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The Court of Federal Claims and the Trump Administration’s Contract and Grant Terminations: A Primer for Federal Grantees and Contractors

November 18, 2025

by Alex Hontos, Eric Weisenburger, Chris DeLong, and Matthew Gillespie

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The Trump Administration’s unprecedented terminations of federal contracts and grants have affected organizations seeking options and remedies. Universities, academic research institutions, federal contractors, and state and local governments have been particularly impacted. But seeking judicial redress is not straight-forward; courts considering such challenges have identified jurisdictional problems when seeking relief from a federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act. Enter the United States Court of Federal Claims.

This briefing paper introduces Dorsey clients to the Court of Federal Claims, a specialized and lesser-known federal court that will be increasingly important and relevant as the battle over federal grants and contracts continues through the Second Trump Administration. 

What is the Court of Federal Claims?

The Court of Federal Claims (“COFC”)—in its current form—was created by the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992.[1]  But the COFC’s history long precedes its current iteration.  In 1855, Congress created the Court of Claims to “relieve the pressure on Congress” to handle “private bills,” meaning claims against the federal government, which were then the responsibility of Congress. The Court of Claims lacked authority to render final judgments, however, and instead merely made recommendations to Congress.[2]

In 1863, during the height of the Civil War, the Court of Claims’ recommendations regarding claims against the government became too voluminous for Congress to handle, so Congress empowered the Court of Claims to issue final judgments against the United States.[3] The Court of Claims’ jurisdiction was refined a few decades later through the Tucker Act in 1887,[4] which remains the statutory basis for the Court of Federal Claims today.[5] The Court of Claims’ remit was refined again in 1925 by Act of Congress that reorganized the Court of Claims into a trial division and appellate division.[6]  The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the Court of Claims, folded its appellate division into the newly created United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and established the United States Claims Court.[7]  In 1992, the Federal Courts Administration Act renamed the United States Claims Court to the United States Court of Federal Claims.[8] 

The COFC is an “Article I court,” referring to Article I of the United States Constitution which governs the legislative branch.[9]  As an Article I court, the COFC is a “legislative” court that hears cases only under specific circumstances delineated by statute (discussed below).[10]  COFC judges are appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate, for a fifteen-year term.[11]  There are sixteen active COFC judgeships.[12]  Currently, there are also five active senior judges and no vacancies. Among the judges, ten were appointed by President Trump, five by President Biden, and one by President Obama.[13] Judgments of the COFC are appealable to the Federal Circuit, which is an “Article III court.”[14] 

Sovereign Immunity and COFC Jurisdiction

As an Article I court, the COFC is not a court of general jurisdiction like federal district courts. Instead, the COFC can hear only those matters within its statutory grant of jurisdiction.  And there is only one defendant for lawsuits brought in the COFC: the United States.[15] 

Sovereign immunity generally bars claims against the United States.  The Tucker Act, however, resolves this bar for certain claims.[16]  In passing the Tucker Act, Congress waived sovereign immunity with respect to certain money-damage actions and prescribed the jurisdictional boundaries of the COFC.[17]  The Tucker Act provides, in relevant part:

(a)(1) The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort . . .

(2) To provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded by the judgment, the court may, as an incident of and collateral to any such judgment, issue orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records, and such orders may be issued to any appropriate official of the United States . . . .[18]

Thus, the Tucker Act provides the COFC jurisdiction to hear “actions pursuant to contracts with the United States, actions to recover illegal exactions of money by the United States, and actions brought pursuant to money-mandating statutes, regulations, executive orders, or constitutional provisions.”[19]   But “the Court of Federal Claims’ limited jurisdiction does not include tort claims, criminal-law claims, or non-money-mandating constitutional provisions.”[20]   

Important in the context of recent litigation, the Federal Circuit has held the COFC, as an Article I court, “lacks the general federal question jurisdiction of the district courts, which would allow it to review the agency’s actions and to grant relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).”[21]  And when a “plaintiff has another suit for or in respect to [a] claim pending against the United States” in another court, the Court of Federal Claims “has no jurisdiction over [that] claim” while the other suit is pending.[22] 

Cases in the COFC do not follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”).  Instead, the COFC has its own rules,[23] which in some instances differ from the FRCP.  For example, because the only defendant in the COFC is the United States, COFC Rule 4 does not detail the process for a “Summons” like FRCP 4 but rather addresses “Serving a Complaint on the United States.”[24]

Statute of Limitations

The general statute of limitations for monetary claims against the federal government is six years.[25] But certain claims have other potential time-bars.  For example, some contract claims are governed by the Contract Disputes Act and must first be submitted to and adjudicated by a contracting officer, whose decisions generally must be challenged in the COFC within one year.[26]  As another example, bid protest actions based on ambiguities or errors identified in the government’s solicitation (rather than errors in the evaluation-and-award process) generally must be brought before the deadline to submit offers in response to the solicitation.[27]

Permissible Remedies at COFC

The COFC’s principal remedy is a money judgment—think damages associated with a breach of contract.[28] “The United States Court of Federal Claims does not have general authority to issue injunctive relief.”[29]  Despite COFC’s lack of “general authority” to grant equitable relief, however, the COFC has limited authority to issue equitable relief “as an incident of and collateral to any such [money] judgment.”[30] For example, COFC can order the government to correct its records.[31] 

Litigation in the COFC

For administrative challenges leading up to a COFC action, the federal agency whose decisions or actions gave rise to the claim is often represented by their own agency’s counsel.  Once the action is filed in the COFC, however, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) steps in to represent the agency. Each case and set of facts is different, but new counsel coming into the case can be beneficial for informal resolution between the parties because DOJ attorneys will often take a fresh look at the issues in dispute.  The DOJ section that represents the United States at the COFC—the “National Courts Section” of the Civil Division—has historically had a reputation as pragmatic and apolitical.  Further, because DOJ represents the United States in litigation, DOJ gets to settle a case or dispute, even over the objection of the agency. 

In addition, funds to settle claims and lawsuits at COFC can come from a different funding source than, for example, the funding supporting the contract or grant in dispute.  Instead, the United States Judgment Fund “pays court judgments and compromise settlements of lawsuits against the [federal] government.”[32]

Examples of Tucker Act Cases at COFC

The COFC, and its predecessor courts, have heard a wide variety of cases brought under the Tucker Act in the nearly 140 years since its passage.  Some relatively recent and significant examples have shaped the scope of the COFC’s jurisdiction to hear grant and contract claims. While the bulk of the COFC’s cases involve contracts governed by the Contract Disputes Act—a law that does not cover terminated federal grants or even all contracts with the United States—there are numerous examples of non-CDA contract disputes that have resulted in recovery against the United States for breach.

First, in Thermalon Industries, Ltd. v. United States, the COFC held that federal grants qualify as the type of contract for which a plaintiff can sue for wrongful termination in the COFC.[33]  There, the COFC explained that the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) awarded a grant to Thermalon and, after work began, the NSF audited Thermalon’s invoices and disallowed certain costs Thermalon submitted.[34]  Thermalon stopped work and the NSF terminated the grant.[35] Thermalon sought relief from the NSF, which the NSF denied, so Thermalon filed suit in the COFC.[36]  The NSF moved to dismiss, arguing the Tucker Act did not confer jurisdiction because Thermalon’s grant was not a contract.[37] The COFC denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the Tucker Act covers more than just “situations that involve the government ‘stepping off the throne and engaging in [the] purchase and sale of goods’ in the market place.”[38]  Ultimately, the COFC determined that “contracts enforceable under the Tucker Act result only if there is a mutual intent to contract, including an offer, acceptance, and consideration,” and that “the government always has the choice when designing a grant scheme to select a scheme that does or does not involve contracts.”[39]  Since Thermalon, the law is clear that instruments with the United States that have the traditional indicia of contracts are contracts for purposes of COFC jurisdiction.[40] 

Second, in the “Winstar” cases, the COFC held (and the Supreme Court affirmed) that even the United States’ exercise of a sovereign power can support a breach-of-contract claim.  In those cases, financial institutions sued in the COFC for breaches of contracts that had promised regulatory relief.[41] The financial institution plaintiffs had agreed to purchase savings-and-loan institutions during an industry crisis in the 1980s in exchange for, among other things, reduced regulatory burdens, such as lower reserve requirements.[42]  The contracts provided that if those regulatory benefits were reversed, the United States would owe damages.[43]  Years after the contracts were signed, Congress enacted legislation that prohibited some of the very incentives the financial institutions had contracted to obtain. The COFC awarded the financial institutions damages for breach of contract.[44]  The Federal Circuit (en banc) and United States Supreme Court affirmed the damages awards, explaining that although the federal government cannot agree in a contract that it will not exercise a sovereign power (such as enacting legislation), it can agree that it will pay costs caused by exercising that power, and the COFC has jurisdiction to hear such cases.[45]  Following this decision, more than 100 separate—but similar—cases were filed in the COFC, the last of which was finally resolved in 2015.[46]

Third, in a line of cases known as the “Spent Nuclear Fuel” cases, the COFC maintained plaintiffs’ right to seek monetary relief when forced to incur costs based on an agency’s failure to meet contractual obligations.  In these cases, electric utilities brought claims for breaches of contracts in which the utilities agreed to dispose of spent nuclear fuel (“SNF”) produced at the utilities’ power plants.[47]  Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, in which the federal government recognized that it must provide for “permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste,” and that the “generators and owners” of the waste must have the primary responsibility to pay for disposal of it and for the interim costs of storage pending disposal.[48]  The Act mandated that the utilities contract with the Department of Energy (“DOE”) and required disposal of waste to begin no later than January 31, 1998.[49] But in 1994, DOE announced the repository to dispose of SNF would not be available until 2010 and that DOE had no obligation to provide for disposal by the deadline.[50] 

The utilities brought actions for judicial review of DOE’s decision in the D.C. Circuit, which held DOE did have an obligation to begin disposing of the waste by the January 31, 1998 deadline.[51]  Nevertheless, DOE informed certain utilities that it would not accept waste by the deadline, so the utilities went back to the D.C. Circuit seeking writs of mandamus to force DOE to comply with the deadline.[52]  But the D.C. Circuit held instead that the utilities could pursue contractual remedies—sue for damages caused by the breach of the contracts with DOE.[53]  The utilities then filed breach-of-contract actions against DOE in the COFC seeking money damages for the costs to be incurred with extended storage of SNF and alleged an unconstitutional taking of property (the interim storage facilities) by failing to dispose of SNF.[54]  The government moved to dismiss on the ground that the utilities had failed to exhaust administrative remedies required by the contract when filing contractual claims.[55]  The utilities moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for their breach-of-contract claims.  Id. The COFC denied the government’s motion to dismiss because there was no applicable administrative dispute process for specific breach claims.[56] The court also granted partial summary judgment for the utilities on liability, explaining that it was undisputed that DOE had failed to begin accepting, transporting, and disposing of the SNF.[57]  The Federal Circuit affirmed.[58] 

Fourth, the COFC hears breaches of settlement agreements.  As one example, a former employee of the United States Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) alleged OPM violated confidentiality provisions in his settlement agreement and brought a claim for money damages.[59]  The COFC concluded it had jurisdiction over such claims under the Tucker Act, but dismissed the claim because it had already been litigated before the Merit Systems Protection Board.[60]  The Federal Circuit affirmed that the Tucker Act conferred the COFC jurisdiction over this breach claim and reversed dismissal under the doctrine of res judicata.[61] 

New Questions Over the Scope of APA Jurisdiction and Remedies in Recent Actions

Under the Second Trump Administration, federal district courts have faced a deluge of new lawsuits from states and organizations seeking injunctions to pause terminations of grants, contracts, or other federal programs.  To date, these challenges have often been brought as statutory causes of action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).[62]  Some district courts have granted interim injunctive relief from which the Administration has often sought relief from the circuit courts of appeal and even the Supreme Court. For example, multiple states brought an action under the APA in federal district court seeking an injunction preventing the Department of Education from “terminating various education-related grants” and “requir[ing] the Government to pay out past-due grant obligations and to continue paying obligations as they accrue.”[63]  The district court granted preliminary injunctive relief, which was not stayed, and the Administration sought emergency relief from the Supreme Court.  In a relatively short order on the Administration’s request, the Supreme Court granted a stay of the injunction, ruling that the government was likely to succeed in its defense against the claims because the claims were, in essence, seeking “‘to enforce a contractual obligation to pay money,’” which is a claim in the remit of the Court of Federal Claims.[64] 

Since the Supreme Court’s order in Department of Education, courts have expressed increased skepticism over the scope of APA jurisdiction when reviewing challenges to grants and contracts.  In a recent example, the D.C. federal district court heard a challenge from a union and associations of scientists and academics over termination of NSF grants designed “to support underrepresented groups in STEM [Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math] fields.”[65] NSF terminated those grants following issuance of subregulatory guidance entitled “Statement of NSF Priorities” in April 2025,[66] as part of a sweeping termination of approximately 1,600 similar grants totaling over $1 billion.[67] The plaintiffs challenged termination of the grants on several bases, one of which was an APA challenge to NSF’s termination of the grants that sought injunctive relief from the court ordering NSF to reinstate the grants at issue.[68]  Relying in part of the Department of Education decision, the federal district court determined that it lacks jurisdiction to hear those APA claims, despite that the claims “do[] not overtly seek monetary relief, nor expressly invoke contractual claims,” because the rights at issue “stem from the cancelled grant agreements and [plaintiffs] seek specific performance of those agreements.”[69] 

In a similar challenge, the Supreme Court cast doubt on a grantee’s ability to obtain monetary relief or grant reinstatement through an APA challenge.  In National Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Association, a plurality of the Supreme Court explained that the APA does not allow federal district courts to adjudicate claims based on terminations of research-related grants or to order relief that amounted to an obligation to pay money damages based on such grants.[70]  In that case, the plaintiffs brought an APA action in federal district court to challenge agency-issued guidance that resulted in the National Institutes of Health terminating hundreds of grants. 

The Supreme Court’s recent emergency orders in Department of Education and National Institutes of Health are proving to be a hurdle—though not an impossible one—when seeking relief in the federal district courts.  Though the APA path may still be available in certain fact patterns, organizational leaders should understand that there are other options—including the Court of Federal Claims—to seek redress for wrongs wrought by the decisions of policy makers in Washington, D.C.

Dorsey’s government-contracts team has appeared in many Court of Federal Claims matters and advises organizations assessing federal grant or contract terminations, seeking termination and settlement costs from federal agencies, pursuing administrative appeals, or litigating those disputes in the federal district courts or Court of Federal Claims.


[1] Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506.

[2] See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552 (1962) (superseded by statute on other grounds).

[3] See id. at 553.

[4] 24 Stat. 505 (1887).

[5] See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 556; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491.

[6] See Pub. L. No. 68-451, 43 Stat. 964.

[7] See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.

[8] See Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506.

[9] See, e.g., Indus. for the Blind, Inc. v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 132, 135 (2015).

[10] See Courts: A Brief Overview, Federal Judicial Center, https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/courts-brief-overview.

[11] See 28 U.S.C. §§ 171-172.

[12] See 28 U.S.C. § 171.

[13] See Judges, United States Court of Federal Claims, https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/judges.

[14] See Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

[15] See Double Lion Uchet Express Tr. v. United States, 149 Fed. Cl. 415, 420 (2020) (“[I]n the Court of Federal Claims, ‘the only proper defendant . . . is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual.’” (quoting Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003))).

[16] See 28 U.S.C. § 1491.

[17] See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399-400 (1976) (describing the Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity for certain claims against the United States).

[18] 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a).  The COFC also has jurisdiction to hear bid protests, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b), which are challenges to the federal government’s procurement decisions.  Dorsey has extensive expertise and experience in representing and advising organizations on myriad federal procurement issues.

[19] Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

[20] Chisum v. United States, No. 2025-1562, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 25967, 2025 WL 2836408, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 7, 2025).

[21] Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

[22] United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 311 (2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1500.

[23] Rules of the Unites States Court of Federal Claims (2024), available at https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/cfc/files/rcfc_complete.pdf.

[24] Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 with Ct. Fed. Cl. R. 4.

[25] See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (“Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”).

[26] See 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103-7104. 

[27] See generally Blue & Gold, Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

[28] See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2). 

[29] Sergent’s Mech. Sys. v. United States, 157 Fed. Cl. 41, 46 (2021) (citing Richardson v. Morris, 409 U.S. 464, 465 (1973) (“[T]he [Tucker] Act has long been construed as authorizing only actions for money judgments and not suits for equitable relief against the United States.”)).

[30] 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2). 

[31] Id.

[32] Judgment Fund, Bureau of the Fiscal Service,  https://fiscal.treasury.gov/judgment-fund/; see also 31 U.S.C. § 1304.

[33] 34 Fed. Cl. 411 (1995). 

[34] Id. at 414.

[35] Id. 

[36] Id.

[37] Id. 

[38] Id. at 417 (quoting Kania v. United States, 650 F.2d 264 (Ct. Cl. 1981)). 

[39] Thermalon, 34 Fed. Cl. at 421. 

[40] Hometown Fin., Inc. v. United States, 409 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (identifying “(1) mutuality of intent to contract; (2) offer and acceptance; (3) consideration; and (4) a government representative having actual authority to bind the United States”).

[41] See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). 

[42] See id. 

[43] See id. 

[44] See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112 (1990). 

[45] See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 881.

[46] Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13 No. 2 FDIC Banking Review 26, 33 (2000).

[47] See Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

[48] See id. at 1337 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131(a)(4)). 

[49] Id.

[50] See id. at 1338. 

[51] See Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

[52] See Northern States Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

[53] Id. 

[54] See Maine Yankee Atomic Power, 225 F.3d at 1337. 

[55] See Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 223, 225 (1999). 

[56] Id. at 235.

[57] See id.  

[58] Maine Yankee Atomic Power, 225 F.3d at 1337.

[59] See Cunningham v. United States, 748 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

[60] See  Cunningham v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 208, 221 (2012).

[61] Cunningham, 748 F.3d at 1174.

[62] See 5 USC § 551 et seq.

[63] See Dep’t of Education v. California, et al., 604 U.S. 650, 650 (2025). 

[64] Id. at 651.

[65] Am. Ass’n of Physics Tchrs., Inc. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., No. 25-cv-1923, 4, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176901, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2025).

[66] Id. at *2.

[67] Id. at *2-3. 

[68] See id. at *3. 

[69] Id. at *7. 

[70] 606 U.S. __, __, 145 S. Ct. 2658 (2025).

Firm Highlights

Insights

Litigation Privilege Does Not Automatically Protect Communications with Funders: The Commercial Court Clarifies the Limits of Privilege in the Context of Litigation Funding

In Uber London Ltd & Ors v Garry White & Ors; Mishcon de Reya LLP [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that documents created to help a funder decide whether to invest in a claim will not ordinarily attract litigation privilege. This means that information a firm gathers while acting for a funder can later fall within the control of the claimants it goes on to represent in the same matter. Background The Claimants (a claim group of over 10,000 individual London black cab drivers and the assignee of two former minicab operators) alleged that the Defendants (three companies in the Uber group) obtained and retained their private hire operator's licence through an unlawful means conspiracy alleged to involve fraud. Because the claims were issued outside the ordinary six-year limitation period, the Claimants relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, contending they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud before June 2018. A preliminary issue trial was listed to determine the question of whether the Claimants discovered, or could have discovered with reasonable diligence, the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment only after June 2018. The Claimants were represented by Mishcon de Reya ("MdR"). However, before MdR’s engagement with the individual drivers had begun, in late 2017 it was engaged by the litigation funder Harbour to investigate the merits and value of the potential claim. During that stage, MdR corresponded extensively with Harbour and with the Licensed Taxi Drivers' Association ("LTDA"), a black cab drivers' trade association. MdR was not formally engaged by the Claimants until October 2018 onwards. Once the proceedings had started, the Defendants sought disclosure of communications exchanged between MdR and Harbour before the engagement of MdR by the Claimants (the "Harbour Communications"). This included correspondence between MdR and Harbour, communications with the LTDA, and documents held on MdR's file opened in Harbour's name in connection with the potential claim. The Claimants resisted disclosure on four grounds: (i) that the documents were not relevant; (ii) on the grounds of litigation privilege; (iii) that the documents were outside their control; and (iv) that disclosure occurring so close to trial would be disproportionate. Judgment (i) Were the Harbour Communications relevant to the preliminary issue? The Court held that the Harbour Communications were likely to contain relevant material, on two bases. First, where the Claimants or the LTDA had communicated directly with MdR, that material could shed light on individual Claimants' actual knowledge of the alleged facts. Secondly, what MdR and Harbour had discovered during their investigation could inform the question of what a Claimant could reasonably have discovered at the time (even though the Defendants accepted that MdR's knowledge could not simply be imputed to the Claimants). (ii) Were the Harbour Communications protected by litigation privilege? As set out in the classic cases of Three Rivers (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 and WH Holding Ltd v E20 Stadium LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2652, communications between parties or their solicitors and third parties for the purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation are privileged when the following conditions are satisfied: Litigation must be in progress or in reasonable contemplation. The communications must have been made for the sole or dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The litigation must be adversarial, not investigative or inquisitorial. The Court rejected the Claimant’s claim to be able to withhold the Harbour Communications on the basis of litigation privilege. The Court confirmed that litigation privilege protects only communications created for the dominant purpose of conducting litigation. The Court found that Harbour had instructed MdR so that Harbour could decide whether to fund the proceedings. As such, the dominant purpose of the communications was in relation to funding, not the conduct of litigation. This was distinguished from the situation where an individual litigant who takes its own funding decision. In that situation, the decision whether to fund and the decision whether to litigate are one and the same, made by the person who will actually be the claimant, and so it forms a part of that person's conduct of their own litigation. In contrast, a third-party funder's commercial decision whether to fund someone else's claim is not necessarily part of conducting that litigation. The fact that litigation privilege can, in principle, be claimed by a non-party funder (as recognised in the case of Al Sadeq v Dechert [2024] EWCA 28) did not assist Harbour, since there was no evidence it intended to play any role in the litigation itself beyond funding it. Communications between Harbour and MdR did remain capable of attracting another kind of privilege: legal advice privilege, because of the solicitor-client relationship between Harbour and MdR. But communications with third parties such as the LTDA were not automatically protected in the same way. (iii) Were the Harbour Communications within the Claimants' control? The Court also rejected the argument that the Harbour Communications sat outside the Claimants' control because they belonged to Harbour and not the Claimants. The Court’s reasoning was that once the individual Claimant drivers became MdR's clients, MdR also owed them a duty to disclose material information. That included information that MdR had originally acquired while acting for Harbour. As held in the case of Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood (a firm) [2005] 1 WLR 567, a solicitor owing duties to two clients cannot simply prefer one over the other, and it was unrealistic to suppose MdR would investigate the same claims for Harbour, then represent the Claimants, while disregarding everything it had already learned. The obvious commercial expectation was that this earlier work would be used to advance the Claimants' case. MdR sought to rely on a confidentiality clause in a 2024 retainer agreement between it and RGL Management Ltd (a claims management company acting on behalf of the Claimants) to argue that it was relieved of any duty to disclose information obtained while acting for other clients. The provision stated that MdR may "have acted for persons in the same or similar sector as yours and by agreeing to the terms of this letter you agree that will have no duty to disclose to you any confidential information that we have obtained, or might in the future obtain, from acting for such persons or which is derived from any other source". The Court rejected this on several grounds. Claimants who had already become MdR's clients had an existing right to information in the Harbour Communications where it was relevant to their claims before the 2024 retainer agreement. If they were to surrender that right, it would have required their informed consent (also required under the SRA Code of Conduct). The Court found no evidence that such informed consent had been given. The terms had simply been made available to the Claimants through a portal, with no indication that Claimants understood they were giving up existing rights to relevant information. The Court found that even if the terms had been contractually binding, that would not have amounted to informed consent. In addition, the wording of the clause was not sufficiently clear to show that the Claimants had agreed to waive access to this information. (iv) Was disclosure reasonable, proportionate, and necessary at this stage? The Claimants argued that it was neither reasonable nor proportionate for disclosure to be given at such a late stage (approximately two weeks before the start of the preliminary issue trial) and that it was not necessary for the just disposal of the proceedings. The Court rejected this, but it drew a distinction between two categories of documents within the Harbour Communications: Documents bearing on the actual knowledge of the individual drivers, including communications with the LTDA, were not privileged, likely straightforward to review, and directly relevant to the preliminary issue. Their disclosure was ordered as reasonable, proportionate, and necessary. Documents reflecting only MdR's or Harbour's own assessment of the merits were of more marginal, indirect relevance and largely likely to fall under legal advice privilege. A review to isolate the smaller pool of non-privileged material in this category would be time-consuming for limited benefit, so this was excluded from the order. Key Points to Note The judgment is an important reminder of several practical points: However closely a funder is involved in evaluating a claim's merits, litigation privilege will only apply to communications where the sole or dominant purpose of the communication is the conduct of litigation, not the funder's own decision on whether to finance it. Unless that communication separately attracts legal advice privilege, it may need to be disclosed. The same considerations apply to other communications. For example, in RBS Rights Litigation [2017] 1 WLR 3539 the argument that an After the Event (ATE) policy was subject to litigation privilege was rejected on a similar basis. Whilst in this case, there was no dispute as to whether litigation was in contemplation, it is important to note that litigation privilege will not automatically apply to the investigative stages of a claim, i.e. before litigation is in contemplation. Even where litigation is reasonably contemplated, the dominant purpose test must still be satisfied. Material created primarily for fact-finding, risk assessment, or other investigative purposes will not attract litigation privilege unless those activities are actually undertaken for the dominant purpose of conducting the litigation. (See The Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2017] EWHC 1017 (QB)). When engaging a law firm, clients should ensure that they understand whether the firm has previously obtained information about their claim while acting for another party (for example, a funder or another interested party) and how that information will be handled. Any restrictions on the firm’s ability to share relevant information with the client should be explained clearly at the outset, including what information may be withheld and why. If this decision raises questions about your own funding arrangements, disclosure strategy, or privilege position, please get in touch with our Commercial Litigation team.

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State Affordability Infrastructure Districts (SAIDs) — A Financing Tool for Taiwanese Investment in Arizona Science and Technology Parks

If you have developed a facility inside one of Taiwan's science or technology parks, you are accustomed to the one-stop-shop of government planning the park and delivering the roads, water, power, and other infrastructure before your building is even constructed. In the United States, including Arizona, land development generally does not work that way. In Arizona, the cost of infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, power, and the digital backbone, typically falls on the private landowner and is incurred up front before operations generate revenue to offset that cost. For a company entering the Arizona market, this is often the largest and earliest capital burden of the entire project. Arizona recently created a tool that provides a more cost-effective way for landowners and developer to finance some of that infrastructure. House Bill 2999, signed into law June 2026 and codified at Chapter 40 of Title 48 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, establishes the creation of a State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID). How a SAID Works Landowners are now able to use a SAID to finance public infrastructure such as water, sewer, stormwater, roads, parking, lighting, communications, rail sidings and signalization, and similar improvements, through tax-exempt bonds. The bonds are repaid over up to 30 years and secured solely by the property within the SAID. No city, county, or state credit is pledged, and no obligation falls on other taxpayers, and therefore no city, county, or state approval other than from the Arizona Finance Authority (AFA). In effect, a SAID lets you spread the cost of horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of funding it entirely at the outset. And tax-exempt bonds often offer a lower interest rate than taxable or other types of financing. How a SAID is Formed A SAID is formed upon the filing of a petition with the AFA. The petition must include the finance plan, general plan, estimated costs, maximum tax rate, appraisal, bond counsel certificate, consultant list, petitioner experience, legal description, title report, and other materials. While the landowner is required to provide notice to the local governing jurisdiction, local governing jurisdiction does not have the right to approve or deny. The petition is reviewed administratively by the AFA through a standards-based process. For an inbound investor without long-standing local relationships, an objective, criteria-driven process is a meaningful advantage to the overt political process associated with other financing districts in Arizona. Formation requirements. A SAID requires consent from 100% of landowners within the proposed district; public infrastructure costs must exceed $5 million (easily met at any real scale); the district property must all be in the same county and need not be contiguous provided that noncontiguous property is located within five miles of the district's other property; and the board is initially appointed by the forming owners of the SAID district, later transitioning to election as ownership diversifies. Actual bond issuance requires an election of the SAID property owners. Ownership and corporate structure. Consent rights and board seats run with title. If you hold the Arizona land through a U.S. blocker beneath your Taiwan parent, the standard model for Taiwanese/Arizona real estate and operating investment, the U.S. property-holding entity, rather than it’s corporate parent, is the landowner of record for the district. Before formation, our Dorsey team will confirm that you have the proper corporate structure and board mechanics to be compliant.  Board composition has no citizenship or residency requirement. This is a common concern for foreign investors, and the statute answers it cleanly. Under A.R.S. § 48-7004, a director must either hold fee title to real property in the district or be an individual designated or appointed by a fee-title owner. Corporations, partnerships, and other business entities are expressly permitted to be those owners, to vote as owners, and to designate an individual to serve. There is no requirement that a director be a U.S. citizen or resident. So your U.S. property-holding entity, as landowner of record, can appoint whichever of your principals you choose, including a Taiwan-based individual, as the three-member board.  Power infrastructure limitation. The enacted definition of "public infrastructure" in A.R.S. § 48-7001 does not include electrical power generation or transmission. The reference to electrical facilities appears only as components of lighting and traffic-control systems, and the Legislature removed broader energy infrastructure from the definition during the Senate amendments. A SAID will likely not finance the high-load power infrastructure required for semiconductor fabrication, data storage, or heavy manufacturing.  Water infrastructure within a current utility CC&N. Where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the SAID cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility on completion. Entitlements and zoning: The determination of entitlements, zoning, and other land use permitting, as well as construction permitting for a technology or manufacturing facilities remain with the local jurisdiction and run on a separate track. Our Dorsey team will help you coordinate the financing and entitlement timelines together. Our Dorsey team works regularly with Taiwanese and other Asia-Pacific companies entering the Arizona market. If a SAID fits your project, we can structure it for your cross-border ownership.

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Patent Partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic Join Dorsey in Palo Alto

Patent partners Al Araiza and Lena Petrovic have joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Palo Alto, the international law firm announced today. Al Araiza works with clients to develop and implement patent strategies that align with corporate objectives, supporting growth initiatives, financing efforts, and successful exits, including initial public offerings and acquisitions. He advises on building, managing, and optimizing patent portfolios across a broad range of emerging and frontier technologies, with depth in wireless communications, artificial intelligence, and energy innovation. Before practicing law, Al gained engineering experience in the defense industry, working on energy system modeling and communications circuitry design. He also conducted biomedical research, with findings published in peer-reviewed journals. He has been recognized in the IAM Patent 1000 for his work advising clients on patent strategy and portfolio development. Al received his J.D. from Duke University School of Law, his M.E. in Biomedical Engineering from Tulane University, and his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from UCLA. Lena Petrovic works across the software and hardware industries to develop clear, well-supported patent applications. She guides clients through the prosecution process and advises on global trademark and copyright matters, including licensing and portfolio management. Lena regularly supports clients developing technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, fintech, cryptography, interactive and immersive experiences, and digital media, and works with companies in entertainment, gaming, and sports. Before practicing law, Lena spent a decade at Pixar, where she contributed to major films including The Incredibles, Ratatouille, WALL‑E, and Brave. Lena received her J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law, her M.S. in Computer Science from Princeton University, and her B.S. from California Institute of Technology. “Al and Lena bring a practical, technical, and business-focused approach informed by extensive experience working with technology companies, startups, and investors,” said Gina Cornelio, Patent Practice Group Co-Leader. “We are thrilled to welcome them to the Patent team and our growing Palo Alto office.” “Dorsey’s Patent practice is dedicated to understanding each client's business deeply, tailoring patent strategies that directly advance their goals,” said Al Araiza. “We are proud to join this outstanding team and look forward to driving success for our clients.”

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The Long-Awaited Public Infrastructure Financing Solution for Development in Arizona

Every developer who has taken raw Arizona ground to a finished project knows the largest upfront cost other than the land price is almost always the cost to install the public infrastructure. Water, sewer, stormwater, streets, dry utilities, and the fiber backbone all have to be in the ground before a single lot closes or a building opens. That capital is deployed early and generates no return for years. For decades the standard workaround has been the Community Facilities District (CFD). That tool has grown materially harder to use, for reasons cited below, and House Bill 2999, signed in June 2026 and now codified as Chapter 40 of Title 48, is Arizona's response. Some Background I have spent a good part of my career on the other side of this problem. In the 1990s and early 2000s I served as general counsel of SunCor Development Company, one of Arizona's most active master-planned community developers, where we used Community Facilities Districts to finance hundreds of millions of dollars of major infrastructure across Arizona in cities such as Goodyear, Phoenix, Tempe, Litchfield Park, and Prescott Valley. For its time the CFD was an effective structure, and a great deal of what is now on the ground in those communities was financed with this tool. Unfortunately, CFDs have over time become considerably harder to use. Successive legislative amendments have layered on tax-rate ceilings, homebuyer disclosure obligations, and added procedural steps. Another drag on the use of CFDs is that formation of them runs through the municipality, where approval can turn as much on local politics as on the merits of a project. Developers now routinely are asked to absorb delay and uncertainty that a project's economics cannot support, which is a large part of why Arizona has fallen behind Colorado, Texas, and Utah in getting infrastructure financed. A better tool was needed, and Chapter 40 is it. How a SAID Improves on a CFD A State Affordability Infrastructure District (SAID) keeps what worked about the CFD: tax-exempt, property-secured, non-recourse infrastructure financing — while shedding much of what made the CFD cumbersome. Its principal advantages over a traditional CFD: Administrative formation. A SAID is formed by the Arizona Finance Authority against fixed statutory criteria, through a yes-or-no compliance review on a sixty-day clock, rather than through the discretionary approval of a city council or a board of supervisors. Insulation from municipal politics. Because formation is a state-level compliance determination, a meritorious project is far less exposed to local political headwinds than it is under the CFD process. Landowner control of the board. A SAID is governed by a board of the landowners — appointed at formation, then elected on an acreage basis. In a typical municipal CFD, the city council sits as the district board; here, the developer controls governance. Advance funding of impact fees. A SAID can use bond proceeds to advance-pay municipal development impact fees, unlike CFDs, removing one of the largest upfront cash burdens in a project. A uniform, statewide process. The criteria are the same regardless of jurisdiction, replacing the municipality-by-municipality variation that has made CFD outcomes hard to predict. Flexible boundaries. A district may include noncontiguous parcels in the same county within five miles of one another, which fits phased and multi-tract development. Capped cost and a fixed timeline. Authority fees to form a district are capped at $15,000, and a complete petition must be acted on within sixty days. The full range of bonds. A SAID may issue general obligation, special assessment, revenue, and refunding bonds, secured solely by district property and creating no obligation for any other taxpayer. What is a SAID A SAID is a special taxing district that the owners of a development form to finance public infrastructure with tax-exempt bonds: general obligation bonds, special assessment bonds, and revenue bonds. The bonds are secured only by the property inside the district and are repaid over the long term, with terms up to 30 years. They do not affect the credit of the city, the county, or the State, and they create no obligation for any taxpayer outside the district. In practical terms, a SAID lets you finance horizontal infrastructure over the life of the asset instead of writing the check at the front end. The maximum ad valorem rate securing general obligation bonds is capped by statute at $5.00 per $100 of net assessed limited property valuation, with a limited step-up to cover a debt-service shortfall. SAIDs Work for Commercial as Well as Residential Development The SAID bill drew most of its press as a housing-affordability measure, and it appears to be a strong one. It is the first Arizona district statute to let bond proceeds advance-fund municipal development impact fees, which pulls one of the largest upfront cash burdens off a homebuilder's pro forma. But the statute's eligible infrastructure categories apply with equal force to commercial, industrial, and mixed-use projects. An industrial or logistics project can finance roads, rail crossings, sidings, and grade separations. A life-sciences or technology campus can finance its water, sewer, roads, and broadband the same way a subdivision can. Read Chapter 40 as a general-purpose infrastructure finance platform, not a subdivision-only device. How Formation Works A SAID is formed administratively by the Arizona Finance Authority. The Authority reviews the petition for compliance with the statute; it is a yes-or-no review against fixed criteria, not a discretionary negotiation with a city council or a board of supervisors, and it runs on a sixty-day clock once a complete petition is filed. Formation requires the written consent of 100% of the landowners in the proposed district and an engineer's certification that public infrastructure costs will exceed $5 million. The district may include noncontiguous parcels so long as they lie in the same county and within five miles of the district's other property, which accommodates phased and multi-tract development; if any part of the district sits inside a municipality, the whole district must stay within that municipality's limits or planning area. The Authority's fees to form a district are capped at $15,000. Issuing bonds requires a district election. Governance Simplified A SAID is run by a three-member board. The initial directors are named in the petition; after that, directors are elected by the landowners on an acreage basis as ownership diversifies. Board service runs with ownership; a director must either hold fee title inside the district or be an individual designated by a fee-title owner; and corporations, partnerships, and other entities may hold that ownership, vote as owners, and designate the individual who serves. A district has no power of eminent domain and no zoning authority, and directors may not be officials or employees of the municipality in which the district sits. What a SAID Does Not Do It finances; it does not entitle. Zoning, platting, rezonings, use permits, and the specialized approvals a manufacturing or life-sciences facility may need all remain with the local jurisdiction and proceed on their own track. The financing and entitlement timelines should be coordinated with formation of the SAID, but they are separate processes. Two substantive limits are worth flagging at the planning stage. First, electric power is largely outside the tool: the statutory definition of public infrastructure does not reach power generation or transmission, and broader energy infrastructure was removed from the bill during the Senate amendments. A power-intensive user should not assume a SAID will carry its electrical load. Second, where water, sewer, or wastewater facilities fall within a regulated utility's certificated service territory, the district cannot build or own them without the utility's written consent and must convey them to the utility upon completion. Our Take For most master-planned residential work, and for a wide range of commercial and industrial development, a SAID will be the most efficient infrastructure-financing structure Arizona has offered. The right time to evaluate it is early in the acquisition and pre-development process, while the capital stack, the development agreement, and the entitlement strategy are still being set. Once the district's boundaries, general plan, and financing parameters are set, it is cumbersome at best to bring those into conformance later. Our Dorsey team has begun advising our developer clients on SAID formation on residential, commercial, and industrial projects statewide. If you would like us to assess whether a SAID fits a project you are working on, please reach out.

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37 Dorsey Attorneys Named 2026 Top Lawyers by Minnesota Monthly

Minnesota Monthly has recognized 37 Dorsey attorneys across 27 practice areas as 2026 Top Lawyers in Minnesota. Honorees are selected through a peer nomination process and a curated survey of practicing attorneys in Minnesota, who identify leading lawyers across a range of practice areas. Administrative / Regulatory Law Jennifer Coates Antitrust Law Michael Lindsay Banking & Financial Service Law Peter Nelson Copyright Law  Jeffrey Cadwell Corporate Law  Robert Hensley Robert Rosenbaum Criminal Defense: White-Collar  Beth Forsythe Edward Magarian RJ Zayed Health Care Law  Claire Topp Immigration Law  J. Mike Sevilla Insurance Law  Daniel Brown Intellectual Property and Patent Law  Stuart Hemphill International Trade Law  Jonathan Van Horn Labor and Employment Law  Edward Magarian Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Land Use & Zoning  Jay Lindgren Marcus Mollison Litigation – Antitrust  Michael Lindsay F. Matthew Ralph Jaime Stilson Litigation – Commercial  Michael Lindsay Litigation – Construction  Eric Ruzicka Litigation – Intellectual Property  Peter Lancaster RJ Zayed Litigation – Labor Employment Benefits  Ryan Mick Melissa Raphan Litigation – Trusts and Estates  William J. Berens Theresa Bevilacqua Bridget Logstrom Koci Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions  James K. Langdon Mergers & Acquisitions Law  Keith Ahlgren Rachel Benedict Brian Burke Morgan Helme John Jorgenson Brian Moore Robert Rosenbaum Jonathan Van Horn Bri Whiting Municipal Law Jay Lindgren Nonprofit/Charities Law Claire Topp Securities / Capital Markets Law Cam Hoang Robert Rosenbaum Securities Regulation Theresa Bevilacqua James K. Langdon Tax Law William J. Berens Trusts and Estates Jennifer Ede Bridget Logstrom Koci Sonny Miller Kiley Petty Henry

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Real Estate Attorney Alexis Olsen Joins Dorsey in Phoenix

Attorney Alexis Olsen has joined Dorsey & Whitney LLP as Of Counsel in the Real Estate group in Phoenix, the law firm announced today. Alexis focuses her practice on large-scale residential, mixed-use, and multi-asset development projects as well as multi-state commercial leasing transactions. She guides clients through sophisticated acquisitions, dispositions, leasing, entity structuring, investment strategies, and due diligence matters. She has structured co-investment arrangements that drive capital deployment into housing subdivisions nationwide and has represented both landlords and tenants in commercial leasing transactions involving office, retail, industrial, and specialty-use properties, including cannabis dispensaries. Alexis received her J.D. from Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law and her B.A. from the University of Arizona. Alexis comes to Dorsey from Squire Patton Boggs. “Alexis strengthens Dorsey’s real estate capabilities at a time when Phoenix remains one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic real estate markets in the country,” said Scott Jenkins, Dorsey’s Phoenix office head. “Her addition further enhances our deep bench of 12 real estate attorneys in Phoenix and reflects our continued investment in serving clients throughout Arizona and supporting their real estate transactions and objectives across the country. We are thrilled to welcome Alexis to Dorsey.” “Joining a firm with such a deep bench of experienced attorneys in the Phoenix office, especially in the Real Estate group, presents an exciting opportunity not just for my own professional growth, but for the clients we service,” said Alexis Olsen. “I look forward to building on this strong foundation, growing our national practice, and delivering top-tier service to our clients.”

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Proposed CMS Rule Ramps Up Potential Medicare Fraud Administrative Remedies

On July 6, 2026, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed a rule that would expand its administrative remedies to combat potential fraud. The proposed rule is the latest in a round of administrative actions that signal CMS’s intent to aggressively pursue allegations of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and heighten the risk of fraud enforcement against even well-intentioned Medicare and Medicaid providers and suppliers. The proposed rule includes several changes to regulations that govern Medicare billing privileges. Providers and suppliers should be aware that these changes dramatically expand the flexibility afforded to CMS in enrollment and revocation actions, potentially leading to harsh consequences for ministerial and administrative errors. If finalized, moreover, the proposed rule could have material implications for providers and suppliers facing threatened revocation, including heightened risk of overpayment liability and increased hurdles to challenging revocations and denials of enrollment. Added Flexibility to Existing Revocation Grounds CMS has proposed to remove a number of factors that the regulations list as relevant to a determination of whether a provider has engaged in “abuse of billing privileges.” While acknowledging that the inclusion of these factors in the regulations was permissive (requiring consideration only where “as appropriate or applicable”), CMS stated that it must be afforded “the maximum flexibility to address all possible . . . scenarios without the rigid constraints of our existing factors.” CMS provided little guidance as to the outer bounds of what conduct could constitute an “abuse of privileges” that merits revocation of Medicare billing privileges. Instead, CMS noted that a “pattern of practice” of abuse of billing privileges might be established “by a simple finding that several of a provider’s claims do not meet Medicare requirements.” Similarly, CMS has proposed to expand the regulatory provision that permits revocation of enrollment if a provider certifies as “true” false or misleading information in Medicare enrollment application or renewal forms to include any scenario in which a provider submits “false or misleading information on or associated with any CMS Medicare enrollment-related form,” including materials submitted to Medicare contractors. CMS stated that it interprets this expanded rule to include anything related to Medicare enrollment, and not only those submissions that are “intended to gain or maintain Medicare enrollment.” If finalized, the proposed rule would add significant flexibility to CMS’s ability to pursue revocation of a provider’s enrollment. While CMS has assured providers that it would “invoke [the revised regulations]. . . only when legitimately warranted under the facts and circumstances and not as a matter of course,” such expanded flexibility threatens unpredictability in the event of even administrative or ministerial errors in submissions and claims. These changes would, moreover, make it more difficult for providers to challenge a revocation action. Expanded Revocation Grounds In addition to adding flexibility to existing grounds for revocation, CMS’s proposed rule adds to and expands CMS’s already broad authority to revoke provider and supplier enrollment. Such proposed changes include adding the following grounds for revocation: Denial of Enrollment Application. Where CMS could previously revoke a provider’s other enrollments if one enrollment is revoked, CMS would also be able to revoke a provider’s existing enrollments if an application for enrollment submitted by the provider is denied. High-Risk Enrollments. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if it determines the provider or supplier (including owning/managing employees or organizations) poses a high risk of fraud, waste, or abuse due to “. . . an affiliation under [42 C.F.R.] § 424.519” or “the provider’s or supplier’s location within a limited geographic area that has an excessive number of providers and suppliers.” Certain Misdemeanor Convictions. CMS would be able to revoke enrollment if a provider or supplier—or its owners, managing employees, managing organizations, officers, or directors—are convicted of a “misdemeanor related to sexual assault or financial misconduct within the past 10 years that CMS deems detrimental to the best interests of the Medicare program and its beneficiaries.” Ownership Changes (HHA, Hospice, DMEPOS). CMS would have broad authority to revoke enrollment of home health agencies, hospices, and DMEPOS suppliers who do not comply with the regulations governing provider changes of ownership. These proposed, expanded grounds for revocation are notably broad, and CMS provides only limited guidance as to what conduct might result in revocation under these grounds. As with the proposed expansion of existing grounds for revocation, the open-ended nature of these proposed grounds for revocation may make it more difficult for providers and suppliers to challenge revocation actions. Expanded Grounds to Deny Medicare Enrollment As with revocations, CMS proposes to expand the grounds under which a provider’s application to enroll in Medicare can be denied. These expanded and additional grounds include many of the grounds added for revocations, but also include: Medicare Debt or Payment Suspension. CMS proposes expanding the ground to deny enrollment based on Medicare debt or payment suspension to include a provider or supplier’s “managing employee, managing organization, or individual or entity with any other form of business or financial relationship with the provider or supplier[.]” Significantly, this expansive definition (called an “associated party” under the proposed regulation) currently contains no material limitations, meaning almost any person or entity with whom an applicant does business could create denial liability. Sharing Locations with Denied/Revoked Providers or Suppliers. CMS would have authority to deny applications where a “provider’s or supplier’s practice location is in the same suite or office as another provider or supplier whose Medicare enrollment has been revoked or denied.” Hospices with Distant Medical Directors or Administrators. CMS would have discretion to deny hospice applications if the hospice’s medical director or administrator serves “multiple other hospices” or practices/is located “at such a distance (for example, in a different state) from the enrolling hospice that the medical director cannot realistically perform all medical director functions,” with a similar provision for administrators. In addition, CMS proposes applications denied for “other program termination or suspension,” may be applied to the provider or supplier in its own name or NPI or that of its owners, managing employees, or managing organization regardless of whether any appeals are pending. Retroactive Revocation CMS proposed to restructure and expand the regulatory grounds for retroactive revocation of billing privileges. Currently, Medicare regulations provide that revocations are, by default, prospective in nature: effective 30 days after CMS or the CMS contractor mails notice to the provider. Under certain circumstances, the regulations provide for revocations to be retroactive, such as when a provider is convicted of a felony, the date a professional license is suspended, revoked, or surrendered, or when a provider submits a false certification in their enrollment application. CMS has proposed to reframe the rule so as to default to retroactive revocation of billing privileges. CMS expressed concern that providers may collect payment from Medicare while remaining so non-compliant with enrollment requirements as to merit revocation. To address this concern, CMS proposed that all revocations be retroactive to the date of determined non-compliance.[1] As a result, providers suspected of misconduct or non-compliance are likely to face claims of retroactive overpayments in addition to the immediate concern no longer receiving Medicare payments while their enrollment is revoked. Reapplication Bar CMS’s proposed rule expands the grounds from which a provider may be prohibited from seeking reapplication as a Medicare provider. Under current regulations, CMS may prohibit prospective providers from enrolling in Medicare for up to 10 years if its enrollment application is denied because the applicant submitted false or misleading information in its application. Under the proposed rule, CMS will have the discretion to prohibit a provider from enrolling in Medicare if their enrollment application is denied for any reason. Conclusion As a part of the federal government’s increasingly aggressive push to combat real or perceived healthcare fraud, the proposed rule both broadens CMS’s authority to revoke and deny Medicare enrollment and raises the stakes for revocation and denial. What the proposed rule does not share is how CMS plans to exercise this expanded discretion: as a result, the proposed rule, if enacted, increases the unpredictability and potential ramifications of even technical noncompliance with CMS rules. As a result, Medicare providers should keep a close eye on potential revisions to these rules and their potential implementation and consider proactively evaluating their compliance under CMS standards. [1] In the proposed rule, CMS identifies, with respect to each ground for revocation, what it will consider to be the effective date of revocation.

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Dorsey Partner Melissa Raphan Elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers

International law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP is pleased to announce that Partner Melissa Raphan has been elected a Fellow of the College of Labor & Employment Lawyers (CLEL) as part of its 2026 class. “Melissa’s election to this prestigious fellowship comes as no surprise to those of us who have had the privilege of working with her,” says Peter Nelson, Dorsey’s Managing Partner.  “She is an exceptional employment lawyer, a trusted advisor, and a leader whose impact extends far beyond her matters. Clients rely on her deep knowledge, strategic counsel, and ability to navigate complex workplace disputes and sensitive employment matters with both confidence and compassion. She has helped shape our firm, strengthen our profession, and opened doors for countless others through her commitment to mentorship and diversity. We are incredibly proud of her accomplishments and delighted to see her receive this recognition.” CLEL is a nonprofit professional association that honors the nation’s leading attorneys in the field of labor and employment law. Originally established to recognize excellence in the profession, CLEL has evolved into a respected intellectual and practical resource for the legal community and its many audiences. Its mission centers on recognizing individuals who have made significant contributions to the field, fostering the exchange of knowledge and delivering value to academia, government, the judiciary, and the broader public. Election as a fellow represents the highest level of peer acknowledgment, reflecting sustained achievement, integrity, and a commitment to advancing the profession. Melissa’s career reflects CLEL’s mission. She has been recognized both regionally and nationally for her advocacy, leadership, and achievements both inside and outside of the courtroom. Her employment litigation experience spans class actions, collective actions, and high-stakes individual disputes in state and federal courts, as well as arbitration forums including the American Arbitration Association and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). She is also a trusted advisor on a full range of workplace issues, from hiring and performance management to sensitive terminations and organizational change. She brings decades of experience representing clients across the financial services, healthcare, food and agriculture, and energy sectors. Melissa will be formally inducted during CLEL’s installation ceremony held in conjunction with the American Bar Association’s Labor & Employment Law Conference in Washington, D.C., on November 7.

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Alaska HB 126: What Changes for Alaska Native Corporations, Proxy Filings, and Annual Reports

Alaska House Bill 126 (HB 126), sponsored by Representative Neal Foster and passed by the 34th Alaska Legislature, is now law. The bill changes which Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) must file proxy and annual report materials with the State of Alaska, and makes it easier to reinstate certain dissolved Village Corporations. For many smaller Village Corporations, the practical result is less public disclosure. For shareholders, advisors, and the public, it means some financial information that used to be available through the State will no longer be readily obtained. This eUpdate explains what HB 126 does in plain terms, walks through the practical trade-offs, and answers common questions. 1. What HB 126 Changes The old rule Under prior law (Alaska Statutes Sec. 45.55.139), an Alaska Native Corporation had to file its annual report, proxies, and proxy statements with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities (the Division) if it had more than $1 million in assets and 500 or more shareholders on its current rolls. A filing ANC was also required to follow the Division’s proxy rules (3 AAC 08.305 through .365), which require specific disclosures such as top 5 executive compensation, and related-party transactions. Because these filings are treated as public records, they gave non-shareholders, including the public and the press, visibility into ANC financial information that is not filed with the SEC. The new rule HB 126 changes how the 500-shareholder test is measured. Now, the asset test is removed, and the shareholder count is based on how many shareholders the corporation originally enrolled when it was formed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), not how many it has today. As shares have passed down through families over the decades, some Village Corporations that started with fewer than 500 shareholders now have more than 500 recordholders. Under the old current-count test, when those corporations had crossed the threshold, they had to file. Under the new original-enrollment test, they do not. Who is affected Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders are the main beneficiaries. They no longer have to file proxy and annual report materials with the Division or follow the Division’s proxy regulations at 3 AAC 08.305 through .365. Two groups must continue to file as before: all twelve ANCSA Regional Corporations, each of which enrolled more than 500 shareholders at creation, and all Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders. As reported by the Alaska Beacon, when the bill was under consideration, the Division identified 59 corporations then filing, expected at least seven village corporations to become exempt, and was reviewing roughly 30 more. 2. Practical Analysis HB 126 reduces a real compliance burden for smaller Village Corporations, which now need not spend time and money on State filings. In coming years, the exempt Village Corporations may experience benefits associated with less public disclosure and less regulation. But at the same time, less public disclosure carries trade-offs. Benchmarking will become harder Publicly-filed proxy statements and annual reports have long served as a reference set. Shareholders, corporations, advisors, and counsel use them to compare governance practices, compensation, and financial results across similarly-situated ANCs. Since fewer of these materials will be filed publicly, there will be fewer comparable documents available, which will make benchmarking and market-checking more difficult for like-sized ANCs over time. Executive compensation transparency may be reduced The Division’s proxy rules require disclosure of the compensation of ANC’s top five most highly compensated individuals (3 AAC 08.345(b)(2)), related-party transactions above $20,000 (3 AAC 08.345(b)(3)), and audited financial statements and management’s discussion and analysis (3 AAC 08.365). When a corporation is no longer required to file these disclosures publicly, it becomes harder for shareholders and others to obtain the information, to understand how compensation is set for their corporate leadership, and how it compares across corporations of similar size and complexity. Transparency may matter more as ANCs grow Some ANCs have grown into large, complex enterprises with substantial revenue and many subsidiaries, even with fewer than 500 shareholders. For an ANC with a broad and dispersed shareholder base, public materials can be an important way for shareholders and other stakeholders to understand governance, compensation, and performance across ANCs. Reduced disclosure may carry more practical weight in those settings than for a small corporation whose shareholders are closely connected to the business. The ANCSA annual report obligation continues It is important not to overstate what HB 126 does. HB 126 changes the state filing proxy requirements. It does not remove the separate obligation under ANCSA itself. That obligation comes from ANCSA at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c), which requires a Native Corporation that would otherwise be subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prepare and transmit to its shareholders an annual report containing substantially the information a company subject to that Act would include. Similarly, ANCs that solicit proxies for an annual meeting are still required to furnish shareholders with those proxy materials under general Alaska corporate law. However, ANCs are now no longer required to transmit proxy statements to the State. ANCs’ reporting obligations to their shareholders are unaffected by HB 126. Any corporation newly exempt from state filing still owes its shareholders a detailed annual report and a proxy statement, even though that report is no longer routed through the State and made public. Reinstatement of dissolved Village Corporations Separately, HB 126 amends AS 10.06.960(k) to remove the prior deadline (previously December 31, 2020) for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. A dissolved Village Corporation may now apply to be reinstated under AS 10.06.633(e) at any time. Reinstatement still runs through the commissioner under AS 10.06.633(e). In general, that means the ANC must apply, cure the neglect or delinquency that led to dissolution, and pay the amounts owed, and the corporation’s name must be available or be changed to one that is. Once reinstated, the corporation and its shareholders are restored to the rights, privileges, liabilities, and obligations they would have had as if the dissolution had never occurred, and corporate and shareholder actions taken during the dissolution are treated as valid. If the previously-used corporate name is no longer available, the board alone may amend the articles to adopt a new name (without the necessity for shareholder approval). 3. Frequently Asked Questions What does HB 126 do? It changes how Alaska measures the 500-shareholder test that decides which ANCs must file proxy and annual report materials with the state. It removes the asset test, and it counts shareholders based on original enrollment rather than the current rolls. It also removes the deadline for reinstating an involuntarily dissolved Native Village Corporation. Which ANCs are affected? Village Corporations that originally enrolled fewer than 500 shareholders, because they may no longer need to file with the Division. Regional Corporations and Village Corporations that originally enrolled 500 or more shareholders must continue to file as before. Does HB 126 eliminate all reporting obligations? No. It changes the state filing requirement under AS 45.55.139, but it does not remove the separate ANCSA obligation (43 U.S.C. Sec. 1625(c)) to provide shareholders with an annual report, and general corporate law still calls for a proxy statement when the ANC solicits proxies. Corporations that remain subject to state filing requirements must also continue to comply with the Division's rules. We think we are now exempt. What should our ANC board and management consider? Confirm your ANC’s original enrollment number and whether your corporation falls below the new threshold. Watch for communications from the State on this topic as they proceed with their research. If your ANC is now exempt, decide how your corporation will meet its continuing ANCSA obligation to shareholders, review proxy and annual meeting materials and timelines, and consider what to communicate to shareholders about any change in how they will receive information. It is worth documenting the basis for any exemption. What should ANC shareholders watch for? Shareholders should watch for how and when they will continue to receive annual report and proxy statement information directly from their ANC, since some material that used to be available through the State’s online website will no longer be publicly filed. If something is unclear, shareholders can ask their ANC how it intends to meet its ANCSA reporting obligations. How Dorsey Can Help HB 126 lightens the State filing load for smaller Village Corporations, but it also raises practical questions: confirming who is exempt, meeting continuing ANCSA obligations to shareholders, keeping proxy and annual meeting processes on track, and maintaining benchmarking when public materials become less available. These are exactly the kinds of judgment calls that benefit from early planning. Dorsey’s attorneys work closely with Alaska Native Corporations and related stakeholders. If you have questions about HB 126, ANC governance, proxy filings, annual reports, disclosure obligations, or shareholder communications, please contact your Dorsey attorney, including the authors of this eUpdate.