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Litigation Risks Arising from Hidden or “Junk” Fees

July 7, 2025

by Kent J. Schmidt, F. Matthew Ralph, and Alex Hake

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Hidden fees that consumers learn about late in the process of completing a transaction are increasingly targeted in state and federal legislation.  Using names such as “junk fees” and “drip pricing”, these laws create new litigation risks for companies. This episode covers the new statutes as well as FTC regulations, application in common scenarios, pending litigation claims, all to better understand how businesses and those who advise them can avoid these lawsuits. SharkCast host Kent Schmidt interviews Dorsey attorneys Matt Ralph and Alex Hake on these issues, including what these developments mean for class action risks.

This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

Transcript

Voiceover

[00:00:03] Welcome to another episode of the SharkCast on litigation risks management, where we explore why businesses are so frequently sued and how to mitigate and navigate the dangers lurking in these risky waters.  Join us now as we welcome our host, Kent Schmidt, litigation partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.

Schmidt

[00:00:26] Well thanks for joining us today for another episode of SharkCast.  Today I’m very happy to welcome to the podcast virtual studios my long-time friend and partner, Matt Ralph, and a newer friend and colleague, Alex Hake.  Welcome Matt and Alex.  Glad to have you on SharkCast both for the first time.

Ralph

[00:00:51] Well it’s great to be here, Kent, although I was hoping this interview would take place on the old Merv Griffin set.

Schmidt

[00:00:57] No, we’re moved beyond that, those decade-old relics.  So speaking of old, Matt and I have been around Dorsey for a long time.  Matt, when did you start at Dorsey in the Minneapolis office?

Ralph

[00:01:10] I started in the fall of 2002.

Schmidt

[00:01:13] Okay.  So that’s about four years after I started.  So we’re both old timers as you can see by the gray beards.  Alex is a newer addition and Alex, you just joined a year and half ago.  Is that right?

Hake

[00:01:29] Not even that far, way back in September 2024 was when I come on.

Schmidt

[00:01:32] Okay.

Hake

[00:01:33] So.

Schmidt

[00:01:34] Alright.  Well it’s good to have both new friends and old friends to join us on SharkCast, and I asked Alex and Matt to join us today in part because I saw an article that they authored at the end of the year last year about a topic that I’ve been paying some attention to out here in California on junk fees and drip pricing.  There’s new law in Minnesota which is where both Matt and Alex are based on junk fees, and we of course have our version of that out here in California.  We, of course, just came out of a presidential election and junk fees and various iterations of that concept even became a topic in the campaign.  And I think the reason is because it’s very, very popular with consumers.  We all have perhaps an experience or two where we go into a transaction and we get right up to check out, and we realize oh, there’s some extra fees that are attached and they’re very, any number of tags or titles to those fees, but the bottom line is you’re going to be paying a little more perhaps then you thought of at the beginning of the transaction, and because that resonates with consumers and the electorate for that matter, I think there’s going to be a lot of consumer class action in this area.

Schmidt

[00:03:08] So I think it’s important for companies to understand this emerging area of the law, and we’re gonna go through some of the statutes, including some FTC activity in this area, so we can be proactive and prophylactic in addressing these things.  So why don’t we start with what you guys have covered already in written form in Minnesota.  Can one of you give me a summary of what happened last year in the legislature and what the Minnesota Attorney General is providing on junk fees in Minnesota?

Ralph

[00:03:48] Yeah, sure.  Thank you, Kent.  And just to clarify your remarks, a junk fee is a fee that a seller intends to be part of the final price but that the seller doesn’t disclose in the advertised price.  And the reason they’re effective is because they’re a part of a bait and switch tactic.  The advertised price lures consumers into the transaction and then after the consumer spends some time and effort completing it the junk fee is tacked on to the end.  And at that point many consumers submit to the junk fee rather than start over and try to find a substitute product.  So in Minnesota, the new law requires that the advertised price include all mandatory fees.  It’s no longer enough now to disclose a base price and other mandatory fees separately.  You cannot make the consumer do the math in Minnesota.  You have to advertise the total final price, but there are some key exceptions to that.  In Minnesota you don’t have to disclose taxes on a transaction.  You don’t have to disclose shipping costs that will be incurred by the consumer.  And when it comes to automatic and mandatory gratuities charged by restaurants, bars or hotels that are expressed as a percentage of the transaction, it’s enough that that mandatory gratuity be disclosed that it’s going to be charged but not the final amount.  And finally, one interesting wrinkle here in Minnesota, and this is not expressed in the law, but the Minnesota Attorney General has taken the position that credit card fees are not to subject to disclosure if the consumer can reasonably avoid those fees by paying cash.  There’s going to be the case in both situations.

Schmidt

[00:05:24] So what are some areas that you think that companies non-intending to violate the new regulation could have, you know, whether we call the foot fault or a minor deviation and be looking at some legal action as result?

Ralph

[00:05:46] Yeah, that’s a good question.  I would say that the two types of industries that leap to mind are retail markets online, you know, like the Amazons or other platforms of the world because very often when you get to the end you see a list of itemized charges that are tacked on.  I think there’s gonna be a question in many people’s minds.  Which of those were mandatory fees that were known in advance that will go effect the final price?  I think too industries with complicated bills.  I’m thinking here telecommunications bills that I’ve seen where it often seems like there’s a whole lot of mandatory fees that are assessed that frequently look like they’re government charges, not necessarily taxes but government charges, and many companies have worded junk fees in ways that make it look like they are taxes or government charges, and I think that companies that do that need to be on the lookout.

Schmidt

[00:06:37] Yeah, and I don’t know if you have an answer to this or if there’s been any clarity provided by the AG, but you mentioned earlier an exemption for shipping costs.  What about that very vague concept of handling, shipping and handling cost which can be a profit center for some companies that can jack up those handling charges pretty significantly.  Do you know if that’s exempted under the Minnesota statute or is that something left for the courts to clarify?

Ralph

[00:07:10] I don’t know.  I don’t think that’s expressly addressed, but I think the analysis would be if the handling is part of the shipping, which people understand to be handling the product, wrapping it in the appropriate packaging and putting it in the mail, that’s probably going to be covered as part of the mandatory shipping, but if there’s some fee for some additional movement of the product it’ll be viewed with skepticism.

Schmidt

[00:07:31] Okay.  Well let’s move from Minnesota for a moment.  We might come back to that shortly, and Alex, let’s get you in here and pivot our conversation to how this plays out in real life litigation.  I think that there’s a general understanding that certainly regulators, state or federal, can bring various enforcement actions for violation of a consumer protection statute, but regulators often sit back and rely on our friends, and I use that term in air quotes, our frenemies in the consumer class action space, the plaintiff consumer class action space to do their job.  So how do these types of issues come into play in consumer class actions, Alex?

Hake

[00:08:27] Yeah.  So I think that’s exactly right.  You are seeing there’s some opportunities now for private individuals and then organizations, you know, may be consumer advocacy groups to start enforcing some of these new rules on behalf of consumers.  I think one of the interesting cases right now is coming out of the DC Superior Court where there are Travelers, which is a non-profit kind of traveler advocacy group, is bringing a class action on behalf of people who had reserved hotel rooms in this hotel chain, Sonesta, and they filed this complaint in 2023 on behalf of these consumers on claims that basically Sonesta was charging junk fees in violation of DC’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act or CPPA.  Really the claim is that Travelers alleges that Sonesta uses kind of a two-step method, to hide its true hotel reservation prices from consumers.  So first, Sonesta does something called partition pricing, where it splits the actual price that it plans to charge into two parts.  One part is advertised as the reservation part and then the other part is later withheld and shown later as the destination fee.

Schmidt

[00:09:42] And I see, by the way that phrase partition pricing used a lot in this area, so that’s a concept that is not unique to DC and it’s a good descriptive phrase.  Breaking down this price...

Hake

[00:09:59] Yes.

Schmidt

[00:10:00] …to lure in the consumer.

Hake

[00:10:02] Yeah.  Yeah.

Ralph

[00:10:03] Just to jump with one other point.  I believe the same organization sued a different hotel chain, the Hyatt chain, in 2020 on very similar allegations.  So it’s something that they’ve done more than once.

Schmidt

[00:10:14] Yeah.

Hake

[00:10:15] Yeah, correct.  And I think, especially with, and what you were saying, Matt, too about big retail chains, a lot of these complaints could almost be copied and pasted from one to another if they’re doing what seems to be a very common practice of including these fees.  And also going back to the terminology, there’s multiple words being thrown around here, junk fees, partition pricing, another one that they bring in is this idea of drip pricing, which is kind of the second thing that they accuse of Sonesta of doing, which withholding that destination fee until right before the consumer is about to pay.  So it makes it more likely that they just accept that increased cost rather than start the whole reservation process over again somewhere else.  But I think really they all kind of amount to, boil down to the same concept where it’s that you are not revealing the entire price at the beginning and withholding that until closer to the point of transaction.  So in Travelers’ complaint they use an example of somebody who thinks they’re going to book a hotel room for say $189 per night.  They end up eventually paying $253 per night at checkout once taxes and fees are applied, and about 40% of that difference is just coming from what Sonesta has qualified as this destination fee.  Even though, of course, Sonesta included, intended that to be included in the original price from the beginning and the consumer had no ability to avoid incurring that fee, but it’s only disclosed towards the end of the process.

Schmidt

[00:11:46] And so let’s just break that down with some hypotheticals.  You’re not too far from law school so this won’t be too shocking to you.  Destination fee, just a sort of make term I assume for just adding something on, but if it was an upgrade fee or if it was a fee in order to use the gym or in order to use something else, the consumer has an option as to whether or not they want that upgrade, and therefor that is not something that would have to be disclosed.  It’s the unavoidable.  Correct me if I’m wrong.  It’s the unavoidability of the fee that triggers most of these statutes, right?

Hake

[00:12:29] Yeah.  That’s correct, it is, and it will depend on what law you’re looking at and, you know, we have Minnesota state law, we have California state law, we have the new federal rule, and there is this common concept of mandatory fees, mandatory charges, some laws will go into more steps to define that, some leave it a little bit more vague.  Obviously, I think that is probably going to become a big point of contention as these cases start to get litigated, you know, what is or is not mandatory, what does the consumer have actual power to change.  What’s interesting about this case in DC is that it’s actually not brought under one of these new junk fee laws that have come about in the last couple of years or so, but it’s brought under DC’s more generic prohibition on deceptive trade practices, which in DC prevents companies from misrepresenting or admitting a material fact which might have a tendency to mislead the consumer.  So in this case Travelers is kind of stretching that generic consumer protection to cover this junk fee area.

Schmidt

[00:13:32] And I just want to interject a California analog here that I’ve looked at the DC statute or ordinance and it’s very similar to California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act.  And that’s where the California junk fee provision has been codified.  It’s codified, there’s a list of 20-some prohibited practices, some are very specific, some are incredibly general and vague, and they just decided to add it to that rather than an entire new statutory scheme dedicated to junk fees.  So I think you’re going to see that a lot because a lot of states have followed that framework of, you know, listing prohibited transactions.  And so, California and DC are examples of that.

Hake

[00:14:26] I think that may also play into how it’s enforced and what the penalties can be because if you have that existing framework of who can bring a case under these, you know, in the DC case they have this very specific part of that law that allows a company like Travelers to sue on a class basis and represent a class of consumers even though Travelers itself never made any of these reservations, you know, they never incurred this harm.  So I think those, amending these junk fee provisions into those existing consumer protection laws may also then trigger some of the other more general parts of that law.

Schmidt

[00:15:03] So tell us, Alex and/or Matt, where those DC hotel charge cases are in the process?  Are they getting past motion to dismiss?  What’s the status of those cases as of today?

Hake

[00:15:21] Well the Sonesta case, and I was just talking about that, has actually been recently granted class certification.  So that is one of the most far along cases that we’ve seen on this topic.  The Hyatt case, which was also filed by Travelers using again a very similar complaint, that case was removed to federal court and it’s currently hanging in kind of motion to dismiss limbo.  So we’re still waiting to see what happens there.

Schmidt

[00:15:48] Okay.  Well, you know, for a case to get to class certification, it’s, you know, survived challenge and motion to dismiss and it’s well on its way to being, you know, heard on the merits, so we’ll have to keep an eye on both of those cases and see how they unfold and whether case law’s going to be made that might be cited in some of these other cases.  Matt, turning back to Minnesota, I notice in your article that you both published last, late last year, that you link to the Minnesota Attorney General’s guidance on the Minnesota Statute, which I always think is super helpful.  I think when an enforcer, such as a state Attorney General or some other entity, can give examples and can provide clarity as to what at least their position is as to what violates the law and what is not, it can provide very important clarity and a safe harbor for companies.  Can you tell us anything more about what the AG’s guidance has provided?

Ralph

[00:16:59] Yeah.  Well, I agree with you 100%.  In the absence of any guiding case law, I think that even the courts will probably be looking to the AG’s website for insight into what the AG thinks about this law.  I think it’s important to note, under the AG’s guidance, that the Minnesota law does not affect the amount of prices that can be charged.  It doesn’t affect discounts that are made from prices.  All it does is regulates the disclosure of mandatory fees and says that they have to be included in the advertised price.  There are in fact other laws that the AG’s guidance reminds of related to discounting and fair advertising, so it’s important to forget that those do exist.  And I think too that another advantage of the AG’s website is it gives some concreate examples, like Alex was mentioning in the lawsuit where there were screen shots of what the consumer sees when they’re buying the hotel room.  The AG gives examples of what are compliant and non-compliant prices.  They’re pretty simple examples but they’re good illustrations for anybody who wants to, you know, get familiar with what the AG is thinking.

Schmidt

[00:18:15] That’s very good.  Let’s talk about one area that I can see companies falling into in this junk fee or drip pricing area, and that is aggregated social media marketing, or search engines that go out and get prices and advertise for the company.  So I can envision a situation where in-house council takes a look at this and goes through the company website, if it’s an e-commerce or if it’s a hotel booking site or whatever the service or product is being offered, and they focus intently on what the consumer’s experience is and make sure that price doesn’t include any, the price that’s advertised on the website includes any junk fees, but they overlook that their marketing folks have come up with all sorts of ideas to have prices put out in pop ups, although we don’t have those quite as much as we used to, but in social media feeds and other marketing aggregators that are out there that don’t list the price, or maybe just have an asterisk that says, you know, additional charges or whatever, but doesn’t list the price.  And I think it’s important to understand that what the regulators are getting after is not just that process on the company website before the credit card information is entered, but all sorts of advertisements that are out there that would have a price but not the full price.  Thoughts on that issue.

Ralph

[00:20:12] Yeah.  That’s a really good point, Kent.  The Minnesota Statute is directed towards the advertiser which we presume to be the seller, but it could be different, and you could incur liability under the Minnesota Statute but passing along advertised prices even when it isn’t necessarily your responsibility for them not paying the final full price.  You know, your examples also raise the point that the lack of uniformity nationwide in these new laws related to junk fees can also be a trap for the unwary, and it might behoove companies to look at and start from the most restrictive laws out there.  So for example, in states where you can advertise the mandatory fees separately from the base price as long as those fees are in close proximity to and look comparable to the base price so that it’s clear from the way it’s positioned that they’ll all be added together into a final price.  That’s permissible perhaps in some states, but not in Minnesota.  And so, you know, if those prices are passed along by social media, or algorithm, or an aggregator it might be compliant in one state but not another.  Matter of fact, it poses significant problems for advertisers.

Schmidt

[00:21:27] Well speaking of the challenges of disparate statutory schemes in, you know, 50 states plus the District of Columbia, there has been some activity by the FTC in this space.  Can we turn to that for moment?  I know we’re at the beginning of a new administration and it seems like everything is in flux as to what regulations and what initiatives at the end of the Biden administration are going to survive, but we can only deal with what we have today.  What’s the status of what the FTC is doing in this area right now?  I don’t know if anyone wants to venture pull out their crystal ball and take a guess as to what’s going to happen in the future.  I certainly am not.  But what are the thoughts on what’s happening on the federal level with junk fees and related issues?

Hake

[00:22:24] So I can speak a little bit to some of the federal developments lately.  Basically in late, late 2024, last December, the FTC finalized a rule that it had been considering for a long time, and that rule now is if everything stays the same, it’s set to go into effect on May 12, 2025, this year.  Basically kind of what some of what that rule does is it is just like these other junk fee statutes.  It forces companies to disclose the total price of their goods whenever they put out price, whenever they make a price representation anywhere, whether that’s in an advertisement or in a communication, any part of that process.  But a very key restriction to this FTC rule is it only applies to the sale of live event tickets and short-term lodging.  So when, if, people may remembering it was being discussed earlier, it used to be way broader and then they severely narrowed it for the final rule.  Basically, it requires business to clearly and conspicuously disclose the total price.  So just like the Minnesota law, the FTC defines what must be included in that total price calculation, fees that can, again it goes back to the idea of what is mandatory and what is not.  So if it is a mandatory fee, it has be disclosed.  If it’s not mandatory, it doesn’t.  And I think what you were saying, Kent, about trying to read the tea leaves here, I can’t do that either, but I can at least may be lay out a few things for consideration that kind of may hint at where this is going.  So when this rule was finalized back in 2024, there was one lone member of the FTC who dissented, and that was Andrew Ferguson, who is now the chair of the FTC under the Trump administration.

Schmidt

[00:24:19] So to be clear, he dissented from the rule being enacted at all, or he dissented from it being narrowed to the two industries that you identified?

Hake

[00:24:29] So he dissented it from it being enacted at all.

Schmidt

[00:24:32] Okay.

Hake

[00:24:33] But what’s interesting the grounds for his dissent, if you look at that, he’s not, he’s saying that he’s not dissenting on the merits of whether he thinks this is a good rule or a bad rule, but he was just opposed to the idea that there was this rule making coming so late in the previous presidential administration.

Schmidt

[00:24:47] I see.

Hake

[00:24:48] So that doesn’t really provide us a lot to work on because again he said his dissent wasn’t based on the merits of the rule.  Now, again, like I said earlier, the rule is set to go into effect in May.  We haven’t seen anything that is indicating that something’s going to come and mess up that process.  There’s always the Congressional Review Act where Congress has the power to basically prevent this from going into effect, but I think the most likely outcome, I would say, is that it does go into effect unless something changes.

Schmidt

[00:25:25] So far Elon Musk hasn’t Tweeted on it and given his position, so we’ll wait for those tea leaves to emerge.

Ralph

[00:25:35] Just to jump in with a thought on that.  The FTC is a bipartisan commission, and I think that the extreme narrowing of the final rule reflected a compromise at the FTC level.  And there’s another, there’s an interesting concurring statement by one of the commissioners who approved of the, you know, rule, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter.  She did think that a broader rule was warranted, and her statement gives examples of different kinds of hidden fees that aren’t as well known, and one example that she cited specifically, it sounded particularly interesting.  Apparently in rental markets it’s become very common for landlords to tack on fees in addition to rent.  They’ll advertise the rent, but once you sign the lease along come the additional fees, including fees on processing payments, and in this particular example the tenant had no option to pay by any means where there would no fee.  In other words, there was going to be an extra fee tacked onto any method of payment used by the tenant.  So, that’s another market I think to keep our eye on in terms of how these

Schmidt

[00:26:40] It’s interesting how that process at the FTC ending up narrowing to two industries as opposed to being generally applicable.  One has to wonder if it’s the lobbying dollars hard at work that resulted in that, and I know these types of things are, they take a long time and there’s a lot of activity and things that go on behind the scenes.  You mentioned the, which is a great example, the charges associated with payment in the rental example and not having the option to get around that by paying, for example, by check.  I could see that tripping up companies where there’s a processing fee for a credit card payment, and yet they don’t want to mess with having checks sent, so it becomes unavoidable by virtue of that mechanism in place, or that policy that’s implemented that all of a sudden triggers arguably, you know, these types of statutory prohibitions.

Ralph

[00:27:53] Exactly.

Schmidt

[00:27:54] Well let’s just maybe finish off this discussion with any more practical guidelines that we might be able to offer in order to avoid litigation in this area.  As you know, that’s my mantra of what I am constantly thinking about and talking about with clients.  What are the prophylactic steps that you can take?  We’ve talked about a few of those just in the ordinary course in our conversation, but do you have any additional ideas or thoughts on how a company not intending to violate one of these statutes or regulations might inadvertently fall into at least a gray area and create a consumer class action claim?

Ralph

[00:28:48] Yeah.  I guess my rule of thumb, Kent, would be, you know, when in doubt disclose and try to be as transparent as possible and as early in the process as possible.  In Minnesota has a bright line rule now, it’s got to be in the advertised price.  So there’s not a whole lot of ambiguity about that.  When it comes to fees like, you know, mandatory tips that are gonna be created as a percentage of a transaction whose total price you don’t know, you know, that’s an example where I think the guidance that you need to disclose that you’re going to be charging that kind of a fee, even if you don’t know what the amount is.  The fact that you are going to be charging it should be disclosed early enough and not in the smallest font.

Schmidt

[00:29:32] Very good.  Very good thought.  Alex, anything for you to add?

Hake

[00:29:35] I mean, I would just reiterate something that you mentioned earlier, Kent, about traps that I think it’s easy to fall into with these laws where they’re so focused on disclosing the total price and as a company I might think well of course I’m disclosing the total price eventually.  But the idea that you have to be very conscious of anywhere that a price for a good or service appears, and that might not just be on the page where the consumer has already clicked and they want to buy it.  It might be on all sorts of imaginable places where your price for you product might be posted.  That I think is potentially a key trap for these laws.

Schmidt

[00:30:09] That’s very helpful too.  Let me just maybe just round this out with one thought of my own, and that is what I have referred to as the veracity of the charge.  You know, we heard, what was the term that was used in the hotel, the charge?  What do they call that?

Hake

[00:30:29] They had partition pricing, drip pricing, [UNINTELLIGIBLE].

Schmidt

[00:30:32] What they called it.

Hake

[00:30:33] What they qualified the charge as was a destination fee.  [UNINTELLIGIBLE] vague.

Schmidt

[00:30:36] A destination fee, whatever that is.  But sometimes I think, you know, this might not come into direct contact with prohibition, might not be directly prohibited, but more in the generalized area of deceptive business practice where you have a fee that is grossly disproportionate to the cost.  I mentioned earlier handling charges, shipping and handling charges, and I’ve litigated in this area even apart from these types of statutes where it’s an inflated charge.  It cannot really be justified in terms of the actual or even approximated cost associated with that aspect of the service.  I think I’d be very nervous about some type of charge that you can’t back up with at least an approximate accounting that justifies that charge.  Otherwise it just looks like a hidden and almost deceptive cost center.  Any thoughts on that?

Ralph

[00:31:44] Yeah, I agree 100%.  You know, the Minnesota, the new Minnesota Statute itself expressly says, and the AG’s guidance on expressly says, we’re not trying to regulate the price itself.  We don’t care about the price.  But under other consumer protection laws that the AG does enforce, that kind of practice would be considered deceptive.  And I think you’re right that it’s not a practice that’s likely to stand up well in court if it’s put under a microscope.  So I would be very wary of engaging in practices like that.

Schmidt

[00:32:15] Well very, very helpful comments, incredibly useful discussion.  As many things that we discuss on SharkCast, it’s an evolving situation, so I’m sure we’ll be continuing to communicate and monitor on this issue.  That’s about all the time, however, that we have to discuss hidden fees and junk fees today.  We are now at the segment of SharkCast episode that we call the Deeper Dive, that we like to learn a little bit more about our guest, and we do this at the end of each episode.  And today I’d like to return to one of my favorite Deeper Dive topics, which is the topic of movies.  And I’d like to specifically ask you both to give a movie recommendation, even if it’s not something that is not new, even a classic movie that, you know, you would go back to, like a must watch.  Like anyone that you would come in contact with you’d say you gotta see this movie.  And before you do, I’ll just tell you that part of what inspires this question is I just watched, rewatched Schindler’s List about three or four weeks ago.  It is a long movie.  It’s a difficult movie, but it’s one of the best movies I think ever made and absolutely gripping story of the conflicting and challenging choices that were made by Schindler in connection with some of the compromises he made, but the ultimate good that he did in saving so many lives.  And I think I would put that on my short list of movies that you really do have to see.  And it’s not, not all of it’s pleasant to see, but it’s a very, very moving epic piece of work by Spielberg.  So who wants to go first and tell me what sort of that, what one or two movies that just is almost live changing, or something you would go back to and watch multiple times?

Ralph

[00:34:31] Well I’ll jump in on this because with the recent passing of Gene Hackman, I was inspired to rewatch some of his movies, and one performance of his that I love and it’s a great movie, is Unforgiven, the Client Eastwood western.  And, you know, so many westerns are based on the hero who ultimately satisfies the audience by taking vengeance on all the bad guys and gunning them down, and that really takes a different perspective on good guys versus bad guys and justifiable use of violence in a setting where there are just fabulous and ambiguous characters.  Client Eastwood is essentially a murderer turned into a good guy who’s forced to avenge a friend who is unjustly killed.  And Gene Hackman is a sheriff with a sterling reputation, and he’s incredibly brave, but he also strays into complete brutality enforcing law.  It’s an excellent movie that’s very thought-provoking and just a timeless classic.

Schmidt

[00:35:32] Well I’m going to take you up on that recommendation ‘cause that is one that I did not see.  In honor of Gene Hackman, last weekend, I did watch the French Connection for the first time.

Ralph

[00:35:40] I just watched that last night too.

Schmidt

[00:35:41] Oh did you?  Yeah, so it’s a great one, and he’s truly one of the greats and will be missed.  How about you Alex?  A movie that grips you.

Hake

[00:35:51] Yes.  Well now I’m questioning whether my taste in cinema is refined as both yours is.  I think for me it’s, for me it always go back to nostalgia and thinking about my childhood.  For me that meant one of the big things in my life was back when the Peter Jackson Lord of the Rings trilogy came out.  I just thought that was very, very great point in my life, but I think looking back on it now too just thinking that, you know, I feel like those were really big community effort that went into making that huge undertaking, and I just don’t think you see that so much anymore where it’s just kind of team of really dedicated, passionate people who all come together to make something they really care about.

Schmidt

[00:36:33] Yeah.

Ralph

[00:36:34] Well I second that opinion.  I read Lord of the Rings probably ten times and the Hobbit five.  I love all those movies, and I think too I’d like to recommend the Rings of Power spinoff series that has two seasons.  It’s really well done.

Schmidt

[00:36:46] Alright.

Hake

[00:36:47] I’ll get back to your recommendation, and I won’t approach that topic.

Schmidt

[00:36:51] Well I’m going to spring a bonus question on both of you in our Deeper Dive.  And so I’m going to start with you Alex.  As a newly-minted Dorsey lawyer, can you give me something that has been a pleasant surprise, we’ll keep it all in the positive, about what the practice of law is like in your very formative years at Dorsey?  Let’s keep it on the positive.  I’m sure there are some unpleasant surprises, but tell us anything about your practice that sort of surprise from how you envisioned things in law school.

Hake

[00:37:28] I would say the most pleasant surprise for me is just how quickly you can start to get the hang of things.  I think from going from square zero effectively with never having done, you know, everything is just a giant list of well, I’ve never done that, I’ve never done that, I’ve never done that before, and then you do it for the first time, and then at the pace of things here, week five or six well I’ve already done that three times now.  And so I’m a big lifelong learner and that’s something I love about this job is it gives me the opportunity to be continually learning, but I think the flip side of that is you also build experience really quickly.

Schmidt

[00:38:02] Okay.  Well that’s great and we’re all lifetime learners which is partly why I enjoy doing this podcast.  Alright Matt, question for you that’s the bonus question out of the blue.  You’ve been at this almost as long as I have.  What’s something that you have learned as a partner, so this will be a benefit to Alex, that may be you didn’t fully appreciate as an associate in terms of the craft of practicing law?

Ralph

[00:38:34] Well here’s what I would say to Alex and the young lawyers, what I think is one of the most important things you learn as a trial partner.  Don’t panic, because almost any situation you can handle, you can correct, you can get out of, provided you don’t lose your mind or lose your self-control and make it worse.  And so I’ve been reminded of this because my wife, who used to be a Dorsey partner, went in-house and deals with executives and it can be very stressful and they often need to have an easy button for solutions.  And I think in contrast when there are emergencies at Dorsey in the trial department, when you’re leading a case, you have to be the one with the easy button who’s gonna calm everybody down and provide the answer, so.

Schmidt

[00:39:26] Well there’s certainly many opportunities for panic to arise in a busy, complex litigation trial practice.  That’s for sure, so that’s really great advice.  Very succinct and very appropriate for our conversation today.  With that I’d like to thank you both for being guests here on SharkCast today.  I’d also like to thank our listeners for participating and listening to this interesting conversation.  As always I’m indebted to the extraordinary team at Dorsey for making this podcast and episode possible.  For more resources on this and other litigation risk go to litigationsrisks.com where more information can be found, including a book on managing litigation risk written by yours truly.  Until next time, my friends, this yet another reminder that there are a lot of sharks swimming out there in the murky waters, so swim safely.

Voiceover

[00:40:20] This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone.  Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things.  The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney.  This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

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Alaska HB 126: What Changes for Alaska Native Corporations, Proxy Filings, and Annual Reports

Alaska House Bill 126 (HB 126), sponsored by Representative Neal Foster and passed by the 34th Alaska Legislature, is now law. The bill changes which Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) must file proxy and annual report materials with the State of Alaska, and makes it easier to reinstate certain dissolved Village Corporations. For many smaller Village Corporations, the practical result is less public disclosure. For shareholders, advisors, and the public, it means some financial information that used to be available through the State will no longer be readily obtained. This eUpdate explains what HB 126 does in plain terms, walks through the practical trade-offs, and answers common questions. 1. What HB 126 Changes The old rule Under prior law (Alaska Statutes Sec. 45.55.139), an Alaska Native Corporation had to file its annual report, proxies, and proxy statements with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities (the Division) if it had more than $1 million in assets and 500 or more shareholders on its current rolls. A filing ANC was also required to follow the Division’s proxy rules (3 AAC 08.305 through .365), which require specific disclosures such as top 5 executive compensation, and related-party transactions. Because these filings are treated as public records, they gave non-shareholders, including the public and the press, visibility into ANC financial information that is not filed with the SEC. The new rule HB 126 changes how the 500-shareholder test is measured. Now, the asset test is removed, and the shareholder count is based on how many shareholders the corporation originally enrolled when it was formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), not how many it has today. As shares have passed down through families over the decades, some Village Corporations that started with fewer than 500 shareholders now have more than 500 recordholders. Under the old current-count test, when those corporations had crossed the threshold, they had to file. Under the new original-enrollment test, they do not. Who is affected Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders are the main beneficiaries. They no longer have to file proxy and annual report materials with the Division or follow the Division’s proxy regulations at 3 AAC 08.305 through .365. Two groups must continue to file as before: all twelve ANCSA Regional Corporations, each of which enrolled more than 500 shareholders at creation, and all Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders. As reported by the Alaska Beacon, when the bill was under consideration, the Division identified 59 corporations then filing, expected at least seven village corporations to become exempt, and was reviewing roughly 30 more. 2. Practical Analysis HB 126 reduces a real compliance burden for smaller Village Corporations, which now need not spend time and money on State filings. In coming years, the exempt Village Corporations may experience benefits associated with less public disclosure and less regulation. But at the same time, less public disclosure carries trade-offs. Benchmarking will become harder Publicly-filed proxy statements and annual reports have long served as a reference set. Shareholders, corporations, advisors, and counsel use them to compare governance practices, compensation, and financial results across similarly-situated ANCs. Since fewer of these materials will be filed publicly, there will be fewer comparable documents available, which will make benchmarking and market-checking more difficult for like-sized ANCs over time. Executive compensation transparency may be reduced The Division’s proxy rules require disclosure of the compensation of ANC’s top five most highly compensated individuals (3 AAC 08.345(b)(2)), related-party transactions above $20,000 (3 AAC 08.345(b)(3)), and audited financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis (3 AAC 08.365). When a corporation is no longer required to file these disclosures publicly, it becomes harder for shareholders and others to obtain the information, to understand how compensation is set for their corporate leadership, and how it compares across corporations of similar size and complexity. Transparency may matter more as ANCs grow Some ANCs have grown into large, complex enterprises with substantial revenue and many subsidiaries, even with fewer than 500 shareholders. For an ANC with a broad and dispersed shareholder base, public materials can be an important way for shareholders and other stakeholders to understand governance, compensation, and performance across ANCs. Reduced disclosure may carry more practical weight in those settings than for a small corporation whose shareholders are closely connected to the business. The ANCSA annual report obligation continues It is important not to overstate what HB 126 does. HB 126 changes the state filing proxy requirements. It does not remove the separate obligation under ANCSA itself. That obligation comes from ANCSA at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c), which requires a Native Corporation that would otherwise be subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prepare and transmit to its shareholders an annual report containing substantially the information a company subject to that Act would include. Similarly, ANCs that solicit proxies for an annual meeting are still required to furnish shareholders with those proxy materials under general Alaska corporate law. However, ANCs are now no longer required to transmit proxy statements to the State. ANCs’ reporting obligations to their shareholders are unaffected by HB 126. Any corporation newly exempt from state filing still owes its shareholders a detailed annual report and a proxy statement, even though that report is no longer routed through the State and made public. Reinstatement of dissolved Village Corporations Separately, HB 126 amends AS 10.06.960(k) to remove the prior deadline (previously December 31, 2020) for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. A dissolved Village Corporation may now apply to be reinstated under AS 10.06.633(e) at any time. Reinstatement still runs through the commissioner under AS 10.06.633(e). In general, that means the ANC must apply, cure the neglect or delinquency that led to dissolution, and pay the amounts owed, and the corporation’s name must be available or be changed to one that is. Once reinstated, the corporation and its shareholders are restored to the rights, privileges, liabilities, and obligations they would have had as if the dissolution had never occurred, and corporate and shareholder actions taken during the dissolution are treated as valid. If the previously-used corporate name is no longer available, the board alone may amend the articles to adopt a new name (without the necessity for shareholder approval). 3. Frequently Asked Questions What does HB 126 do? It changes how Alaska measures the 500-shareholder test that decides which ANCs must file proxy and annual report materials with the state. It removes the asset test, and it counts shareholders based on original enrollment rather than the current rolls. It also removes the deadline for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. Which ANCs are affected? Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders, because they may no longer need to file with the Division. Regional Corporations and Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders must continue to file as before. Does HB 126 eliminate all reporting obligations? No. It changes the state filing requirement under AS 45.55.139, but it does not remove the separate ANCSA obligation (43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c)) to provide shareholders with an annual report, and general corporate law still calls for a proxy statement when the ANC solicits proxies. Corporations that remain subject to state filing requirements must also continue to comply with the Division's rules. We think we are now exempt. What should our ANC board and management consider? Confirm your ANC’s original enrollment number and whether your corporation falls below the new threshold. Watch for communications from the State on this topic as they proceed with their research. If your ANC is now exempt, decide how your corporation will meet its continuing ANCSA obligation to shareholders, review proxy and annual meeting materials and timelines, and consider what to communicate to shareholders about any change in how they will receive information. It is worth documenting the basis for any exemption. What should ANC shareholders watch for? Shareholders should watch for how and when they will continue to receive annual report and proxy statement information directly from their ANC, since some material that used to be available through the State’s online website will no longer be publicly filed. If something is unclear, shareholders can ask their ANC how it intends to meet its ANCSA reporting obligations. How Dorsey Can Help HB 126 lightens the State filing load for smaller Village Corporations, but it also raises practical questions: confirming who is exempt, meeting continuing ANCSA obligations to shareholders, keeping proxy and annual meeting processes on track, and maintaining benchmarking when public materials become less available. These are exactly the kinds of judgment calls that benefit from early planning. Dorsey’s attorneys work closely with Alaska Native Corporations and related stakeholders. If you have questions about HB 126, ANC governance, proxy filings, annual reports, disclosure obligations, or shareholder communications, please contact your Dorsey attorney, including the authors of this eUpdate.

Insights

State Affordability Infrastructure Districts (SAIDs) — A Financing Tool for Taiwanese Investment in Arizona Science and Technology Parks

If you have developed a facility inside one of Taiwan's science or technology parks, you are accustomed to the one-stop-shop of government planning the park and delivering the roads, water, power, and other infrastructure before your building is even constructed. In the United States, including Arizona, land development generally does not work that way. In Arizona, the cost of infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, power, and the digital backbone, typically falls on the private landowner and is incurred up front before operations generate revenue to offset that cost. For a company entering the Arizona market, this is often the largest and earliest capital burden of the entire project. Arizona recently created a tool that provides a more cost-effective way for landowners and developer to finance some of that infrastructure. House Bill 2999, signed into law June 2026 and codified at Chapter 40 of Title 48 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, establishes the creation of a State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID). How a SAID Works Landowners are now able to use a SAID to finance public infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, parking, lighting, communications, rail sidings and signalization, and similar improvements, through tax-exempt bonds. The bonds are repaid over up to 30 years and secured solely by the property within the SAID. No city, county, or state credit is pledged, and no obligation falls on other taxpayers, and therefore no city, county, or state approval other than from the Arizona Finance Authority (AFA). In effect, a SAID lets you spread the cost of horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of funding it entirely at the outset. And tax-exempt bonds often offer a lower interest rate than taxable or other types of financing. How a SAID is Formed A SAID is formed upon the filing of a petition with the AFA. The petition must include the finance plan, general plan, estimated costs, maximum tax rate, appraisal, bond counsel certificate, consultant list, petitioner experience, legal description, title report, and other materials. While the landowner is required to provide notice to the local governing jurisdiction, local governing jurisdiction does not have the right to approve or deny. The petition is reviewed administratively by the AFA through a standards-based process. For an inbound investor without long-standing local relationships, an objective, criteria-driven process is a meaningful advantage to the overt political process associated with other financing districts in Arizona. Formation requirements. A SAID requires consent from 100% of landowners within the proposed district; public infrastructure costs must exceed $5 million (easily met at any real scale); the district property must all be in the same county and need not be contiguous provided that noncontiguous property is located within five miles of the district's other property; and the board is initially appointed by the forming owners of the SAID district, later transitioning to election as ownership diversifies. Actual bond issuance requires an election of the SAID property owners. Ownership and corporate structure. Consent rights and board seats run with title. If you hold the Arizona land through a U.S. blocker beneath your Taiwan parent, the standard model for Taiwanese/Arizona real estate and operating investment, the U.S. property-holding entity, rather than it’s corporate parent, is the landowner of record for the district. Before formation, our Dorsey team will confirm that you have the proper corporate structure and board mechanics to be compliant.  Board composition has no citizenship or residency requirement. This is a common concern for foreign investors, and the statute answers it cleanly. Under A.R.S. § 48-7004, a director must either hold fee title to real property in the district or be an individual designated or appointed by a fee-title owner. Corporations, partnerships, and other business entities are expressly permitted to be those owners, to vote as owners, and to designate an individual to serve. There is no requirement that a director be a U.S. citizen or resident. So your U.S. property-holding entity, as landowner of record, can appoint whichever of your principals you choose, including a Taiwan-based individual, as the three-member board.  Power infrastructure limitation. The enacted definition of "public infrastructure" in A.R.S. § 48-7001 does not include electrical power generation or transmission. The reference to electrical facilities appears only as components of lighting and traffic-control systems, and the Legislature removed broader energy infrastructure from the definition during the Senate amendments. A SAID will likely not finance the high-load power infrastructure required for semiconductor fabrication, data storage, or heavy manufacturing.  Water infrastructure within a current utility CC&N. Where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the SAID cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility on completion. Entitlements and zoning: The determination of entitlements, zoning, and other land use permitting, as well as construction permitting for a technology or manufacturing facilities remain with the local jurisdiction and run on a separate track. Our Dorsey team will help you coordinate the financing and entitlement timelines together. Our Dorsey team works regularly with Taiwanese and other Asia-Pacific companies entering the Arizona market. If a SAID fits your project, we can structure it for your cross-border ownership.

News

Patent Partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic Join Dorsey in Palo Alto

Patent partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic have joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Palo Alto, the international law firm announced today. Al Araiza works with clients to develop and implement patent strategies that align with corporate objectives, supporting growth initiatives, financing efforts, and successful exits, including initial public offerings and acquisitions. He advises on building, managing, and optimizing patent portfolios across a broad range of emerging and frontier technologies, with depth in wireless communications, artificial intelligence, and energy innovation. Before practicing law, Al gained engineering experience in the defense industry, working on energy system modeling and communications circuitry design. He also conducted biomedical research, with findings published in peer-reviewed journals. He has been recognized in the IAM Patent 1000 for his work advising clients on patent strategy and portfolio development. Al received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law, his M.E. in Biomedical Engineering from Tulane University, and his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from UCLA. Lena Petrovic works across the software and hardware industries to develop clear, well-supported patent applications. She guides clients through the prosecution process and advises on global trademark and copyright matters, including licensing and portfolio management. Lena regularly supports clients developing technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, fintech, cryptography, interactive and immersive experiences, and digital media, and works with companies in entertainment, gaming, and sports. Before practicing law, Lena spent a decade at Pixar, where she contributed to major films including The Incredibles, Ratatouille, WALL‑E, and Brave. Lena received her J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law, her M.S. in Computer Science from Princeton University, and her B.S. from California Institute of Technology. “Al and Lena bring a practical, technical, and business-focused approach informed by extensive experience working with technology companies, startups, and investors,” said Gina Cornelio, Patent Practice Group Co-Leader. “We are thrilled to welcome them to the Patent team and our growing Palo Alto office.” “Dorsey’s Patent practice is dedicated to understanding each client's business deeply, tailoring patent strategies that directly advance their goals,” said Al Araiza. “We are proud to join this outstanding team and look forward to driving success for our clients.”

Insights

The Long-Awaited Public Infrastructure Financing Solution for Development in Arizona

Every developer who has taken raw Arizona ground to a finished project knows the largest upfront cost other than the land price is almost always the cost to install the public infrastructure. Water, sewer, stormwater, streets, dry utilities, and the fiber backbone all have to be in the ground before a single lot closes or a building opens. That capital is deployed early and generates no return for years. For decades the standard workaround has been the Community Facilities District (CFD). That tool has grown materially harder to use, for reasons cited below, and House Bill 2999, signed in June 2026 and now codified as Chapter 40 of Title 48, is Arizona's response. Some Background I have spent a good part of my career on the other side of this problem. In the 1990s and early 2000s I served as general counsel of SunCor Development Company, one of Arizona's most active master-planned community developers, where we used Community Facilities Districts to finance hundreds of millions of dollars of major infrastructure across Arizona in cities such as Goodyear, Phoenix, Tempe, Litchfield Park, and Prescott Valley. For its time the CFD was an effective structure, and a great deal of what is now on the ground in those communities was financed with this tool. Unfortunately, CFDs have over time become considerably harder to use. Successive legislative amendments have layered on tax-rate ceilings, homebuyer disclosure obligations, and added procedural steps. Another drag on the use of CFDs is that formation of them runs through the municipality, where approval can turn as much on local politics as on the merits of a project. Developers now routinely are asked to absorb delay and uncertainty that a project's economics cannot support, which is a large part of why Arizona has fallen behind Colorado, Texas, and Utah in getting infrastructure financed. A better tool was needed, and Chapter 40 is it. How a SAID Improves on a CFD A State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID) keeps what worked about the CFD: tax-exempt, property-secured, non-recourse infrastructure financing — while shedding much of what made the CFD cumbersome. Its principal advantages over a traditional CFD: Administrative formation. A SAID is formed by the Arizona Finance Authority against fixed statutory criteria, through a yes-or-no compliance review on a sixty-day clock, rather than through the discretionary approval of a city council or a board of supervisors. Insulation from municipal politics. Because formation is a state-level compliance determination, a meritorious project is far less exposed to local political headwinds than it is under the CFD process. Landowner control of the board. A SAID is governed by a board of the landowners — appointed at formation, then elected on an acreage basis. In a typical municipal CFD, the city council sits as the district board; here, the developer controls governance. Advance funding of impact fees. A SAID can use bond proceeds to advance-pay municipal development impact fees, unlike CFDs, removing one of the largest upfront cash burdens in a project. A uniform, statewide process. The criteria are the same regardless of jurisdiction, replacing the municipality-by-municipality variation that has made CFD outcomes hard to predict. Flexible boundaries. A district may include noncontiguous parcels in the same county within five miles of one another, which fits phased and multi-tract development. Capped cost and a fixed timeline. Authority fees to form a district are capped at $15,000, and a complete petition must be acted on within sixty days. The full range of bonds. A SAID may issue general obligation, special assessment, revenue, and refunding bonds, secured solely by district property and creating no obligation for any other taxpayer. What is a SAID A SAID is a special taxing district that the owners of a development form to finance public infrastructure with tax-exempt bonds: general obligation bonds, special assessment bonds, and revenue bonds. The bonds are secured only by the property inside the district and are repaid over the long term, with terms up to 30 years. They do not affect the credit of the city, the county, or the State, and they create no obligation for any taxpayer outside the district. In practical terms, a SAID lets you finance horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of writing the check at the front end. The maximum ad valorem rate securing general obligation bonds is capped by statute at $5.00 per $100 of net assessed limited property valuation, with a limited step-up to cover a debt-service shortfall. SAIDs Work for Commercial as Well as Residential Development The SAID bill drew most of its press as a housing-affordability measure, and it appears to be a strong one. It is the first Arizona district statute to let bond proceeds advance-fund municipal development impact fees, which pulls one of the largest upfront cash burdens off a homebuilder's pro forma. But the statute's eligible infrastructure categories apply with equal force to commercial, industrial, and mixed-use projects. An industrial or logistics project can finance roads, rail crossings, sidings, and grade separations. A life-sciences or technology campus can finance its water, sewer, roads, and broadband the same way a subdivision can. Read Chapter 40 as a general-purpose infrastructure finance platform, not a subdivision-only device. How Formation Works A SAID is formed administratively by the Arizona Finance Authority. The Authority reviews the petition for compliance with the statute; it is a yes-or-no review against fixed criteria, not a discretionary negotiation with a city council or a board of supervisors, and it runs on a sixty-day clock once a complete petition is filed. Formation requires the written consent of 100% of the landowners in the proposed district and an engineer's certification that public infrastructure costs will exceed $5 million. The district may include noncontiguous parcels so long as they lie in the same county and within five miles of the district's other property, which accommodates phased and multi-tract development; if any part of the district sits inside a municipality, the whole district must stay within that municipality's limits or planning area. The Authority's fees to form a district are capped at $15,000. Issuing bonds requires a district election. Governance Simplified A SAID is run by a three-member board. The initial directors are named in the petition; after that, directors are elected by the landowners on an acreage basis as ownership diversifies. Board service runs with ownership; a director must either hold fee title inside the district or be an individual designated by a fee-title owner; and corporations, partnerships, and other entities may hold that ownership, vote as owners, and designate the individual who serves. A district has no power of eminent domain and no zoning authority, and directors may not be officials or employees of the municipality in which the district sits. What a SAID Does Not Do It finances; it does not entitle. Zoning, platting, rezonings, use permits, and the specialized approvals a manufacturing or life-sciences facility may need all remain with the local jurisdiction and proceed on their own track. The financing and entitlement timelines should be coordinated with formation of the SAID, but they are separate processes. Two substantive limits are worth flagging at the planning stage. First, electric power is largely outside the tool: the statutory definition of public infrastructure does not reach power generation or transmission, and broader energy infrastructure was removed from the bill during the Senate amendments. A power-intensive user should not assume a SAID will carry its electrical load. Second, where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the district cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility upon completion. Our Take For most master-planned residential work, and for a wide range of commercial and industrial development, a SAID will be the most efficient infrastructure-financing structure Arizona has offered. The right time to evaluate it is early in the acquisition and pre-development process, while the capital stack, the development agreement, and the entitlement strategy are still being set. Once the district's boundaries, general plan, and financing parameters are set, it is cumbersome at best to bring those into conformance later. Our Dorsey team has begun advising our developer clients on SAID formation on residential, commercial, and industrial projects statewide. If you would like us to assess whether a SAID fits a project you are working on, please reach out.

News

Real Estate Attorney Alexis Olsen Joins Dorsey in Phoenix

Attorney Alexis Olsen has joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP as Of Counsel in the Real Estate group in Phoenix, the law firm announced today. Alexis focuses her practice on large-scale residential, mixed-use, and multi-asset development projects as well as multi-state commercial leasing transactions. She guides clients through sophisticated acquisitions, dispositions, leasing, entity structuring, investment strategies, and due diligence matters. She has structured co-investment arrangements that drive capital deployment into housing subdivisions nationwide and has represented both landlords and tenants in commercial leasing transactions involving office, retail, industrial, and specialty-use properties, including cannabis dispensaries. Alexis received her J.D. from Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law and her B.A. from the University of Arizona. Alexis comes to Dorsey from Squire Patton Boggs. “Alexis strengthens Dorsey’s real estate capabilities at a time when Phoenix remains one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic real estate markets in the country,” said Scott Jenkins, Dorsey’s Phoenix office head. “Her addition further enhances our deep bench of 12 real estate attorneys in Phoenix and reflects our continued investment in serving clients throughout Arizona and supporting their real estate transactions and objectives across the country. We are thrilled to welcome Alexis to Dorsey.” “Joining a firm with such a deep bench of experienced attorneys in the Phoenix office, especially in the Real Estate group, presents an exciting opportunity not just for my own professional growth, but for the clients we service,” said Alexis Olsen. “I look forward to building on this strong foundation, growing our national practice, and delivering top-tier service to our clients.”

News

Dorsey Partner Melissa Raphan Elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers

International law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP is pleased to announce that Partner Melissa Raphan has been elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers (CLEL) as part of its 2026 class. “Melissa’s election to this prestigious fellowship comes as no surprise to those of us who have had the privilege of working with her,” says Peter Nelson, Dorsey’s Managing Partner.  “She is an exceptional employment lawyer, a trusted advisor, and a leader whose impact extends far beyond her matters. Clients rely on her deep knowledge, strategic counsel, and ability to navigate complex workplace disputes and sensitive employment matters with both confidence and compassion. She has helped shape our firm, strengthen our profession, and opened doors for countless others through her commitment to mentorship and diversity. We are incredibly proud of her accomplishments and delighted to see her receive this recognition.” CLEL is a nonprofit professional association that honors the nation’s leading attorneys in the field of labor and employment law. Originally established to recognize excellence in the profession, CLEL has evolved into a respected intellectual and practical resource for the legal community and its many audiences. Its mission centers on recognizing individuals who have made significant contributions to the field, fostering the exchange of knowledge and delivering value to academia, government, the judiciary, and the broader public. Election as a fellow represents the highest level of peer acknowledgment, reflecting sustained achievement, integrity, and a commitment to advancing the profession. Melissa’s career reflects CLEL’s mission. She has been recognized both regionally and nationally for her advocacy, leadership, and achievements both inside and outside of the courtroom. Her employment litigation experience spans class actions, collective actions, and high-stakes individual disputes in state and federal courts, as well as arbitration forums including the American Arbitration Association and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). She is also a trusted advisor on a full range of workplace issues, from hiring and performance management to sensitive terminations and organizational change. She brings decades of experience representing clients across the financial services, healthcare, food and agriculture, and energy sectors. Melissa will be formally inducted during CLEL’s installation ceremony held in conjunction with the American Bar Association’s Labor & Employment Law Conference in Washington, D.C., on November 7.

News

37 Dorsey Attorneys Named 2026 Top Lawyers by Minnesota Monthly

Minnesota Monthly has recognized 37 Dorsey attorneys across 27 practice areas as 2026 Top Lawyers in Minnesota. Honorees are selected through a peer nomination process and a curated survey of practicing attorneys in Minnesota, who identify leading lawyers across a range of practice areas. Administrative / Regulatory Law Jennifer Coates Antitrust Law Michael Lindsay Banking & Financial Service Law Peter Nelson Copyright Law  Jeffrey Cadwell Corporate Law  Robert Hensley Robert Rosenbaum Criminal Defense: White-Collar  Beth Forsythe Edward Magarian RJ Zayed Health Care Law  Claire Topp Immigration Law  J. Mike Sevilla Insurance Law  Daniel Brown Intellectual Property and Patent Law  Stuart Hemphill International Trade Law  Jonathan Van Horn Labor and Employment Law  Edward Magarian Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Land Use & Zoning  Jay Lindgren Marcus Mollison Litigation – Antitrust  Michael Lindsay F. Matthew Ralph Jaime Stilson Litigation – Commercial  Michael Lindsay Litigation – Construction  Eric Ruzicka Litigation – Intellectual Property  Peter Lancaster RJ Zayed Litigation – Labor Employment Benefits  Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Litigation – Trusts and Estates  William J. Berens Theresa Bevilacqua Bridget Logstrom Koci Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions  James K. Langdon Mergers & Acquisitions Law  Keith Ahlgren Rachel Benedict Brian Burke Morgan Helme John Jorgenson Brian Moore Robert Rosenbaum Jonathan Van Horn Bri Whiting Municipal Law Jay Lindgren Nonprofit/Charities Law Claire Topp Securities / Capital Markets Law Cam Hoang Robert Rosenbaum Securities Regulation Theresa Bevilacqua James K. Langdon Tax Law William J. Berens Trusts and Estates Jennifer Ede Bridget Logstrom Koci Sonny Miller Kiley Petty Henry

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Proposed CMS Rule Ramps Up Potential Medicare Fraud Administrative Remedies

On July 6, 2026, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a rule that would expand its administrative remedies to combat potential fraud. The proposed rule is the latest in a round of administrative actions that signal CMS’s intent to aggressively pursue allegations of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and heighten the risk of fraud enforcement against even well-intentioned Medicare and Medicaid providers and suppliers. The proposed rule includes several changes to regulations that govern Medicare billing privileges. Providers and suppliers should be aware that these changes dramatically expand the flexibility afforded to CMS in enrollment and revocation actions, potentially leading to harsh consequences for ministerial and administrative errors. If finalized, moreover, the proposed rule could have material implications for providers and suppliers facing threatened revocation, including heightened risk of overpayment liability and increased hurdles to challenging revocations and denials of enrollment. Added Flexibility to Existing Revocation Grounds CMS has proposed to remove a number of factors that the regulations list as relevant to a determination of whether a provider has engaged in “abuse of billing privileges.” While acknowledging that the inclusion of these factors in the regulations was permissive (requiring consideration only where “as appropriate or applicable”), CMS stated that it must be afforded “the maximum flexibility to address all possible . . . scenarios without the rigid constraints of our existing factors.” CMS provided little guidance as to the outer bounds of what conduct could constitute an “abuse of privileges” that merits revocation of Medicare billing privileges. Instead, CMS noted that a “pattern of practice” of abuse of billing privileges might be established “by a simple finding that several of a provider’s claims do not meet Medicare requirements.” Similarly, CMS has proposed to expand the regulatory provision that permits revocation of enrollment if a provider certifies as “true” false or misleading information in Medicare enrollment application or renewal forms to include any scenario in which a provider submits “false or misleading information on or associated with any CMS Medicare enrollment-related form,” including materials submitted to Medicare contractors. CMS stated that it interprets this expanded rule to include anything related to Medicare enrollment, and not only those submissions that are “intended to gain or maintain Medicare enrollment.” If finalized, the proposed rule would add significant flexibility to CMS’s ability to pursue revocation of a provider’s enrollment. While CMS has assured providers that it would “invoke [the revised regulations]. . . only when legitimately warranted under the facts and circumstances and not as a matter of course,” such expanded flexibility threatens unpredictability in the event of even administrative or ministerial errors in submissions and claims. These changes would, moreover, make it more difficult for providers to challenge a revocation action. Expanded Revocation Grounds In addition to adding flexibility to existing grounds for revocation, CMS’s proposed rule adds to and expands CMS’s already broad authority to revoke provider and supplier enrollment. Such proposed changes include adding the following grounds for revocation: Denial of Enrollment Application. Where CMS could previously revoke a provider’s other enrollments if one enrollment is revoked, CMS would also be able to revoke a provider’s existing enrollments if an application for enrollment submitted by the provider is denied. High-Risk Enrollments. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if it determines the provider or supplier (including owning/managing employees or organizations) poses a high risk of fraud, waste, or abuse due to “. . . an affiliation under [42 C.F.R.] § 424.519” or “the provider’s or supplier’s location within a limited geographic area that has an excessive number of providers and suppliers.” Certain Misdemeanor Convictions. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if a provider or supplier—or its owners, managing employees, managing organizations, officers, or directors—are convicted of a “misdemeanor related to sexual assault or financial misconduct within the past 10 years that CMS deems detrimental to the best interests of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries.” Ownership Changes (HHA, Hospice, DMEPOS). CMS would have broad authority to revoke enrollment of home health agencies, hospices, and DMEPOS suppliers who do not comply with the regulations governing provider changes of ownership. These proposed, expanded grounds for revocation are notably broad, and CMS provides only limited guidance as to what conduct might result in revocation under these grounds. As with the proposed expansion of existing grounds for revocation, the open-ended nature of these proposed grounds for revocation may make it more difficult for providers and suppliers to challenge revocation actions. Expanded Grounds to Deny Medicare Enrollment As with revocations, CMS proposes to expand the grounds under which a provider’s application to enroll in Medicare can be denied. These expanded and additional grounds include many of the grounds added for revocations, but also include: Medicare Debt or Payment Suspension. CMS proposes expanding the ground to deny enrollment based on Medicare debt or payment suspension to include a provider or supplier’s “managing employee, managing organization, or individual or entity with any other form of business or financial relationship with the provider or supplier[.]” Significantly, this expansive definition (called an “associated party” under the proposed regulation) currently contains no material limitations, meaning almost any person or entity with whom an applicant does business could create denial liability. Sharing Locations with Denied/Revoked Providers or Suppliers. CMS would have authority to deny applications where a “provider’s or supplier’s practice location is in the same suite or office as another provider or supplier whose Medicare enrollment has been revoked or denied.” Hospices with Distant Medical Directors or Administrators. CMS would have discretion to deny hospice applications if the hospice’s medical director or administrator serves “multiple other hospices” or practices/is located “at such a distance (for example, in a different state) from the enrolling hospice that the medical director cannot realistically perform all medical director functions,” with a similar provision for administrators. In addition, CMS proposes applications denied for “other program termination or suspension,” may be applied to the provider or supplier in its own name or NPI or that of its owners, managing employees, or managing organization regardless of whether any appeals are pending. Retroactive Revocation CMS proposed to restructure and expand the regulatory grounds for retroactive revocation of billing privileges. Currently, Medicare regulations provide that revocations are, by default, prospective in nature: effective 30 days after CMS or the CMS contractor mails notice to the provider. Under certain circumstances, the regulations provide for revocations to be retroactive, such as when a provider is convicted of a felony, the date a professional license is suspended, revoked, or surrendered, or when a provider submits a false certification in their enrollment application. CMS has proposed to reframe the rule so as to default to retroactive revocation of billing privileges. CMS expressed concern that providers may collect payment from Medicare while remaining so non-compliant with enrollment requirements as to merit revocation. To address this concern, CMS proposed that all revocations be retroactive to the date of determined non-compliance.[1] As a result, providers suspected of misconduct or non-compliance are likely to face claims of retroactive overpayments in addition to the immediate concern no longer receiving Medicare payments while their enrollment is revoked. Reapplication Bar CMS’s proposed rule expands the grounds from which a provider may be prohibited from seeking reapplication as a Medicare provider. Under current regulations, CMS may prohibit prospective providers from enrolling in Medicare for up to 10 years if its enrollment application is denied because the applicant submitted false or misleading information in its application. Under the proposed rule, CMS will have the discretion to prohibit a provider from enrolling in Medicare if their enrollment application is denied for any reason. Conclusion As a part of the federal government’s increasingly aggressive push to combat real or perceived healthcare fraud, the proposed rule both broadens CMS’s authority to revoke and deny Medicare enrollment and raises the stakes for revocation and denial. What the proposed rule does not share is how CMS plans to exercise this expanded discretion: as a result, the proposed rule, if enacted, increases the unpredictability and potential ramifications of even technical noncompliance with CMS rules. As a result, Medicare providers should keep a close eye on potential revisions to these rules and their potential implementation and consider proactively evaluating their compliance under CMS standards. [1] In the proposed rule, CMS identifies, with respect to each ground for revocation, what it will consider to be the effective date of revocation.

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Litigation Privilege Does Not Automatically Protect Communications with Funders: The Commercial Court Clarifies the Limits of Privilege in the Context of Litigation Funding

In Uber London Ltd & Ors v Garry White & Ors; Mishcon de Reya LLP [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that documents created to help a funder decide whether to invest in a claim will not ordinarily attract litigation privilege. This means that information a firm gathers while acting for a funder can later fall within the control of the claimants it goes on to represent in the same matter. Background The Claimants (a claim group of over 10,000 individual London black cab drivers and the assignee of two former minicab operators) alleged that the Defendants (three companies in the Uber group) obtained and retained their private hire operator's licence through an unlawful means conspiracy alleged to involve fraud. Because the claims were issued outside the ordinary six-year limitation period, the Claimants relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, contending they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud before June 2018. A preliminary issue trial was listed to determine the question of whether the Claimants discovered, or could have discovered with reasonable diligence, the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment only after June 2018. The Claimants were represented by Mishcon de Reya ("MdR"). However, before MdR’s engagement with the individual drivers had begun, in late 2017 it was engaged by the litigation funder Harbour to investigate the merits and value of the potential claim. During that stage, MdR corresponded extensively with Harbour and with the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association ("LTDA"), a black cab drivers' trade association. MdR was not formally engaged by the Claimants until October 2018 onwards. Once the proceedings had started, the Defendants sought disclosure of communications exchanged between MdR and Harbour before the engagement of MdR by the Claimants (the "Harbour Communications"). This included correspondence between MdR and Harbour, communications with the LTDA, and documents held on MdR's file opened in Harbour's name in connection with the potential claim. The Claimants resisted disclosure on four grounds: (i) that the documents were not relevant; (ii) on the grounds of litigation privilege; (iii) that the documents were outside their control; and (iv) that disclosure occurring so close to trial would be disproportionate. Judgment (i) Were the Harbour Communications relevant to the preliminary issue? The Court held that the Harbour Communications were likely to contain relevant material, on two bases. First, where the Claimants or the LTDA had communicated directly with MdR, that material could shed light on individual Claimants' actual knowledge of the alleged facts. Secondly, what MdR and Harbour had discovered during their investigation could inform the question of what a Claimant could reasonably have discovered at the time (even though the Defendants accepted that MdR's knowledge could not simply be imputed to the Claimants). (ii) Were the Harbour Communications protected by litigation privilege? As set out in the classic cases of Three Rivers (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 and WH Holding Ltd v E20 Stadium LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2652, communications between parties or their solicitors and third parties for the purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation are privileged when the following conditions are satisfied: Litigation must be in progress or in reasonable contemplation. The communications must have been made for the sole or dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The litigation must be adversarial, not investigative or inquisitorial. The Court rejected the Claimant’s claim to be able to withhold the Harbour Communications on the basis of litigation privilege. The Court confirmed that litigation privilege protects only communications created for the dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The Court found that Harbour had instructed MdR so that Harbour could decide whether to fund the proceedings. As such, the dominant purpose of the communications was in relation to funding, not the conduct of litigation. This was distinguished from the situation where an individual litigant who takes its own funding decision. In that situation, the decision whether to fund and the decision whether to litigate are one and the same, made by the person who will actually be the claimant, and so it forms a part of that person's conduct of their own litigation. In contrast, a third-party funder's commercial decision whether to fund someone else's claim is not necessarily part of conducting that litigation. The fact that litigation privilege can, in principle, be claimed by a non-party funder (as recognised in the case of Al Sadeq v Dechert [2024] EWCA 28) did not assist Harbour, since there was no evidence it intended to play any role in the litigation itself beyond funding it. Communications between Harbour and MdR did remain capable of attracting another kind of privilege: legal advice privilege, because of the solicitor-client relationship between Harbour and MdR. But communications with third parties such as the LTDA were not automatically protected in the same way. (iii) Were the Harbour Communications within the Claimants' control? The Court also rejected the argument that the Harbour Communications sat outside the Claimants' control because they belonged to Harbour and not the Claimants. The Court’s reasoning was that once the individual Claimant drivers became MdR's clients, MdR also owed them a duty to disclose material information. That included information that MdR had originally acquired while acting for Harbour. As held in the case of Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood (a firm) [2005] 1 WLR 567, a solicitor owing duties to two clients cannot simply prefer one over the other, and it was unrealistic to suppose MdR would investigate the same claims for Harbour, then represent the Claimants, while disregarding everything it had already learned. The obvious commercial expectation was that this earlier work would be used to advance the Claimants' case. MdR sought to rely on a confidentiality clause in a 2024 retainer agreement between it and RGL Management Ltd (a claims management company acting on behalf of the Claimants) to argue that it was relieved of any duty to disclose information obtained while acting for other clients. The provision stated that MdR may "have acted for persons in the same or similar sector as yours and by agreeing to the terms of this letter you agree that will have no duty to disclose to you any confidential information that we have obtained, or might in the future obtain, from acting for such persons or which is derived from any other source". The Court rejected this on several grounds. Claimants who had already become MdR's clients had an existing right to information in the Harbour Communications where it was relevant to their claims before the 2024 retainer agreement. If they were to surrender that right, it would have required their informed consent (also required under the SRA Code of Conduct). The Court found no evidence that such informed consent had been given. The terms had simply been made available to the Claimants through a portal, with no indication that Claimants understood they were giving up existing rights to relevant information. The Court found that even if the terms had been contractually binding, that would not have amounted to informed consent. In addition, the wording of the clause was not sufficiently clear to show that the Claimants had agreed to waive access to this information. (iv) Was disclosure reasonable, proportionate, and necessary at this stage? The Claimants argued that it was neither reasonable nor proportionate for disclosure to be given at such a late stage (approximately two weeks before the start of the preliminary issue trial) and that it was not necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings. The Court rejected this, but it drew a distinction between two categories of documents within the Harbour Communications: Documents bearing on the actual knowledge of the individual drivers, including communications with the LTDA, were not privileged, likely straightforward to review, and directly relevant to the preliminary issue. Their disclosure was ordered as reasonable, proportionate, and necessary. Documents reflecting only MdR's or Harbour's own assessment of the merits were of more marginal, indirect relevance and largely likely to fall under legal advice privilege. A review to isolate the smaller pool of non-privileged material in this category would be time-consuming for limited benefit, so this was excluded from the order. Key Points to Note The judgment is an important reminder of several practical points: However closely a funder is involved in evaluating a claim's merits, litigation privilege will only apply to communications where the sole or dominant purpose of the communication is the conduct of litigation, not the funder's own decision on whether to finance it. Unless that communication separately attracts legal advice privilege, it may need to be disclosed. The same considerations apply to other communications. For example, in RBS Rights Litigation [2017] 1 WLR 3539 the argument that an After the Event (ATE) policy was subject to litigation privilege was rejected on a similar basis. Whilst in this case, there was no dispute as to whether litigation was in contemplation, it is important to note that litigation privilege will not automatically apply to the investigative stages of a claim, i.e. before litigation is in contemplation. Even where litigation is reasonably contemplated, the dominant purpose test must still be satisfied. Material created primarily for fact-finding, risk assessment, or other investigative purposes will not attract litigation privilege unless those activities are actually undertaken for the dominant purpose of conducting the litigation. (See The Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2017] EWHC 1017 (QB)). When engaging a law firm, clients should ensure that they understand whether the firm has previously obtained information about their claim while acting for another party (for example, a funder or another interested party) and how that information will be handled. Any restrictions on the firm’s ability to share relevant information with the client should be explained clearly at the outset, including what information may be withheld and why. If this decision raises questions about your own funding arrangements, disclosure strategy, or privilege position, please get in touch with our Commercial Litigation team.