.

How AI is Reshaping US Copyright Law

September 24, 2025

by Kent J. Schmidt and J. Michael Keyes

Download as a PDF

Share this page

The creative industries, including music and all forms of publishing, have been disrupted perhaps more than any other in the wake of the AI revolution, as new creative powers are unleased, allowing anyone to generate new content with ease.  With these innovation comes litigation risks of copyright infringement. Courts are keeping pace with these rapid AI advancements, applying well-known principles such as “fair use” and other copyright doctrines. In this episode, Kent Schmidt interviews Dorsey Partner Mike Keyes on one such AI copyright case and what it means for creative industries managing copyright litigation risks in an AI-dominated world.

This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

Transcript

Schmidt

[00:00] Welcome to another episode of SharkCast.  Today I’m pleased to welcome back to the virtual SharkCast studios my partner and friend Mike Keyes who’s back for another episode following his first episode a number of months ago.  So, Mike welcome back.  Thank you for rejoining us here at SharkCast.

Keyes

[00:22] Kent, great to see you.  Thanks for having me back.  Always a pleasure to be with you.

Schmidt

[00:26] Well Mike, today we’re gonna talk about AI and copyright.  And before we dig into copyright law, just an observation, it seems like in almost every conversation with family members or colleagues or neighbors or whatever, somehow, someway, AI comes up.  Because everyone’s starting to discover the millions of applications of AI and it’s also the fact that AI is covered in conferences and events and CLEs continually and we want to make we’re adding new value added material and not just mimicking the content of others.  But do you find that in your circles that AI is just sort of a topic of conversation everywhere you turn.

Keyes

[01:18] I think that’s exactly right Kent.  And at the risk of overstating it, I think it’s probably the biggest copyright related issue in our history frankly.

Schmidt

[01:28] It is, and it’s just permeating in our lives.  I chuckle when I think about this, but I decided a couple weekends ago to try my hand at making homemade French baguettes with flour sourced from France.  And I didn’t use a cookbook, I used a combination of YouTube videos and AI to help me through the process and to sort of learn the process for the first time.  They turned out okay...

Keyes

[01:58] I love it.

Schmidt

[01:59] ...But not like right up to the standards but.

Keyes

[02:02] You’re not going to quit your day job.

Schmidt

[02:04] No, not quite yet.  But if I’m now using AI to make French baguettes, then I think it can be used for virtually anything.  And of course, no industry has been impacted by AI as much as what we would call the creative industries, you know, music and books and what is, comes under the heading of publishing but perhaps even broader than that.  AI is allowing everyone to be creative, everyone to be a publisher of course.  And there in lies the problem.  So, Mike you come from a background of IP litigation with particular emphasis and focus, at least in part, on copyright, so I’d like to chat with you about copyright infringement claims and how they’re being impacted by AI.  We have a number of topics we’re gonna unfold here but can you just give us a general observation at the outset about this.  And what I like to do is hear your reaction then we can give it our listeners a little bit of a level set or refresher on some AI concepts and then talk about a decision in particular relating to AI and conclude with some thoughts on litigation risk avoidance, my favorite topic, in the context of AI.  So...

Keyes

[03:42] Yeah.

Schmidt

[03:43] ...What are your overall thoughts on AI and copyright infringement in particular.

Keyes

[03:50] Yeah, I think you really hit the nail on the head at the outset of today’s episode.  I mean it’s such a gargantuan issue in the world of copyright.  As I mentioned, I think it’s the biggest copyright related issue that we’ve ever faced in the history of copyright.  And copyright goes back to the founding of our country.  Our first copyright act was enacted in 1790.  It was very limited at the time, as you can imagine, it only protected, I think it was books and maps, at the time, and charts maybe or graphs.  But since then with technological revolutions including the player piano in the early 1900s, to radio broadcasts in the 20s and 30s, to Sony Betamax machine from the 1980s, the digital revolution of course of the 90s and 2000s...

Schmidt

[04:43] The Napster era.

Keyes

[04:43] ...And now of course we’re at AI.  Napster, exactly, right, right, right.  So we’ve seen over the course of our history a number of technologies that have come into play that didn’t exist and copyright had to adapt.  Either through court decision or frankly it was more court decisions trying to catch up with copyright and then Congress stepping in to amend the Federal Copyright Act.  So, I think we’re seeing, we’re on the cusp of a, not on the cusp, we’re in the kinda the bullseye of copyright evolution 7.0 or whatever it would be at this point with AI.

Schmidt

[05:25] Well, and you mentioned that concept of courts trying to catch up with technology and of course that relates to how swiftly technology is changing and we’ve never seen that acceleration quite like we have in the last two to three years when AI has come into I guess common use.  I mean AI has been around much longer than the last two years, but...

Keyes

[05:52] For sure.

Schmidt

[05:52] ...It seemed like it just hit, you know, homes and consumers within the last couple years and so it’s moving, the technology’s moving so fast, and courts are really having to catch up, right.

Keyes

[06:09] Yeah, that’s exactly right.  I mean just like with other technological evolutions, I mentioned the player pianos from the early 1900s where, you know, the supreme case involving piano rolls for player pianos.  It went all to the US Supreme Court.  And the Court said well this really isn’t a copy, you know, the perforated piano rolls that used to stick into player pianos, Court said that’s not a copy.  Well, of course, Congress stepped in and amended the Copyright Act to deal with the notion of what are called mechanical licenses, and we still have mechanical licenses that are part and parcel to the Copyright Act today.

Schmidt

[06:48] So, you’ve laid a little bit of the groundwork but lets, you know, talking about the origins of copyright law, but can you give us just an overview of US copyright law in just a few minutes.  I know that’s a challenge.  With particular emphasis on the fair use doctrine, which a lot of people invoke and use sort of like the phrase hearsay or other legal concepts that people through around but actually has a specific and defined meaning.

Keyes

[07:23] Sure, well I’ll do my best here Kent.  So, as I mentioned our first copyright act is from the 1790s.  Copyright is a concept that’s actually enshrined in the Constitution in Article 1, it’s one of those specific instances mentioned in the Constitution that Congress has the right to protect artists and inventors, or authors and inventors and give them a limited monopoly over their works and inventions.  And so that led to respectively the Copyright Act and the Patent Act.  The Copyright Act has been amended over the course of many years but it essentially protects in its current formulation what are defined as works of authorship.  And you can think of that as being fairly broadly defined to include things such as books, movies, architectural works, paintings, you know, creative works if you will as a shorthand.  And so it gives certain exclusive rights to authors that allow them to prohibit the copying of those works, distribution of copies and other related rights.  So that’s essentially the bundle of sticks that copyright authors enjoy.  Now you mentioned the concept of fair use, there’s also built into this statute this whole notion of fair use, in section 107 of the Copyright Act, that provides that it shall be an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement, that someone has used someone else’s work in a manner that the law considers fair.  Kind of the quintessential fair use would be in the academic realm, it’s not exclusively for academic related purposes but, you know, a professor copies a portion of an article and distributes that copy of the article to his or her students to teach a concept.  We think of that being kind of quintessential type of fair use, but there are certainly other instances too.  We’ve a couple of recent fair use cases over the last, it’s been over the last few decades now, but most recently a couple years ago the Supreme Court weighed in on the whole concept of fair use and copyright.  So we have a bit of guidance from the courts, but ultimately it’s such a fact specific issue, it’s going to turn on the set of facts that are presented to the court in the context of litigation between the parties that are at issue in the lawsuit.

Schmidt

[10:00] And can you comment briefly on registration and how that impacts the rights of the author to assert a claim for copyright infringement.

Keyes

[10:13] Sure, so under the Copyright Act, there is a method by which you can register your copyright with the Library of Congress.  It’s a fairly straight forward process.  You take a copy of your work, you submit it along with an application electronically to the Library of Congress and they examine it, there’s an examiner at the copyright office within the Library of Congress that will take a quick look to make sure that the prerequisites are met and then you’ll get your work registered.  Now you don’t need to register your work in order for you to have protection.  Under US law you receive copyright protection once your work is what we call fixed in a tangible medium of expression.  So, once it’s fixed and it’s perceptible you have copyright protection in that.  Now it’s always best to register your work because you get certain enhanced remedies as a result of registration.  And if it’s a US work you actually can’t sue copyright infringement until it’s registered with the Library of Congress.

Schmidt

[11:18] I see.  Okay, those are important foundations for our discussion that follows.  But before we talk about AI, can you explain some of the ways in which copyright law has been adapting to what we might say a modern technology including software code, including new digital applications and so forth that I think lead up to the courts deciding cases involving AI.

Keyes

[11:54] Sure so, I guess I’d go back to the 1990s when the internet exploded and we had all sorts of issues with distribution and copying, making digital copies and reproductions of works.  That’s one of the instances where Congress stepped in and passed what’s called the Digital Millenium Copyright Act.  And so it’s been with us for a couple of decades.  It works reasonably well.  But we see copyright infringement related claims in all sorts of concepts both in business and non-business setting alike.

Schmidt

[12:13] I mean one way I would understand it is that all that technology has made it easier to copy all types of things, all types of media, and with the ease with which people can copy and transform, which is something we’re gonna talk about in a minute, or transform to at least a certain extent, there are more copyright claims than ever because everyone has this ability to copy that you didn’t have before, that was more tedious to do before.  And so every time there’s a technology that allows someone to copy you have more and more copyright claims.  Let’s talk about the transformative aspects of a copyright claim.  Just putting it in very basic terms, how courts have dealt with this concept of the ability of a person to take something that has protection and then transform it until it no longer is a copy, but it is something that’s new.  What are the general principals that relate to that.

Keyes

[13:44] Yeah, so we could probably have a whole series of podcasts related to transformation when it comes to copyright.  But essentially, I think it’s best to think of this in, with the kinda dual principles associated with the Copyright Act.  What we’re trying to do is, we’re trying to incentivize authors and other creators to create works of authorship, to have a really robust output of creative content.  Yet at the same time we’re also trying to balance that people will take another work and add to it and transform it and add to the betterment of society as a result.  And so we have on the one hand we want to provide exclusive rights to authors so that they make sure that they’re incentivized to create works, but at the same time we don’t want to squelch the creativity completely of other people.  We want them to be able to, you know, we all stand on the shoulders of giants, right.  So, we all want to incentivize future creators and authors to take what’s in the existing corpus and be able to transform it and use it to create more works.  So that’s kinda the inherent tension that we have between copyright protection on the one hand and fair use on the other.  And one of the elements that courts really look to try and balance those somewhat competitive interests is to look at, and this is one the probably the most important fair use factor, it’s the transformation that has been where the second comer has used the first creators work and transformed it in a meaningful way to create a new purpose or to create a new work that still incorporates parts of the preexisting work.

Schmidt

[15:44] That inherently sounds like a very difficult line to draw just by your description and it’s a great segway to talk about the case that we’ve teed up here.  It is Andrea Bartz et. al. vs. Anthropic, the AI, one the major AI platforms.  It was issued by Judge Alsup in the Northern district of California in June of 2025.  So why don’t we talk about this case, this important case.  I’ve enjoyed reading it.  We’ve had some discussion back and forth offline, but for our listeners can you summarize what the case is about and then we’ll get into how Judge Alsup applied some of these principles we’ve been talking about in the brave new world of AI.

Keyes

[16:36] You bet.  So this is an actual class action lawsuit that has been filed by a number of authors.  And as you mentioned they sued Anthropic which was actually founded by a number of former OpenAI employees that launched this new venture back, I think it was in 2021.  And so they launched this new venture Anthropic which is a large language model that’s branded under the name Claude.  And so what they did here, allegedly according to the lawsuit, is they did a couple of things.  They trained Claude using I guess two different types of works although they were all works of authorship, they’re all books for the most part.  What they did initially is they obtained what Judge Alsup refers to as pirated copies of some of these books that were available on the dark web and other locations where you could actually go and download them.  And so, Anthropic initially started using pirated copies of books and a huge number of them to train Claude, but then ultimately started using actual copies that they obtained legally.  And what they did, they obtained copies, Anthropic did, and its employees and other agents, obtained copies of, physical copies, of the books at issue and then digitized them to create a massive library and also used that to train the LLMs.  So the authors were not happy about this, claimed that the process of taking the works both the properly obtained physical copies and digitizing them was an act of infringement and then also using the pirated copies to train the LLM was also an act of infringement.  So that’s the basic claim at issue in the suit.

Schmidt

[18:44] And the decision that we’re going to discus was on a motion for summary judgment which...

Keyes

[18:50] Right.

Schmidt

[18:50] ...It was interesting to me just as a litigator that they sort of bypass class certification and bypass a motion to dismiss and just went straight to summary judgment and front and center in the motion for summary judgment is whether this is a fair use, of course a distinction being drawn between the pirated copies and the copies that were legitimately obtained.  So how did Judge Alsup come down on these issues for training the LLM with both pirated and legitimately obtained copies.

Keyes

[19:27] Yeah, so we talked a moment ago about the whole notion of transformative uses and conceptually what Judge Alsup said was, look, for purposes of training the LLM, this really is a very transformative use of someone else’s copyrighted work.  I think he said, exceedingly, it’s exceedingly transformative.  And quote, spectacularly so.  So Judge Alsup really is onboard with the whole notion of, at least in theory, using someone else’s copyrighted work to train an LLM is very transformative in it’s own right.  So, in that regard, certainly that was welcome news to Anthropic and other AI developers, that look, we do have a pretty solidly in our camp ruling that using copyrighted works to train an LLM is in fact transformative and is a fair use.

Schmidt

[20:29] Let me interject a question just to make sure I’m clear as from a very practical standpoint what you’re understanding is as to what we’re talking about for training.  So for example, I think my son’s favorite, one of his favorite authors is Cormac McCarthy who writes in a very unique style and so if you uploaded all of Cormac McCarthy’s novels, however many there are, I think he passed away a year or so ago, you could then allow a user to say I want you to write this in a Cormac McCarthy style, a subject completely different and it would understand that style.  Is that a correct understanding as far as you know from what is being referred to here as training the LLM.

Keyes

[21:25] I think that’s right.  And there’s a very important limitation on what this case is about.  This case is about inputs not about outputs.  So, what I mean by that is all Judge Alsup’s ruling deals with is whether the concept of training an LLM with copyrighted content, whether that’s a fair use.  And we do have an answer on that rather narrow but very important issue.  There’s a whole other outstanding issue as to, well what about the outputs, what are those, are they potentially infringing.  It doesn’t rule on that specific issue at all, doesn’t even touch it.  And it says look this is just about, Judge Alsup says this is just about the whole notion of training.  So, we only have really one, an answer to part of the equation here when it comes to a claim for copyright infringement.

Schmidt

[22:25] So lets extend the Cormac McCarthy illustration to see if we can understand the inputs and outputs.  The scenario I just described where the, you know, let’s assume that they’re all legitimately obtained, someone goes buys all the books, a copy of all the books, and they train an LLM to write in the style, or put out in the style of Cormac McCarthy, that’s be a legitimate output, legitimate input under the, Judge Alsup’s formulation but a question he didn’t decide is that would allow the user to essentially say give me the cliff notes version of the book or give me a condensed version of the book.  That’s an output that he didn’t reach and that perhaps other courts have reached or will reach.  Is that the distinction between input and output.

Keyes

[23:27] I think that’s exactly correct.  He didn’t reach that other very important issue as to the outputs, the content that’s created by the AI.  And whether that would be infringing and who would be the infringer in that instance.  So that’s not answered by Anthropic.  There’s another case, I mean there’s probably I would say three dozen AI cases that are pending in various federal courts throughout the country, but one that was recently filed that I think will get to that issue is a case involving Disney where it sued, and I think there’s both the inputs and outputs issue involved there with respect to that AI.  That was a case that was just filed, I think it’s in, down in your neck of the woods Kent, in central district of California.  And so we’ll see, I suspect we may get an answer both on the inputs and outputs question there.

Schmidt

[24:26] Okay, well I sense another episode of SharkCast maybe a year or so from now.

Keyes

[24:32] There you go.

Schmidt

[24:33] But in the meantime, let me just sort of get, put you on the spot Mike, if you don’t mind.

Keyes

[24:38] Please.

Schmidt

[24:38] And ask you if you’d put the black robe on for a moment, and you’re a district court judge, you’re also a creative guy.  We’ve talked about in the last podcast about your music background, you have a lot of works that you’ve done and created particularly in the music space.  What are your thoughts on this, on how Judge Alsup decided at least this case and to the extent you have thoughts on these issues that remain to be decided.  Do you think the courts are find the right balance in that tension you talked about between encouraging new works and protecting the authors and originators of works.

Keyes

[25:27] Yeah, you know, I must say I’ve kind of gone back and forth a little bit, but I have a lot of respect for Judge Alsup.  He’s been involved as you know in a ton of cases involving technology.  His opinions are always a good read.  I think his analysis is correct.  I think that in this particular circumstance with the books that were legally obtained and using them for a very transformative purpose of training an LLM, I think that is the type of transformative use that the Copyright Act should encourage.  Now that being said, I think ultimately, we’re going to need some sort of congressional guidance here in terms of what exactly are the proper boundaries here.  You know there is a bill that’s pending, I’m not sure how far along it is, the TRAIN Act.  It was proposed by a group of senators about transparency in training LLMs.  Yeah, I see some utility in that but it only answers part of the equation again.  Or only provides specific information and I’d say the TRAIN Act itself presupposes that training an LLM would be an act of infringement which is kind of contrary to what Judge Alsup just told us, at least in the limited context of that case.  So, I think we’re gonna need to have some sort of congressional action here that really does tell us what the proper balance is.  And how that typically works in the copyright context is you get a whole bunch of stakeholders together, there’s a whole series of hearings and meeting with Congress and they try to hammer out what the statute should look like as a result of hearing from all these stakeholders.

Schmidt

[27:26] Yeah that seems to be a very, very important piece of the process rather than Congress just starting to tackle these questions on its own without that input from the stakeholders.  Well, one of the things I want to cover also because the whole purpose of this podcast and what I write and speak about is litigation avoidance.  So, whether is relates to AI or not, I’d like you to address from a very practical standpoint the steps that companies should take to minimize copyright infringement risk, litigation risk.  And if you can address some of the way perhaps outside the sort of stereotypical basic copyright infringement where someone just photocopies an entire book or something of that nature.  You know stands at the photocopier for hours and hours, that’s kind of an obvious thing.  But what are the ways that copyright claims sneak up and arise for a company that doesn’t intend to violate the law or anyone’s rights and yet they find themselves embroiled in a major piece of copyright litigation.

Keyes

[28:42] Sure, yeah, I mean the number of, or types of instances of copyright infringement are vast these days particularly with AI.  I mean we’ve seen claims related to an employee taking, for example, a competitor’s marketing collateral, feeding it into an LLM and having a whole different type of work created but it has a similar look and feel, it has similar graphical elements and so on and so forth.  Something like that is so easy to do from an employment perspective as far as the employee doing that.  I mean we see a lot of instances where the inputs are provided to the LLM and you ask the LLM, hey, create this output that looks something like this.  I think there’s numerous instances where that sort of thing is happening and can create potential exposure.  So your point about litigation risks and mitigating those I think it’s so important in this context to make sure that, you know, companies should have AI policies related to what employees can and can’t do with respect to AI.  I mean super valuable tool to have at your disposal for doing all sorts of things quickly and efficiently but again need to be careful to balance against the rights of third parties and make sure that you’re kind of staying on that side of the line that wouldn’t lead to a claim of infringement.

Schmidt

[30:20] Well that sounds like a very, very tricky area to navigate.

Keyes

[30:23] Very.

Schmidt

[30:24] Constantly evolving.  And the ability to, as I said earlier, the ability copy means the ability to create a copyright infringement claim so easily.  And I appreciate what you said about policies.  I guess I would add every time I hear about company policies, I always want to add the addendum to training as well.  Because policies...

Keyes

[30:47] So true.

Schmidt

[30:48] ...Policies without training are often, perhaps even worse than no policy at all.  Because you know people violating a policy but not really understanding the policy or forgetting the policy.

Keyes

[31:00] That’s absolutely true.  I mean it’s critical that employees understand at least at a high level what the issues are here and what we’re trying to avoid as a company in terms of running afoul of the law and running into potential copyright infringement claims.  So you’re exactly right.  Policy without training, and regular training and reminders isn’t much of a policy at all.

Schmidt

[31:24] Do you do some of that training in your practice of advising companies on not only their policy but offering some guidance on the training or doing the training yourself.

Keyes

[31:35] We absolutely had.  Particularly in the context of creating advertising campaigns, so yes it’s something that we have been regularly involved in recently.

Schmidt

[31:46] Very good.  Well I like all that litigation avoidance work.

Keyes

[31:50] I know you do Kent.

Schmidt

[31:54] The ounce of prevention is worth the pound of cure in [UNINTELLIGIBLE]...

Keyes

[31:57] Yeah, no doubt.

Schmidt

[31:58] ...Different areas.  Well that is about the extent of our time to talk about copyright infringement.  And as a veteran of the SharkCast podcast you know we like to end with sort of a lighter note, talking about things outside the law, the world that exists out there.  And when we were trying to schedule a time to record this episode you mentioned in passing that you had a road trip and it piqued my interest and I don’t really know much about it.  I know a couple of facts but can you tell our listeners about your recent, sounds like epic road trip that you went on.

Keyes

[32:37] It was rather epic I would say.  So yes, when we tried to schedule this before I said, you know I’ve had something come up.  I’m going on a bit of a unexpected road trip with my son.  We drove from Washington state with a U-Haul and his car behind the U-Haul, drove up all the way up to Anchorage.  2,515 miles to be exact.  So we had an amazing time.  That’s a part of the world that I hadn’t from that perspective.  I’ve flown to Anchorage many, many times but never witnessed it on the ground and it was truly, truly sensational.  Great father, son bonding experience.

Schmidt

[33:16] How many days did it take you.

Keyes

[33:18] It took us five, which was about 500 miles a day, which doesn’t sound that grueling, but when you’re on the Alaska highway and it’s two lanes and you gotta be constantly on the lookout for wildlife and so on and so forth, it’s a long 500 miles a day.

Schmidt

[33:37] Yeah, I’m sure, I’m sure.  A lot of really fantastic conversations with your son I’m sure.

Keyes

[33:44] Amazing.  Yeah, it was great.  It was super memorable.  Now that said I probably won’t ever do it again.  But it was sure a blast.

Schmidt

[33:53] Yeah.  Did you stop in on the Dorsey Anchorage office while you were there do you at the...

Keyes

[34:00] I did.

Schmidt

[34:00] ...to Seattle.

Keyes

[34:03] No, I stopped by and said hi to all of our friends up there and regaled them with some of my Alaska highway stories which people really got a kick out of.

Schmidt

[34:12] Well that’s fantastic.  Well Anchorage, I have not been to Anchorage either by road or flight and so it’s definitely on my list of places to get to whether for business or pleasure or actually probably more likely a combination of both.

Keyes

[34:26] There you go.

Schmidt

[34:27] Thanks for sharing that with us.  Well, that’s about all the time we have for this episode of SharkCast.  I’d like to thank you again for being here and very interesting conversation.  I’m sure we’ll reconnect probably next year to talk about some of the emerging decisions in this area or other IP related areas.  So thank you for being here.

Keyes

[34:54] I would really enjoy that Kent.  So I’ll look forward to next time and thanks again for having me.  Always a pleasure.

Schmidt

[35:00] As always I’m indebted to the extraordinary team at Dorsey for making this podcast and episode possible.  For more resources on this and other litigation risks, go to litigationrisks.com where more information can be found including a book on managing litigation risk written by yours truly.  Until next time my friends this is yet another reminder that are there are a lot of sharks swimming out there in the murky waters so swim safely.

Firm Highlights

News

Patent Partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic Join Dorsey in Palo Alto

Patent partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic have joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Palo Alto, the international law firm announced today. Al Araiza works with clients to develop and implement patent strategies that align with corporate objectives, supporting growth initiatives, financing efforts, and successful exits, including initial public offerings and acquisitions. He advises on building, managing, and optimizing patent portfolios across a broad range of emerging and frontier technologies, with depth in wireless communications, artificial intelligence, and energy innovation. Before practicing law, Al gained engineering experience in the defense industry, working on energy system modeling and communications circuitry design. He also conducted biomedical research, with findings published in peer-reviewed journals. He has been recognized in the IAM Patent 1000 for his work advising clients on patent strategy and portfolio development. Al received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law, his M.E. in Biomedical Engineering from Tulane University, and his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from UCLA. Lena Petrovic works across the software and hardware industries to develop clear, well-supported patent applications. She guides clients through the prosecution process and advises on global trademark and copyright matters, including licensing and portfolio management. Lena regularly supports clients developing technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, fintech, cryptography, interactive and immersive experiences, and digital media, and works with companies in entertainment, gaming, and sports. Before practicing law, Lena spent a decade at Pixar, where she contributed to major films including The Incredibles, Ratatouille, WALL‑E, and Brave. Lena received her J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law, her M.S. in Computer Science from Princeton University, and her B.S. from California Institute of Technology. “Al and Lena bring a practical, technical, and business-focused approach informed by extensive experience working with technology companies, startups, and investors,” said Gina Cornelio, Patent Practice Group Co-Leader. “We are thrilled to welcome them to the Patent team and our growing Palo Alto office.” “Dorsey’s Patent practice is dedicated to understanding each client's business deeply, tailoring patent strategies that directly advance their goals,” said Al Araiza. “We are proud to join this outstanding team and look forward to driving success for our clients.”

Insights

Litigation Privilege Does Not Automatically Protect Communications with Funders: The Commercial Court Clarifies the Limits of Privilege in the Context of Litigation Funding

In Uber London Ltd & Ors v Garry White & Ors; Mishcon de Reya LLP [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that documents created to help a funder decide whether to invest in a claim will not ordinarily attract litigation privilege. This means that information a firm gathers while acting for a funder can later fall within the control of the claimants it goes on to represent in the same matter. Background The Claimants (a claim group of over 10,000 individual London black cab drivers and the assignee of two former minicab operators) alleged that the Defendants (three companies in the Uber group) obtained and retained their private hire operator's licence through an unlawful means conspiracy alleged to involve fraud. Because the claims were issued outside the ordinary six-year limitation period, the Claimants relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, contending they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud before June 2018. A preliminary issue trial was listed to determine the question of whether the Claimants discovered, or could have discovered with reasonable diligence, the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment only after June 2018. The Claimants were represented by Mishcon de Reya ("MdR"). However, before MdR’s engagement with the individual drivers had begun, in late 2017 it was engaged by the litigation funder Harbour to investigate the merits and value of the potential claim. During that stage, MdR corresponded extensively with Harbour and with the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association ("LTDA"), a black cab drivers' trade association. MdR was not formally engaged by the Claimants until October 2018 onwards. Once the proceedings had started, the Defendants sought disclosure of communications exchanged between MdR and Harbour before the engagement of MdR by the Claimants (the "Harbour Communications"). This included correspondence between MdR and Harbour, communications with the LTDA, and documents held on MdR's file opened in Harbour's name in connection with the potential claim. The Claimants resisted disclosure on four grounds: (i) that the documents were not relevant; (ii) on the grounds of litigation privilege; (iii) that the documents were outside their control; and (iv) that disclosure occurring so close to trial would be disproportionate. Judgment (i) Were the Harbour Communications relevant to the preliminary issue? The Court held that the Harbour Communications were likely to contain relevant material, on two bases. First, where the Claimants or the LTDA had communicated directly with MdR, that material could shed light on individual Claimants' actual knowledge of the alleged facts. Secondly, what MdR and Harbour had discovered during their investigation could inform the question of what a Claimant could reasonably have discovered at the time (even though the Defendants accepted that MdR's knowledge could not simply be imputed to the Claimants). (ii) Were the Harbour Communications protected by litigation privilege? As set out in the classic cases of Three Rivers (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 and WH Holding Ltd v E20 Stadium LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2652, communications between parties or their solicitors and third parties for the purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation are privileged when the following conditions are satisfied: Litigation must be in progress or in reasonable contemplation. The communications must have been made for the sole or dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The litigation must be adversarial, not investigative or inquisitorial. The Court rejected the Claimant’s claim to be able to withhold the Harbour Communications on the basis of litigation privilege. The Court confirmed that litigation privilege protects only communications created for the dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The Court found that Harbour had instructed MdR so that Harbour could decide whether to fund the proceedings. As such, the dominant purpose of the communications was in relation to funding, not the conduct of litigation. This was distinguished from the situation where an individual litigant who takes its own funding decision. In that situation, the decision whether to fund and the decision whether to litigate are one and the same, made by the person who will actually be the claimant, and so it forms a part of that person's conduct of their own litigation. In contrast, a third-party funder's commercial decision whether to fund someone else's claim is not necessarily part of conducting that litigation. The fact that litigation privilege can, in principle, be claimed by a non-party funder (as recognised in the case of Al Sadeq v Dechert [2024] EWCA 28) did not assist Harbour, since there was no evidence it intended to play any role in the litigation itself beyond funding it. Communications between Harbour and MdR did remain capable of attracting another kind of privilege: legal advice privilege, because of the solicitor-client relationship between Harbour and MdR. But communications with third parties such as the LTDA were not automatically protected in the same way. (iii) Were the Harbour Communications within the Claimants' control? The Court also rejected the argument that the Harbour Communications sat outside the Claimants' control because they belonged to Harbour and not the Claimants. The Court’s reasoning was that once the individual Claimant drivers became MdR's clients, MdR also owed them a duty to disclose material information. That included information that MdR had originally acquired while acting for Harbour. As held in the case of Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood (a firm) [2005] 1 WLR 567, a solicitor owing duties to two clients cannot simply prefer one over the other, and it was unrealistic to suppose MdR would investigate the same claims for Harbour, then represent the Claimants, while disregarding everything it had already learned. The obvious commercial expectation was that this earlier work would be used to advance the Claimants' case. MdR sought to rely on a confidentiality clause in a 2024 retainer agreement between it and RGL Management Ltd (a claims management company acting on behalf of the Claimants) to argue that it was relieved of any duty to disclose information obtained while acting for other clients. The provision stated that MdR may "have acted for persons in the same or similar sector as yours and by agreeing to the terms of this letter you agree that will have no duty to disclose to you any confidential information that we have obtained, or might in the future obtain, from acting for such persons or which is derived from any other source". The Court rejected this on several grounds. Claimants who had already become MdR's clients had an existing right to information in the Harbour Communications where it was relevant to their claims before the 2024 retainer agreement. If they were to surrender that right, it would have required their informed consent (also required under the SRA Code of Conduct). The Court found no evidence that such informed consent had been given. The terms had simply been made available to the Claimants through a portal, with no indication that Claimants understood they were giving up existing rights to relevant information. The Court found that even if the terms had been contractually binding, that would not have amounted to informed consent. In addition, the wording of the clause was not sufficiently clear to show that the Claimants had agreed to waive access to this information. (iv) Was disclosure reasonable, proportionate, and necessary at this stage? The Claimants argued that it was neither reasonable nor proportionate for disclosure to be given at such a late stage (approximately two weeks before the start of the preliminary issue trial) and that it was not necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings. The Court rejected this, but it drew a distinction between two categories of documents within the Harbour Communications: Documents bearing on the actual knowledge of the individual drivers, including communications with the LTDA, were not privileged, likely straightforward to review, and directly relevant to the preliminary issue. Their disclosure was ordered as reasonable, proportionate, and necessary. Documents reflecting only MdR's or Harbour's own assessment of the merits were of more marginal, indirect relevance and largely likely to fall under legal advice privilege. A review to isolate the smaller pool of non-privileged material in this category would be time-consuming for limited benefit, so this was excluded from the order. Key Points to Note The judgment is an important reminder of several practical points: However closely a funder is involved in evaluating a claim's merits, litigation privilege will only apply to communications where the sole or dominant purpose of the communication is the conduct of litigation, not the funder's own decision on whether to finance it. Unless that communication separately attracts legal advice privilege, it may need to be disclosed. The same considerations apply to other communications. For example, in RBS Rights Litigation [2017] 1 WLR 3539 the argument that an After the Event (ATE) policy was subject to litigation privilege was rejected on a similar basis. Whilst in this case, there was no dispute as to whether litigation was in contemplation, it is important to note that litigation privilege will not automatically apply to the investigative stages of a claim, i.e. before litigation is in contemplation. Even where litigation is reasonably contemplated, the dominant purpose test must still be satisfied. Material created primarily for fact-finding, risk assessment, or other investigative purposes will not attract litigation privilege unless those activities are actually undertaken for the dominant purpose of conducting the litigation. (See The Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2017] EWHC 1017 (QB)). When engaging a law firm, clients should ensure that they understand whether the firm has previously obtained information about their claim while acting for another party (for example, a funder or another interested party) and how that information will be handled. Any restrictions on the firm’s ability to share relevant information with the client should be explained clearly at the outset, including what information may be withheld and why. If this decision raises questions about your own funding arrangements, disclosure strategy, or privilege position, please get in touch with our Commercial Litigation team.

Insights

Proposed CMS Rule Ramps Up Potential Medicare Fraud Administrative Remedies

On July 6, 2026, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a rule that would expand its administrative remedies to combat potential fraud. The proposed rule is the latest in a round of administrative actions that signal CMS’s intent to aggressively pursue allegations of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and heighten the risk of fraud enforcement against even well-intentioned Medicare and Medicaid providers and suppliers. The proposed rule includes several changes to regulations that govern Medicare billing privileges. Providers and suppliers should be aware that these changes dramatically expand the flexibility afforded to CMS in enrollment and revocation actions, potentially leading to harsh consequences for ministerial and administrative errors. If finalized, moreover, the proposed rule could have material implications for providers and suppliers facing threatened revocation, including heightened risk of overpayment liability and increased hurdles to challenging revocations and denials of enrollment. Added Flexibility to Existing Revocation Grounds CMS has proposed to remove a number of factors that the regulations list as relevant to a determination of whether a provider has engaged in “abuse of billing privileges.” While acknowledging that the inclusion of these factors in the regulations was permissive (requiring consideration only where “as appropriate or applicable”), CMS stated that it must be afforded “the maximum flexibility to address all possible . . . scenarios without the rigid constraints of our existing factors.” CMS provided little guidance as to the outer bounds of what conduct could constitute an “abuse of privileges” that merits revocation of Medicare billing privileges. Instead, CMS noted that a “pattern of practice” of abuse of billing privileges might be established “by a simple finding that several of a provider’s claims do not meet Medicare requirements.” Similarly, CMS has proposed to expand the regulatory provision that permits revocation of enrollment if a provider certifies as “true” false or misleading information in Medicare enrollment application or renewal forms to include any scenario in which a provider submits “false or misleading information on or associated with any CMS Medicare enrollment-related form,” including materials submitted to Medicare contractors. CMS stated that it interprets this expanded rule to include anything related to Medicare enrollment, and not only those submissions that are “intended to gain or maintain Medicare enrollment.” If finalized, the proposed rule would add significant flexibility to CMS’s ability to pursue revocation of a provider’s enrollment. While CMS has assured providers that it would “invoke [the revised regulations]. . . only when legitimately warranted under the facts and circumstances and not as a matter of course,” such expanded flexibility threatens unpredictability in the event of even administrative or ministerial errors in submissions and claims. These changes would, moreover, make it more difficult for providers to challenge a revocation action. Expanded Revocation Grounds In addition to adding flexibility to existing grounds for revocation, CMS’s proposed rule adds to and expands CMS’s already broad authority to revoke provider and supplier enrollment. Such proposed changes include adding the following grounds for revocation: Denial of Enrollment Application. Where CMS could previously revoke a provider’s other enrollments if one enrollment is revoked, CMS would also be able to revoke a provider’s existing enrollments if an application for enrollment submitted by the provider is denied. High-Risk Enrollments. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if it determines the provider or supplier (including owning/managing employees or organizations) poses a high risk of fraud, waste, or abuse due to “. . . an affiliation under [42 C.F.R.] § 424.519” or “the provider’s or supplier’s location within a limited geographic area that has an excessive number of providers and suppliers.” Certain Misdemeanor Convictions. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if a provider or supplier—or its owners, managing employees, managing organizations, officers, or directors—are convicted of a “misdemeanor related to sexual assault or financial misconduct within the past 10 years that CMS deems detrimental to the best interests of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries.” Ownership Changes (HHA, Hospice, DMEPOS). CMS would have broad authority to revoke enrollment of home health agencies, hospices, and DMEPOS suppliers who do not comply with the regulations governing provider changes of ownership. These proposed, expanded grounds for revocation are notably broad, and CMS provides only limited guidance as to what conduct might result in revocation under these grounds. As with the proposed expansion of existing grounds for revocation, the open-ended nature of these proposed grounds for revocation may make it more difficult for providers and suppliers to challenge revocation actions. Expanded Grounds to Deny Medicare Enrollment As with revocations, CMS proposes to expand the grounds under which a provider’s application to enroll in Medicare can be denied. These expanded and additional grounds include many of the grounds added for revocations, but also include: Medicare Debt or Payment Suspension. CMS proposes expanding the ground to deny enrollment based on Medicare debt or payment suspension to include a provider or supplier’s “managing employee, managing organization, or individual or entity with any other form of business or financial relationship with the provider or supplier[.]” Significantly, this expansive definition (called an “associated party” under the proposed regulation) currently contains no material limitations, meaning almost any person or entity with whom an applicant does business could create denial liability. Sharing Locations with Denied/Revoked Providers or Suppliers. CMS would have authority to deny applications where a “provider’s or supplier’s practice location is in the same suite or office as another provider or supplier whose Medicare enrollment has been revoked or denied.” Hospices with Distant Medical Directors or Administrators. CMS would have discretion to deny hospice applications if the hospice’s medical director or administrator serves “multiple other hospices” or practices/is located “at such a distance (for example, in a different state) from the enrolling hospice that the medical director cannot realistically perform all medical director functions,” with a similar provision for administrators. In addition, CMS proposes applications denied for “other program termination or suspension,” may be applied to the provider or supplier in its own name or NPI or that of its owners, managing employees, or managing organization regardless of whether any appeals are pending. Retroactive Revocation CMS proposed to restructure and expand the regulatory grounds for retroactive revocation of billing privileges. Currently, Medicare regulations provide that revocations are, by default, prospective in nature: effective 30 days after CMS or the CMS contractor mails notice to the provider. Under certain circumstances, the regulations provide for revocations to be retroactive, such as when a provider is convicted of a felony, the date a professional license is suspended, revoked, or surrendered, or when a provider submits a false certification in their enrollment application. CMS has proposed to reframe the rule so as to default to retroactive revocation of billing privileges. CMS expressed concern that providers may collect payment from Medicare while remaining so non-compliant with enrollment requirements as to merit revocation. To address this concern, CMS proposed that all revocations be retroactive to the date of determined non-compliance.[1] As a result, providers suspected of misconduct or non-compliance are likely to face claims of retroactive overpayments in addition to the immediate concern no longer receiving Medicare payments while their enrollment is revoked. Reapplication Bar CMS’s proposed rule expands the grounds from which a provider may be prohibited from seeking reapplication as a Medicare provider. Under current regulations, CMS may prohibit prospective providers from enrolling in Medicare for up to 10 years if its enrollment application is denied because the applicant submitted false or misleading information in its application. Under the proposed rule, CMS will have the discretion to prohibit a provider from enrolling in Medicare if their enrollment application is denied for any reason. Conclusion As a part of the federal government’s increasingly aggressive push to combat real or perceived healthcare fraud, the proposed rule both broadens CMS’s authority to revoke and deny Medicare enrollment and raises the stakes for revocation and denial. What the proposed rule does not share is how CMS plans to exercise this expanded discretion: as a result, the proposed rule, if enacted, increases the unpredictability and potential ramifications of even technical noncompliance with CMS rules. As a result, Medicare providers should keep a close eye on potential revisions to these rules and their potential implementation and consider proactively evaluating their compliance under CMS standards. [1] In the proposed rule, CMS identifies, with respect to each ground for revocation, what it will consider to be the effective date of revocation.

Insights

The Long-Awaited Public Infrastructure Financing Solution for Development in Arizona

Every developer who has taken raw Arizona ground to a finished project knows the largest upfront cost other than the land price is almost always the cost to install the public infrastructure. Water, sewer, stormwater, streets, dry utilities, and the fiber backbone all have to be in the ground before a single lot closes or a building opens. That capital is deployed early and generates no return for years. For decades the standard workaround has been the Community Facilities District (CFD). That tool has grown materially harder to use, for reasons cited below, and House Bill 2999, signed in June 2026 and now codified as Chapter 40 of Title 48, is Arizona's response. Some Background I have spent a good part of my career on the other side of this problem. In the 1990s and early 2000s I served as general counsel of SunCor Development Company, one of Arizona's most active master-planned community developers, where we used Community Facilities Districts to finance hundreds of millions of dollars of major infrastructure across Arizona in cities such as Goodyear, Phoenix, Tempe, Litchfield Park, and Prescott Valley. For its time the CFD was an effective structure, and a great deal of what is now on the ground in those communities was financed with this tool. Unfortunately, CFDs have over time become considerably harder to use. Successive legislative amendments have layered on tax-rate ceilings, homebuyer disclosure obligations, and added procedural steps. Another drag on the use of CFDs is that formation of them runs through the municipality, where approval can turn as much on local politics as on the merits of a project. Developers now routinely are asked to absorb delay and uncertainty that a project's economics cannot support, which is a large part of why Arizona has fallen behind Colorado, Texas, and Utah in getting infrastructure financed. A better tool was needed, and Chapter 40 is it. How a SAID Improves on a CFD A State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID) keeps what worked about the CFD: tax-exempt, property-secured, non-recourse infrastructure financing — while shedding much of what made the CFD cumbersome. Its principal advantages over a traditional CFD: Administrative formation. A SAID is formed by the Arizona Finance Authority against fixed statutory criteria, through a yes-or-no compliance review on a sixty-day clock, rather than through the discretionary approval of a city council or a board of supervisors. Insulation from municipal politics. Because formation is a state-level compliance determination, a meritorious project is far less exposed to local political headwinds than it is under the CFD process. Landowner control of the board. A SAID is governed by a board of the landowners — appointed at formation, then elected on an acreage basis. In a typical municipal CFD, the city council sits as the district board; here, the developer controls governance. Advance funding of impact fees. A SAID can use bond proceeds to advance-pay municipal development impact fees, unlike CFDs, removing one of the largest upfront cash burdens in a project. A uniform, statewide process. The criteria are the same regardless of jurisdiction, replacing the municipality-by-municipality variation that has made CFD outcomes hard to predict. Flexible boundaries. A district may include noncontiguous parcels in the same county within five miles of one another, which fits phased and multi-tract development. Capped cost and a fixed timeline. Authority fees to form a district are capped at $15,000, and a complete petition must be acted on within sixty days. The full range of bonds. A SAID may issue general obligation, special assessment, revenue, and refunding bonds, secured solely by district property and creating no obligation for any other taxpayer. What is a SAID A SAID is a special taxing district that the owners of a development form to finance public infrastructure with tax-exempt bonds: general obligation bonds, special assessment bonds, and revenue bonds. The bonds are secured only by the property inside the district and are repaid over the long term, with terms up to 30 years. They do not affect the credit of the city, the county, or the State, and they create no obligation for any taxpayer outside the district. In practical terms, a SAID lets you finance horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of writing the check at the front end. The maximum ad valorem rate securing general obligation bonds is capped by statute at $5.00 per $100 of net assessed limited property valuation, with a limited step-up to cover a debt-service shortfall. SAIDs Work for Commercial as Well as Residential Development The SAID bill drew most of its press as a housing-affordability measure, and it appears to be a strong one. It is the first Arizona district statute to let bond proceeds advance-fund municipal development impact fees, which pulls one of the largest upfront cash burdens off a homebuilder's pro forma. But the statute's eligible infrastructure categories apply with equal force to commercial, industrial, and mixed-use projects. An industrial or logistics project can finance roads, rail crossings, sidings, and grade separations. A life-sciences or technology campus can finance its water, sewer, roads, and broadband the same way a subdivision can. Read Chapter 40 as a general-purpose infrastructure finance platform, not a subdivision-only device. How Formation Works A SAID is formed administratively by the Arizona Finance Authority. The Authority reviews the petition for compliance with the statute; it is a yes-or-no review against fixed criteria, not a discretionary negotiation with a city council or a board of supervisors, and it runs on a sixty-day clock once a complete petition is filed. Formation requires the written consent of 100% of the landowners in the proposed district and an engineer's certification that public infrastructure costs will exceed $5 million. The district may include noncontiguous parcels so long as they lie in the same county and within five miles of the district's other property, which accommodates phased and multi-tract development; if any part of the district sits inside a municipality, the whole district must stay within that municipality's limits or planning area. The Authority's fees to form a district are capped at $15,000. Issuing bonds requires a district election. Governance Simplified A SAID is run by a three-member board. The initial directors are named in the petition; after that, directors are elected by the landowners on an acreage basis as ownership diversifies. Board service runs with ownership; a director must either hold fee title inside the district or be an individual designated by a fee-title owner; and corporations, partnerships, and other entities may hold that ownership, vote as owners, and designate the individual who serves. A district has no power of eminent domain and no zoning authority, and directors may not be officials or employees of the municipality in which the district sits. What a SAID Does Not Do It finances; it does not entitle. Zoning, platting, rezonings, use permits, and the specialized approvals a manufacturing or life-sciences facility may need all remain with the local jurisdiction and proceed on their own track. The financing and entitlement timelines should be coordinated with formation of the SAID, but they are separate processes. Two substantive limits are worth flagging at the planning stage. First, electric power is largely outside the tool: the statutory definition of public infrastructure does not reach power generation or transmission, and broader energy infrastructure was removed from the bill during the Senate amendments. A power-intensive user should not assume a SAID will carry its electrical load. Second, where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the district cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility upon completion. Our Take For most master-planned residential work, and for a wide range of commercial and industrial development, a SAID will be the most efficient infrastructure-financing structure Arizona has offered. The right time to evaluate it is early in the acquisition and pre-development process, while the capital stack, the development agreement, and the entitlement strategy are still being set. Once the district's boundaries, general plan, and financing parameters are set, it is cumbersome at best to bring those into conformance later. Our Dorsey team has begun advising our developer clients on SAID formation on residential, commercial, and industrial projects statewide. If you would like us to assess whether a SAID fits a project you are working on, please reach out.

Insights

State Affordability Infrastructure Districts (SAIDs) — A Financing Tool for Taiwanese Investment in Arizona Science and Technology Parks

If you have developed a facility inside one of Taiwan's science or technology parks, you are accustomed to the one-stop-shop of government planning the park and delivering the roads, water, power, and other infrastructure before your building is even constructed. In the United States, including Arizona, land development generally does not work that way. In Arizona, the cost of infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, power, and the digital backbone, typically falls on the private landowner and is incurred up front before operations generate revenue to offset that cost. For a company entering the Arizona market, this is often the largest and earliest capital burden of the entire project. Arizona recently created a tool that provides a more cost-effective way for landowners and developer to finance some of that infrastructure. House Bill 2999, signed into law June 2026 and codified at Chapter 40 of Title 48 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, establishes the creation of a State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID). How a SAID Works Landowners are now able to use a SAID to finance public infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, parking, lighting, communications, rail sidings and signalization, and similar improvements, through tax-exempt bonds. The bonds are repaid over up to 30 years and secured solely by the property within the SAID. No city, county, or state credit is pledged, and no obligation falls on other taxpayers, and therefore no city, county, or state approval other than from the Arizona Finance Authority (AFA). In effect, a SAID lets you spread the cost of horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of funding it entirely at the outset. And tax-exempt bonds often offer a lower interest rate than taxable or other types of financing. How a SAID is Formed A SAID is formed upon the filing of a petition with the AFA. The petition must include the finance plan, general plan, estimated costs, maximum tax rate, appraisal, bond counsel certificate, consultant list, petitioner experience, legal description, title report, and other materials. While the landowner is required to provide notice to the local governing jurisdiction, local governing jurisdiction does not have the right to approve or deny. The petition is reviewed administratively by the AFA through a standards-based process. For an inbound investor without long-standing local relationships, an objective, criteria-driven process is a meaningful advantage to the overt political process associated with other financing districts in Arizona. Formation requirements. A SAID requires consent from 100% of landowners within the proposed district; public infrastructure costs must exceed $5 million (easily met at any real scale); the district property must all be in the same county and need not be contiguous provided that noncontiguous property is located within five miles of the district's other property; and the board is initially appointed by the forming owners of the SAID district, later transitioning to election as ownership diversifies. Actual bond issuance requires an election of the SAID property owners. Ownership and corporate structure. Consent rights and board seats run with title. If you hold the Arizona land through a U.S. blocker beneath your Taiwan parent, the standard model for Taiwanese/Arizona real estate and operating investment, the U.S. property-holding entity, rather than it’s corporate parent, is the landowner of record for the district. Before formation, our Dorsey team will confirm that you have the proper corporate structure and board mechanics to be compliant.  Board composition has no citizenship or residency requirement. This is a common concern for foreign investors, and the statute answers it cleanly. Under A.R.S. § 48-7004, a director must either hold fee title to real property in the district or be an individual designated or appointed by a fee-title owner. Corporations, partnerships, and other business entities are expressly permitted to be those owners, to vote as owners, and to designate an individual to serve. There is no requirement that a director be a U.S. citizen or resident. So your U.S. property-holding entity, as landowner of record, can appoint whichever of your principals you choose, including a Taiwan-based individual, as the three-member board.  Power infrastructure limitation. The enacted definition of "public infrastructure" in A.R.S. § 48-7001 does not include electrical power generation or transmission. The reference to electrical facilities appears only as components of lighting and traffic-control systems, and the Legislature removed broader energy infrastructure from the definition during the Senate amendments. A SAID will likely not finance the high-load power infrastructure required for semiconductor fabrication, data storage, or heavy manufacturing.  Water infrastructure within a current utility CC&N. Where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the SAID cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility on completion. Entitlements and zoning: The determination of entitlements, zoning, and other land use permitting, as well as construction permitting for a technology or manufacturing facilities remain with the local jurisdiction and run on a separate track. Our Dorsey team will help you coordinate the financing and entitlement timelines together. Our Dorsey team works regularly with Taiwanese and other Asia-Pacific companies entering the Arizona market. If a SAID fits your project, we can structure it for your cross-border ownership.

News

37 Dorsey Attorneys Named 2026 Top Lawyers by Minnesota Monthly

Minnesota Monthly has recognized 37 Dorsey attorneys across 27 practice areas as 2026 Top Lawyers in Minnesota. Honorees are selected through a peer nomination process and a curated survey of practicing attorneys in Minnesota, who identify leading lawyers across a range of practice areas. Administrative / Regulatory Law Jennifer Coates Antitrust Law Michael Lindsay Banking & Financial Service Law Peter Nelson Copyright Law  Jeffrey Cadwell Corporate Law  Robert Hensley Robert Rosenbaum Criminal Defense: White-Collar  Beth Forsythe Edward Magarian RJ Zayed Health Care Law  Claire Topp Immigration Law  J. Mike Sevilla Insurance Law  Daniel Brown Intellectual Property and Patent Law  Stuart Hemphill International Trade Law  Jonathan Van Horn Labor and Employment Law  Edward Magarian Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Land Use & Zoning  Jay Lindgren Marcus Mollison Litigation – Antitrust  Michael Lindsay F. Matthew Ralph Jaime Stilson Litigation – Commercial  Michael Lindsay Litigation – Construction  Eric Ruzicka Litigation – Intellectual Property  Peter Lancaster RJ Zayed Litigation – Labor Employment Benefits  Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Litigation – Trusts and Estates  William J. Berens Theresa Bevilacqua Bridget Logstrom Koci Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions  James K. Langdon Mergers & Acquisitions Law  Keith Ahlgren Rachel Benedict Brian Burke Morgan Helme John Jorgenson Brian Moore Robert Rosenbaum Jonathan Van Horn Bri Whiting Municipal Law Jay Lindgren Nonprofit/Charities Law Claire Topp Securities / Capital Markets Law Cam Hoang Robert Rosenbaum Securities Regulation Theresa Bevilacqua James K. Langdon Tax Law William J. Berens Trusts and Estates Jennifer Ede Bridget Logstrom Koci Sonny Miller Kiley Petty Henry

News

Real Estate Attorney Alexis Olsen Joins Dorsey in Phoenix

Attorney Alexis Olsen has joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP as Of Counsel in the Real Estate group in Phoenix, the law firm announced today. Alexis focuses her practice on large-scale residential, mixed-use, and multi-asset development projects as well as multi-state commercial leasing transactions. She guides clients through sophisticated acquisitions, dispositions, leasing, entity structuring, investment strategies, and due diligence matters. She has structured co-investment arrangements that drive capital deployment into housing subdivisions nationwide and has represented both landlords and tenants in commercial leasing transactions involving office, retail, industrial, and specialty-use properties, including cannabis dispensaries. Alexis received her J.D. from Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law and her B.A. from the University of Arizona. Alexis comes to Dorsey from Squire Patton Boggs. “Alexis strengthens Dorsey’s real estate capabilities at a time when Phoenix remains one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic real estate markets in the country,” said Scott Jenkins, Dorsey’s Phoenix office head. “Her addition further enhances our deep bench of 12 real estate attorneys in Phoenix and reflects our continued investment in serving clients throughout Arizona and supporting their real estate transactions and objectives across the country. We are thrilled to welcome Alexis to Dorsey.” “Joining a firm with such a deep bench of experienced attorneys in the Phoenix office, especially in the Real Estate group, presents an exciting opportunity not just for my own professional growth, but for the clients we service,” said Alexis Olsen. “I look forward to building on this strong foundation, growing our national practice, and delivering top-tier service to our clients.”

Insights

Alaska HB 126: What Changes for Alaska Native Corporations, Proxy Filings, and Annual Reports

Alaska House Bill 126 (HB 126), sponsored by Representative Neal Foster and passed by the 34th Alaska Legislature, is now law. The bill changes which Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) must file proxy and annual report materials with the State of Alaska, and makes it easier to reinstate certain dissolved Village Corporations. For many smaller Village Corporations, the practical result is less public disclosure. For shareholders, advisors, and the public, it means some financial information that used to be available through the State will no longer be readily obtained. This eUpdate explains what HB 126 does in plain terms, walks through the practical trade-offs, and answers common questions. 1. What HB 126 Changes The old rule Under prior law (Alaska Statutes Sec. 45.55.139), an Alaska Native Corporation had to file its annual report, proxies, and proxy statements with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities (the Division) if it had more than $1 million in assets and 500 or more shareholders on its current rolls. A filing ANC was also required to follow the Division’s proxy rules (3 AAC 08.305 through .365), which require specific disclosures such as top 5 executive compensation, and related-party transactions. Because these filings are treated as public records, they gave non-shareholders, including the public and the press, visibility into ANC financial information that is not filed with the SEC. The new rule HB 126 changes how the 500-shareholder test is measured. Now, the asset test is removed, and the shareholder count is based on how many shareholders the corporation originally enrolled when it was formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), not how many it has today. As shares have passed down through families over the decades, some Village Corporations that started with fewer than 500 shareholders now have more than 500 recordholders. Under the old current-count test, when those corporations had crossed the threshold, they had to file. Under the new original-enrollment test, they do not. Who is affected Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders are the main beneficiaries. They no longer have to file proxy and annual report materials with the Division or follow the Division’s proxy regulations at 3 AAC 08.305 through .365. Two groups must continue to file as before: all twelve ANCSA Regional Corporations, each of which enrolled more than 500 shareholders at creation, and all Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders. As reported by the Alaska Beacon, when the bill was under consideration, the Division identified 59 corporations then filing, expected at least seven village corporations to become exempt, and was reviewing roughly 30 more. 2. Practical Analysis HB 126 reduces a real compliance burden for smaller Village Corporations, which now need not spend time and money on State filings. In coming years, the exempt Village Corporations may experience benefits associated with less public disclosure and less regulation. But at the same time, less public disclosure carries trade-offs. Benchmarking will become harder Publicly-filed proxy statements and annual reports have long served as a reference set. Shareholders, corporations, advisors, and counsel use them to compare governance practices, compensation, and financial results across similarly-situated ANCs. Since fewer of these materials will be filed publicly, there will be fewer comparable documents available, which will make benchmarking and market-checking more difficult for like-sized ANCs over time. Executive compensation transparency may be reduced The Division’s proxy rules require disclosure of the compensation of ANC’s top five most highly compensated individuals (3 AAC 08.345(b)(2)), related-party transactions above $20,000 (3 AAC 08.345(b)(3)), and audited financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis (3 AAC 08.365). When a corporation is no longer required to file these disclosures publicly, it becomes harder for shareholders and others to obtain the information, to understand how compensation is set for their corporate leadership, and how it compares across corporations of similar size and complexity. Transparency may matter more as ANCs grow Some ANCs have grown into large, complex enterprises with substantial revenue and many subsidiaries, even with fewer than 500 shareholders. For an ANC with a broad and dispersed shareholder base, public materials can be an important way for shareholders and other stakeholders to understand governance, compensation, and performance across ANCs. Reduced disclosure may carry more practical weight in those settings than for a small corporation whose shareholders are closely connected to the business. The ANCSA annual report obligation continues It is important not to overstate what HB 126 does. HB 126 changes the state filing proxy requirements. It does not remove the separate obligation under ANCSA itself. That obligation comes from ANCSA at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c), which requires a Native Corporation that would otherwise be subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prepare and transmit to its shareholders an annual report containing substantially the information a company subject to that Act would include. Similarly, ANCs that solicit proxies for an annual meeting are still required to furnish shareholders with those proxy materials under general Alaska corporate law. However, ANCs are now no longer required to transmit proxy statements to the State. ANCs’ reporting obligations to their shareholders are unaffected by HB 126. Any corporation newly exempt from state filing still owes its shareholders a detailed annual report and a proxy statement, even though that report is no longer routed through the State and made public. Reinstatement of dissolved Village Corporations Separately, HB 126 amends AS 10.06.960(k) to remove the prior deadline (previously December 31, 2020) for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. A dissolved Village Corporation may now apply to be reinstated under AS 10.06.633(e) at any time. Reinstatement still runs through the commissioner under AS 10.06.633(e). In general, that means the ANC must apply, cure the neglect or delinquency that led to dissolution, and pay the amounts owed, and the corporation’s name must be available or be changed to one that is. Once reinstated, the corporation and its shareholders are restored to the rights, privileges, liabilities, and obligations they would have had as if the dissolution had never occurred, and corporate and shareholder actions taken during the dissolution are treated as valid. If the previously-used corporate name is no longer available, the board alone may amend the articles to adopt a new name (without the necessity for shareholder approval). 3. Frequently Asked Questions What does HB 126 do? It changes how Alaska measures the 500-shareholder test that decides which ANCs must file proxy and annual report materials with the state. It removes the asset test, and it counts shareholders based on original enrollment rather than the current rolls. It also removes the deadline for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. Which ANCs are affected? Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders, because they may no longer need to file with the Division. Regional Corporations and Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders must continue to file as before. Does HB 126 eliminate all reporting obligations? No. It changes the state filing requirement under AS 45.55.139, but it does not remove the separate ANCSA obligation (43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c)) to provide shareholders with an annual report, and general corporate law still calls for a proxy statement when the ANC solicits proxies. Corporations that remain subject to state filing requirements must also continue to comply with the Division's rules. We think we are now exempt. What should our ANC board and management consider? Confirm your ANC’s original enrollment number and whether your corporation falls below the new threshold. Watch for communications from the State on this topic as they proceed with their research. If your ANC is now exempt, decide how your corporation will meet its continuing ANCSA obligation to shareholders, review proxy and annual meeting materials and timelines, and consider what to communicate to shareholders about any change in how they will receive information. It is worth documenting the basis for any exemption. What should ANC shareholders watch for? Shareholders should watch for how and when they will continue to receive annual report and proxy statement information directly from their ANC, since some material that used to be available through the State’s online website will no longer be publicly filed. If something is unclear, shareholders can ask their ANC how it intends to meet its ANCSA reporting obligations. How Dorsey Can Help HB 126 lightens the State filing load for smaller Village Corporations, but it also raises practical questions: confirming who is exempt, meeting continuing ANCSA obligations to shareholders, keeping proxy and annual meeting processes on track, and maintaining benchmarking when public materials become less available. These are exactly the kinds of judgment calls that benefit from early planning. Dorsey’s attorneys work closely with Alaska Native Corporations and related stakeholders. If you have questions about HB 126, ANC governance, proxy filings, annual reports, disclosure obligations, or shareholder communications, please contact your Dorsey attorney, including the authors of this eUpdate.

News

Dorsey Partner Melissa Raphan Elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers

International law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP is pleased to announce that Partner Melissa Raphan has been elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers (CLEL) as part of its 2026 class. “Melissa’s election to this prestigious fellowship comes as no surprise to those of us who have had the privilege of working with her,” says Peter Nelson, Dorsey’s Managing Partner.  “She is an exceptional employment lawyer, a trusted advisor, and a leader whose impact extends far beyond her matters. Clients rely on her deep knowledge, strategic counsel, and ability to navigate complex workplace disputes and sensitive employment matters with both confidence and compassion. She has helped shape our firm, strengthen our profession, and opened doors for countless others through her commitment to mentorship and diversity. We are incredibly proud of her accomplishments and delighted to see her receive this recognition.” CLEL is a nonprofit professional association that honors the nation’s leading attorneys in the field of labor and employment law. Originally established to recognize excellence in the profession, CLEL has evolved into a respected intellectual and practical resource for the legal community and its many audiences. Its mission centers on recognizing individuals who have made significant contributions to the field, fostering the exchange of knowledge and delivering value to academia, government, the judiciary, and the broader public. Election as a fellow represents the highest level of peer acknowledgment, reflecting sustained achievement, integrity, and a commitment to advancing the profession. Melissa’s career reflects CLEL’s mission. She has been recognized both regionally and nationally for her advocacy, leadership, and achievements both inside and outside of the courtroom. Her employment litigation experience spans class actions, collective actions, and high-stakes individual disputes in state and federal courts, as well as arbitration forums including the American Arbitration Association and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). She is also a trusted advisor on a full range of workplace issues, from hiring and performance management to sensitive terminations and organizational change. She brings decades of experience representing clients across the financial services, healthcare, food and agriculture, and energy sectors. Melissa will be formally inducted during CLEL’s installation ceremony held in conjunction with the American Bar Association’s Labor & Employment Law Conference in Washington, D.C., on November 7.