

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The Long-Awaited Public Infrastructure Financing Solution for Development in Arizona

Every developer who has taken raw Arizona ground to a finished project knows the largest upfront cost other than the land price is almost always the cost to install the public infrastructure. Water, sewer, stormwater, streets, dry utilities, and the fiber backbone all have to be in the ground before a single lot closes or a building opens. That capital is deployed early and generates no return for years. For decades the standard workaround has been the Community Facilities District (CFD). That tool has grown materially harder to use, for reasons cited below, and House Bill 2999, signed in June 2026 and now codified as Chapter 40 of Title 48, is Arizona's response. Some Background I have spent a good part of my career on the other side of this problem. In the 1990s and early 2000s I served as general counsel of SunCor Development Company, one of Arizona's most active master-planned community developers, where we used Community Facilities Districts to finance hundreds of millions of dollars of major infrastructure across Arizona in cities such as Goodyear, Phoenix, Tempe, Litchfield Park, and Prescott Valley. For its time the CFD was an effective structure, and a great deal of what is now on the ground in those communities was financed with this tool. Unfortunately, CFDs have over time become considerably harder to use. Successive legislative amendments have layered on tax-rate ceilings, homebuyer disclosure obligations, and added procedural steps. Another drag on the use of CFDs is that formation of them runs through the municipality, where approval can turn as much on local politics as on the merits of a project. Developers now routinely are asked to absorb delay and uncertainty that a project's economics cannot support, which is a large part of why Arizona has fallen behind Colorado, Texas, and Utah in getting infrastructure financed. A better tool was needed, and Chapter 40 is it. How a SAID Improves on a CFD A State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID) keeps what worked about the CFD: tax-exempt, property-secured, non-recourse infrastructure financing — while shedding much of what made the CFD cumbersome. Its principal advantages over a traditional CFD: Administrative formation. A SAID is formed by the Arizona Finance Authority against fixed statutory criteria, through a yes-or-no compliance review on a sixty-day clock, rather than through the discretionary approval of a city council or a board of supervisors. Insulation from municipal politics. Because formation is a state-level compliance determination, a meritorious project is far less exposed to local political headwinds than it is under the CFD process. Landowner control of the board. A SAID is governed by a board of the landowners — appointed at formation, then elected on an acreage basis. In a typical municipal CFD, the city council sits as the district board; here, the developer controls governance. Advance funding of impact fees. A SAID can use bond proceeds to advance-pay municipal development impact fees, unlike CFDs, removing one of the largest upfront cash burdens in a project. A uniform, statewide process. The criteria are the same regardless of jurisdiction, replacing the municipality-by-municipality variation that has made CFD outcomes hard to predict. Flexible boundaries. A district may include noncontiguous parcels in the same county within five miles of one another, which fits phased and multi-tract development. Capped cost and a fixed timeline. Authority fees to form a district are capped at $15,000, and a complete petition must be acted on within sixty days. The full range of bonds. A SAID may issue general obligation, special assessment, revenue, and refunding bonds, secured solely by district property and creating no obligation for any other taxpayer. What is a SAID A SAID is a special taxing district that the owners of a development form to finance public infrastructure with tax-exempt bonds: general obligation bonds, special assessment bonds, and revenue bonds. The bonds are secured only by the property inside the district and are repaid over the long term, with terms up to 30 years. They do not affect the credit of the city, the county, or the State, and they create no obligation for any taxpayer outside the district. In practical terms, a SAID lets you finance horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of writing the check at the front end. The maximum ad valorem rate securing general obligation bonds is capped by statute at $5.00 per $100 of net assessed limited property valuation, with a limited step-up to cover a debt-service shortfall. SAIDs Work for Commercial as Well as Residential Development The SAID bill drew most of its press as a housing-affordability measure, and it appears to be a strong one. It is the first Arizona district statute to let bond proceeds advance-fund municipal development impact fees, which pulls one of the largest upfront cash burdens off a homebuilder's pro forma. But the statute's eligible infrastructure categories apply with equal force to commercial, industrial, and mixed-use projects. An industrial or logistics project can finance roads, rail crossings, sidings, and grade separations. A life-sciences or technology campus can finance its water, sewer, roads, and broadband the same way a subdivision can. Read Chapter 40 as a general-purpose infrastructure finance platform, not a subdivision-only device. How Formation Works A SAID is formed administratively by the Arizona Finance Authority. The Authority reviews the petition for compliance with the statute; it is a yes-or-no review against fixed criteria, not a discretionary negotiation with a city council or a board of supervisors, and it runs on a sixty-day clock once a complete petition is filed. Formation requires the written consent of 100% of the landowners in the proposed district and an engineer's certification that public infrastructure costs will exceed $5 million. The district may include noncontiguous parcels so long as they lie in the same county and within five miles of the district's other property, which accommodates phased and multi-tract development; if any part of the district sits inside a municipality, the whole district must stay within that municipality's limits or planning area. The Authority's fees to form a district are capped at $15,000. Issuing bonds requires a district election. Governance Simplified A SAID is run by a three-member board. The initial directors are named in the petition; after that, directors are elected by the landowners on an acreage basis as ownership diversifies. Board service runs with ownership; a director must either hold fee title inside the district or be an individual designated by a fee-title owner; and corporations, partnerships, and other entities may hold that ownership, vote as owners, and designate the individual who serves. A district has no power of eminent domain and no zoning authority, and directors may not be officials or employees of the municipality in which the district sits. What a SAID Does Not Do It finances; it does not entitle. Zoning, platting, rezonings, use permits, and the specialized approvals a manufacturing or life-sciences facility may need all remain with the local jurisdiction and proceed on their own track. The financing and entitlement timelines should be coordinated with formation of the SAID, but they are separate processes. Two substantive limits are worth flagging at the planning stage. First, electric power is largely outside the tool: the statutory definition of public infrastructure does not reach power generation or transmission, and broader energy infrastructure was removed from the bill during the Senate amendments. A power-intensive user should not assume a SAID will carry its electrical load. Second, where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the district cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility upon completion. Our Take For most master-planned residential work, and for a wide range of commercial and industrial development, a SAID will be the most efficient infrastructure-financing structure Arizona has offered. The right time to evaluate it is early in the acquisition and pre-development process, while the capital stack, the development agreement, and the entitlement strategy are still being set. Once the district's boundaries, general plan, and financing parameters are set, it is cumbersome at best to bring those into conformance later. Our Dorsey team has begun advising our developer clients on SAID formation on residential, commercial, and industrial projects statewide. If you would like us to assess whether a SAID fits a project you are working on, please reach out.

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Alaska HB 126: What Changes for Alaska Native Corporations, Proxy Filings, and Annual Reports

Alaska House Bill 126 (HB 126), sponsored by Representative Neal Foster and passed by the 34th Alaska Legislature, is now law. The bill changes which Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) must file proxy and annual report materials with the State of Alaska, and makes it easier to reinstate certain dissolved Village Corporations. For many smaller Village Corporations, the practical result is less public disclosure. For shareholders, advisors, and the public, it means some financial information that used to be available through the State will no longer be readily obtained. This eUpdate explains what HB 126 does in plain terms, walks through the practical trade-offs, and answers common questions. 1. What HB 126 Changes The old rule Under prior law (Alaska Statutes Sec. 45.55.139), an Alaska Native Corporation had to file its annual report, proxies, and proxy statements with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities (the Division) if it had more than $1 million in assets and 500 or more shareholders on its current rolls. A filing ANC was also required to follow the Division’s proxy rules (3 AAC 08.305 through .365), which require specific disclosures such as top 5 executive compensation, and related-party transactions. Because these filings are treated as public records, they gave non-shareholders, including the public and the press, visibility into ANC financial information that is not filed with the SEC. The new rule HB 126 changes how the 500-shareholder test is measured. Now, the asset test is removed, and the shareholder count is based on how many shareholders the corporation originally enrolled when it was formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), not how many it has today. As shares have passed down through families over the decades, some Village Corporations that started with fewer than 500 shareholders now have more than 500 recordholders. Under the old current-count test, when those corporations had crossed the threshold, they had to file. Under the new original-enrollment test, they do not. Who is affected Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders are the main beneficiaries. They no longer have to file proxy and annual report materials with the Division or follow the Division’s proxy regulations at 3 AAC 08.305 through .365. Two groups must continue to file as before: all twelve ANCSA Regional Corporations, each of which enrolled more than 500 shareholders at creation, and all Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders. As reported by the Alaska Beacon, when the bill was under consideration, the Division identified 59 corporations then filing, expected at least seven village corporations to become exempt, and was reviewing roughly 30 more. 2. Practical Analysis HB 126 reduces a real compliance burden for smaller Village Corporations, which now need not spend time and money on State filings. In coming years, the exempt Village Corporations may experience benefits associated with less public disclosure and less regulation. But at the same time, less public disclosure carries trade-offs. Benchmarking will become harder Publicly-filed proxy statements and annual reports have long served as a reference set. Shareholders, corporations, advisors, and counsel use them to compare governance practices, compensation, and financial results across similarly-situated ANCs. Since fewer of these materials will be filed publicly, there will be fewer comparable documents available, which will make benchmarking and market-checking more difficult for like-sized ANCs over time. Executive compensation transparency may be reduced The Division’s proxy rules require disclosure of the compensation of ANC’s top five most highly compensated individuals (3 AAC 08.345(b)(2)), related-party transactions above $20,000 (3 AAC 08.345(b)(3)), and audited financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis (3 AAC 08.365). When a corporation is no longer required to file these disclosures publicly, it becomes harder for shareholders and others to obtain the information, to understand how compensation is set for their corporate leadership, and how it compares across corporations of similar size and complexity. Transparency may matter more as ANCs grow Some ANCs have grown into large, complex enterprises with substantial revenue and many subsidiaries, even with fewer than 500 shareholders. For an ANC with a broad and dispersed shareholder base, public materials can be an important way for shareholders and other stakeholders to understand governance, compensation, and performance across ANCs. Reduced disclosure may carry more practical weight in those settings than for a small corporation whose shareholders are closely connected to the business. The ANCSA annual report obligation continues It is important not to overstate what HB 126 does. HB 126 changes the state filing proxy requirements. It does not remove the separate obligation under ANCSA itself. That obligation comes from ANCSA at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c), which requires a Native Corporation that would otherwise be subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prepare and transmit to its shareholders an annual report containing substantially the information a company subject to that Act would include. Similarly, ANCs that solicit proxies for an annual meeting are still required to furnish shareholders with those proxy materials under general Alaska corporate law. However, ANCs are now no longer required to transmit proxy statements to the State. ANCs’ reporting obligations to their shareholders are unaffected by HB 126. Any corporation newly exempt from state filing still owes its shareholders a detailed annual report and a proxy statement, even though that report is no longer routed through the State and made public. Reinstatement of dissolved Village Corporations Separately, HB 126 amends AS 10.06.960(k) to remove the prior deadline (previously December 31, 2020) for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. A dissolved Village Corporation may now apply to be reinstated under AS 10.06.633(e) at any time. Reinstatement still runs through the commissioner under AS 10.06.633(e). In general, that means the ANC must apply, cure the neglect or delinquency that led to dissolution, and pay the amounts owed, and the corporation’s name must be available or be changed to one that is. Once reinstated, the corporation and its shareholders are restored to the rights, privileges, liabilities, and obligations they would have had as if the dissolution had never occurred, and corporate and shareholder actions taken during the dissolution are treated as valid. If the previously-used corporate name is no longer available, the board alone may amend the articles to adopt a new name (without the necessity for shareholder approval). 3. Frequently Asked Questions What does HB 126 do? It changes how Alaska measures the 500-shareholder test that decides which ANCs must file proxy and annual report materials with the state. It removes the asset test, and it counts shareholders based on original enrollment rather than the current rolls. It also removes the deadline for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. Which ANCs are affected? Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders, because they may no longer need to file with the Division. Regional Corporations and Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders must continue to file as before. Does HB 126 eliminate all reporting obligations? No. It changes the state filing requirement under AS 45.55.139, but it does not remove the separate ANCSA obligation (43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c)) to provide shareholders with an annual report, and general corporate law still calls for a proxy statement when the ANC solicits proxies. Corporations that remain subject to state filing requirements must also continue to comply with the Division's rules. We think we are now exempt. What should our ANC board and management consider? Confirm your ANC’s original enrollment number and whether your corporation falls below the new threshold. Watch for communications from the State on this topic as they proceed with their research. If your ANC is now exempt, decide how your corporation will meet its continuing ANCSA obligation to shareholders, review proxy and annual meeting materials and timelines, and consider what to communicate to shareholders about any change in how they will receive information. It is worth documenting the basis for any exemption. What should ANC shareholders watch for? Shareholders should watch for how and when they will continue to receive annual report and proxy statement information directly from their ANC, since some material that used to be available through the State’s online website will no longer be publicly filed. If something is unclear, shareholders can ask their ANC how it intends to meet its ANCSA reporting obligations. How Dorsey Can Help HB 126 lightens the State filing load for smaller Village Corporations, but it also raises practical questions: confirming who is exempt, meeting continuing ANCSA obligations to shareholders, keeping proxy and annual meeting processes on track, and maintaining benchmarking when public materials become less available. These are exactly the kinds of judgment calls that benefit from early planning. Dorsey’s attorneys work closely with Alaska Native Corporations and related stakeholders. If you have questions about HB 126, ANC governance, proxy filings, annual reports, disclosure obligations, or shareholder communications, please contact your Dorsey attorney, including the authors of this eUpdate.

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Litigation Privilege Does Not Automatically Protect Communications with Funders: The Commercial Court Clarifies the Limits of Privilege in the Context of Litigation Funding

In Uber London Ltd & Ors v Garry White & Ors; Mishcon de Reya LLP [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that documents created to help a funder decide whether to invest in a claim will not ordinarily attract litigation privilege. This means that information a firm gathers while acting for a funder can later fall within the control of the claimants it goes on to represent in the same matter. Background The Claimants (a claim group of over 10,000 individual London black cab drivers and the assignee of two former minicab operators) alleged that the Defendants (three companies in the Uber group) obtained and retained their private hire operator's licence through an unlawful means conspiracy alleged to involve fraud. Because the claims were issued outside the ordinary six-year limitation period, the Claimants relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, contending they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud before June 2018. A preliminary issue trial was listed to determine the question of whether the Claimants discovered, or could have discovered with reasonable diligence, the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment only after June 2018. The Claimants were represented by Mishcon de Reya ("MdR"). However, before MdR’s engagement with the individual drivers had begun, in late 2017 it was engaged by the litigation funder Harbour to investigate the merits and value of the potential claim. During that stage, MdR corresponded extensively with Harbour and with the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association ("LTDA"), a black cab drivers' trade association. MdR was not formally engaged by the Claimants until October 2018 onwards. Once the proceedings had started, the Defendants sought disclosure of communications exchanged between MdR and Harbour before the engagement of MdR by the Claimants (the "Harbour Communications"). This included correspondence between MdR and Harbour, communications with the LTDA, and documents held on MdR's file opened in Harbour's name in connection with the potential claim. The Claimants resisted disclosure on four grounds: (i) that the documents were not relevant; (ii) on the grounds of litigation privilege; (iii) that the documents were outside their control; and (iv) that disclosure occurring so close to trial would be disproportionate. Judgment (i) Were the Harbour Communications relevant to the preliminary issue? The Court held that the Harbour Communications were likely to contain relevant material, on two bases. First, where the Claimants or the LTDA had communicated directly with MdR, that material could shed light on individual Claimants' actual knowledge of the alleged facts. Secondly, what MdR and Harbour had discovered during their investigation could inform the question of what a Claimant could reasonably have discovered at the time (even though the Defendants accepted that MdR's knowledge could not simply be imputed to the Claimants). (ii) Were the Harbour Communications protected by litigation privilege? As set out in the classic cases of Three Rivers (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 and WH Holding Ltd v E20 Stadium LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2652, communications between parties or their solicitors and third parties for the purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation are privileged when the following conditions are satisfied: Litigation must be in progress or in reasonable contemplation. The communications must have been made for the sole or dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The litigation must be adversarial, not investigative or inquisitorial. The Court rejected the Claimant’s claim to be able to withhold the Harbour Communications on the basis of litigation privilege. The Court confirmed that litigation privilege protects only communications created for the dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The Court found that Harbour had instructed MdR so that Harbour could decide whether to fund the proceedings. As such, the dominant purpose of the communications was in relation to funding, not the conduct of litigation. This was distinguished from the situation where an individual litigant who takes its own funding decision. In that situation, the decision whether to fund and the decision whether to litigate are one and the same, made by the person who will actually be the claimant, and so it forms a part of that person's conduct of their own litigation. In contrast, a third-party funder's commercial decision whether to fund someone else's claim is not necessarily part of conducting that litigation. The fact that litigation privilege can, in principle, be claimed by a non-party funder (as recognised in the case of Al Sadeq v Dechert [2024] EWCA 28) did not assist Harbour, since there was no evidence it intended to play any role in the litigation itself beyond funding it. Communications between Harbour and MdR did remain capable of attracting another kind of privilege: legal advice privilege, because of the solicitor-client relationship between Harbour and MdR. But communications with third parties such as the LTDA were not automatically protected in the same way. (iii) Were the Harbour Communications within the Claimants' control? The Court also rejected the argument that the Harbour Communications sat outside the Claimants' control because they belonged to Harbour and not the Claimants. The Court’s reasoning was that once the individual Claimant drivers became MdR's clients, MdR also owed them a duty to disclose material information. That included information that MdR had originally acquired while acting for Harbour. As held in the case of Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood (a firm) [2005] 1 WLR 567, a solicitor owing duties to two clients cannot simply prefer one over the other, and it was unrealistic to suppose MdR would investigate the same claims for Harbour, then represent the Claimants, while disregarding everything it had already learned. The obvious commercial expectation was that this earlier work would be used to advance the Claimants' case. MdR sought to rely on a confidentiality clause in a 2024 retainer agreement between it and RGL Management Ltd (a claims management company acting on behalf of the Claimants) to argue that it was relieved of any duty to disclose information obtained while acting for other clients. The provision stated that MdR may "have acted for persons in the same or similar sector as yours and by agreeing to the terms of this letter you agree that will have no duty to disclose to you any confidential information that we have obtained, or might in the future obtain, from acting for such persons or which is derived from any other source". The Court rejected this on several grounds. Claimants who had already become MdR's clients had an existing right to information in the Harbour Communications where it was relevant to their claims before the 2024 retainer agreement. If they were to surrender that right, it would have required their informed consent (also required under the SRA Code of Conduct). The Court found no evidence that such informed consent had been given. The terms had simply been made available to the Claimants through a portal, with no indication that Claimants understood they were giving up existing rights to relevant information. The Court found that even if the terms had been contractually binding, that would not have amounted to informed consent. In addition, the wording of the clause was not sufficiently clear to show that the Claimants had agreed to waive access to this information. (iv) Was disclosure reasonable, proportionate, and necessary at this stage? The Claimants argued that it was neither reasonable nor proportionate for disclosure to be given at such a late stage (approximately two weeks before the start of the preliminary issue trial) and that it was not necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings. The Court rejected this, but it drew a distinction between two categories of documents within the Harbour Communications: Documents bearing on the actual knowledge of the individual drivers, including communications with the LTDA, were not privileged, likely straightforward to review, and directly relevant to the preliminary issue. Their disclosure was ordered as reasonable, proportionate, and necessary. Documents reflecting only MdR's or Harbour's own assessment of the merits were of more marginal, indirect relevance and largely likely to fall under legal advice privilege. A review to isolate the smaller pool of non-privileged material in this category would be time-consuming for limited benefit, so this was excluded from the order. Key Points to Note The judgment is an important reminder of several practical points: However closely a funder is involved in evaluating a claim's merits, litigation privilege will only apply to communications where the sole or dominant purpose of the communication is the conduct of litigation, not the funder's own decision on whether to finance it. Unless that communication separately attracts legal advice privilege, it may need to be disclosed. The same considerations apply to other communications. For example, in RBS Rights Litigation [2017] 1 WLR 3539 the argument that an After the Event (ATE) policy was subject to litigation privilege was rejected on a similar basis. Whilst in this case, there was no dispute as to whether litigation was in contemplation, it is important to note that litigation privilege will not automatically apply to the investigative stages of a claim, i.e. before litigation is in contemplation. Even where litigation is reasonably contemplated, the dominant purpose test must still be satisfied. Material created primarily for fact-finding, risk assessment, or other investigative purposes will not attract litigation privilege unless those activities are actually undertaken for the dominant purpose of conducting the litigation. (See The Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2017] EWHC 1017 (QB)). When engaging a law firm, clients should ensure that they understand whether the firm has previously obtained information about their claim while acting for another party (for example, a funder or another interested party) and how that information will be handled. Any restrictions on the firm’s ability to share relevant information with the client should be explained clearly at the outset, including what information may be withheld and why. If this decision raises questions about your own funding arrangements, disclosure strategy, or privilege position, please get in touch with our Commercial Litigation team.

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Real Estate Attorney Alexis Olsen Joins Dorsey in Phoenix

Attorney Alexis Olsen has joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP as Of Counsel in the Real Estate group in Phoenix, the law firm announced today. Alexis focuses her practice on large-scale residential, mixed-use, and multi-asset development projects as well as multi-state commercial leasing transactions. She guides clients through sophisticated acquisitions, dispositions, leasing, entity structuring, investment strategies, and due diligence matters. She has structured co-investment arrangements that drive capital deployment into housing subdivisions nationwide and has represented both landlords and tenants in commercial leasing transactions involving office, retail, industrial, and specialty-use properties, including cannabis dispensaries. Alexis received her J.D. from Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law and her B.A. from the University of Arizona. Alexis comes to Dorsey from Squire Patton Boggs. “Alexis strengthens Dorsey’s real estate capabilities at a time when Phoenix remains one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic real estate markets in the country,” said Scott Jenkins, Dorsey’s Phoenix office head. “Her addition further enhances our deep bench of 12 real estate attorneys in Phoenix and reflects our continued investment in serving clients throughout Arizona and supporting their real estate transactions and objectives across the country. We are thrilled to welcome Alexis to Dorsey.” “Joining a firm with such a deep bench of experienced attorneys in the Phoenix office, especially in the Real Estate group, presents an exciting opportunity not just for my own professional growth, but for the clients we service,” said Alexis Olsen. “I look forward to building on this strong foundation, growing our national practice, and delivering top-tier service to our clients.”

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Dorsey Partner Melissa Raphan Elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers

International law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP is pleased to announce that Partner Melissa Raphan has been elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers (CLEL) as part of its 2026 class. “Melissa’s election to this prestigious fellowship comes as no surprise to those of us who have had the privilege of working with her,” says Peter Nelson, Dorsey’s Managing Partner.  “She is an exceptional employment lawyer, a trusted advisor, and a leader whose impact extends far beyond her matters. Clients rely on her deep knowledge, strategic counsel, and ability to navigate complex workplace disputes and sensitive employment matters with both confidence and compassion. She has helped shape our firm, strengthen our profession, and opened doors for countless others through her commitment to mentorship and diversity. We are incredibly proud of her accomplishments and delighted to see her receive this recognition.” CLEL is a nonprofit professional association that honors the nation’s leading attorneys in the field of labor and employment law. Originally established to recognize excellence in the profession, CLEL has evolved into a respected intellectual and practical resource for the legal community and its many audiences. Its mission centers on recognizing individuals who have made significant contributions to the field, fostering the exchange of knowledge and delivering value to academia, government, the judiciary, and the broader public. Election as a fellow represents the highest level of peer acknowledgment, reflecting sustained achievement, integrity, and a commitment to advancing the profession. Melissa’s career reflects CLEL’s mission. She has been recognized both regionally and nationally for her advocacy, leadership, and achievements both inside and outside of the courtroom. Her employment litigation experience spans class actions, collective actions, and high-stakes individual disputes in state and federal courts, as well as arbitration forums including the American Arbitration Association and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). She is also a trusted advisor on a full range of workplace issues, from hiring and performance management to sensitive terminations and organizational change. She brings decades of experience representing clients across the financial services, healthcare, food and agriculture, and energy sectors. Melissa will be formally inducted during CLEL’s installation ceremony held in conjunction with the American Bar Association’s Labor & Employment Law Conference in Washington, D.C., on November 7.