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Crossing the Pond: Managing Litigation Expectations in Europe and the U.S.

March 11, 2024

by Kent J. Schmidt and Aymen Khoury

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The challenges of navigating complex litigation increase substantially when parties are required to litigate in a far flung jurisdiction. Litigation in an unfamiliar jurisdiction challenges assumptions about how the litigation process unfolds. Expectations on the timing, sequence and a prudent strategy invariably need to be adjusted to the new norms of the jurisdiction that will be adjudicating the dispute. In this episode, Dorsey London Partner Aymen Khoury and Partner/Podcast Host Kent Schmidt discuss key differences of commercial litigation in the U.S. and Europe, as well as how companies sued in an international litigation can be prepared before entering unfamiliar territory of foreign litigation.

This podcast is not legal advice and does not establish an attorney-client relationship or create any duty of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or those appearing in this podcast to anyone. Although we try to assure that the content of this podcast is accurate, comprehensive, and reflects current legal developments, we do not warrant or guarantee those things. The opinions expressed in this podcast are the opinions of those appearing in the podcast only and not those of Dorsey & Whitney. This podcast is considered attorney advertising under the applicable rules of certain states.

Transcript

Voiceover
Welcome to another episode of the SharkCast on litigation Risks Management, where we explore why businesses are so frequently sued and how to mitigate and navigate the dangers lurking in these risky waters. Join us now as we welcome our host, Kent Schmidt, litigation partner at the law firm of Dorsey and Whitney.

Schmidt
Well it’s a great pleasure to welcome to SharkCast for a new episode my friend and partner, Aymen Khoury from our London office.  Welcome Aymen.

Khoury
Thank you for inviting me, Kent.  Delighted to be here.

Schmidt
Well Aymen, as you can tell from that fantastic accent practices in Europe, and particularly out of our London office, and is a talented litigator.  He practices in all types of litigation, much like I do here in the US, and Aymen is a relatively new friend and partner to Dorsey, at least, and just a couple of months ago, Aymen and I spent some time at a conference in Paris, and we enjoyed getting to know one another, and just in the course of going to various meetings around the city, we ended up having conversations in the back of Uber cars and at various cafes that we were meeting at about our different practices, how the US litigation practice compares to the litigation practice in the UK, and I thought it would be a very interesting episode to have him come on and once it sort of recreate and expand on those conversations with a focus on what companies outside the US, who might be accustomed to European style litigation should contemplate if they are named in US litigation, and perhaps to a lesser extent the opposite, US companies that are ensnared in litigation in Europe, including in the UK.  So, Aymen it was a great opportunity for us to get to know each other back in November when we were in Paris together, and I value your insight and your friendship, so I’m so happy that you’re here and thanks for being a guest.

Khoury
Thank you, and obviously likewise, Ken.  I think a real feature of those meetings, and discussions we had were the differences in approach when it comes to litigation, but also expectations of even other lawyers in our profession.  So in that regard, it’s quite interesting to explore this further with you today.

Schmidt
Well, as it is often said, the world seems to be getting smaller, and I think that it’s more likely today than ever before given how global commerce works, that a company on one side of the Atlantic, for example, may be ensnared in litigation on the opposite side, and so this cross border litigation or international litigation is something that companies of all size need to be increasingly sensitive to.  Let’s first start off by talking about the perception of US litigation.  What is the typical perception of someone in the UK, or in Europe as to what US litigation entails?

Khoury
Trying to put aside the sort of movies, and the soap operas, and the shows we’ve all been growing up watching, I think maybe slightly unfair perception in terms of the difference with, say, England for example.  It’s perceived maybe to be more expensive, more convoluted, perhaps even more aggressive in terms of taking up points.  Maybe more extensive, which I think is probably fairer and we’ll probably come across some of those examples later, but I think they’re probably the headline differences that people perceive in terms of the differences, say, England and the US.  Of course then there are differences between the rest of Europe, and the US, which are probably fairer in the sense that they’re very different jurisdictions in terms of their processes and setups, and I think those differences are largely around time and costs and the sort of nature of the process of litigation, whether it be a civil or common jurisdiction differences.

Schmidt
Now, from your vantage point, you get to look at different types of litigation because you, not only advise domestic companies in the UK and Europe on US litigation, but you do litigation in various jurisdictions and arbitrations in various jurisdictions.  Can you give us a flavor of what your international litigation practice is like, with an emphasis on jurisdiction?

Khoury
Yeah, so first and foremost, I’m English High Court litigation and international arbitration lawyer practicing English law, but I’m also an Arabic speaker, and I guess as a result of that, I as well as assisting various clients in the UK, my practice has a strong international dimension and includes amongst other things, a focus on the Middle East, acting for clients from or connected to that region, but also act for clients generally in support of legal proceedings in foreign jurisdictions, and over the years that’s involved me in matters across a number of jurisdictions, most obviously in the Arab world such as the United Arab Emirates or Qatar or Saudi, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, but also across Europe and in jurisdictions such as the British Virgin Islands, China, and of course the United States as well in particular.

Schmidt
So tell me a little bit about your experience in helping companies outside the US understand what to expect on the US litigation front.

Khoury
Yeah, so, I mean, in that sense, you know a lot of the cases that I’ve worked in over the years have included a US element, so even if I’m thinking of a particular example I could give you more recently of a High Court litigation involving all US parties, but the jurisdiction was England, the choice of law was England, but by its nature involved ancillary disputes, and proceedings in New York and Nevada, in California, and so you get a real stark comparison between what it’s like to run an English litigation or US litigation, not least because they’re sort of happening at the same time, but also you’re working with your US colleagues as well as yourself, running the English litigation and that’s a fairly typical classic example of where we might sort of cross paths, and where we see the differences, and of course, the clients can be either English or US or indeed from a third party, and then there’s a bit of an education piece, both for yourself as the lawyer who’s normally practicing in England, but if you’ve done enough of them, you realize there’s some differences, and of course then for the client themselves.  So that’s sort of the typical way we come across these differences, and in practice, how they sort of unfold.

Schmidt
In advising a company, say based in London or Paris or the Middle East, on new US litigation, what are some of the surprises that you have to prepare those clients for as they enter the fray of US litigation, even if they’re familiar with, for example, the English Commonwealth system?

Khoury
Yeah, I think there’s kind of two sets of differences, whether you’re mainland Europe and whether you’re sort of UK and Ireland or, and when I say UK, I mean specifically England and Wales, ‘cause that’s the real reference to our jurisdiction, but much of Europe is, as your listeners and you will know, minus Ireland and the UK, have civil law jurisdictions and these rely on codified systems, of course, with written core principles, while common law jurisdictions such as England and Wales and the US of course, depend on case law and the development of precedent, largely set by judges in previous cases and that brings various differences, but probably the main overarching difference is between these two systems as what’s I think often described as a inquisitorial in nature, that being the civil law system, while our respective systems of common law, adopts fair to say a more adversarial approach, and that fundamental difference between the adversarial and the trial of fact approach means that, say the US and the UK, myself and yourself as lawyers, probably play a bit more of a central role in establishing the facts, and shaping the client’s case on which judges in court, certainly in England, largely rely on rather than inquire extensively independently.  Whereas in civil jurisdictions, it’s the judges that probably play a more central role, investigators of and establishers of facts and thereby apply relevant legal codes, but I think what’s particularly different, it’s interesting is what you alluded to at the end there is perhaps surprising to some clients is the difference is even between the two common law systems of the US and England, let alone between the US and sort of the civil code systems.  So I mean, for starters, we don’t have a written constitution that you guys have, there are sometimes stark differences, which then can and should influence a client’s approach to a dispute, I mean the strategy adopted, and even in some cases, whether to litigate and push the button at all.

Schmidt
So let me make sure I understand this.  If we’re really comparing three systems, the Continental European system of civil law, the English common law and the US, which is in large part common law, and we’re sort of measuring the adversarial nature both in the sense of how the litigation is conducted as well as the tone and tenor of the litigation that each would be ranked by the US most adversarial, perhaps the UK second, and the civil European system third.  Is that a correct assessment?

Khoury
Yeah, exactly.  So obviously, both England and the US are common law, but you know, more recent history US moved away from the general overarching exact common law system that we currently still have, and as you said, you apply a layer of a federal system and a constitution to that common law system, which we don’t have, and then you’ve got the civil law system of Europe, minus countries like Ireland, which is a much more codified, sort of rigid, if that’s the right word, form of rules and laws.

Schmidt
Do you have views on whether this sliding scale of adversarial nature of litigation has benefits or delivers a more complete package of justice if I could use that word.

Khoury
Yeah, I think they’re definitely advantages and disadvantages to both approaches.  Your listeners and you won’t be surprised to hear, I think both in terms of the litigation processes, but also the effect of how parties carry out business, so even outside of the court process, the system of courts, and the legal system has an effect.  So for example, civil law jurisdictions tend to have more sophisticated models and provisions for contracts with provisions prescribed in law, whereas freedom of contract, for example, is a fundamental principle in common law jurisdictions.  So that’s a key difference, and perhaps I would say for the business minded, the more commercial is more of an advantage in the common law system.  Furthermore, that the adaptability and fluidity of the common law is probably I’d say its single biggest advantage over the civil system.  It’s the system better equipped generally with addressing developments, whether it be in business, and commerce, and of course in social changes.  Largely ‘cause it’s less reliant on legislative law making, you don’t have to wait for the process to change or for law to be passed in order to evolve, but the flip side of that, of course, is that civil law provides more certainty as a consequence, the laws are defined, they’re in detail, and civil law proceedings probably fair to say, tend to be more streamlined and efficient compared to our respective kind of common law systems, I think that’s probably a fair assessment.

Schmidt
Well, that’s very interesting.  One part of your answer that I think is fascinating, is the freedom of contract concept, where in the US we have a great deal of freedom of contract, the exceptions being, of course, certain consumer contracts have to have prescribed language, and then obviously insurance contracts, you can’t just write an insurance policy on your own, you have to be an insurer and write those contracts in, but those are the relatively narrow exceptions to the freedom of contract and the civil law system is much more regulated in that sense.  Is that what you’re saying?

Khoury
Yeah, I think probably a good summary is to say that less is implied in our contracts than maybe over the civil system in the sense that you can pretty much put in whatever you want subject to, as you said, those kind of exceptions, and if you don’t put in those things, then there’s a kind of a phrase here that the court seldomly interferes in a bad bargain, so it’s kind of up to two grown-ups to decide for themselves what the deal is, and whilst there are things that are implied, not as much I would say is on the continent or civil systems.

Schmidt
I want to go back to your question about the efficiencies and the timeline for litigation being shorter, if it is less adversarial in all senses, what’s the standard expected timeline for litigation to be concluded from the start to finish at least before you get to an appellate level, if it just says pretty standard business dispute, say in London court.

Khoury
I think typically, from issuing serving your claim form, issuing it in court, and serving your claim form, and then the particulars, we probably would expect as much as, I mean, we’re talking about major big commercial disputes, of course, not sort of smaller amounts, so anything in the millions plus, we would normally say to a client, your expectation is you’re not gonna get to try and in essence sort of 18 months to two years, and that would be if things go according to plan, if you like, because there’s a process in which largely like in the US various hurdles have to be overcome with that, be disclosure, stroke discovery, witness statements, etc.  So I think typically we tend to prepare clients for about 18 months to two years before seeing trial.

Schmidt
So I think that’s comparable to a business dispute in the US, ‘cause I think my estimate would be the same, but I’m gathering that given the adversarial nature, that period of time, there’d be a lot more activity on the US side than there would on the UK, which is probably where we should go next in this conversation, which is what happens during that 18 months in a more adversarial system, versus a less adversarial system.

Khoury
I mean in terms of, you know, preparation of witnesses is probably the main difference.  When you get to trial in European systems, they don’t have typically the same cross examination of witnesses, that tends to be left to judges, but that’s sort of, if you like the end, the upshot of what you were asking about that happened before, and I think the main difference is if we take sort of the process of what you call discovery and what we call disclosure is largely a chunk of the preparation, and we obviously share similar requirements, and then when I say we, I’m comparing the US and the UK as opposed to sort of the civil systems, where we have similar requirements, share documents and you know share the information about what exists, and what’s in our control, and both jurisdictions I think fair to say, can be extensive and expensive, and compared to a civil system that largely doesn’t exist there, you don’t have that extensive disclosure, stroke discovery obligations where parties have to reveal and swap documents of that nature, but I think, crucially, the US sort of discovery includes pretrial exchange, not just of documents, and I think this is probably question more for you than for me, but also understand, it’s of all information in the form of depositions, and potential witness statements, and I think, you know, we certainly don’t have that in England and Wales, parties on the whole are only really permitted to seek evidence for use of trial, and not as part of a disclosure exercise.  There is not an opportunity to cross examine witnesses in England until you get to trial, and as such we’ve got no opportunity to explore, under oath, what a potential witness may say under cross examination, when called to give direct evidence, and therefore again, that also limits the potentially the investigation further of what documents may exist through that process.

Schmidt
So perhaps, I can recap what you’re saying by giving a quick summary of the US process, in both state and federal court.  So initial disclosures are due usually at the outset of the case, particularly in federal court, but they’re very, very limited from each side, and then the first thing that usually happens is extensive document requests from either side, everyone wants to see every email, text message, all of the file, everything, and that takes usually a couple months, and now involves third party vendors, and searches for E discovery and so forth, and then the next thing that happens once you have the documents, you’ve digested them, then the process moves to depositions, and the depositions could be anywhere from two or three to, you know, 20 or so and the, but the biggest case I’ve ever had, I think we took 30 depositions per side, I think in that case, and it just went on and on, and you know, the depositions particularly are not just designed to learn the facts, but to set up this witness, to call it trial and to box them in on their testimony, so you can impeach them with contradictory prior deposition testimony, but as I’m hearing you say, that process just does not exist, and by that process I mean deposing someone for the purpose of hearing their story and then being prepared if they’re called as a witness at trial, or if you want to call them as a witness at trial.

Khoury
Yeah, absolutely, I mean that is a fundamental difference, so in England and Wales, witness statements are prepared in exchange before trial.

Schmidt
So what’s a witness statement?  Can you put a finer point on that?

Khoury
Yeah, so a witness statement is, so each party will have decided, at some point before serving on the other party, what we’re calling witness statements, who their witnesses at trial are going to be, and those are entirely meant to be witnesses of fact, so they’re not experts who will talk about any area, and also they’re meant to be providing evidence of only facts, so they are meant to be stripped out of any submissions or any legal arguments, and those are statements that lawyers prepare, subject to some very stringent rules, which recently I would say about a couple, two, three years ago, have been tightened in the sense that amongst other things, there is now a requirement for the statements to be largely as much as possible in the witnesses own words, so legal speak, and sort of lawyer cute drafting, is largely prohibited, which can provide some challenges to preparing statements.

Schmidt
So you have to be somewhat hands off, so, you want your witness to prepare something in your own words, but there’s a limit on how you can assist them.

Khoury
Absolutely.  Yeah.  I mean, what I particularly have in mind is something called a practice direction 57 AC, I think it is what was introduced, and they brought in three broad principles, which is that a witness statement should serve as written evidence of what a witness is going to say or could say at trial, and therefore should only contain evidence related to the matters within that witness’s personal knowledge, and what that means is, it shouldn’t be used, which was probably the case in years gone by, until we move towards this system, or this particular rule, is that they shouldn’t be used to make submission to argue the case, that’s left for the lawyers at trial, and it also extends to quite tight rules on what you can say in the statement.  So, for example, the classic difficulties that lawyers can get into is that they will show a client a document and say, you know, give your view on this, but of course often these disputes are litigated three, four years after the facts, and it is rare for a individual to remember in detail receiving that particular email in the middle of a million other emails, and what that email said, and what he felt about it, or she felt about it, and what they may have thought at the time, so in previous years, the approach by lawyers was to put that email before the client and effectively take the clients witness testimony and put the best possible presentation of that document in the witness statement. That’s prohibited now because, amongst other things, the witness needs to say whether that was within their personal knowledge, or whether they were prompted, or reminded of the document by the lawyer, which, as you can imagine, is a very stark difference from what the rules used to be like, but also I assume quite different than what your approach is.

Schmidt
Yeah, very stark from our approach.  I mean, we work extensively with witnesses at all stages of the proceedings, preparing them for their deposition, preparing them if they’re going to sign a declaration in support of a written motion, and certainly preparing them when it’s time to testify at trial, and I guess the phrase comes to mind of whether you put words in the mouth of the witness, but you certainly refresh their recollection as to the main themes of the case that, you know, the companies position and what they wrote.  That’s a big part of what US lawyers do, so it’s surprising to think about that being off limits, under some rules of how you operate.

Khoury
Yeah, I think the way to look at it is we similarly spend a lot of time and energy in its fundamental aspect of the case in terms of getting witness statements together, and reviewing the documents, and putting it, but I think the difference is there’s much more, probably transparency is the right word now, in terms of if you’ve done that, if you’ve reminded your client or a witness of a document, as opposed to the other way round, they could remember of their own volition, then there are requirements for you to indicate that, and you can expect that they are going to be cross examined on that in quite aggressive terms if they haven’t.  So classically, you know, someone in their statement might say that they remember how they felt, and what their email said from six years ago, and when it comes to cross examination, the other side will do their best to say that that beggars belief and actually, you know, the reality is your lawyer reminded you of it, because they reviewed your disclosure or their disclosure and you failed to notify the court that that was the case, i.e., your memory of it is not contemporaneous, it is after the event, and so it’s a bit more nuancing.  It still requires a lot of work.  All the steps that you mentioned, but with a lot more restrictions I think.

Schmidt
Well, let’s turn to another aspect of the differences between the jurisdictions, and how cases are determined, and I’m speaking here of jury trials in civil cases.  I’ve had a lot of conversations with lawyers around the world, and this is a recurring theme, so, can you talk about the expectations of companies outside the US and their reactions when they discovered that a multi-million dollar, highly complex piece of commercial litigation is going to be decided by 12 people off the street.

Khoury
Fair to say, a degree of nervousness to put it mildly.  The starting point to make clear is you probably, and many of your listeners may know, is that jury trials in England and Wales are largely limited to criminal cases.  The vast majority of civil cases tried in court don’t have juries other than maybe, say, defamation trials.  They’re the main exceptions that come to mind.  Most often, a judge hears them on their own, deciding them by finding facts, applying the relevant law, there may be argument presented about the facts, and about what the law actually is, but ultimately the system is when the arguments finished, the judge will give a reasoned judgement, and not in anyone else’s hands, you can sometimes be quite good at gauging where the judge is with you over a process of a long trial, so in that sense, there’s a bit more certainty, perhaps, there’s less room for sort of what I would say is erratic sort of rulings, and so clients perhaps are more prepared and happier to trust in that process and say, well, you know, you get the rub either way if the judge is with you, or not with you.  Whereas I think most clients I know would be very nervous about 12, if you’re like lay individuals, not because of anything in relation to their ability, but just more because, I mean if we take the sort of work that you and I do and you know majority of sort of Dorsey does is that we’re looking at sort of commercial disputes.  Often these cases will turn on technical arguments, involving interpretation of a contract or application of a precedent, not necessarily just principally, findings of facts, and whilst judges are certainly not infallible, the fact that they’re solely making the decision on such issues should, as I said earlier, lead to less erratic decisions overall and less variance in decisions overall, and that certainty, of course, is what businesses crave most is certainty, whether it be costs, or decisions, or results, so I think that’s probably what most clients nervousness and fears would be over a jury trial.

Schmidt
Well, again, just in contrast, one of the major strategic decisions that is considered in US commercial litigation is whether to waive jury trial, for all of those considerations, you have to decide is the jury going to be more likely to see things my way, or is the trial court judge, as we say trying the case to the bench, and so you just don’t have that discussion for the most part under your system, so very interesting contract.

Khoury
No, and do you need unanimity in that, I mean, do both parties have to agree to waive, or how does that work?

Schmidt
So each party can demand a jury trial based on the claims that are asserted, not every claim calls for a jury, you know, for example, equitable claims are decided by the bench, and the legal claims are decided by the jury, so we have this division between law and equity, certain statutory claims go to the bench or the jury, and so each side has a right to jury trial, if the pleadings and the causes of action trigger that right, and then at various points in time each side can waive jury, and so you’re also looking at what your adversary’s doing, whether they’re waiving jury or not, whether they’re inclined to waive jury, so there’s a lot of strategy that goes in bench versus jury and, you know, obviously jury is a much more expensive process, it’s a longer process than a bench trial, and so that plays in the consideration as well.  It’s probably a good segue to our next topic that I’d like to tackle, which is litigation cost.  You can’t really talk about complex commercial litigation without talking about costs, which affects the bottom line, and so I’d like to explore a little bit of how the two jurisdictions, as well as any other jurisdictions that you have knowledge of, differ with respect to costs and fee shifting.

Khoury
The question, of course in England, is ultimately the discretion of the core, but there is the general rule, which is costs follow the event, and as you know that means loser pays winners costs.  That’s if you like probably the fundamental difference, I mean as I understand in America, there are examples in instances where costs can be claimed, but certainly not to that degree in terms of adverse costs.

Schmidt
Yes, it’s well, we have two concepts, cost and legal fees.  So costs are like court costs, filing fees, which are usually nominal compared to the legal fees, but you can’t shift legal fees unless it’s provided by contract or by statute, so some consumer statutes for example, have a provision for attorney fees for the prevailing party, and some of those are one way streets, only the consumer can recover fee, so if a company defeats a consumer claim they can’t recover their fee, so it’s what we call a one way street attorney fee provisions, and then you can provide for that also, in a commercial agreement that the prevailing party gets attorney fees, but absent those two, the general rule is, you can only recover your costs, which are nominal, and you can’t recover your legal fees.

Khoury
Yeah, so when I, and when we refer to costs in England, we mean all of those costs, so legal, attorney fees, court filing fees, even photocopying costs, expert fees, so cost is anything that you’ve incurred reasonably connected to the dispute.

Schmidt
So the conventional wisdom is that, that is one of the reasons there’s more litigation in the US than in the UK is because there’s greater pause for a company in the UK realizing the downside than there is in the US, particularly if there’s not a provision under statute or contract, you know, what’s the harm in filing a lawsuit and see what happens.  Do you agree with that conventional wisdom, or do you think that’s not necessarily the case?

Khoury
I think overall I do, but I think it impacts both whether to issue a claim, and when to issue a claim, but also how you may conduct the claim.  So, I think overall the difference in our cost regime has a massive impact, so pre-action costs cannot be claimed until a party issues a claim in England, this means that until then, the risk of making claims is simply a party’s own cost, as it would be for the entirety of the claim, in the US.

Schmidt
So you don’t get pre filing cost to prepare for the litigation, you just get it from the moment the litigation is filed?

Khoury
Only if you don’t file.  Once a party does file and once the party presses the button and issues, those pre-action costs come into play, so then you look back…

Schmidt
Got it.

Khoury
…and then each side will be on the hook for the other parties costs should they lose the case, and this makes what you’re referring to a party think twice about issuing claim, but it also means, in my view, and experience, is it’s more likely that each party will explore pre-action stages before issuing, because one they know in that stage the risk is just their own costs and they also know, conversely, once they issue, these costs will come into play, so from my discussions with you in the past, my understanding is you do tend to have maybe more of an exploration of the pre-action stage in England than you would in the US, because there is a strong deterrent, if you like from being trigger happy if that’s the right phrase.  Certainly claims just to pressure an opponent into settling are less common in England because of that.  You know, you have to be fairly sure.  Yes, we do have claims that we issue similar to you where there’s protective claims, whether it be for limitation periods etc., but on the whole, the idea of just suing someone then talking is quite rare and certainly most lawyers who are fulfilling their duty to the court would discourage and very severely warn their client against doing that, they would advise them to explore the pre-action stage first.

Schmidt
Again, commonplace in the US to send not just the demand letter, but we filed this lawsuit, but we’re interested in settling the case, so trigger happy I think is probably a good word for that.  As we talk about costs, I think we have to just delve for a moment into the concept of contingency fees which drive US litigation extensively by giving law firms an economic interest in the outcome of litigation.  This ranges from personal injury cases, which are almost all contingency fee driven, you know, slip and falls, someone in an auto accident, to consumer class actions, to large ticket commercial litigation claims in which, you know, two companies are fighting over, you know, tens of millions of dollars.  A lot of those cases are brought on a contingency fee basis.  What is the current status in the UK on contingency fee cases and those variety of litigation matters?

Khoury
Yeah, so I mean, traditionally for years and years and years, the concept of what was referred to as champerty, it’s a variety of maintenance, so when the maintaining party contracts for a sale of the proceeds of an action or suit, which is what we’re talking about, really was strictly prohibited and for many years, contingency fee arrangements between a lawyer and a client were effectively unenforceable at common law because they were considered champertous.  However, the common law position moved on and was substantially amended by statute, and we have a variety of fee structuring, or fee arrangements that we can now enter into with clients.  Conditional fee arrangements where you can have a part of the fee paid by the client with an uplift determined on success of a case, which I think you certainly have from my understanding.

Schmidt
Yep.  Success fees.

Khoury
Yeah, exact, success fees, with an uplift that can be decided with the client, but also I think the biggest development is what you’re probably more referring to as contingency fees is what we call damages based agreements, DBAs and for years, and years, and years they were completely outlawed.  You could not share in the spoils if you like or in the return of your clients’ winnings, and those are now permitted, and that probably takes us a lot closer to a US style contingency fee agreement.  Litigation funding is also permitted and has been permitted for a while and there’s a buoyant market in the litigation funding, but that’s slightly different than obviously DBAs.  I think the DBAs is the biggest advancement and sort of stark difference in years gone by, but having said that, again from what we’ve discussed in the past, my understanding is that we’re still fairly limited in our use of DBAs, whereas I think contingency fees, etc. as you alluded to a minute ago, it’s much more popular and much more common in your cases in the US I think it’s fair to say.

Schmidt
Yeah.  No, I think that’s true.  There are limits on it in the sense of certain, you know, ethics rules that require certain disclosures, and limits on percentages, and fundamental fairness with contingency fees, but there aren’t really limits on the types of cases, things of that nature.  Is the move toward what you call DBAs, also known as contingency fee cases, is there a lot of controversy surrounding that as to whether that’s going to result in the UK being more litigious?

Khoury
Not really, I mean, it’s been around for a few years now.  When it was introduced, and I remembered this very clearly at the time, is that there was this view that it’s going to change everything, we’re going to turn into a sort of US style approach litigation.

Schmidt
And not said in a flattering way of the US I assume.

Khoury
Well, I think in the sense that there might be more litigation, I think in that sense, in the sense that it will allow people to take up cases that otherwise they would be precluded from doing from lack of funds because they can’t pay their lawyers, whereas now, you know, if the lawyer takes the risk of a DBA then more cases can be brought.  My experience, that hasn’t been the case for a couple of reasons.  One is, at the time, although is no longer arguably the case because of a couple of cases that came out since, it used to be an all or nothing, so you couldn’t do a sort of hybrid model.  The lawyer had to accept nonpayment of all their fees, or just a standard retainer which obviously put off a lot of commercial law firms, ‘cause that’s 100% your fees on risk, so wasn’t taken up as much traditionally by law firms, but also even if a hybrid model is allowed, as arguably there is permissible now, where you can say have 50% your fees on the DBA etc., and the rest paid.  The reality is firms would not be very commercially minded if they were accepting DBAs, or agreeing to DBAs for bad cases.

Schmidt
Sure.  It has a gatekeeping component to it.

Khoury
Exactly, exactly.  So that should regulate the fact that it’s not going to necessarily increase litigation, because you’re not suddenly gonna get a wave of let’s try it and see kind of claims, ‘cause it’s obviously you know it’s a kind of no win, no fee, extreme DBA, so I think in that sense it hasn’t massively impacted the way things are proceeding.  Having said that, I do anticipate that they will, and generally the approach to litigation in England particularly is going to adapt and develop because I think amongst other things, the hourly rate might be something that increasingly will be called into question, and therefore the recovery of that, and I think the main reason why that continues to be a strong model, is because the court allows the recovery of it, and I think once the court moves away from it or limits it, and we’ve seen and as we’ve discussed in the US, it’s completely limited, then I think the structuring between lawyer and client will ultimately reflect that change.

Schmidt
Well, speaking of costs and what a dominant theme that is in managing litigation, it often drives parties that didn’t think they were going to be settling a case six months ago to decide no, actually we need to work this out and we need to figure out not a win-win situation, because neither side is necessarily happy with the result, but we need to stop spending money on litigation and figure out how to resolve this.  That’s a major part of US litigation to get a case into the procedural posture, and the strategic position to explore settlement so that you’ll get a favorable settlement.  How does what we call ADR, alternative dispute resolution work in the UK?

Khoury
Probably, this is 1 area where there’s maybe more similarities than differences, I think it’s probably fair to say that most commentators would accept the rise in mediation and has kind of been largely influenced from practices that have been going on for a while in the US, but mediation, which is an example of ADR in England is voluntarily in confidential process.  I suspect largely like it is in America, although perhaps maybe different than America is the court is very vocal and forceful about encouraging the parties to try it, and that includes cost sanctions, I mean there’s cases that are famous for winning parties not recovering their costs because, you know, earlier on in the dispute, they were deemed to unreasonably refuse the offer of mediation, but these can happen at any time mediation, and a lot of cases settle well down the line rather than early on, particularly after disclosure of witness statements are exchanged and often actually even at the eve trial, and I don’t know if that’s difference in terms of timing, but I think if it is, one of the reasons possibly is going back to your point about costs, is that the spectrum of costs consequences as we refer to them, looms quite large kind of in the minds of every litigator in England.  The idea that what are the consequences of taking up a bad or good point, or losing a point weighs heavily in English litigation.

Schmidt
I can see how it’s all interrelated.

Khoury
Yeah, exactly.  So I think you were alluding the fact that you put all the pressure in to try and force a settlement.  Well, we certainly adopt the same approach ‘cause that’s, you know, sort of the obvious tactic, but I think the difference is, we have to be quite careful about what we do in the lead up to that because if I have 10 fantastic points, or if I have 10 pressure points, five of which are not fantastic legally, but are a wonderful pressure point, I may still not choose to adopt them, because there may be cost consequences, whereas in some ways, I guess there’s less to lose in the US because, you know, if you win on these points or lose on these points, there are no cost consequences, so I think that then subsequently has an effect come mediation, and I think, you know, ultimately whether a case settles or not, the issue of costs, and whether that’s factored into a settlement offer, i.e. global, whether it includes your costs or not, tends to be a large point of debate, or a large point of difference between the parties, and sometimes in a quite surprising manner when you think you’re almost close on all the other issues, just you differ on costs.

Schmidt
Well, that’s certainly the case in the US, although in those instances where there’s no attorney fee provision, either by contract or statute, you also have a situation that sometimes occurs where one side knows that, and they know the other side is not able to keep up with the litigation costs, and so there’s sort of a war of attrition, of let’s keep this going, we’ll eventually grind them down, and that sometimes happens, so cost drives so much, you know, as the saying goes, follow the dollar, and here we’re talking about the dollar relating to litigation expenses, and it tells a lot about how litigation is handled, and sort of the economics of litigating these cases.  Well, I think that’s about all the time we have to do our comparison of litigation regimes in the US and in Europe, but keeping with our same theme of your international experience and background, I want to step away from talking about legal issues, but keep a discussion going on how your experience living at various places around the world as well as I suppose, having a international practice, and certainly friends around the world, and contacts around the world impacts you in terms of your cultures, your ideas, your approach to life, your view of this increasingly complex, and in many ways, scary world that we live in.  Can you give us a, sort of a biographical sketch, but culminating in who you are today as a person?

Khoury
Yeah, sure, I was born in London, but I grew up in Lagos in Nigeria, before returning here for school in university, which is maybe slightly less usual, but also my parents are British Palestinians, and I grew up speaking Arabic to them around the house, but also learning English with them at home, and also from a wonderful Indian teacher in Africa, which brings another layer of sort of cultural diversity.  I spend a lot of time in other countries, including the Middle East, and the US, that brings with it obvious advantages such as, you know, the ability to speak the other languages, like Arabic, but I think for me the biggest influence it has had on me, is the cultural fluency it gives you, most obviously in the Middle East, because of what I’ve just referred to in terms of background, but also elsewhere.  My parents themselves lived in various countries, so we were always international, if you like, quote, unquote, in our mindset, my family, now including my sisters who live in the US and Spain respectively, are dotted around the world.  It doesn’t necessarily always make it easy, but I think it’s an advantage that’s been offered to me and I’m very privileged and love having, it helps with work and maybe explains the natural gravitation towards a more international practice that you’re mentioning and we’ve discussed, I mean really in summary, without sort of generalizing and I’ve got to be very careful to do so, because one can generalize about yourself as well.  I think it’s fair to say that it can require a slightly different mindset to deal with an English client or an English corporate, compared to US individual client or corporate, and then even more so to say, a Middle Eastern individual client or cooperate.  In summary, I think to me it’s sort of that similarity and the ease with different cultures certainly helps with this, no question.

Schmidt
Well, it certainly makes life more interesting than, you know, just having relationships with people in your own county, or your own community, having relationships with people around the world, and there are certain challenges, and crossing cultural barriers, but those challenges are always rewarding to achieve because you start learning different ideas, and exposure to different ways of doing things, and it helps you realize in one sense how small our world is, which is sort of how we began this conversation.

Khoury
Yeah, absolutely, and as you alluded to at the start, we saw for ourselves, both within each other and other people we met in Paris most recently, so I think that’s a very good example.

Schmidt
Well, with that, I think we are out of time for this episode.  This has been a very insightful conversation.  As I said at the outset, I enjoyed our time together in Paris, and I similarly valued this time to compare notes on our various experiences in international litigation.  Why don’t I give you the last word with a take away that you’d like our listeners to think about with respect to litigation in the US, again setting up the question, if you’re advising or talking on the phone with the prospective client that is in the UK, or is somewhere else in Europe, and they’ve been named on a major piece of litigation in California, or Florida, or New York, or Texas, or one of the other US jurisdiction state or federal, what would you say be the one piece of advice you’d want them to take away from that conversation?

Khoury
Certainly compared to European litigation and disputes generally think hard about what US litigation means.  Cost is one thing, but these can be budgeted.  What is less quantifiable is the toll litigation takes on time and energy of you and your business, whether that be preparing for depositions, or the discovery process, all the way to process of jury selection.

Schmidt
Well, thanks again Aymen for being here on the show, and I’ve really enjoyed this conversation.  With that, I’d like to thank you for being here and thank our listeners for tuning in.  As always, I’m indebted to the extraordinary team at Dorsey for making this podcast and episode possible.  For more resources on this and other litigation risk, go to litigationrisk.com, where more information can be found, including a book on managing litigation risks, written by yours truly.  Until next time, my friends, this is yet another reminder that there are a lot of sharks swimming out there in the murky waters, so swim safely.

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Alaska HB 126: What Changes for Alaska Native Corporations, Proxy Filings, and Annual Reports

Alaska House Bill 126 (HB 126), sponsored by Representative Neal Foster and passed by the 34th Alaska Legislature, is now law. The bill changes which Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) must file proxy and annual report materials with the State of Alaska, and makes it easier to reinstate certain dissolved Village Corporations. For many smaller Village Corporations, the practical result is less public disclosure. For shareholders, advisors, and the public, it means some financial information that used to be available through the State will no longer be readily obtained. This eUpdate explains what HB 126 does in plain terms, walks through the practical trade-offs, and answers common questions. 1. What HB 126 Changes The old rule Under prior law (Alaska Statutes Sec. 45.55.139), an Alaska Native Corporation had to file its annual report, proxies, and proxy statements with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities (the Division) if it had more than $1 million in assets and 500 or more shareholders on its current rolls. A filing ANC was also required to follow the Division’s proxy rules (3 AAC 08.305 through .365), which require specific disclosures such as top 5 executive compensation, and related-party transactions. Because these filings are treated as public records, they gave non-shareholders, including the public and the press, visibility into ANC financial information that is not filed with the SEC. The new rule HB 126 changes how the 500-shareholder test is measured. Now, the asset test is removed, and the shareholder count is based on how many shareholders the corporation originally enrolled when it was formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), not how many it has today. As shares have passed down through families over the decades, some Village Corporations that started with fewer than 500 shareholders now have more than 500 recordholders. Under the old current-count test, when those corporations had crossed the threshold, they had to file. Under the new original-enrollment test, they do not. Who is affected Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders are the main beneficiaries. They no longer have to file proxy and annual report materials with the Division or follow the Division’s proxy regulations at 3 AAC 08.305 through .365. Two groups must continue to file as before: all twelve ANCSA Regional Corporations, each of which enrolled more than 500 shareholders at creation, and all Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders. As reported by the Alaska Beacon, when the bill was under consideration, the Division identified 59 corporations then filing, expected at least seven village corporations to become exempt, and was reviewing roughly 30 more. 2. Practical Analysis HB 126 reduces a real compliance burden for smaller Village Corporations, which now need not spend time and money on State filings. In coming years, the exempt Village Corporations may experience benefits associated with less public disclosure and less regulation. But at the same time, less public disclosure carries trade-offs. Benchmarking will become harder Publicly-filed proxy statements and annual reports have long served as a reference set. Shareholders, corporations, advisors, and counsel use them to compare governance practices, compensation, and financial results across similarly-situated ANCs. Since fewer of these materials will be filed publicly, there will be fewer comparable documents available, which will make benchmarking and market-checking more difficult for like-sized ANCs over time. Executive compensation transparency may be reduced The Division’s proxy rules require disclosure of the compensation of ANC’s top five most highly compensated individuals (3 AAC 08.345(b)(2)), related-party transactions above $20,000 (3 AAC 08.345(b)(3)), and audited financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis (3 AAC 08.365). When a corporation is no longer required to file these disclosures publicly, it becomes harder for shareholders and others to obtain the information, to understand how compensation is set for their corporate leadership, and how it compares across corporations of similar size and complexity. Transparency may matter more as ANCs grow Some ANCs have grown into large, complex enterprises with substantial revenue and many subsidiaries, even with fewer than 500 shareholders. For an ANC with a broad and dispersed shareholder base, public materials can be an important way for shareholders and other stakeholders to understand governance, compensation, and performance across ANCs. Reduced disclosure may carry more practical weight in those settings than for a small corporation whose shareholders are closely connected to the business. The ANCSA annual report obligation continues It is important not to overstate what HB 126 does. HB 126 changes the state filing proxy requirements. It does not remove the separate obligation under ANCSA itself. That obligation comes from ANCSA at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c), which requires a Native Corporation that would otherwise be subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prepare and transmit to its shareholders an annual report containing substantially the information a company subject to that Act would include. Similarly, ANCs that solicit proxies for an annual meeting are still required to furnish shareholders with those proxy materials under general Alaska corporate law. However, ANCs are now no longer required to transmit proxy statements to the State. ANCs’ reporting obligations to their shareholders are unaffected by HB 126. Any corporation newly exempt from state filing still owes its shareholders a detailed annual report and a proxy statement, even though that report is no longer routed through the State and made public. Reinstatement of dissolved Village Corporations Separately, HB 126 amends AS 10.06.960(k) to remove the prior deadline (previously December 31, 2020) for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. A dissolved Village Corporation may now apply to be reinstated under AS 10.06.633(e) at any time. Reinstatement still runs through the commissioner under AS 10.06.633(e). In general, that means the ANC must apply, cure the neglect or delinquency that led to dissolution, and pay the amounts owed, and the corporation’s name must be available or be changed to one that is. Once reinstated, the corporation and its shareholders are restored to the rights, privileges, liabilities, and obligations they would have had as if the dissolution had never occurred, and corporate and shareholder actions taken during the dissolution are treated as valid. If the previously-used corporate name is no longer available, the board alone may amend the articles to adopt a new name (without the necessity for shareholder approval). 3. Frequently Asked Questions What does HB 126 do? It changes how Alaska measures the 500-shareholder test that decides which ANCs must file proxy and annual report materials with the state. It removes the asset test, and it counts shareholders based on original enrollment rather than the current rolls. It also removes the deadline for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. Which ANCs are affected? Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders, because they may no longer need to file with the Division. Regional Corporations and Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders must continue to file as before. Does HB 126 eliminate all reporting obligations? No. It changes the state filing requirement under AS 45.55.139, but it does not remove the separate ANCSA obligation (43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c)) to provide shareholders with an annual report, and general corporate law still calls for a proxy statement when the ANC solicits proxies. Corporations that remain subject to state filing requirements must also continue to comply with the Division's rules. We think we are now exempt. What should our ANC board and management consider? Confirm your ANC’s original enrollment number and whether your corporation falls below the new threshold. Watch for communications from the State on this topic as they proceed with their research. If your ANC is now exempt, decide how your corporation will meet its continuing ANCSA obligation to shareholders, review proxy and annual meeting materials and timelines, and consider what to communicate to shareholders about any change in how they will receive information. It is worth documenting the basis for any exemption. What should ANC shareholders watch for? Shareholders should watch for how and when they will continue to receive annual report and proxy statement information directly from their ANC, since some material that used to be available through the State’s online website will no longer be publicly filed. If something is unclear, shareholders can ask their ANC how it intends to meet its ANCSA reporting obligations. How Dorsey Can Help HB 126 lightens the State filing load for smaller Village Corporations, but it also raises practical questions: confirming who is exempt, meeting continuing ANCSA obligations to shareholders, keeping proxy and annual meeting processes on track, and maintaining benchmarking when public materials become less available. These are exactly the kinds of judgment calls that benefit from early planning. Dorsey’s attorneys work closely with Alaska Native Corporations and related stakeholders. If you have questions about HB 126, ANC governance, proxy filings, annual reports, disclosure obligations, or shareholder communications, please contact your Dorsey attorney, including the authors of this eUpdate.

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Real Estate Attorney Alexis Olsen Joins Dorsey in Phoenix

Attorney Alexis Olsen has joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP as Of Counsel in the Real Estate group in Phoenix, the law firm announced today. Alexis focuses her practice on large-scale residential, mixed-use, and multi-asset development projects as well as multi-state commercial leasing transactions. She guides clients through sophisticated acquisitions, dispositions, leasing, entity structuring, investment strategies, and due diligence matters. She has structured co-investment arrangements that drive capital deployment into housing subdivisions nationwide and has represented both landlords and tenants in commercial leasing transactions involving office, retail, industrial, and specialty-use properties, including cannabis dispensaries. Alexis received her J.D. from Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law and her B.A. from the University of Arizona. Alexis comes to Dorsey from Squire Patton Boggs. “Alexis strengthens Dorsey’s real estate capabilities at a time when Phoenix remains one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic real estate markets in the country,” said Scott Jenkins, Dorsey’s Phoenix office head. “Her addition further enhances our deep bench of 12 real estate attorneys in Phoenix and reflects our continued investment in serving clients throughout Arizona and supporting their real estate transactions and objectives across the country. We are thrilled to welcome Alexis to Dorsey.” “Joining a firm with such a deep bench of experienced attorneys in the Phoenix office, especially in the Real Estate group, presents an exciting opportunity not just for my own professional growth, but for the clients we service,” said Alexis Olsen. “I look forward to building on this strong foundation, growing our national practice, and delivering top-tier service to our clients.”

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Litigation Privilege Does Not Automatically Protect Communications with Funders: The Commercial Court Clarifies the Limits of Privilege in the Context of Litigation Funding

In Uber London Ltd & Ors v Garry White & Ors; Mishcon de Reya LLP [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that documents created to help a funder decide whether to invest in a claim will not ordinarily attract litigation privilege. This means that information a firm gathers while acting for a funder can later fall within the control of the claimants it goes on to represent in the same matter. Background The Claimants (a claim group of over 10,000 individual London black cab drivers and the assignee of two former minicab operators) alleged that the Defendants (three companies in the Uber group) obtained and retained their private hire operator's licence through an unlawful means conspiracy alleged to involve fraud. Because the claims were issued outside the ordinary six-year limitation period, the Claimants relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, contending they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud before June 2018. A preliminary issue trial was listed to determine the question of whether the Claimants discovered, or could have discovered with reasonable diligence, the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment only after June 2018. The Claimants were represented by Mishcon de Reya ("MdR"). However, before MdR’s engagement with the individual drivers had begun, in late 2017 it was engaged by the litigation funder Harbour to investigate the merits and value of the potential claim. During that stage, MdR corresponded extensively with Harbour and with the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association ("LTDA"), a black cab drivers' trade association. MdR was not formally engaged by the Claimants until October 2018 onwards. Once the proceedings had started, the Defendants sought disclosure of communications exchanged between MdR and Harbour before the engagement of MdR by the Claimants (the "Harbour Communications"). This included correspondence between MdR and Harbour, communications with the LTDA, and documents held on MdR's file opened in Harbour's name in connection with the potential claim. The Claimants resisted disclosure on four grounds: (i) that the documents were not relevant; (ii) on the grounds of litigation privilege; (iii) that the documents were outside their control; and (iv) that disclosure occurring so close to trial would be disproportionate. Judgment (i) Were the Harbour Communications relevant to the preliminary issue? The Court held that the Harbour Communications were likely to contain relevant material, on two bases. First, where the Claimants or the LTDA had communicated directly with MdR, that material could shed light on individual Claimants' actual knowledge of the alleged facts. Secondly, what MdR and Harbour had discovered during their investigation could inform the question of what a Claimant could reasonably have discovered at the time (even though the Defendants accepted that MdR's knowledge could not simply be imputed to the Claimants). (ii) Were the Harbour Communications protected by litigation privilege? As set out in the classic cases of Three Rivers (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 and WH Holding Ltd v E20 Stadium LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2652, communications between parties or their solicitors and third parties for the purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation are privileged when the following conditions are satisfied: Litigation must be in progress or in reasonable contemplation. The communications must have been made for the sole or dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The litigation must be adversarial, not investigative or inquisitorial. The Court rejected the Claimant’s claim to be able to withhold the Harbour Communications on the basis of litigation privilege. The Court confirmed that litigation privilege protects only communications created for the dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The Court found that Harbour had instructed MdR so that Harbour could decide whether to fund the proceedings. As such, the dominant purpose of the communications was in relation to funding, not the conduct of litigation. This was distinguished from the situation where an individual litigant who takes its own funding decision. In that situation, the decision whether to fund and the decision whether to litigate are one and the same, made by the person who will actually be the claimant, and so it forms a part of that person's conduct of their own litigation. In contrast, a third-party funder's commercial decision whether to fund someone else's claim is not necessarily part of conducting that litigation. The fact that litigation privilege can, in principle, be claimed by a non-party funder (as recognised in the case of Al Sadeq v Dechert [2024] EWCA 28) did not assist Harbour, since there was no evidence it intended to play any role in the litigation itself beyond funding it. Communications between Harbour and MdR did remain capable of attracting another kind of privilege: legal advice privilege, because of the solicitor-client relationship between Harbour and MdR. But communications with third parties such as the LTDA were not automatically protected in the same way. (iii) Were the Harbour Communications within the Claimants' control? The Court also rejected the argument that the Harbour Communications sat outside the Claimants' control because they belonged to Harbour and not the Claimants. The Court’s reasoning was that once the individual Claimant drivers became MdR's clients, MdR also owed them a duty to disclose material information. That included information that MdR had originally acquired while acting for Harbour. As held in the case of Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood (a firm) [2005] 1 WLR 567, a solicitor owing duties to two clients cannot simply prefer one over the other, and it was unrealistic to suppose MdR would investigate the same claims for Harbour, then represent the Claimants, while disregarding everything it had already learned. The obvious commercial expectation was that this earlier work would be used to advance the Claimants' case. MdR sought to rely on a confidentiality clause in a 2024 retainer agreement between it and RGL Management Ltd (a claims management company acting on behalf of the Claimants) to argue that it was relieved of any duty to disclose information obtained while acting for other clients. The provision stated that MdR may "have acted for persons in the same or similar sector as yours and by agreeing to the terms of this letter you agree that will have no duty to disclose to you any confidential information that we have obtained, or might in the future obtain, from acting for such persons or which is derived from any other source". The Court rejected this on several grounds. Claimants who had already become MdR's clients had an existing right to information in the Harbour Communications where it was relevant to their claims before the 2024 retainer agreement. If they were to surrender that right, it would have required their informed consent (also required under the SRA Code of Conduct). The Court found no evidence that such informed consent had been given. The terms had simply been made available to the Claimants through a portal, with no indication that Claimants understood they were giving up existing rights to relevant information. The Court found that even if the terms had been contractually binding, that would not have amounted to informed consent. In addition, the wording of the clause was not sufficiently clear to show that the Claimants had agreed to waive access to this information. (iv) Was disclosure reasonable, proportionate, and necessary at this stage? The Claimants argued that it was neither reasonable nor proportionate for disclosure to be given at such a late stage (approximately two weeks before the start of the preliminary issue trial) and that it was not necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings. The Court rejected this, but it drew a distinction between two categories of documents within the Harbour Communications: Documents bearing on the actual knowledge of the individual drivers, including communications with the LTDA, were not privileged, likely straightforward to review, and directly relevant to the preliminary issue. Their disclosure was ordered as reasonable, proportionate, and necessary. Documents reflecting only MdR's or Harbour's own assessment of the merits were of more marginal, indirect relevance and largely likely to fall under legal advice privilege. A review to isolate the smaller pool of non-privileged material in this category would be time-consuming for limited benefit, so this was excluded from the order. Key Points to Note The judgment is an important reminder of several practical points: However closely a funder is involved in evaluating a claim's merits, litigation privilege will only apply to communications where the sole or dominant purpose of the communication is the conduct of litigation, not the funder's own decision on whether to finance it. Unless that communication separately attracts legal advice privilege, it may need to be disclosed. The same considerations apply to other communications. For example, in RBS Rights Litigation [2017] 1 WLR 3539 the argument that an After the Event (ATE) policy was subject to litigation privilege was rejected on a similar basis. Whilst in this case, there was no dispute as to whether litigation was in contemplation, it is important to note that litigation privilege will not automatically apply to the investigative stages of a claim, i.e. before litigation is in contemplation. Even where litigation is reasonably contemplated, the dominant purpose test must still be satisfied. Material created primarily for fact-finding, risk assessment, or other investigative purposes will not attract litigation privilege unless those activities are actually undertaken for the dominant purpose of conducting the litigation. (See The Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2017] EWHC 1017 (QB)). When engaging a law firm, clients should ensure that they understand whether the firm has previously obtained information about their claim while acting for another party (for example, a funder or another interested party) and how that information will be handled. Any restrictions on the firm’s ability to share relevant information with the client should be explained clearly at the outset, including what information may be withheld and why. If this decision raises questions about your own funding arrangements, disclosure strategy, or privilege position, please get in touch with our Commercial Litigation team.

News

37 Dorsey Attorneys Named 2026 Top Lawyers by Minnesota Monthly

Minnesota Monthly has recognized 37 Dorsey attorneys across 27 practice areas as 2026 Top Lawyers in Minnesota. Honorees are selected through a peer nomination process and a curated survey of practicing attorneys in Minnesota, who identify leading lawyers across a range of practice areas. Administrative / Regulatory Law Jennifer Coates Antitrust Law Michael Lindsay Banking & Financial Service Law Peter Nelson Copyright Law  Jeffrey Cadwell Corporate Law  Robert Hensley Robert Rosenbaum Criminal Defense: White-Collar  Beth Forsythe Edward Magarian RJ Zayed Health Care Law  Claire Topp Immigration Law  J. Mike Sevilla Insurance Law  Daniel Brown Intellectual Property and Patent Law  Stuart Hemphill International Trade Law  Jonathan Van Horn Labor and Employment Law  Edward Magarian Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Land Use & Zoning  Jay Lindgren Marcus Mollison Litigation – Antitrust  Michael Lindsay F. Matthew Ralph Jaime Stilson Litigation – Commercial  Michael Lindsay Litigation – Construction  Eric Ruzicka Litigation – Intellectual Property  Peter Lancaster RJ Zayed Litigation – Labor Employment Benefits  Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Litigation – Trusts and Estates  William J. Berens Theresa Bevilacqua Bridget Logstrom Koci Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions  James K. Langdon Mergers & Acquisitions Law  Keith Ahlgren Rachel Benedict Brian Burke Morgan Helme John Jorgenson Brian Moore Robert Rosenbaum Jonathan Van Horn Bri Whiting Municipal Law Jay Lindgren Nonprofit/Charities Law Claire Topp Securities / Capital Markets Law Cam Hoang Robert Rosenbaum Securities Regulation Theresa Bevilacqua James K. Langdon Tax Law William J. Berens Trusts and Estates Jennifer Ede Bridget Logstrom Koci Sonny Miller Kiley Petty Henry

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The Long-Awaited Public Infrastructure Financing Solution for Development in Arizona

Every developer who has taken raw Arizona ground to a finished project knows the largest upfront cost other than the land price is almost always the cost to install the public infrastructure. Water, sewer, stormwater, streets, dry utilities, and the fiber backbone all have to be in the ground before a single lot closes or a building opens. That capital is deployed early and generates no return for years. For decades the standard workaround has been the Community Facilities District (CFD). That tool has grown materially harder to use, for reasons cited below, and House Bill 2999, signed in June 2026 and now codified as Chapter 40 of Title 48, is Arizona's response. Some Background I have spent a good part of my career on the other side of this problem. In the 1990s and early 2000s I served as general counsel of SunCor Development Company, one of Arizona's most active master-planned community developers, where we used Community Facilities Districts to finance hundreds of millions of dollars of major infrastructure across Arizona in cities such as Goodyear, Phoenix, Tempe, Litchfield Park, and Prescott Valley. For its time the CFD was an effective structure, and a great deal of what is now on the ground in those communities was financed with this tool. Unfortunately, CFDs have over time become considerably harder to use. Successive legislative amendments have layered on tax-rate ceilings, homebuyer disclosure obligations, and added procedural steps. Another drag on the use of CFDs is that formation of them runs through the municipality, where approval can turn as much on local politics as on the merits of a project. Developers now routinely are asked to absorb delay and uncertainty that a project's economics cannot support, which is a large part of why Arizona has fallen behind Colorado, Texas, and Utah in getting infrastructure financed. A better tool was needed, and Chapter 40 is it. How a SAID Improves on a CFD A State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID) keeps what worked about the CFD: tax-exempt, property-secured, non-recourse infrastructure financing — while shedding much of what made the CFD cumbersome. Its principal advantages over a traditional CFD: Administrative formation. A SAID is formed by the Arizona Finance Authority against fixed statutory criteria, through a yes-or-no compliance review on a sixty-day clock, rather than through the discretionary approval of a city council or a board of supervisors. Insulation from municipal politics. Because formation is a state-level compliance determination, a meritorious project is far less exposed to local political headwinds than it is under the CFD process. Landowner control of the board. A SAID is governed by a board of the landowners — appointed at formation, then elected on an acreage basis. In a typical municipal CFD, the city council sits as the district board; here, the developer controls governance. Advance funding of impact fees. A SAID can use bond proceeds to advance-pay municipal development impact fees, unlike CFDs, removing one of the largest upfront cash burdens in a project. A uniform, statewide process. The criteria are the same regardless of jurisdiction, replacing the municipality-by-municipality variation that has made CFD outcomes hard to predict. Flexible boundaries. A district may include noncontiguous parcels in the same county within five miles of one another, which fits phased and multi-tract development. Capped cost and a fixed timeline. Authority fees to form a district are capped at $15,000, and a complete petition must be acted on within sixty days. The full range of bonds. A SAID may issue general obligation, special assessment, revenue, and refunding bonds, secured solely by district property and creating no obligation for any other taxpayer. What is a SAID A SAID is a special taxing district that the owners of a development form to finance public infrastructure with tax-exempt bonds: general obligation bonds, special assessment bonds, and revenue bonds. The bonds are secured only by the property inside the district and are repaid over the long term, with terms up to 30 years. They do not affect the credit of the city, the county, or the State, and they create no obligation for any taxpayer outside the district. In practical terms, a SAID lets you finance horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of writing the check at the front end. The maximum ad valorem rate securing general obligation bonds is capped by statute at $5.00 per $100 of net assessed limited property valuation, with a limited step-up to cover a debt-service shortfall. SAIDs Work for Commercial as Well as Residential Development The SAID bill drew most of its press as a housing-affordability measure, and it appears to be a strong one. It is the first Arizona district statute to let bond proceeds advance-fund municipal development impact fees, which pulls one of the largest upfront cash burdens off a homebuilder's pro forma. But the statute's eligible infrastructure categories apply with equal force to commercial, industrial, and mixed-use projects. An industrial or logistics project can finance roads, rail crossings, sidings, and grade separations. A life-sciences or technology campus can finance its water, sewer, roads, and broadband the same way a subdivision can. Read Chapter 40 as a general-purpose infrastructure finance platform, not a subdivision-only device. How Formation Works A SAID is formed administratively by the Arizona Finance Authority. The Authority reviews the petition for compliance with the statute; it is a yes-or-no review against fixed criteria, not a discretionary negotiation with a city council or a board of supervisors, and it runs on a sixty-day clock once a complete petition is filed. Formation requires the written consent of 100% of the landowners in the proposed district and an engineer's certification that public infrastructure costs will exceed $5 million. The district may include noncontiguous parcels so long as they lie in the same county and within five miles of the district's other property, which accommodates phased and multi-tract development; if any part of the district sits inside a municipality, the whole district must stay within that municipality's limits or planning area. The Authority's fees to form a district are capped at $15,000. Issuing bonds requires a district election. Governance Simplified A SAID is run by a three-member board. The initial directors are named in the petition; after that, directors are elected by the landowners on an acreage basis as ownership diversifies. Board service runs with ownership; a director must either hold fee title inside the district or be an individual designated by a fee-title owner; and corporations, partnerships, and other entities may hold that ownership, vote as owners, and designate the individual who serves. A district has no power of eminent domain and no zoning authority, and directors may not be officials or employees of the municipality in which the district sits. What a SAID Does Not Do It finances; it does not entitle. Zoning, platting, rezonings, use permits, and the specialized approvals a manufacturing or life-sciences facility may need all remain with the local jurisdiction and proceed on their own track. The financing and entitlement timelines should be coordinated with formation of the SAID, but they are separate processes. Two substantive limits are worth flagging at the planning stage. First, electric power is largely outside the tool: the statutory definition of public infrastructure does not reach power generation or transmission, and broader energy infrastructure was removed from the bill during the Senate amendments. A power-intensive user should not assume a SAID will carry its electrical load. Second, where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the district cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility upon completion. Our Take For most master-planned residential work, and for a wide range of commercial and industrial development, a SAID will be the most efficient infrastructure-financing structure Arizona has offered. The right time to evaluate it is early in the acquisition and pre-development process, while the capital stack, the development agreement, and the entitlement strategy are still being set. Once the district's boundaries, general plan, and financing parameters are set, it is cumbersome at best to bring those into conformance later. Our Dorsey team has begun advising our developer clients on SAID formation on residential, commercial, and industrial projects statewide. If you would like us to assess whether a SAID fits a project you are working on, please reach out.

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State Affordability Infrastructure Districts (SAIDs) — A Financing Tool for Taiwanese Investment in Arizona Science and Technology Parks

If you have developed a facility inside one of Taiwan's science or technology parks, you are accustomed to the one-stop-shop of government planning the park and delivering the roads, water, power, and other infrastructure before your building is even constructed. In the United States, including Arizona, land development generally does not work that way. In Arizona, the cost of infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, power, and the digital backbone, typically falls on the private landowner and is incurred up front before operations generate revenue to offset that cost. For a company entering the Arizona market, this is often the largest and earliest capital burden of the entire project. Arizona recently created a tool that provides a more cost-effective way for landowners and developer to finance some of that infrastructure. House Bill 2999, signed into law June 2026 and codified at Chapter 40 of Title 48 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, establishes the creation of a State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID). How a SAID Works Landowners are now able to use a SAID to finance public infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, parking, lighting, communications, rail sidings and signalization, and similar improvements, through tax-exempt bonds. The bonds are repaid over up to 30 years and secured solely by the property within the SAID. No city, county, or state credit is pledged, and no obligation falls on other taxpayers, and therefore no city, county, or state approval other than from the Arizona Finance Authority (AFA). In effect, a SAID lets you spread the cost of horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of funding it entirely at the outset. And tax-exempt bonds often offer a lower interest rate than taxable or other types of financing. How a SAID is Formed A SAID is formed upon the filing of a petition with the AFA. The petition must include the finance plan, general plan, estimated costs, maximum tax rate, appraisal, bond counsel certificate, consultant list, petitioner experience, legal description, title report, and other materials. While the landowner is required to provide notice to the local governing jurisdiction, local governing jurisdiction does not have the right to approve or deny. The petition is reviewed administratively by the AFA through a standards-based process. For an inbound investor without long-standing local relationships, an objective, criteria-driven process is a meaningful advantage to the overt political process associated with other financing districts in Arizona. Formation requirements. A SAID requires consent from 100% of landowners within the proposed district; public infrastructure costs must exceed $5 million (easily met at any real scale); the district property must all be in the same county and need not be contiguous provided that noncontiguous property is located within five miles of the district's other property; and the board is initially appointed by the forming owners of the SAID district, later transitioning to election as ownership diversifies. Actual bond issuance requires an election of the SAID property owners. Ownership and corporate structure. Consent rights and board seats run with title. If you hold the Arizona land through a U.S. blocker beneath your Taiwan parent, the standard model for Taiwanese/Arizona real estate and operating investment, the U.S. property-holding entity, rather than it’s corporate parent, is the landowner of record for the district. Before formation, our Dorsey team will confirm that you have the proper corporate structure and board mechanics to be compliant.  Board composition has no citizenship or residency requirement. This is a common concern for foreign investors, and the statute answers it cleanly. Under A.R.S. § 48-7004, a director must either hold fee title to real property in the district or be an individual designated or appointed by a fee-title owner. Corporations, partnerships, and other business entities are expressly permitted to be those owners, to vote as owners, and to designate an individual to serve. There is no requirement that a director be a U.S. citizen or resident. So your U.S. property-holding entity, as landowner of record, can appoint whichever of your principals you choose, including a Taiwan-based individual, as the three-member board.  Power infrastructure limitation. The enacted definition of "public infrastructure" in A.R.S. § 48-7001 does not include electrical power generation or transmission. The reference to electrical facilities appears only as components of lighting and traffic-control systems, and the Legislature removed broader energy infrastructure from the definition during the Senate amendments. A SAID will likely not finance the high-load power infrastructure required for semiconductor fabrication, data storage, or heavy manufacturing.  Water infrastructure within a current utility CC&N. Where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the SAID cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility on completion. Entitlements and zoning: The determination of entitlements, zoning, and other land use permitting, as well as construction permitting for a technology or manufacturing facilities remain with the local jurisdiction and run on a separate track. Our Dorsey team will help you coordinate the financing and entitlement timelines together. Our Dorsey team works regularly with Taiwanese and other Asia-Pacific companies entering the Arizona market. If a SAID fits your project, we can structure it for your cross-border ownership.

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Dorsey Partner Melissa Raphan Elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers

International law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP is pleased to announce that Partner Melissa Raphan has been elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers (CLEL) as part of its 2026 class. “Melissa’s election to this prestigious fellowship comes as no surprise to those of us who have had the privilege of working with her,” says Peter Nelson, Dorsey’s Managing Partner.  “She is an exceptional employment lawyer, a trusted advisor, and a leader whose impact extends far beyond her matters. Clients rely on her deep knowledge, strategic counsel, and ability to navigate complex workplace disputes and sensitive employment matters with both confidence and compassion. She has helped shape our firm, strengthen our profession, and opened doors for countless others through her commitment to mentorship and diversity. We are incredibly proud of her accomplishments and delighted to see her receive this recognition.” CLEL is a nonprofit professional association that honors the nation’s leading attorneys in the field of labor and employment law. Originally established to recognize excellence in the profession, CLEL has evolved into a respected intellectual and practical resource for the legal community and its many audiences. Its mission centers on recognizing individuals who have made significant contributions to the field, fostering the exchange of knowledge and delivering value to academia, government, the judiciary, and the broader public. Election as a fellow represents the highest level of peer acknowledgment, reflecting sustained achievement, integrity, and a commitment to advancing the profession. Melissa’s career reflects CLEL’s mission. She has been recognized both regionally and nationally for her advocacy, leadership, and achievements both inside and outside of the courtroom. Her employment litigation experience spans class actions, collective actions, and high-stakes individual disputes in state and federal courts, as well as arbitration forums including the American Arbitration Association and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). She is also a trusted advisor on a full range of workplace issues, from hiring and performance management to sensitive terminations and organizational change. She brings decades of experience representing clients across the financial services, healthcare, food and agriculture, and energy sectors. Melissa will be formally inducted during CLEL’s installation ceremony held in conjunction with the American Bar Association’s Labor & Employment Law Conference in Washington, D.C., on November 7.

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Patent Partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic Join Dorsey in Palo Alto

Patent partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic have joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Palo Alto, the international law firm announced today. Al Araiza works with clients to develop and implement patent strategies that align with corporate objectives, supporting growth initiatives, financing efforts, and successful exits, including initial public offerings and acquisitions. He advises on building, managing, and optimizing patent portfolios across a broad range of emerging and frontier technologies, with depth in wireless communications, artificial intelligence, and energy innovation. Before practicing law, Al gained engineering experience in the defense industry, working on energy system modeling and communications circuitry design. He also conducted biomedical research, with findings published in peer-reviewed journals. He has been recognized in the IAM Patent 1000 for his work advising clients on patent strategy and portfolio development. Al received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law, his M.E. in Biomedical Engineering from Tulane University, and his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from UCLA. Lena Petrovic works across the software and hardware industries to develop clear, well-supported patent applications. She guides clients through the prosecution process and advises on global trademark and copyright matters, including licensing and portfolio management. Lena regularly supports clients developing technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, fintech, cryptography, interactive and immersive experiences, and digital media, and works with companies in entertainment, gaming, and sports. Before practicing law, Lena spent a decade at Pixar, where she contributed to major films including The Incredibles, Ratatouille, WALL‑E, and Brave. Lena received her J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law, her M.S. in Computer Science from Princeton University, and her B.S. from California Institute of Technology. “Al and Lena bring a practical, technical, and business-focused approach informed by extensive experience working with technology companies, startups, and investors,” said Gina Cornelio, Patent Practice Group Co-Leader. “We are thrilled to welcome them to the Patent team and our growing Palo Alto office.” “Dorsey’s Patent practice is dedicated to understanding each client's business deeply, tailoring patent strategies that directly advance their goals,” said Al Araiza. “We are proud to join this outstanding team and look forward to driving success for our clients.”

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Proposed CMS Rule Ramps Up Potential Medicare Fraud Administrative Remedies

On July 6, 2026, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a rule that would expand its administrative remedies to combat potential fraud. The proposed rule is the latest in a round of administrative actions that signal CMS’s intent to aggressively pursue allegations of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and heighten the risk of fraud enforcement against even well-intentioned Medicare and Medicaid providers and suppliers. The proposed rule includes several changes to regulations that govern Medicare billing privileges. Providers and suppliers should be aware that these changes dramatically expand the flexibility afforded to CMS in enrollment and revocation actions, potentially leading to harsh consequences for ministerial and administrative errors. If finalized, moreover, the proposed rule could have material implications for providers and suppliers facing threatened revocation, including heightened risk of overpayment liability and increased hurdles to challenging revocations and denials of enrollment. Added Flexibility to Existing Revocation Grounds CMS has proposed to remove a number of factors that the regulations list as relevant to a determination of whether a provider has engaged in “abuse of billing privileges.” While acknowledging that the inclusion of these factors in the regulations was permissive (requiring consideration only where “as appropriate or applicable”), CMS stated that it must be afforded “the maximum flexibility to address all possible . . . scenarios without the rigid constraints of our existing factors.” CMS provided little guidance as to the outer bounds of what conduct could constitute an “abuse of privileges” that merits revocation of Medicare billing privileges. Instead, CMS noted that a “pattern of practice” of abuse of billing privileges might be established “by a simple finding that several of a provider’s claims do not meet Medicare requirements.” Similarly, CMS has proposed to expand the regulatory provision that permits revocation of enrollment if a provider certifies as “true” false or misleading information in Medicare enrollment application or renewal forms to include any scenario in which a provider submits “false or misleading information on or associated with any CMS Medicare enrollment-related form,” including materials submitted to Medicare contractors. CMS stated that it interprets this expanded rule to include anything related to Medicare enrollment, and not only those submissions that are “intended to gain or maintain Medicare enrollment.” If finalized, the proposed rule would add significant flexibility to CMS’s ability to pursue revocation of a provider’s enrollment. While CMS has assured providers that it would “invoke [the revised regulations]. . . only when legitimately warranted under the facts and circumstances and not as a matter of course,” such expanded flexibility threatens unpredictability in the event of even administrative or ministerial errors in submissions and claims. These changes would, moreover, make it more difficult for providers to challenge a revocation action. Expanded Revocation Grounds In addition to adding flexibility to existing grounds for revocation, CMS’s proposed rule adds to and expands CMS’s already broad authority to revoke provider and supplier enrollment. Such proposed changes include adding the following grounds for revocation: Denial of Enrollment Application. Where CMS could previously revoke a provider’s other enrollments if one enrollment is revoked, CMS would also be able to revoke a provider’s existing enrollments if an application for enrollment submitted by the provider is denied. High-Risk Enrollments. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if it determines the provider or supplier (including owning/managing employees or organizations) poses a high risk of fraud, waste, or abuse due to “. . . an affiliation under [42 C.F.R.] § 424.519” or “the provider’s or supplier’s location within a limited geographic area that has an excessive number of providers and suppliers.” Certain Misdemeanor Convictions. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if a provider or supplier—or its owners, managing employees, managing organizations, officers, or directors—are convicted of a “misdemeanor related to sexual assault or financial misconduct within the past 10 years that CMS deems detrimental to the best interests of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries.” Ownership Changes (HHA, Hospice, DMEPOS). CMS would have broad authority to revoke enrollment of home health agencies, hospices, and DMEPOS suppliers who do not comply with the regulations governing provider changes of ownership. These proposed, expanded grounds for revocation are notably broad, and CMS provides only limited guidance as to what conduct might result in revocation under these grounds. As with the proposed expansion of existing grounds for revocation, the open-ended nature of these proposed grounds for revocation may make it more difficult for providers and suppliers to challenge revocation actions. Expanded Grounds to Deny Medicare Enrollment As with revocations, CMS proposes to expand the grounds under which a provider’s application to enroll in Medicare can be denied. These expanded and additional grounds include many of the grounds added for revocations, but also include: Medicare Debt or Payment Suspension. CMS proposes expanding the ground to deny enrollment based on Medicare debt or payment suspension to include a provider or supplier’s “managing employee, managing organization, or individual or entity with any other form of business or financial relationship with the provider or supplier[.]” Significantly, this expansive definition (called an “associated party” under the proposed regulation) currently contains no material limitations, meaning almost any person or entity with whom an applicant does business could create denial liability. Sharing Locations with Denied/Revoked Providers or Suppliers. CMS would have authority to deny applications where a “provider’s or supplier’s practice location is in the same suite or office as another provider or supplier whose Medicare enrollment has been revoked or denied.” Hospices with Distant Medical Directors or Administrators. CMS would have discretion to deny hospice applications if the hospice’s medical director or administrator serves “multiple other hospices” or practices/is located “at such a distance (for example, in a different state) from the enrolling hospice that the medical director cannot realistically perform all medical director functions,” with a similar provision for administrators. In addition, CMS proposes applications denied for “other program termination or suspension,” may be applied to the provider or supplier in its own name or NPI or that of its owners, managing employees, or managing organization regardless of whether any appeals are pending. Retroactive Revocation CMS proposed to restructure and expand the regulatory grounds for retroactive revocation of billing privileges. Currently, Medicare regulations provide that revocations are, by default, prospective in nature: effective 30 days after CMS or the CMS contractor mails notice to the provider. Under certain circumstances, the regulations provide for revocations to be retroactive, such as when a provider is convicted of a felony, the date a professional license is suspended, revoked, or surrendered, or when a provider submits a false certification in their enrollment application. CMS has proposed to reframe the rule so as to default to retroactive revocation of billing privileges. CMS expressed concern that providers may collect payment from Medicare while remaining so non-compliant with enrollment requirements as to merit revocation. To address this concern, CMS proposed that all revocations be retroactive to the date of determined non-compliance.[1] As a result, providers suspected of misconduct or non-compliance are likely to face claims of retroactive overpayments in addition to the immediate concern no longer receiving Medicare payments while their enrollment is revoked. Reapplication Bar CMS’s proposed rule expands the grounds from which a provider may be prohibited from seeking reapplication as a Medicare provider. Under current regulations, CMS may prohibit prospective providers from enrolling in Medicare for up to 10 years if its enrollment application is denied because the applicant submitted false or misleading information in its application. Under the proposed rule, CMS will have the discretion to prohibit a provider from enrolling in Medicare if their enrollment application is denied for any reason. Conclusion As a part of the federal government’s increasingly aggressive push to combat real or perceived healthcare fraud, the proposed rule both broadens CMS’s authority to revoke and deny Medicare enrollment and raises the stakes for revocation and denial. What the proposed rule does not share is how CMS plans to exercise this expanded discretion: as a result, the proposed rule, if enacted, increases the unpredictability and potential ramifications of even technical noncompliance with CMS rules. As a result, Medicare providers should keep a close eye on potential revisions to these rules and their potential implementation and consider proactively evaluating their compliance under CMS standards. [1] In the proposed rule, CMS identifies, with respect to each ground for revocation, what it will consider to be the effective date of revocation.