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Navigating the New FTC Rule Against Non-Compete Provisions

July 1, 2024

by Kent J. Schmidt

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On April 23, 2024, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a Final Rule banning the use of non-compete provisions in employment contracts. While subject to legal challenges, the federal standards, combined with diverse state rules on such provisions (ranging from complete bans to general permissiveness) create new challenges for employers. Employers must tread carefully in understanding how to protect confidential information and trade secrets from walking out the door with departing employees. In this episode, Kent Schmidt interviews Nicholas Pappas on the substance, status and exceptions to the FTC rule and how employers, these issues given, the evolving legal landscape.

This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

Transcript

Voiceover

Welcome to another episode of the SharkCast on litigation risks management where we explore why businesses are so frequently sued, and how to mitigate and navigate the dangers lurking in these risky waters. Join us now as we welcome our host Kent Schmidt, Litigation Partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.

Schmidt

Welcome to another episode of SharkCast. Today we’re gonna tackle a subject that has been around for a long time, but has been in the forefront of discussion over the last couple months, and that is non-compete agreements. A few months ago earlier this year, the Federal Trade Commission in the U.S. issued a new rule relating to non-competes in employment context, as well as other contexts as well, and there’s been a lot of discussion on this topic of course, given the importance of the subject matter and the wide impact that this rule is having. A lot of individuals from the Labor and Employment groups, as well as the Anti-Trust groups, and just commercial litigators are focused on this issue. I can’t think of anyone that is more qualified to address non-competes, at least in my orbit, than Nicholas Pappas, who is a partner in our New York office. So I’ve asked Nick to come on as a guest today. So welcome to SharkCast. Very glad to have you here to discuss non-competes.

Pappas

Thanks, Kent. It’s great to be here. Look forward to a lively discussion today.

Schmidt

Well, one of the reasons I thought you would be an excellent guest to discuss this is because we like this discussion on topics on SharkCast to be very practical, pragmatic, in terms of where the rubber meets the road as I like to say, and you have spent a significant part of your career both litigating non-competes as well as drafting and reviewing provisions and contracts on non-competes. So in other words, on both sides, the transactional precursor work and then after the non-compete becomes very important because it’s being litigated. Can you tell us a little about that experience and how that has been brought to bear in analyzing the FTC rule before we even get into what this rule is and its various nuances and current status?

Pappas

Sure, Kent. I’ve been focused on non-compete agreements since I became a lawyer 37 years ago. My first non-compete case was as a law clerk in the U.S. District Court. And I’ve been focusing on them as a junior lawyer and throughout my career. I practice employment litigation, I’ve been doing it as a litigator mostly in court cases. But because of my work in large law firms over the years I’ve also had to represent usually the employer, although sometimes the executive, in negotiating non-compete agreements. So I’ve really had to dig deep and learn the ins and the outs of how one would both negotiate a non-compete on the front end and then when things break down to then litigate them on the back end.

Schmidt

So with that background I’d like to ask you for general lay of the land, not a 50 state survey. But before the FTC rule comes into effect, and before we get to the FTC rule, we have 50 state variations on non-competes. What is the general majority/minority, I of course know California non-competes, that’s pretty well known as a very strong employee protecting state. But what’s the general lay of the land on a state law basis?

Pappas

So as, I’m usually on the employer side so I’ll tell you how I look at these issues depending on what state I’m in on the employer side. First of all, there are three states, like California, that totally prohibit non-competes. We would throw in the District of Columbia, which also prohibits non-competes. Minnesota last year adopted a statute prohibiting non-competes on a prospective basis. New York almost did. The Legislature passed one prohibiting non-competes, but Governor Hochul vetoed that at the last minute. There’s a whole other tranche of states that while they don’t prohibit non-competes completely, prohibit them for what I would call low-wage workers, or hourly workers with different varying thresholds. So they would allow them for people making certain amounts of money, prohibit them for others. There are other states that have statutes regulating non-competes that require certain notification requirements. And then what I would consider the, sort of the vast majority of all states have what I would call the common law regulation of non-competes. That is they look at things like does the non-compete have a legitimate interest, does the non-compete protect good will or confidential information or trade secrets, is the non-compete narrowly drafted or is it overbroad? And then there are other things like jurisdiction and geographic scope of non-competes. So those are all topics that as an employer-side lawyer I’ll look at and then advise the employer how to draft these things, negotiate these things, or when I’m litigating ways of either attacking the enforceability of non-compete or defending the enforceability of the non-compete.

Schmidt

And as litigators we, as you have indicated, are usually on one side or the other in this, and I as well have been on both sides. But I think it’s important that we acknowledge the legitimate tension that exists, whether it’s a lawmaker or a judge trying to decide whether a particular non-compete is enforceable in a context. There is a balancing between the rights of the employee, the ability to go to a new company and advance their career, and the rights of the employer to protect the information and the competitive advantage that they have rightfully so as they see talent walk out the door, and different courts approach it different ways. You’ve been on both sides of this. What are your thoughts on that, that tension and the balance?

Pappas

Yeah. So as I said, I represent the employer, but I might be the employer on the hiring side where I’m hiring somebody from an employer where there’s a non-compete, or I might be on the side where my employee left and I’m defending. So you’re right, on that score I’m always representing the employer, but I could be on either side of the battle. Maybe aligned with the executive or not aligned with the executive. And you’re right, and you identified a public policy that the employee will usually point to, which is the free flow of labor. Right? And the ability in the United States for everybody to maximize their economic potential and their talents and to support their families and you see that all throughout the case law. Courts do want to promote the free flow of labor and for people to feed their families. But at the same time the employer, on the employer side, the courts do recognize a legitimate interest in protecting trade secrets, confidential information, the goodwill of the business. And so inevitably there’s a balance between the two sides and the two interests. And there’s, as I said, in the vast majority of states this is a common law thing and you can look at the case law to see where a particular fact pattern may fall in the balance. In some states this has been affected by statutes. You’re absolutely right, that’s, there’s always gonna be a balancing that has to be done, even in the common law jurisdictions.

Schmidt

So as you have summarized, we have 50 state schemes of either a decisional law or statutory or regulations that govern this. And then earlier this year along comes the FTC and says we’d like to weigh in on this. And would you summarize in brief detail what the FTC has done on the non-competes, and then we’ll break it down and go into the details?

Pappas

Yeah. So this saga actually started January of last year, 2023. The FTC published a proposed rule, which is largely the same as the final rule but with some important changes. And when the FTC published the initial rule it invited comments from the public. And the FTC received I think over 19,000 comments, some more substantive than others, and took a while upon receiving those comments to digest those comments, to respond to those comments. And as you mentioned, Kent, on April 23, the FTC published its final rule with about 570 pages of commentary. And then the 570 pages was the FTC’s effort to explain how it viewed the commentary and how it would respond to the commentary, and it made some important changes to the initial rule that it proposed. So you know, what we could talk about today, I could talk about the timing of when this final rule will go into effect. It’s not yet in effect. There are a number of exceptions that the FTC adopted. There are some lawsuits out there on the final rule. And then finally there’s things we could talk about today about how employers should prepare for what’s coming next, and that’s a big question mark for a lot of clients that we advise.

Schmidt

So let me ask you a question right off the bat here on the FTC’s rule. First of all, why wasn’t this left to Congress, and maybe a subpart of that is have there been prior efforts in Congress to just pass a provision in the United States Code rather than doing this through this regulatory process? And I’m sorry, my questions getting more and more compound the longer it goes.

Pappas

Yeah, I object, counsel. I object to [UNINTELLIGIBLE] questions. But I will try to take them one at a time.

Schmidt

Since we’re not in a deposition. You know, I’m just curious, if the FTC is essentially done here what Congress would not have the appetite to do given the prevailing political wind.

Pappas

You’re absolutely right. There have been multiple bills over the last several years, even before the Biden administration, but even after the Biden administration there’ve been several bills, some bi-partisan by the way.

Schmidt

Well that’s refreshing. I wasn’t aware there’s any bi-partisan activity in Congress. But…

Pappas

Yeah, bi-partisan meaning you sometimes will see one or two members from each side peeling off. It’s not bi-partisan in the sense of being overwhelming, as much that we can get through the Senate. I mean, that’s really the bottleneck here, right? You’ve gotta get over 60 Senators to agree to anything these days, and even then getting it through the House is a challenge. But at the end of the day, Kent, there are bills doing what the FTC rule does, which is being a total prohibition. There are bills that are out there doing what I mentioned earlier, which is to prohibit non-competes for low-wage workers, and then there are other bills out there with different permutations of those two things. So you see a lot of activity, but nothing’s getting through Congress. I think that’s a fair read, which is probably why the FTC decided it would take action. And the FTC has been studying this issue, even going to the last administration, it had invited scholars to comment, it held hearings on the subject, and then as I said in January published this proposed rule. But the FTC’s jurisdiction is itself the ground for why it took this action. So the Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act allows the FTC to ban unfair methods of competition and to regulate what it considers unfair methods of competition. So in effect what this new rule does is it takes the position that non-competes are in fact always an unfair method of competition. That’s the matter of great controversy and debate and we’ll get to the litigation in a moment, but that’s actually the subject of what the litigation is about these days.

Schmidt

So the FTC at least has something to tether the rule to in terms of their mandate of operation and of promulgating rules like this. It is a little troublesome that the rule came as a result of congressional gridlock. So that I’m sure has given a lot of fodder and support to the challenges of the FTC rule in the courts. Without going into too much detail on all the nuances of the challenge, what are kind of the major crust of the arguments being made by those that are challenging the rule?

Pappas

You know, I think I would summarize them in several buckets. There’s something called the major questions doctrine, that doctrine being that something that affects vast portions of the economy can be regulated but we need clear and specific authorization from Congress. And the argument there is the Section 5 of the FTC Act, which I just described, would be not sufficiently clear under the major questions doc, and at least that’s the argument that the litigants in this case, mostly the Chamber of Commerce, but others as well are making in three different courts right now; the Eastern District of Texas, the Northern District of Texas, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Another argument is that, as I mentioned, the FTC Act applies to unfair methods of competition. There’s a large group of litigants, mostly for example the National Retail Federation, has argued that non-competes are not in fact unfair. They’re in fact quite fair and they argue the FTC simply didn’t consider and arbitrarily gave back of the hand to evidence that non-competes are in fact very procompetitive and not unfair methods of competition. There’s an argument that the statute was never intended to allow the FTC to engage in this broad kind of rulemaking authority. And that even if the FTC did have authorization and it didn’t violate the major questions doctrine that this delegation of rulemaking authority is unconstitutional because it in fact is an administrative agency performing the function of a legislature, and that would be unconstitutional according to this argument. And finally there’s an argument that the FTC rule, if it’s adopted, would nullify the law in 47 states and overturn 30 million contracts, and that that’s improperly retroactive. And if there’s any way for the FTC to do this it could only be prospective. So that’s in a very broad brush what the litigation is going to be about and what the courts will rule upon. And we have one court that has said it’s going to rule on July 3. So the mystery will be resolved by July 3, one way or the other.

Schmidt

So notwithstanding the fact that the entire rule is in jeopardy and there could be some modifications of it in order to comply with any of these orders that come down in the litigation, what are some of the highlights of the rule relative to companies that companies should be aware of if they’re gonna comply at least with the rule out of an abundance of caution?

Pappas

Yes, so let’s define what is in the words of the rule. Let me read it. It may get a little, I’ll read slowly because the definition of what is a non-compete provision is critical. Right? So here’s what it says. And the final rule broadly says that every term or condition of employment that prohibits a worker from or penalizes a worker for, or functions to prevent a worker from seeking or accepting work in the United States with a different person where such work would begin after the conclusion of the employment, that includes the term or condition, or operating a business in the United States after the conclusion of the employment, that includes the term or condition. So in a nutshell, it’s a broad prohibition of all non-compete provisions, which either penalize or function to limit somebody’s work opportunities after leaving employment. And I wanna focus on the word worker. It’s not employees; it’s workers. So if you’re are a worker, that would include employees, independent contractors, externs, interns, volunteers, apprentices, or sole proprietors, who provide a service to a person. So that’s an enormously and breathtakingly broad rule and a very broad prohibition. So this FTC rule is broad. And so you mentioned well, what should an employer do and how should they comply? We could probably talk about the exceptions if you like, because that’s something if you wanna comply you need to focus on very carefully as the employer.

Schmidt

In many senses the FTC rule is broader than California, which before this point in time I didn’t really think was possible ‘cause I thought California’s was about as broad as could possibly be. One unique aspect of the California statute that was recently enacted is essentially putting some teeth in it so that there’s actually penalties for having such a provision. I think the logic behind it is companies will continue to use non-enforceable non-competes, and if 20 or 30% of the employees are not wise enough to know that it’s unenforceable it still has a benefit to the company. So why not just keep an unenforceable non-compete in the employment contract? And the disincentive for that now is a penalty. Isn’t there the same type of provision in the federal rule?

Pappas

The enforcement mechanisms for the rule are probably not as strong as California, but it’s complicated and undoubtedly this will be one of the many areas for litigation. So first of all there is no private right of action for an individual to enforce the FTC rule, not under the FTC Act. But the FTC itself has enforcement authority to seek injunctive relief to prevent unfair methods of competition. Further if the FTC does that and there is an injunction, the FTC also can then seek a penalty of up to $50,120 per day for violating an injunction. So I’m not an FTC expert. Our anti-trust partners will probably correct me on all of this but, so we’re really talking about government enforcement. Something that’s not been really focused on, and I haven’t seen much in the literature thus far, is even if something is unlawful under federal law, are there state statutory provisions that would allow a, you know, an individual to bring a cause of action under state law to enforce the federal prohibition, and I believe there are state unfair trade practice laws that would allow, for example, I think California being a classic example, has unfair trade practice laws that might allow that. So those laws do have damage provisions, penalty provisions, attorney fee shifting provisions that might come into play in this circumstance. So it’s complicated, but suffice it to say this would potentially expose employers simply for having unlawful agreements in place to the possibility of penalties. Now having said all that, the FTC rule doesn’t nullify, directly, existing non-competes, but says they’re unenforceable. So that may be a semantic debate ‘cause there was, the earlier iteration of the rule actually required withdrawal and nullification non-competes but the current rule, as it’s presently situated, simply requires notice from the employer that the employer will not enforce existing non-competes.

Schmidt

Can you talk for a moment about, if the FTC rule or some variation goes into effect, how that interplays with state rules in terms of the FTC being a floor or a ceiling. Is the scenario that, going forward, employers have to comply with both the FTC rule and whatever the applicable state law is and whatever the higher standard is, is what you have to comply with?

Pappas

I would answer with a yes or no. Right? So some states, for example Florida is a classic example, has a statute authorizing and promoting non-competes. I would say that statute is preempted by the proposed federal regulation. On the other hand there are states like California that may be more protective of free flow labor. It’s both Kent, but I think that the largest effect of the FTC rule is to nullify most state rules, but there is a possibility for greater rights if it’s not inconsistent with FTC rule.

Schmidt

So the takeaway for me on all of this, is you really cannot be relying on the concept of non-competes with very, very limited exceptions such as senior executives and so forth, and even then probably narrowly construed. Nick you’ve talked earlier about some of the exceptions to the FTC rule. Can you go over some of the major exceptions and a few of the nuances in the rule?

Pappas

Sure. So the first exception applies to “senior executives”, and the rule defines senior executive very narrowly, so while there is such an exception, and so non-competes will be permitted for senior executives, even under the rule. That exception is really narrow. I mean they think the FTC estimated it would apply to may be 1% of all workers. And a senior executive is someone who is both in a policy making position, so for example like a CEO or a president, but also has policy making authority, meaning final authority to make policy decisions that control significant aspects of a business entity or a common enterprise, so very important point. If you are a CEO of a division that may not be a senior executive under this definition. It’s the entire enterprise that needs…

Schmidt

Even if the division operates as a separate entity? Has a separate, you know, subsidiary entity.

Pappas

I think that’ll be an issue for litigation to be honest with you. I think it’s unclear under the rule to be honest, but I think the FTC intended this to be a very narrow exception to the carve-out. There’s an exception for sales of business. So let’s say you’re an owner of equity, and you sell your business. Even under the FTC rule you would be permitted to have a non-compete there to protect the goodwill of the business. However, the FTC says it’s got to be a bonafide sale of business, very important. And what does that mean? If I own 0.1% of the equity and I sell that 0.1%, am I, is it legitimate or is it not legitimate under the rule? I mean we had the California example where, which has a similar rule for good faith or non-sham transactions, but if it’s a sham transaction, it would not be permitted under the sale of business exception. So another important factor, the FTC actually broadened this exception. Its initial rule required 25% ownership of equity in order for the sale of business exception to apply. It took away that 25% rule so now it just has to be a bonafide sale of business. So if I sell 1% of the business or 2% of the business, can I have a non-compete then? I would argue that it has to be good faith and bonafide and if it is it should work. If there’s an existing litigation out there the FTC rule doesn’t apply so those cases remain in play. And very importantly, the FTC doesn’t have jurisdiction over the entire economy so for example not for profits are not covered by the FTC rule, and similarly there’s large exceptions for banks and airlines. So I don’t know the full extent of the bank prohibition. It’s interesting that the FTC will commentary did say that it thought its rule would apply to broker dealers and investment advisors, so the bank exception may not be so broad but there is some question about how broad the FTC’s jurisdiction is which is something again that will be an area for further litigation and further work by lawyers. So I think that’s in broad brush, Kent, those are the exceptions to the rule that are in place.

Schmidt

Does the FTC rule get into the question of duration, or geographic scope, or similarity of business? I know a lot of states that allow non-competes require to be reasonable in scope with those type of factors.

Pappas

So you’re talking about if the FTC rule allows a non-compete for a senior

Schmidt

Right. For executives for example.

Pappas

Then does the rule govern, I don’t think the rule gets into that. I think the rule’s focus has mostly been on the nullification piece, the nullifying of non-competes, but of course you still have the FTC general rule that you can’t be, have an unfair method of competion. So I suppose under that broad standard, perhaps there’s, you get to the same place. Where you gotta have a legitimate interest, and limited duration, and limited geographic scope, which is of course the case under state law as well.

Schmidt

Okay. Let’s, now for the sake of our discussion assume that notwithstanding the court challenges this FTC rule and non-competes is going to be enforced or subject to some perhaps limitations and variations will be enforced. What’s an employer to do? They have, as we said earlier, legitimate interest in protecting their business plans, their trade secrets, their proprietary information and having senior executives or even mid-level individuals that the company walk out the door and go work for a company with all that knowledge up in their head, even if they’re not stealing data and taking a thumb drive with them, there’s reason for heartburn. What are employers to do to protect their interests?

Pappas

So first of all, focus on the effective date. If the rule is not adjoined by, in one of these litigations, which my strong suspicion is there will be an injunction before the rule comes into effect, but if the rule comes into effect it’ll come into effect on September 4, 2024. That’s the actual effective date. And with thinking about what happens on September 4th employers should, before that date, audit themselves to do a couple of things. Number one, categorize and identify where non-competes are, what employees have non-competes. For example, do you have a sales force with direct non-competes? Do you have executives with equity arrangements that have non-competes built into them? Do you have non-disclosure agreements? The second thing you should do is figure out how, as an employer, you want to protect your sensitive most sensitive information. I said NDAs or confidentiality agreements might be prohibited but they’re generally okay. Right? I mean generally having an NDA out there and a confidentiality agreement doesn’t prohibit somebody from working for a competitor. So focus on how to protect your confidential information, strengthen your confidentiality agreements, prevent dissemination of confidential information beyond where they need to be disseminated. So impose what I call good housekeeping, have good passwords, have multiple authentication levels, keep secrets secret, label things appropriately. There’s all kinds of things employers can do short of having a non-compete agreement to protect confidential information. Protecting customer good will and workforce stability. There’s a lot of things employers can do to promote customer good will and workforce stability. I mean, for example, increase wages. That would be the California rationale. Right? Why California for a 100 years has had these prohibitions out there. Californian employment lawyers would argue to me all the time how great the rule is and that’s good for workers. The workers will make more money. The FTC pointed to that as a rationale for the rule. The workers should make more money and they would without these non-compete restrictions. So there’s all kinds of things employers can think about. I don’t think there’s going to be a one size fits all solution here, but certainly something worth analyzing and thinking about with your employment lawyer well in advance.

Schmidt

Well I think that’s about all the time we have today to discuss non-competes today. This is an interesting, as they say on the local news, developing story, so we’ll be checking back routinely on this as we see the litigation unfold and some of the details of the rule perhaps refined in its finally iteration or maybe go into effect in its current form but obviously an area for companies to be focused on in the coming months. Thanks so much for all your insights on this Nick. At this point in our show we like to do what we call the deeper dive and learn a little bit more about our guest and some aspects of their life that’s not necessarily related to the law and Nick I’d like to ask you a little bit about your ethnic heritage as your name suggests your ancestors being from Greece, and I know that Greece is a common destination for you. Can you tell us what it’s like to go back to Greece on occasion and visit some of your family there?

Pappas

Sure. We, my wife and I love Greece. It’s, as you said Kent, both my parents were born in Greece and we’ve gone many, many times. I was there a year ago. Visited Crete for the first time. Love the islands a lot. We’re planning a trip in September going to Mykonos for I think my third time, my wife’s fifth time. We just love the Greek Islands. We love the food. The Mediterranean diet is our type of diet. You know, fish and salads and fruits, you know and great wines if you are a wine person. So thanks for that question. In terms of family, you know when I get together with family in Greece, there’s about 30 or 40 people that gather. The last time we did that was under the Acropolis, you know, at a rooftop restaurant which was wonderful. Lots of cousins, you know, nieces, nephews, the whole family. It’s like a family reunion when we go back. We often consider should we simply not tell anybody that we’re going to go back to Greece so as to have a quiet and private vacation, but that doesn’t seem to ever work. We always, the word gets out and the family convenes so it’s always a fun time.

Schmidt

Well I’m sure that most your family is also listening to SharkCast so the word will get out in that way as well.

Pappas

Exactly.

Schmidt

But let me ask you a couple questions about Greek culture. I’ve been a number of countries in Europe but Greek is on my list of countries to get to. What are some of the things you appreciate most about lifestyle of your counterparts in Greece? Whether your family or friends and how that compares to our lifestyle here in the US and maybe even some takeaways that we might be able to learn from and adapting our lifestyle to a little more of a Greek lifestyle.

Pappas

Well I would say it’s a more, it’s a slower lifestyle. The sunshine, I think, makes people healthier and I’m not going to make any judgments, obviously my family has chosen to be in the United States which I, we love America, have always loved America. As a good immigrant, my father and mother taught me that this is the greatest country in the world even though they’re from Greece, and I do agree with that. The opportunities here are a blessing to all of us. The rule of law here is a blessing to all of us. As a lawyer, I can say that. I very much appreciate our system here. That’s not to say I don’t love Greece. I do love Greece. I love the people. I think there’s a definite culture there and you feel it and you see it, and people are kind, and generous, and gentle, and love to laugh. And they love to dance. They love to joke. It’s a wonderful experience. If you get to go Kent, I recommend it strongly. It’s a great place to visit.

Schmidt

Well I think that’s a takeaway from visiting lots of places in Europe. There’s so many ways that they relish life, enjoy life, slow down. I mean try and get ahold of someone in Europe in the month of August. Good Luck. They take time off. They enjoy family and there’s some good lessons to all of us who are working really hard and spending long hours burning the candle at both ends to not forget to slow down and enjoy some of those wonderful things in life. So I hope you enjoy your upcoming visit to Greece and when I have it on my itinerary, I’ll know who to reach out to.

Pappas

Absolutely and thank you for that. I enjoyed the SharkCast very much and thank you for the opportunity.

Schmidt

With that I’d like to thank you for being here and thank our listeners for tuning in. As always I’m indebted to the extraordinary team at Dorsey for making this podcast and episode possible. For more resources on this and other litigation risk go to litigationrisks.com where more information can be found including a book on managing litigation risk written by yours truly. Until next time my friends this is yet another reminder that there are a lot of sharks swimming out there in the murky waters so swim safely.

Voiceover

This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

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Alaska HB 126: What Changes for Alaska Native Corporations, Proxy Filings, and Annual Reports

Alaska House Bill 126 (HB 126), sponsored by Representative Neal Foster and passed by the 34th Alaska Legislature, is now law. The bill changes which Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) must file proxy and annual report materials with the State of Alaska, and makes it easier to reinstate certain dissolved Village Corporations. For many smaller Village Corporations, the practical result is less public disclosure. For shareholders, advisors, and the public, it means some financial information that used to be available through the State will no longer be readily obtained. This eUpdate explains what HB 126 does in plain terms, walks through the practical trade-offs, and answers common questions. 1. What HB 126 Changes The old rule Under prior law (Alaska Statutes Sec. 45.55.139), an Alaska Native Corporation had to file its annual report, proxies, and proxy statements with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities (the Division) if it had more than $1 million in assets and 500 or more shareholders on its current rolls. A filing ANC was also required to follow the Division’s proxy rules (3 AAC 08.305 through .365), which require specific disclosures such as top 5 executive compensation, and related-party transactions. Because these filings are treated as public records, they gave non-shareholders, including the public and the press, visibility into ANC financial information that is not filed with the SEC. The new rule HB 126 changes how the 500-shareholder test is measured. Now, the asset test is removed, and the shareholder count is based on how many shareholders the corporation originally enrolled when it was formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), not how many it has today. As shares have passed down through families over the decades, some Village Corporations that started with fewer than 500 shareholders now have more than 500 recordholders. Under the old current-count test, when those corporations had crossed the threshold, they had to file. Under the new original-enrollment test, they do not. Who is affected Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders are the main beneficiaries. They no longer have to file proxy and annual report materials with the Division or follow the Division’s proxy regulations at 3 AAC 08.305 through .365. Two groups must continue to file as before: all twelve ANCSA Regional Corporations, each of which enrolled more than 500 shareholders at creation, and all Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders. As reported by the Alaska Beacon, when the bill was under consideration, the Division identified 59 corporations then filing, expected at least seven village corporations to become exempt, and was reviewing roughly 30 more. 2. Practical Analysis HB 126 reduces a real compliance burden for smaller Village Corporations, which now need not spend time and money on State filings. In coming years, the exempt Village Corporations may experience benefits associated with less public disclosure and less regulation. But at the same time, less public disclosure carries trade-offs. Benchmarking will become harder Publicly-filed proxy statements and annual reports have long served as a reference set. Shareholders, corporations, advisors, and counsel use them to compare governance practices, compensation, and financial results across similarly-situated ANCs. Since fewer of these materials will be filed publicly, there will be fewer comparable documents available, which will make benchmarking and market-checking more difficult for like-sized ANCs over time. Executive compensation transparency may be reduced The Division’s proxy rules require disclosure of the compensation of ANC’s top five most highly compensated individuals (3 AAC 08.345(b)(2)), related-party transactions above $20,000 (3 AAC 08.345(b)(3)), and audited financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis (3 AAC 08.365). When a corporation is no longer required to file these disclosures publicly, it becomes harder for shareholders and others to obtain the information, to understand how compensation is set for their corporate leadership, and how it compares across corporations of similar size and complexity. Transparency may matter more as ANCs grow Some ANCs have grown into large, complex enterprises with substantial revenue and many subsidiaries, even with fewer than 500 shareholders. For an ANC with a broad and dispersed shareholder base, public materials can be an important way for shareholders and other stakeholders to understand governance, compensation, and performance across ANCs. Reduced disclosure may carry more practical weight in those settings than for a small corporation whose shareholders are closely connected to the business. The ANCSA annual report obligation continues It is important not to overstate what HB 126 does. HB 126 changes the state filing proxy requirements. It does not remove the separate obligation under ANCSA itself. That obligation comes from ANCSA at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c), which requires a Native Corporation that would otherwise be subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prepare and transmit to its shareholders an annual report containing substantially the information a company subject to that Act would include. Similarly, ANCs that solicit proxies for an annual meeting are still required to furnish shareholders with those proxy materials under general Alaska corporate law. However, ANCs are now no longer required to transmit proxy statements to the State. ANCs’ reporting obligations to their shareholders are unaffected by HB 126. Any corporation newly exempt from state filing still owes its shareholders a detailed annual report and a proxy statement, even though that report is no longer routed through the State and made public. Reinstatement of dissolved Village Corporations Separately, HB 126 amends AS 10.06.960(k) to remove the prior deadline (previously December 31, 2020) for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. A dissolved Village Corporation may now apply to be reinstated under AS 10.06.633(e) at any time. Reinstatement still runs through the commissioner under AS 10.06.633(e). In general, that means the ANC must apply, cure the neglect or delinquency that led to dissolution, and pay the amounts owed, and the corporation’s name must be available or be changed to one that is. Once reinstated, the corporation and its shareholders are restored to the rights, privileges, liabilities, and obligations they would have had as if the dissolution had never occurred, and corporate and shareholder actions taken during the dissolution are treated as valid. If the previously-used corporate name is no longer available, the board alone may amend the articles to adopt a new name (without the necessity for shareholder approval). 3. Frequently Asked Questions What does HB 126 do? It changes how Alaska measures the 500-shareholder test that decides which ANCs must file proxy and annual report materials with the state. It removes the asset test, and it counts shareholders based on original enrollment rather than the current rolls. It also removes the deadline for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. Which ANCs are affected? Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders, because they may no longer need to file with the Division. Regional Corporations and Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders must continue to file as before. Does HB 126 eliminate all reporting obligations? No. It changes the state filing requirement under AS 45.55.139, but it does not remove the separate ANCSA obligation (43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c)) to provide shareholders with an annual report, and general corporate law still calls for a proxy statement when the ANC solicits proxies. Corporations that remain subject to state filing requirements must also continue to comply with the Division's rules. We think we are now exempt. What should our ANC board and management consider? Confirm your ANC’s original enrollment number and whether your corporation falls below the new threshold. Watch for communications from the State on this topic as they proceed with their research. If your ANC is now exempt, decide how your corporation will meet its continuing ANCSA obligation to shareholders, review proxy and annual meeting materials and timelines, and consider what to communicate to shareholders about any change in how they will receive information. It is worth documenting the basis for any exemption. What should ANC shareholders watch for? Shareholders should watch for how and when they will continue to receive annual report and proxy statement information directly from their ANC, since some material that used to be available through the State’s online website will no longer be publicly filed. If something is unclear, shareholders can ask their ANC how it intends to meet its ANCSA reporting obligations. How Dorsey Can Help HB 126 lightens the State filing load for smaller Village Corporations, but it also raises practical questions: confirming who is exempt, meeting continuing ANCSA obligations to shareholders, keeping proxy and annual meeting processes on track, and maintaining benchmarking when public materials become less available. These are exactly the kinds of judgment calls that benefit from early planning. Dorsey’s attorneys work closely with Alaska Native Corporations and related stakeholders. If you have questions about HB 126, ANC governance, proxy filings, annual reports, disclosure obligations, or shareholder communications, please contact your Dorsey attorney, including the authors of this eUpdate.

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Proposed CMS Rule Ramps Up Potential Medicare Fraud Administrative Remedies

On July 6, 2026, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a rule that would expand its administrative remedies to combat potential fraud. The proposed rule is the latest in a round of administrative actions that signal CMS’s intent to aggressively pursue allegations of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and heighten the risk of fraud enforcement against even well-intentioned Medicare and Medicaid providers and suppliers. The proposed rule includes several changes to regulations that govern Medicare billing privileges. Providers and suppliers should be aware that these changes dramatically expand the flexibility afforded to CMS in enrollment and revocation actions, potentially leading to harsh consequences for ministerial and administrative errors. If finalized, moreover, the proposed rule could have material implications for providers and suppliers facing threatened revocation, including heightened risk of overpayment liability and increased hurdles to challenging revocations and denials of enrollment. Added Flexibility to Existing Revocation Grounds CMS has proposed to remove a number of factors that the regulations list as relevant to a determination of whether a provider has engaged in “abuse of billing privileges.” While acknowledging that the inclusion of these factors in the regulations was permissive (requiring consideration only where “as appropriate or applicable”), CMS stated that it must be afforded “the maximum flexibility to address all possible . . . scenarios without the rigid constraints of our existing factors.” CMS provided little guidance as to the outer bounds of what conduct could constitute an “abuse of privileges” that merits revocation of Medicare billing privileges. Instead, CMS noted that a “pattern of practice” of abuse of billing privileges might be established “by a simple finding that several of a provider’s claims do not meet Medicare requirements.” Similarly, CMS has proposed to expand the regulatory provision that permits revocation of enrollment if a provider certifies as “true” false or misleading information in Medicare enrollment application or renewal forms to include any scenario in which a provider submits “false or misleading information on or associated with any CMS Medicare enrollment-related form,” including materials submitted to Medicare contractors. CMS stated that it interprets this expanded rule to include anything related to Medicare enrollment, and not only those submissions that are “intended to gain or maintain Medicare enrollment.” If finalized, the proposed rule would add significant flexibility to CMS’s ability to pursue revocation of a provider’s enrollment. While CMS has assured providers that it would “invoke [the revised regulations]. . . only when legitimately warranted under the facts and circumstances and not as a matter of course,” such expanded flexibility threatens unpredictability in the event of even administrative or ministerial errors in submissions and claims. These changes would, moreover, make it more difficult for providers to challenge a revocation action. Expanded Revocation Grounds In addition to adding flexibility to existing grounds for revocation, CMS’s proposed rule adds to and expands CMS’s already broad authority to revoke provider and supplier enrollment. Such proposed changes include adding the following grounds for revocation: Denial of Enrollment Application. Where CMS could previously revoke a provider’s other enrollments if one enrollment is revoked, CMS would also be able to revoke a provider’s existing enrollments if an application for enrollment submitted by the provider is denied. High-Risk Enrollments. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if it determines the provider or supplier (including owning/managing employees or organizations) poses a high risk of fraud, waste, or abuse due to “. . . an affiliation under [42 C.F.R.] § 424.519” or “the provider’s or supplier’s location within a limited geographic area that has an excessive number of providers and suppliers.” Certain Misdemeanor Convictions. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if a provider or supplier—or its owners, managing employees, managing organizations, officers, or directors—are convicted of a “misdemeanor related to sexual assault or financial misconduct within the past 10 years that CMS deems detrimental to the best interests of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries.” Ownership Changes (HHA, Hospice, DMEPOS). CMS would have broad authority to revoke enrollment of home health agencies, hospices, and DMEPOS suppliers who do not comply with the regulations governing provider changes of ownership. These proposed, expanded grounds for revocation are notably broad, and CMS provides only limited guidance as to what conduct might result in revocation under these grounds. As with the proposed expansion of existing grounds for revocation, the open-ended nature of these proposed grounds for revocation may make it more difficult for providers and suppliers to challenge revocation actions. Expanded Grounds to Deny Medicare Enrollment As with revocations, CMS proposes to expand the grounds under which a provider’s application to enroll in Medicare can be denied. These expanded and additional grounds include many of the grounds added for revocations, but also include: Medicare Debt or Payment Suspension. CMS proposes expanding the ground to deny enrollment based on Medicare debt or payment suspension to include a provider or supplier’s “managing employee, managing organization, or individual or entity with any other form of business or financial relationship with the provider or supplier[.]” Significantly, this expansive definition (called an “associated party” under the proposed regulation) currently contains no material limitations, meaning almost any person or entity with whom an applicant does business could create denial liability. Sharing Locations with Denied/Revoked Providers or Suppliers. CMS would have authority to deny applications where a “provider’s or supplier’s practice location is in the same suite or office as another provider or supplier whose Medicare enrollment has been revoked or denied.” Hospices with Distant Medical Directors or Administrators. CMS would have discretion to deny hospice applications if the hospice’s medical director or administrator serves “multiple other hospices” or practices/is located “at such a distance (for example, in a different state) from the enrolling hospice that the medical director cannot realistically perform all medical director functions,” with a similar provision for administrators. In addition, CMS proposes applications denied for “other program termination or suspension,” may be applied to the provider or supplier in its own name or NPI or that of its owners, managing employees, or managing organization regardless of whether any appeals are pending. Retroactive Revocation CMS proposed to restructure and expand the regulatory grounds for retroactive revocation of billing privileges. Currently, Medicare regulations provide that revocations are, by default, prospective in nature: effective 30 days after CMS or the CMS contractor mails notice to the provider. Under certain circumstances, the regulations provide for revocations to be retroactive, such as when a provider is convicted of a felony, the date a professional license is suspended, revoked, or surrendered, or when a provider submits a false certification in their enrollment application. CMS has proposed to reframe the rule so as to default to retroactive revocation of billing privileges. CMS expressed concern that providers may collect payment from Medicare while remaining so non-compliant with enrollment requirements as to merit revocation. To address this concern, CMS proposed that all revocations be retroactive to the date of determined non-compliance.[1] As a result, providers suspected of misconduct or non-compliance are likely to face claims of retroactive overpayments in addition to the immediate concern no longer receiving Medicare payments while their enrollment is revoked. Reapplication Bar CMS’s proposed rule expands the grounds from which a provider may be prohibited from seeking reapplication as a Medicare provider. Under current regulations, CMS may prohibit prospective providers from enrolling in Medicare for up to 10 years if its enrollment application is denied because the applicant submitted false or misleading information in its application. Under the proposed rule, CMS will have the discretion to prohibit a provider from enrolling in Medicare if their enrollment application is denied for any reason. Conclusion As a part of the federal government’s increasingly aggressive push to combat real or perceived healthcare fraud, the proposed rule both broadens CMS’s authority to revoke and deny Medicare enrollment and raises the stakes for revocation and denial. What the proposed rule does not share is how CMS plans to exercise this expanded discretion: as a result, the proposed rule, if enacted, increases the unpredictability and potential ramifications of even technical noncompliance with CMS rules. As a result, Medicare providers should keep a close eye on potential revisions to these rules and their potential implementation and consider proactively evaluating their compliance under CMS standards. [1] In the proposed rule, CMS identifies, with respect to each ground for revocation, what it will consider to be the effective date of revocation.

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State Affordability Infrastructure Districts (SAIDs) — A Financing Tool for Taiwanese Investment in Arizona Science and Technology Parks

If you have developed a facility inside one of Taiwan's science or technology parks, you are accustomed to the one-stop-shop of government planning the park and delivering the roads, water, power, and other infrastructure before your building is even constructed. In the United States, including Arizona, land development generally does not work that way. In Arizona, the cost of infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, power, and the digital backbone, typically falls on the private landowner and is incurred up front before operations generate revenue to offset that cost. For a company entering the Arizona market, this is often the largest and earliest capital burden of the entire project. Arizona recently created a tool that provides a more cost-effective way for landowners and developer to finance some of that infrastructure. House Bill 2999, signed into law June 2026 and codified at Chapter 40 of Title 48 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, establishes the creation of a State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID). How a SAID Works Landowners are now able to use a SAID to finance public infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, parking, lighting, communications, rail sidings and signalization, and similar improvements, through tax-exempt bonds. The bonds are repaid over up to 30 years and secured solely by the property within the SAID. No city, county, or state credit is pledged, and no obligation falls on other taxpayers, and therefore no city, county, or state approval other than from the Arizona Finance Authority (AFA). In effect, a SAID lets you spread the cost of horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of funding it entirely at the outset. And tax-exempt bonds often offer a lower interest rate than taxable or other types of financing. How a SAID is Formed A SAID is formed upon the filing of a petition with the AFA. The petition must include the finance plan, general plan, estimated costs, maximum tax rate, appraisal, bond counsel certificate, consultant list, petitioner experience, legal description, title report, and other materials. While the landowner is required to provide notice to the local governing jurisdiction, local governing jurisdiction does not have the right to approve or deny. The petition is reviewed administratively by the AFA through a standards-based process. For an inbound investor without long-standing local relationships, an objective, criteria-driven process is a meaningful advantage to the overt political process associated with other financing districts in Arizona. Formation requirements. A SAID requires consent from 100% of landowners within the proposed district; public infrastructure costs must exceed $5 million (easily met at any real scale); the district property must all be in the same county and need not be contiguous provided that noncontiguous property is located within five miles of the district's other property; and the board is initially appointed by the forming owners of the SAID district, later transitioning to election as ownership diversifies. Actual bond issuance requires an election of the SAID property owners. Ownership and corporate structure. Consent rights and board seats run with title. If you hold the Arizona land through a U.S. blocker beneath your Taiwan parent, the standard model for Taiwanese/Arizona real estate and operating investment, the U.S. property-holding entity, rather than it’s corporate parent, is the landowner of record for the district. Before formation, our Dorsey team will confirm that you have the proper corporate structure and board mechanics to be compliant.  Board composition has no citizenship or residency requirement. This is a common concern for foreign investors, and the statute answers it cleanly. Under A.R.S. § 48-7004, a director must either hold fee title to real property in the district or be an individual designated or appointed by a fee-title owner. Corporations, partnerships, and other business entities are expressly permitted to be those owners, to vote as owners, and to designate an individual to serve. There is no requirement that a director be a U.S. citizen or resident. So your U.S. property-holding entity, as landowner of record, can appoint whichever of your principals you choose, including a Taiwan-based individual, as the three-member board.  Power infrastructure limitation. The enacted definition of "public infrastructure" in A.R.S. § 48-7001 does not include electrical power generation or transmission. The reference to electrical facilities appears only as components of lighting and traffic-control systems, and the Legislature removed broader energy infrastructure from the definition during the Senate amendments. A SAID will likely not finance the high-load power infrastructure required for semiconductor fabrication, data storage, or heavy manufacturing.  Water infrastructure within a current utility CC&N. Where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the SAID cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility on completion. Entitlements and zoning: The determination of entitlements, zoning, and other land use permitting, as well as construction permitting for a technology or manufacturing facilities remain with the local jurisdiction and run on a separate track. Our Dorsey team will help you coordinate the financing and entitlement timelines together. Our Dorsey team works regularly with Taiwanese and other Asia-Pacific companies entering the Arizona market. If a SAID fits your project, we can structure it for your cross-border ownership.

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Litigation Privilege Does Not Automatically Protect Communications with Funders: The Commercial Court Clarifies the Limits of Privilege in the Context of Litigation Funding

In Uber London Ltd & Ors v Garry White & Ors; Mishcon de Reya LLP [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that documents created to help a funder decide whether to invest in a claim will not ordinarily attract litigation privilege. This means that information a firm gathers while acting for a funder can later fall within the control of the claimants it goes on to represent in the same matter. Background The Claimants (a claim group of over 10,000 individual London black cab drivers and the assignee of two former minicab operators) alleged that the Defendants (three companies in the Uber group) obtained and retained their private hire operator's licence through an unlawful means conspiracy alleged to involve fraud. Because the claims were issued outside the ordinary six-year limitation period, the Claimants relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, contending they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud before June 2018. A preliminary issue trial was listed to determine the question of whether the Claimants discovered, or could have discovered with reasonable diligence, the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment only after June 2018. The Claimants were represented by Mishcon de Reya ("MdR"). However, before MdR’s engagement with the individual drivers had begun, in late 2017 it was engaged by the litigation funder Harbour to investigate the merits and value of the potential claim. During that stage, MdR corresponded extensively with Harbour and with the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association ("LTDA"), a black cab drivers' trade association. MdR was not formally engaged by the Claimants until October 2018 onwards. Once the proceedings had started, the Defendants sought disclosure of communications exchanged between MdR and Harbour before the engagement of MdR by the Claimants (the "Harbour Communications"). This included correspondence between MdR and Harbour, communications with the LTDA, and documents held on MdR's file opened in Harbour's name in connection with the potential claim. The Claimants resisted disclosure on four grounds: (i) that the documents were not relevant; (ii) on the grounds of litigation privilege; (iii) that the documents were outside their control; and (iv) that disclosure occurring so close to trial would be disproportionate. Judgment (i) Were the Harbour Communications relevant to the preliminary issue? The Court held that the Harbour Communications were likely to contain relevant material, on two bases. First, where the Claimants or the LTDA had communicated directly with MdR, that material could shed light on individual Claimants' actual knowledge of the alleged facts. Secondly, what MdR and Harbour had discovered during their investigation could inform the question of what a Claimant could reasonably have discovered at the time (even though the Defendants accepted that MdR's knowledge could not simply be imputed to the Claimants). (ii) Were the Harbour Communications protected by litigation privilege? As set out in the classic cases of Three Rivers (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 and WH Holding Ltd v E20 Stadium LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2652, communications between parties or their solicitors and third parties for the purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation are privileged when the following conditions are satisfied: Litigation must be in progress or in reasonable contemplation. The communications must have been made for the sole or dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The litigation must be adversarial, not investigative or inquisitorial. The Court rejected the Claimant’s claim to be able to withhold the Harbour Communications on the basis of litigation privilege. The Court confirmed that litigation privilege protects only communications created for the dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The Court found that Harbour had instructed MdR so that Harbour could decide whether to fund the proceedings. As such, the dominant purpose of the communications was in relation to funding, not the conduct of litigation. This was distinguished from the situation where an individual litigant who takes its own funding decision. In that situation, the decision whether to fund and the decision whether to litigate are one and the same, made by the person who will actually be the claimant, and so it forms a part of that person's conduct of their own litigation. In contrast, a third-party funder's commercial decision whether to fund someone else's claim is not necessarily part of conducting that litigation. The fact that litigation privilege can, in principle, be claimed by a non-party funder (as recognised in the case of Al Sadeq v Dechert [2024] EWCA 28) did not assist Harbour, since there was no evidence it intended to play any role in the litigation itself beyond funding it. Communications between Harbour and MdR did remain capable of attracting another kind of privilege: legal advice privilege, because of the solicitor-client relationship between Harbour and MdR. But communications with third parties such as the LTDA were not automatically protected in the same way. (iii) Were the Harbour Communications within the Claimants' control? The Court also rejected the argument that the Harbour Communications sat outside the Claimants' control because they belonged to Harbour and not the Claimants. The Court’s reasoning was that once the individual Claimant drivers became MdR's clients, MdR also owed them a duty to disclose material information. That included information that MdR had originally acquired while acting for Harbour. As held in the case of Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood (a firm) [2005] 1 WLR 567, a solicitor owing duties to two clients cannot simply prefer one over the other, and it was unrealistic to suppose MdR would investigate the same claims for Harbour, then represent the Claimants, while disregarding everything it had already learned. The obvious commercial expectation was that this earlier work would be used to advance the Claimants' case. MdR sought to rely on a confidentiality clause in a 2024 retainer agreement between it and RGL Management Ltd (a claims management company acting on behalf of the Claimants) to argue that it was relieved of any duty to disclose information obtained while acting for other clients. The provision stated that MdR may "have acted for persons in the same or similar sector as yours and by agreeing to the terms of this letter you agree that will have no duty to disclose to you any confidential information that we have obtained, or might in the future obtain, from acting for such persons or which is derived from any other source". The Court rejected this on several grounds. Claimants who had already become MdR's clients had an existing right to information in the Harbour Communications where it was relevant to their claims before the 2024 retainer agreement. If they were to surrender that right, it would have required their informed consent (also required under the SRA Code of Conduct). The Court found no evidence that such informed consent had been given. The terms had simply been made available to the Claimants through a portal, with no indication that Claimants understood they were giving up existing rights to relevant information. The Court found that even if the terms had been contractually binding, that would not have amounted to informed consent. In addition, the wording of the clause was not sufficiently clear to show that the Claimants had agreed to waive access to this information. (iv) Was disclosure reasonable, proportionate, and necessary at this stage? The Claimants argued that it was neither reasonable nor proportionate for disclosure to be given at such a late stage (approximately two weeks before the start of the preliminary issue trial) and that it was not necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings. The Court rejected this, but it drew a distinction between two categories of documents within the Harbour Communications: Documents bearing on the actual knowledge of the individual drivers, including communications with the LTDA, were not privileged, likely straightforward to review, and directly relevant to the preliminary issue. Their disclosure was ordered as reasonable, proportionate, and necessary. Documents reflecting only MdR's or Harbour's own assessment of the merits were of more marginal, indirect relevance and largely likely to fall under legal advice privilege. A review to isolate the smaller pool of non-privileged material in this category would be time-consuming for limited benefit, so this was excluded from the order. Key Points to Note The judgment is an important reminder of several practical points: However closely a funder is involved in evaluating a claim's merits, litigation privilege will only apply to communications where the sole or dominant purpose of the communication is the conduct of litigation, not the funder's own decision on whether to finance it. Unless that communication separately attracts legal advice privilege, it may need to be disclosed. The same considerations apply to other communications. For example, in RBS Rights Litigation [2017] 1 WLR 3539 the argument that an After the Event (ATE) policy was subject to litigation privilege was rejected on a similar basis. Whilst in this case, there was no dispute as to whether litigation was in contemplation, it is important to note that litigation privilege will not automatically apply to the investigative stages of a claim, i.e. before litigation is in contemplation. Even where litigation is reasonably contemplated, the dominant purpose test must still be satisfied. Material created primarily for fact-finding, risk assessment, or other investigative purposes will not attract litigation privilege unless those activities are actually undertaken for the dominant purpose of conducting the litigation. (See The Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2017] EWHC 1017 (QB)). When engaging a law firm, clients should ensure that they understand whether the firm has previously obtained information about their claim while acting for another party (for example, a funder or another interested party) and how that information will be handled. Any restrictions on the firm’s ability to share relevant information with the client should be explained clearly at the outset, including what information may be withheld and why. If this decision raises questions about your own funding arrangements, disclosure strategy, or privilege position, please get in touch with our Commercial Litigation team.

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The Long-Awaited Public Infrastructure Financing Solution for Development in Arizona

Every developer who has taken raw Arizona ground to a finished project knows the largest upfront cost other than the land price is almost always the cost to install the public infrastructure. Water, sewer, stormwater, streets, dry utilities, and the fiber backbone all have to be in the ground before a single lot closes or a building opens. That capital is deployed early and generates no return for years. For decades the standard workaround has been the Community Facilities District (CFD). That tool has grown materially harder to use, for reasons cited below, and House Bill 2999, signed in June 2026 and now codified as Chapter 40 of Title 48, is Arizona's response. Some Background I have spent a good part of my career on the other side of this problem. In the 1990s and early 2000s I served as general counsel of SunCor Development Company, one of Arizona's most active master-planned community developers, where we used Community Facilities Districts to finance hundreds of millions of dollars of major infrastructure across Arizona in cities such as Goodyear, Phoenix, Tempe, Litchfield Park, and Prescott Valley. For its time the CFD was an effective structure, and a great deal of what is now on the ground in those communities was financed with this tool. Unfortunately, CFDs have over time become considerably harder to use. Successive legislative amendments have layered on tax-rate ceilings, homebuyer disclosure obligations, and added procedural steps. Another drag on the use of CFDs is that formation of them runs through the municipality, where approval can turn as much on local politics as on the merits of a project. Developers now routinely are asked to absorb delay and uncertainty that a project's economics cannot support, which is a large part of why Arizona has fallen behind Colorado, Texas, and Utah in getting infrastructure financed. A better tool was needed, and Chapter 40 is it. How a SAID Improves on a CFD A State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID) keeps what worked about the CFD: tax-exempt, property-secured, non-recourse infrastructure financing — while shedding much of what made the CFD cumbersome. Its principal advantages over a traditional CFD: Administrative formation. A SAID is formed by the Arizona Finance Authority against fixed statutory criteria, through a yes-or-no compliance review on a sixty-day clock, rather than through the discretionary approval of a city council or a board of supervisors. Insulation from municipal politics. Because formation is a state-level compliance determination, a meritorious project is far less exposed to local political headwinds than it is under the CFD process. Landowner control of the board. A SAID is governed by a board of the landowners — appointed at formation, then elected on an acreage basis. In a typical municipal CFD, the city council sits as the district board; here, the developer controls governance. Advance funding of impact fees. A SAID can use bond proceeds to advance-pay municipal development impact fees, unlike CFDs, removing one of the largest upfront cash burdens in a project. A uniform, statewide process. The criteria are the same regardless of jurisdiction, replacing the municipality-by-municipality variation that has made CFD outcomes hard to predict. Flexible boundaries. A district may include noncontiguous parcels in the same county within five miles of one another, which fits phased and multi-tract development. Capped cost and a fixed timeline. Authority fees to form a district are capped at $15,000, and a complete petition must be acted on within sixty days. The full range of bonds. A SAID may issue general obligation, special assessment, revenue, and refunding bonds, secured solely by district property and creating no obligation for any other taxpayer. What is a SAID A SAID is a special taxing district that the owners of a development form to finance public infrastructure with tax-exempt bonds: general obligation bonds, special assessment bonds, and revenue bonds. The bonds are secured only by the property inside the district and are repaid over the long term, with terms up to 30 years. They do not affect the credit of the city, the county, or the State, and they create no obligation for any taxpayer outside the district. In practical terms, a SAID lets you finance horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of writing the check at the front end. The maximum ad valorem rate securing general obligation bonds is capped by statute at $5.00 per $100 of net assessed limited property valuation, with a limited step-up to cover a debt-service shortfall. SAIDs Work for Commercial as Well as Residential Development The SAID bill drew most of its press as a housing-affordability measure, and it appears to be a strong one. It is the first Arizona district statute to let bond proceeds advance-fund municipal development impact fees, which pulls one of the largest upfront cash burdens off a homebuilder's pro forma. But the statute's eligible infrastructure categories apply with equal force to commercial, industrial, and mixed-use projects. An industrial or logistics project can finance roads, rail crossings, sidings, and grade separations. A life-sciences or technology campus can finance its water, sewer, roads, and broadband the same way a subdivision can. Read Chapter 40 as a general-purpose infrastructure finance platform, not a subdivision-only device. How Formation Works A SAID is formed administratively by the Arizona Finance Authority. The Authority reviews the petition for compliance with the statute; it is a yes-or-no review against fixed criteria, not a discretionary negotiation with a city council or a board of supervisors, and it runs on a sixty-day clock once a complete petition is filed. Formation requires the written consent of 100% of the landowners in the proposed district and an engineer's certification that public infrastructure costs will exceed $5 million. The district may include noncontiguous parcels so long as they lie in the same county and within five miles of the district's other property, which accommodates phased and multi-tract development; if any part of the district sits inside a municipality, the whole district must stay within that municipality's limits or planning area. The Authority's fees to form a district are capped at $15,000. Issuing bonds requires a district election. Governance Simplified A SAID is run by a three-member board. The initial directors are named in the petition; after that, directors are elected by the landowners on an acreage basis as ownership diversifies. Board service runs with ownership; a director must either hold fee title inside the district or be an individual designated by a fee-title owner; and corporations, partnerships, and other entities may hold that ownership, vote as owners, and designate the individual who serves. A district has no power of eminent domain and no zoning authority, and directors may not be officials or employees of the municipality in which the district sits. What a SAID Does Not Do It finances; it does not entitle. Zoning, platting, rezonings, use permits, and the specialized approvals a manufacturing or life-sciences facility may need all remain with the local jurisdiction and proceed on their own track. The financing and entitlement timelines should be coordinated with formation of the SAID, but they are separate processes. Two substantive limits are worth flagging at the planning stage. First, electric power is largely outside the tool: the statutory definition of public infrastructure does not reach power generation or transmission, and broader energy infrastructure was removed from the bill during the Senate amendments. A power-intensive user should not assume a SAID will carry its electrical load. Second, where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the district cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility upon completion. Our Take For most master-planned residential work, and for a wide range of commercial and industrial development, a SAID will be the most efficient infrastructure-financing structure Arizona has offered. The right time to evaluate it is early in the acquisition and pre-development process, while the capital stack, the development agreement, and the entitlement strategy are still being set. Once the district's boundaries, general plan, and financing parameters are set, it is cumbersome at best to bring those into conformance later. Our Dorsey team has begun advising our developer clients on SAID formation on residential, commercial, and industrial projects statewide. If you would like us to assess whether a SAID fits a project you are working on, please reach out.

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37 Dorsey Attorneys Named 2026 Top Lawyers by Minnesota Monthly

Minnesota Monthly has recognized 37 Dorsey attorneys across 27 practice areas as 2026 Top Lawyers in Minnesota. Honorees are selected through a peer nomination process and a curated survey of practicing attorneys in Minnesota, who identify leading lawyers across a range of practice areas. Administrative / Regulatory Law Jennifer Coates Antitrust Law Michael Lindsay Banking & Financial Service Law Peter Nelson Copyright Law  Jeffrey Cadwell Corporate Law  Robert Hensley Robert Rosenbaum Criminal Defense: White-Collar  Beth Forsythe Edward Magarian RJ Zayed Health Care Law  Claire Topp Immigration Law  J. Mike Sevilla Insurance Law  Daniel Brown Intellectual Property and Patent Law  Stuart Hemphill International Trade Law  Jonathan Van Horn Labor and Employment Law  Edward Magarian Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Land Use & Zoning  Jay Lindgren Marcus Mollison Litigation – Antitrust  Michael Lindsay F. Matthew Ralph Jaime Stilson Litigation – Commercial  Michael Lindsay Litigation – Construction  Eric Ruzicka Litigation – Intellectual Property  Peter Lancaster RJ Zayed Litigation – Labor Employment Benefits  Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Litigation – Trusts and Estates  William J. Berens Theresa Bevilacqua Bridget Logstrom Koci Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions  James K. Langdon Mergers & Acquisitions Law  Keith Ahlgren Rachel Benedict Brian Burke Morgan Helme John Jorgenson Brian Moore Robert Rosenbaum Jonathan Van Horn Bri Whiting Municipal Law Jay Lindgren Nonprofit/Charities Law Claire Topp Securities / Capital Markets Law Cam Hoang Robert Rosenbaum Securities Regulation Theresa Bevilacqua James K. Langdon Tax Law William J. Berens Trusts and Estates Jennifer Ede Bridget Logstrom Koci Sonny Miller Kiley Petty Henry

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Patent Partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic Join Dorsey in Palo Alto

Patent partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic have joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Palo Alto, the international law firm announced today. Al Araiza works with clients to develop and implement patent strategies that align with corporate objectives, supporting growth initiatives, financing efforts, and successful exits, including initial public offerings and acquisitions. He advises on building, managing, and optimizing patent portfolios across a broad range of emerging and frontier technologies, with depth in wireless communications, artificial intelligence, and energy innovation. Before practicing law, Al gained engineering experience in the defense industry, working on energy system modeling and communications circuitry design. He also conducted biomedical research, with findings published in peer-reviewed journals. He has been recognized in the IAM Patent 1000 for his work advising clients on patent strategy and portfolio development. Al received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law, his M.E. in Biomedical Engineering from Tulane University, and his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from UCLA. Lena Petrovic works across the software and hardware industries to develop clear, well-supported patent applications. She guides clients through the prosecution process and advises on global trademark and copyright matters, including licensing and portfolio management. Lena regularly supports clients developing technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, fintech, cryptography, interactive and immersive experiences, and digital media, and works with companies in entertainment, gaming, and sports. Before practicing law, Lena spent a decade at Pixar, where she contributed to major films including The Incredibles, Ratatouille, WALL‑E, and Brave. Lena received her J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law, her M.S. in Computer Science from Princeton University, and her B.S. from California Institute of Technology. “Al and Lena bring a practical, technical, and business-focused approach informed by extensive experience working with technology companies, startups, and investors,” said Gina Cornelio, Patent Practice Group Co-Leader. “We are thrilled to welcome them to the Patent team and our growing Palo Alto office.” “Dorsey’s Patent practice is dedicated to understanding each client's business deeply, tailoring patent strategies that directly advance their goals,” said Al Araiza. “We are proud to join this outstanding team and look forward to driving success for our clients.”

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Dorsey Partner Melissa Raphan Elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers

International law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP is pleased to announce that Partner Melissa Raphan has been elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers (CLEL) as part of its 2026 class. “Melissa’s election to this prestigious fellowship comes as no surprise to those of us who have had the privilege of working with her,” says Peter Nelson, Dorsey’s Managing Partner.  “She is an exceptional employment lawyer, a trusted advisor, and a leader whose impact extends far beyond her matters. Clients rely on her deep knowledge, strategic counsel, and ability to navigate complex workplace disputes and sensitive employment matters with both confidence and compassion. She has helped shape our firm, strengthen our profession, and opened doors for countless others through her commitment to mentorship and diversity. We are incredibly proud of her accomplishments and delighted to see her receive this recognition.” CLEL is a nonprofit professional association that honors the nation’s leading attorneys in the field of labor and employment law. Originally established to recognize excellence in the profession, CLEL has evolved into a respected intellectual and practical resource for the legal community and its many audiences. Its mission centers on recognizing individuals who have made significant contributions to the field, fostering the exchange of knowledge and delivering value to academia, government, the judiciary, and the broader public. Election as a fellow represents the highest level of peer acknowledgment, reflecting sustained achievement, integrity, and a commitment to advancing the profession. Melissa’s career reflects CLEL’s mission. She has been recognized both regionally and nationally for her advocacy, leadership, and achievements both inside and outside of the courtroom. Her employment litigation experience spans class actions, collective actions, and high-stakes individual disputes in state and federal courts, as well as arbitration forums including the American Arbitration Association and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). She is also a trusted advisor on a full range of workplace issues, from hiring and performance management to sensitive terminations and organizational change. She brings decades of experience representing clients across the financial services, healthcare, food and agriculture, and energy sectors. Melissa will be formally inducted during CLEL’s installation ceremony held in conjunction with the American Bar Association’s Labor & Employment Law Conference in Washington, D.C., on November 7.